Handbook of SOCIAL INTERVENTION

edited by

EDWARD SEIDMAN

This unprecedented handbook offers a critical appraisal and overview of social and community interventions, integrating various disciplinary perspectives—it will serve as a major building block for future advances in planned social change. Nationally recognized social scientists aim to:

- describe the nature, status, and appraisal of planned and unplanned social change;
- review the history of social change efforts;
- discuss conceptual models, strategies and tactics of social intervention;
- explain and analyze relevant strategies for research design, assessment, and measurement; and
- clarify training and other important issues related to social intervention.

The authors explore concerns shared by anyone—in any setting—who conducts or assesses an intervention, as well as interventions in a wide array of specific settings. Together, their original essays constitute an invaluable resource for policymakers, as well as for professionals, researchers, and students interested in applied research . . . in such areas as education, criminology, economics, urban planning, evaluation, community mental health, and the human services.

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To my parents, Goldie and Harry Seidman, who in innumerable ways, including many they never realized or even imagined, cultivated in me a deep and abiding concern for both the understanding and facilitation of human and social betterment.

Contents

Preface 9

Introduction

EDWARD SEIDMAN 11

PART I: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND VALUE PERSPECTIVES 19

1. Historical Considerations: *Human Services, Natural Networks, and Public Policy*
CLARKE A. CHAMBERS 21

2. Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Social and Community Change
MAGOROH MARUYAMA 33

3. Unexamined Premises of Social Problem Solving
EDWARD SEIDMAN 48

PART II: RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 69

4. Design Issues in Community Intervention Research
ROBERT F. BORUCH and WILLIAM R. SHADISH, Jr. 73

5. Research Modes in Social and Community Change
WILLIAM S. DAVIDSON, ROBIN REDNER, and JOHN A. SAUL 99

6. Quantitative Indicators of Community Change
THOMAS I. MILLER and GENE V GLASS 119

7. Assessing and Improving Social-Ecological Settings
RUDOLF H. MOOS and SONNE LEMKE 143

8. Beyond Experimentation: *New Methods for a New Age*
IAN I. MITROFF 163

PART III: STRATEGIES 179

9. Law and Social Change
ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE and STUART S. NAGEL 187

10. Social Policymaking as Strategic Intervention
RICHARD F. ELMORE 212

11. Organizing for Social Justice
JAMES CROWFOOT, MARK A. CHESLER, and JACQUES BOULET 237

12. The Mass Media and Social Change
GEORGE COMSTOCK 268

13. Theory in Use Among Change Agents
GERALD ZALTMAN 289

PART IV: EDUCATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 313

14. Educational Intervention
ERNEST R. HOUSE and SANDRA MATHISON 323

15. Interventions with Special Needs Children and Adults
M. STEPHEN LILLY 339

16. Where Juvenile Justice Meets Social Service: *Social Intervention with Troubled Youth*
MALCOLM W. KLEIN 362

17. Criminal Justice System Interventions
RONALD ROESCH and RAYMOND CORRADO 385

18. Two Decades of Reform in the Mental Health System (1963-1983)
RICHARD H. PRICE and SALLIE S. SMITH 408

19. Social Interventions with Older Adults
A. E. BENJAMIN, Jr., and CARROLL ESTES 438

20. Government and Families as Interacting Systems: *Outputs, Inputs, and Outcomes*
SHIRLEY L. ZIMMERMAN 455

PART V: ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 473

21. Income Transfer Policy in the United States: *A Review and Assessment*
IRWIN GARFINKEL and ROBERT H. HAVEMAN 479

22. The Workplace: *Employment and Business Interventions*
HENRY M. LEVIN 499

23. The Grassroots Response to Government Housing Interventions
LEONARD F. HEUMANN 522

24. Interventions to Reduce Environmental Stress: *Enhancing Social Support and Personal Control*
CHARLES J. HOLAHAN 542

25. Consumer Energy Conservation Programs
MARVIN E. OLSEN and BERNWARD JOERGES 561

26. Community Leisure Studies: *A Holistic Perspective*
JAMES F. MURPHY 592

PART VI: TRAINING ISSUES AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS 613

27. Training for Social and Community Change
JOHN B. DOYLE, BRIAN L. WILCOX, and N. DICKON REPPUCCI 615

28. Reflections on the Uncertain Future of Social and Community Life
KENNETH E. BOULDING 639

Author Index 653

Subject Index 667

About the Contributors 677

Preface

While interest in social and community intervention has expanded dramatically in the last several decades, a number of areas have yet to receive thorough and intensive scrutiny, and as a group, they have not been brought together in a single source. An integration, overview, and critical appraisal of this nature by recognized experts is a felt need for graduate students and professionals in a variety of disciplines, as well as by legislators and social policymakers interested in planning and developing current and future social programs and policies. Meeting these needs is precisely the objective of the *Handbook of Social Intervention.* The *Handbook* is addressed to both students and professionals and should serve as a valuable resource volume for courses related to planned social change and policy. These courses come under a wide array of disciplines and professions—anthropology, economics, education, law, political science, psychology, psychiatry, social policy programs and institutes, sociology, social work, and urban planning.

Let me briefly trace several of the personally relevant strands that lead to this volume's creation and development. As a clinical psychologist I quickly found myself gravitating to the area of marital and family theory, research, and treatment. The dominant ecological systems theory framework of this area, and the practice of family therapy itself, highlighted the complex process of problem formation and solution. Simple explanations were inadequate. One could see that problems did not lie within individuals, but were multiply determined, dynamic and of a relational nature. Consequently, solutions needed to possess similar attributes.

The nature of these experiences and understandings in family therapy allowed me to make a smooth transition to the area of community psychology. In social and community research and action I quickly found myself at the boundaries of psychology and other disciplines. Much of this occurred in conjunction with graduate students with whom I collaborated on a wide array of social/community intervention projects. We delighted in the clash of perspectives; somehow, we knew that at the juncture of disciplines much was to be learned. Consequently, I advised and followed the paths of my graduate students as they made their education increasingly multidisciplinary. Yet we continued to find that different disciplines infrequently communicated with each other, in person or formally through scientific and professional periodicals. The difficulty of becoming informed, without great effort, by these divergent perspectives and knowledge bases continued to be frustrating.

Then, one sunny spring afternoon several years ago, Dick Cosme and I were chatting. He asked if I had ever thought about doing a handbook. Almost instantly, a well-formed vision appeared: the *Handbook of Social Intervention.* Little did I realize at the time, the long haul ahead.

Several colleagues, friends, and past and present graduate students provided me with a great deal of support, encouragement, and enthusiasm when this project was

only a seedling. Without their confidence and excitement, this project would have never come to fruition. Their opinions, individually and collectively, were particularly salient because I have always had ultimate respect for their wisdom, judgment, and scholarship. These individuals include Rick Price, Dick Reppucci, Jean Ann Linney, Thom Moore, Ron Roesch, Bill Davidson, Fern Chertok, and Ken Maton.

I am particularly indebted to Julian Rappaport, not only for the encouragement and excitement he too expressed about the project at its outset, but because of the well-considered advice and counsel he gave me regarding the *Handbook* on a number of occasions. Furthermore, since adolescence he has continually conveyed an unlimited sense of personal and intellectual respect for me and my capabilities. Without his respect, encouragement, and support, I would undoubtedly not be editing this volume.

My secretary, Sharon Medlock, has what I have come to believe to be an unnatural ability to be pleasant and smile, regardless of the unreasonable and inconsiderate demands and expectations placed on her. And she somehow meets these demands and expectations time after time. In the rare instance when she was unable to, Marsha Healy came to our rescue.

I greatly appreciated Todd and Nicole's tolerance during a six-week period when I was indeed an absentee father. Evie was not only tolerant of an absentee husband, but supportive as always. My family has continually provided me with a facilitative and nurturant context on which to thrive.

Lest I not forget, Tom Reischl hoped to be mentioned in this volume for giving me a "pep" talk late one night when I was approaching another unrealistic, self-imposed deadline.

—*E. S.*

Introduction

Edward Seidman

NEED AND PURPOSE

Questions regarding the nature and quality of social and community life have preoccupied the thoughts, discussions, and writings of women and men—be they business- or craftspersons, farmers, homemakers, novelists, philosophers, secretaries, or scholars—since time immemorial. We have searched not only for meaning and understanding, but for methods of change and advancement as well.

In Western societies, and in the United States in particular, the basic needs of the masses for food and shelter have been satisfied. As a result, governments and some private interests have increasingly directed their attention toward improving human and social welfare. During the last several decades we have witnessed a burgeoning number of life domains for which change has been planned and sometimes implemented (e.g., education, mental health, criminal justice, employment, and the environment). Intervention has been planned primarily by those in positions of power and influence and occasionally by those with deep social and moral commitment. Planning has often been based on philosophical or political outlook. At times, the "wisdom of the day" has been brought to bear in the creation and implementation of solutions. In recent years the amount of observation, study, and analysis regarding these solutions and their impact has rapidly multiplied. The results of these analyses and investigations are increasingly found in professional and scientific periodicals. Unfortunately, many of these outlets have strong disciplinary leanings. Consequently, they focus on problems unique to particular life domains (e.g., education, aging, energy), are investigated primarily by a particular group of scientists or professionals, and are likely to be consumed by the same disciplinary group. Little cross-fertilization occurs. Thus lessons to be learned—by legislators, policy planners, and relevant scientific disciplines and professions—are lost, and social progress inhibited.

Disciplinary boundaries are arbitrary ways of slicing up human and social existence and its alteration. While these arbitrary divisions serve useful purposes, functionally these boundaries tend to constrain knowledge development. It is contended that new knowledge is maximized at the interface of different disciplines and divergent perspectives. Consequently, this volume provides in a single source an integration, overview, and critical appraisal of a diverse array of social and community interventions.

Taking stock of the nature, status, and efficacy of a wide array of social interventions is timely given the current sociopolitical *zeitgeist*, which has cast social intervention into disrepute. It is hoped that this volume will provide a valid, as opposed to "knee-jerk," assessment of social intervention, and will facilitate its future development into more fruitful and socially beneficial directions.

More specifically, the aims of the *Handbook of Social Intervention* are (1) to portray the current nature, status, and appraisal of planned and unplanned social and

community change (thus an intensive and critical analysis of the literature spanning a broad array of psychological, social, educational, economic, and environmental programs and policies is presented); (2) to review the history of social change efforts, as well as to describe and discuss the conceptual models, strategies, and tactics of social intervention; (3) to explicate and analyze research design, assessment, and measurement issues as they pertain to social and community interventions; and (4) to explore several other related social intervention issues (e.g., training).

DEFINITION AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

Before proceeding, let us define several concepts that are both fundamental to, and recurrent throughout this volume. Foremost among these is social intervention itself. *Social intervention* is used to refer to an alteration of intrasocietal relationships, planned and unplanned (or "natural"), intended and unintended. The effect is *social change*. Intrasocietal relationships exist among individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions. Attention in this volume will be directed not toward relationships among individuals or between an individual and more complex units of social organization, but instead toward aggregates of individuals and complex units of social organization or among several complex levels of social organization. In addition to affecting such intrasocietal relationships, social intervention may also have an impact on the overall quality of life in society or on the circumstances of large numbers of individuals and/or groups. These effects occur as a result of the operation of several key processes and their interrelationships. These key processes are the (1) "distribution of rights to resources, goals, and services," (2) "development of life-sustaining and life-enhancing, material and symbolic resources, goods and services," and (3) "allocation of statuses within the totality of societal tasks and functions, involving roles and perogatives" (Gil, 1973: 25).

Social intervention, as hinted at above, has wide latitude. It includes private as well as public intervention, as well as economic and environmental issues because they too are intrinsically social. Though social intervention interacts and is interdependent with foreign intervention and relationships, they are nevertheless arbitrarily excluded from our focus of concern. While some attention is directed toward understanding natural, and thus unplanned, change, or relating passive social intervention and change, a greater emphasis is placed on the appraisal of intentional social intervention. The outcomes of interest are those unintended as well as those intended, however.

Planned social intervention most often takes the form of a social policy. *Social policy* is a plan, guideline, or principle for a course of action. Social policies are most often conceptualized from a "top-down" perspective. However, as we shall see, they occasionally emanate from the "bottom up." Top-down policies are generated both in the public (i.e., governmental) and private domains. Bottom-up policies are generated by those in the arena in which the effects occur. Thus, from this perspective both front-line workers (e.g., teachers and service deliverers) and the recipients of the programs help to create policy.

Programs and projects are both operationalizations of particular social policies; they differ in magnitude, however. A *program* refers to the actual implementation of a policy across multiple sites, and perhaps, time. A *project* refers to the actual implementation of a policy in a single time and setting. Policies, programs, and projects are all forms of social intervention.

THEMATIC CONTINUITIES

There are several themes, issues, and concerns that occur repeatedly throughout many of the different chapters and parts of this volume. These themes are of central importance to those interested in the understanding and successful implementation of social change. These general themes are highlighted below.

The *nature of the social world* portrayed throughout this volume is turbulent and complex. It contains multiple forces and pressures (social, political, and economic). It is a dynamic and constantly changing world. Many things are interdependent, and consequently, causality can only be conceptualized in a mutual and reciprocal fashion.

There are a variety of actors with divergent values, perspectives, cultural backgrounds, roles, positions, and vested interests. These different actors will often be referred to as *stakeholders*. Each stakeholder comes fully equipped with a particular pattern of reasoning and thought that in many ways is a function of his or her cultural background. This has been referred to as a *mindscape* (see Chapter 2). It provides a particular world view and is similar to Berger and Luckmann's (1966) concept of the *social construction of reality*.

As the reader will see, the dominant mindscape in this society has been historically imbued with the *premise of individualism*. Thus if one is unsuccessful, he or she is personally responsible; institutional and systemic causes, or for that matter, the interaction of person and institutional factors, are functionally given only lip service. There are numerous other components of our dominant cultural mindscape (see Chapters 2 and 3), but individualism is the one consistently articulated component throughout the chapters of this volume. Not surprisingly, the dominant cultural mindscape generally, and the underlying premise of individualism in particular, dictate and constrain the nature and form of many of our social interventions and policies.

There is a wide array of strategies and loci of intervention, as will be discerned from the chapters in Parts III, IV, and V of this volume. There are clearly multiple pathways to change. However, top-down strategies seem to prevail. This leads to the prevalence of inappropriately applying *uniform solutions* to *particularistic problems and circumstances*. This is, in part, a function of our dominant cultural mindscape, which seeks simple and easy answers to complex problems.

Discerning the efficacy of our past and current interventions is problematic on several grounds. First, social intervention research, until quite recently, has not been a domain of major scientific curiosity and inquiry, in part, because of its turbulent nature and complexity. Second, and for similar reasons, extant scientific conceptual models, tools, and methods have been too simplistic to match adequately the requisite demands of this inherently ecological and evolutionary arena. Obviously, better models, methods, and tools are necessary. The assessment of unintended as well as intended effects needs to be given greater priority and attention (see Part II for a fuller discussion of these issues).

A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING SOCIAL INTERVENTION

We now turn to a heuristic framework for the consideration of social intervention. It is hoped that this will facilitate one's understanding and ability to integrate subsequent chapters and parts of this volume.

Given the previous depiction of the world of social intervention, a useful framework must provide for its complexity, ever-changing temporal nature, and interde-

pendence. Consequently, a general systems theory or ecological-transactional framework is needed. Not only have I taken the liberty of loosely lumping these two models together, but I also borrow liberally from and integrate freely, and with some distortion, the frameworks of Bronfenbrenner (1979) and Goodwin (1973). Bronfenbrenner's framework has the advantage of looking out at the system as if from the individual organism's perspective. Goodwin's framework provides a better grasp of the "big picture" of the social intervention arena.

Our social ecology is composed of a variety of systems and subsystems. We can view the system beginning from the level of the *individual organism*. A human organism is embedded within a number of social systems. The organism has direct commerce with several systems, and indirect relationships with others.

An individual has direct contact of some form with a variety of *microsystems*. These microsystems are often the family, peers, work, school, religion, and recreation. "A microsystem is a pattern of activities, roles and interpersonal relations experienced by the developing person in a given setting with particular physical and material characteristics" (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 22).

Together, a group or groups of organisms and particular microsystems constitute the *recipient system* for specific social policies and programs. These individuals and their relevant microsystem(s) are literally the beneficiaries (or victims) of specific social interventions. For example, children and schools are the targeted recipient system of educational policies.

"An *exosystem* refers to one or more settings that do not involve the developing person, as an active participant, but in which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what happens in the setting containing the developing person" (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 25). There are a wide array of exosystems that have an impact on human and social welfare, though an individual never has direct contact with that exosystem. However, we will concern ourselves with only two particular kinds of exosystems: donor and administrative.

Donor exosystems are composed of legislative, judicial, and executive subsystems in the governmental arena, occasionally private philanthropic organizations, or also in the private sector, boards of directors of business and human service corporations. The varied donor exosystems make plans and establish policy regarding the well-being of recipient systems, though they usually have no direct contact.

Administrative exosystems are composed of persons charged with overall responsibility for administering the various programs that will presumably solve the "problem"' (Goodwin, 1973: 87). In addition to donor and administrative exosystems, other important exosystems might include the economic or political structure.

Interacting with both the administrative exosystem and the recipient system in the arena of social intervention is the critical *delivery system*. The delivery system "consists of people who interact with recipients and actually provide, under the guidelines of the administrative system, the services mandated by the donor system" (Goodwin, 1973: 87). Delivery system personnel include teachers, social workers, and police officers. They are the front-line workers and have been referred to as "street-level bureaucrats" by Weatherly and Lipsky (1977).

Finally, we have the *macrosystem*. "The macrosystem refers to consistencies, in the form and content of lower-order systems that exist, or could exist at the level of the subculture or culture as a whole, along with any belief systems or ideology underlying such consistencies" (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 26). Such cultural or subcultural beliefs and values are similar to social constructions of reality (Berger and Luck-



FIGURE 1 A Social Systems Framework

mann, 1966) and mindscapes (see Chapter 2) when translated to the level of the individual organism.

These varying systems are always included, even if we restrict our perceptual framework to municipal, state, or regional analysis. As indicated previously, the framework is useful for considering private as well as public interventions. Indeed, from a social-ecological framework, it would be incorrect not to realize that private and public realms are interdependent. One should also recognize that whatever level of analysis one chooses as a punctuation schema (e.g., the state), it is embedded in a series of hierarchically ordered systems. The general framework described above is graphically depicted in Figure 1.

This framework helps us understand several issues. First, it is clear that there are a variety of stakeholders, and while each has a stake in multiple systems and subsys-

tems, some subsystems exert more powerful influences over organisms' behavior than do others. Second, it helps us identify between which systems direct transactions occur. As the reader will see sporadically throughout this volume, understanding the needs, values, and culture of the recipients by systems that plan, administer, and implement social intervention is crucial for its efficacy. Direct transactions are usually a prerequisite for achieving this kind of understanding. Third, it highlights the importance of the delivery system for successful implementation since it is the only direct linkage between the administrative exosystem and recipient system. Fourth, successful implementation requires the support or at least cooperation of other systems. Finally, it facilitates asking the question, Why do most social interventions flow, almost exclusively, from the top down? And, is that the best method for maximizing the efficacy of social interventions?

In fact, these latter questions are intensively addressed in the introductions to Parts III, IV, and V of this volume. What develops there is an emergent, generalized strategy of social intervention. This generalized strategy discusses the need for broad and general intervention plans, established at the level of the donor exosystem, that are more fully articulated and adapted at lower levels, particularly at the level of the recipient system and to some extent at the level of the delivery system. It is at the lower levels that the fine structuring of social action need occur. It appears important that the broad structures allow and encourage such local initiative and determination. Furthermore, it implies that the broad structures themselves will be more beneficial to the degree that lower-level systems help forge them.

DESCRIPTION OF *THE HANDBOOK*

The *Handbook of Social Intervention* consists of chapters written specifically for this volume by nationally recognized scholars and scientists in their respective areas. The volume is composed of six major parts. Each part begins with an introduction by the editor that introduces the theme(s) of each section, integrates the chapters around the theme(s), and discusses its (their) importance and significance.

Part I includes chapters describing the historical considerations with regard to human welfare, natural networks and public policy, cross-cultural perspectives on social change, and the unexamined premises of the social problem-solving process.

The quality and confidence we can place in an analysis of the social and community interventions is critically dependent on research design and measurement issues. This is the topic of Part II, Research Design and Measurement. These chapters are concerned with issues of quasi-experimental and experimental design, quantitative or statistical models of measuring social and community change and the inherent issues and problems entailed, models of understanding and measuring social and community change, assessment methods for the analysis of physical and social environments, and a metaperspective on the research design and measurement issues reviewed.

In Part III, a wide array of strategies of social intervention are discussed and analyzed. These include legal, social policy, and organizing strategies, as well as the use of the mass media and other dissemination strategies.

Parts IV and V consist of an intensive and critical appraisal of the extant literature ranging from educational interventions to programs and policies aimed at conserving natural resources. In Part IV the focus is on psychological, social, and educational programs and policies, while in Part V the focus is on economic and environmental programs and policies. The rationale for separating the policies and programs reviewed in Parts V and VI, while somewhat arbitrary, is based on the notion that the

loci and goals of interventions reviewed differ along dimensions of proximity and directness of effect on psychological and social well-being. Chapters in Part V have a more proximal or direct relationship, while those in Part VI are more distally or indirectly related to psychosocial well-being. However, psychological and social criteria of well-being are by no means insignificant to our consideration and understanding of the impacts of environmental and economic policies and programs.

The chapters of Part IV cover areas of both historical and contemporary importance to social and community life, that is, educational interventions, interventions with special needs children and adults, youth-centered human service interventions, criminal justice system interventions, mental health system interventions, interventions with older adults, and the impact of social policies on the family.

A variety of economic and environmental programs and policies are reviewed in Part V. Since bartering went by the wayside as the major means of survival and social exchange, money has maintained a place of central importance. We have been exposed to economic programs like social security and, most recently, to the negative income tax experiments. Such income transfer programs and policies, as well as business and employment interventions in the workplace, are scrutinized. Other chapters review grassroot responses to housing policies, the impact of the physical environment on human and social behavior, and the use of our recreational and leisure time. With each passing day, each of us becomes shockingly cognizant of the limits of our natural resources. Thus, energy conservation programs are also analyzed. These chapters round out our review of psychological, educational, social, economic, and environmental programs and policies as they affect social and community life.

Finally, Part VI includes two very different, but important, chapters. One chapter considers several models for training change agents for social and community intervention, while the final chapter provides insightful reflections on the future of social and community life.

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I

HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND VALUE PERSPECTIVES

Part I consists of three chapters that are only minimally related. They are grouped together because they each strike several salient themes that are repeated throughout the volume. Chambers (Chapter 1) describes several important historical considerations as a prelude to our journey through the social intervention literature, Maruyama (Chapter 2) provides a cross-cultural perspective on social and community intervention, and Seidman (Chapter 3) depicts the unexamined premises of the social problem-solving process.

Chambers describes several historical themes of interest. His discussion of natural networks of care makes the reader aware that this has always been an important mechanism of social support and care. Today, we see its return to the limelight as these issues have become a burgeoning area of study for many social scientists. But then, as now, natural networks can be harmful as well as beneficial. We have much to learn in this important area.

Chambers traces the evolution and expansion of human services primarily through the profession of social work and as it reflects the values of the larger social milieu; historically social work has been where most of the action was in human services and public policy. Chambers concludes:

> *Intervention, however, aimed more at reform of social arrangements and institutions than at fundamental systemic alteration. The substance of policy goals has, for whatever mixture of motives (altruism, or social control, or loyalty to professional standards and codes), stayed well within prevailing institutional and ideological bounds. Leaders in the profession have tended to prefer concensus to conflict, and have usually felt uncomfortable when challenged by radical alternatives. They have chosen, in most instances, to seek incremental progressive reforms and to draw back from the consideration of alternative systems. This is merely to say that the recurring expectations of radicals that somehow the professional can be converted from amelioration and reform to a drastic restructuring of society and its institutions appears to be unrealistic.*

His historical analysis projects a central component of what is to be learned in appraising the last several decades of social intervention, as discussed primarily in Parts

III, IV, and V of this volume. Drastic restructuring of society is almost unheard of. When successful, we have achieved incremental progressive reforms. Unfortunately, for this editor's predilections, even the latter have occurred far too infrequently. This issue will be intensively explored throughout the balance of the volume.

Maruyama introduces us to a variety of different and intriguing structures or patterns of reasoning and thought generated by diverse cultural histories, mores, and values. He refers to these patterns as "mindscapes." Frequently, significant societal change or innovative social problem solving requires the adoption of a different mindscape. Maruyama demonstrates how difficult, yet how important, adoption of a divergent mindscape or social construction of reality can be for social change.

Seidman describes a variety of determinants or premises that facilitate inaccurate social problem definitions and ultimately solutions. These determinants include the salient cultural mindscape or social construction of reality, the sociopolitical spirit of the times, other dominant societal values and traditions, and the problem solver's unique role or position. In addition, he describes several strategies and tactics to reframe the question and challenge the unexamined premises behind social problem definition. It is hoped that these approaches will lead to more innovative solutions to social problems.

1

Historical Considerations

Human Services, Natural Networks, and Public Policy

Clarke A. Chambers

Taking a long view of broad social policies in welfare fields as they have operated in American life over many generations, since our pilgrim and cavalier ancestors first settled precariously along the eastern seaboard and continuing down through the era we designate as Victorian, one is driven to conclude that political intervention aimed far more at social maintenance than at social change. In the provision of assistance and care for the needy, the first responsibility fell to family and to informal networks of concerned neighbors and friends. Conservative forces that maintained momentum over nearly three centuries of historical experience were difficult to deflect or overcome, and it was not until late in the nineteenth century that concerted efforts to alter the "natural social order" were initiated.

These general opening observations are not intended to propose that governing elites, over these long generations, were indifferent to welfare concerns or that they consciously pursued a hands-off strategy. For even in the nineteenth century, when an ideology of laissez-faire held sway, local and state government proved imaginative in the shaping of activist policies (including the provision of direct subsidies) designed to accelerate economic development, and proved equally adept at the creation of programs and institutions the declared purpose of which was the preservation of social and moral order.

PUBLIC POLICY AND FAMILY WELFARE

Take the relationship of public policy and family welfare as representative of central tendencies in American life. On the one hand ran a dedication to the family as the crucial institution of society, the continuing vigor of which was presumed to arise from its independence and autonomy. Such was the crucial perception of the Elizabethan system of poor laws, which declared that the family carried the first and ultimate responsibility to care for its own members; only when the family was found incompetent to fulfill that obligation did local government pick up the task. On the other hand, there operated a principle of equal force—the legal right (and indeed the moral duty) of institutions external to the family to intervene when, by community judgment, particular families were found to be acting in ways contrary to their own,

and thereby to society's, best interests. In colonial New England, for example, town magistrates regularly exerted their powers of surveillance to admonish and correct parents who did not fully attend their implicit obligation to provide their offspring with religious instruction, training for making a living or managing a household, and proper moral discipline.

From such beginnings grew the legal concept of *parens patriae*, which declared the state to be the ultimate parental authority, a power that could be exercised over orphaned, abandoned, neglected, abused, dependent, incorrigible, and delinquent children and youths. Long before the invention of the juvenile court, society played an active role in the placing of children or in their incarceration in a variety of institutions, both private and public—orphanages, houses of refuge, farm schools, reformatories. That there was little effective resistance to such efforts can be explained by the cultural and ethical authority with which they were infused—the widely held assurance that protective and custodial measures were implicitly benign because they served the health and well-being of the children while at the same time promoting the stability and security of the community.

Institutionalization in the Nineteenth Century

Similar motives and expectations were manifest in the proliferation of private benevolent societies and public institutions that marked the nineteenth century with particular force and vengeance—poorhouses (so often crowded with dependent aged persons), workhouses, insane asylums, homes for the handicapped (the blind, the deaf and dumb, the deformed, the feeble-minded, and the crippled, to use contemporary designations), and prisons (see, for example, Rothman, 1971). In an era that proclaimed the ideal of individual liberty, society came to prefer incarceration and institutional custody for those unhappy folk it defined as deviant. The community would be purified by the removal of such dependent, deviant, and criminal elements—so it was generally believed. In almshouses and workhouses social discipline could be enforced; in asylums the sick and the mad could be cured (or at least enjoy custodial security); in prisons criminals could be punished, made penitent, and perhaps rehabilitated and restored to useful citizenship. Whatever the motives or intent, communities actively initiated programs and founded and sustained institutions, whether through private benevolences and charities or through public agencies, that functioned both to meet human needs and to impose a degree of order. Social movements, like those provoked and led by Dorothea Dix, might seek standards of care more efficient and more humane, but none sought goals beyond alleviation and amelioration; none aimed at the alteration of basic social structures.

Natural Networks of Care

Of equal, or surpassing, significance for three centuries and more, networks of reciprocal care provided primary and proximate assistance whatever the need. Only as a last and desperate resort did needy persons seek out charity or public assistance. One called rather on family, on parents, children, grandparents, aunts and uncles, brothers and sisters, cousins, and on collateral and "courtesy" relatives. The household might consist chiefly of two generations, closely tied by blood, but those on whom one could make claim ranged beyond one's own abode to extended kin and kith, friends and

neighbors, members of one's ethnic or racial group, and co-religionists. (The very word "kith" originally signified persons who were "known"; that is, kindred and familiar fellows, and therefore persons with whom one had close bonds and upon whom one could rely.) The "strategies for survival in a black community" that Stack describes in *All Our Kin* (1974) and the systems of spontaneous community care that Collins and Pancoast detail in their study of *Natural Helping Networks* (1976) clearly functioned over many generations, especially among disadvantaged groups such as blacks, immigrants, and the working poor. In *Case Studies in Unemployment* (Hall, 1931), compiled by a special committee of the National Federation of Settlements, the strategy of mutual assistance during the Depression of the 1930s was clearly evidenced: The unemployed first used up their cushion of savings, and family expenditures were severely restricted (mortgage and time payments on consumer goods and insurance were the first to go). Local businessmen often carried the family by allowing bills to go unpaid—the landlord, the grocer, the fuelman. Only when all resources had been exhausted would a family ask for charity, and then only with great reluctance and anxiety. "They lose something, as they see it, when they take help, even if the cause for asking . . . lies outside their own control" (Hall, 1931: xli, xliv, xlv). Jane Addams (1902: 19, 25) had observed the same phenomenon a generation earlier:

> *A most striking incongruity . . . is the difference between the emotional kindness with which relief is given by one poor neighbor to another poor neighbor, and the guarded care with which relief is given by a charity visitor. . . . The poor are accustomed to help each other and to respond according to their kindliness.*

Black and immigrant communities established their own institutions for mutual aid in an era (c. 1880-1930) marked by irregular employment, insufficient and uncertain annual family income, and high risks of ill health and industrial accident—burial and insurance societies, ethnic fraternals, church sodalities, radical political associations, and labor unions. From shared experience—in church, neighborhood, and workplace—diverse nationality groups founded a variety of "national homes" or "community centers" that responded to cultural and economic imperatives in what was accurately perceived as an alien and hostile society. In no important way could these institutions and agencies alter the basic arrangements of their society, but they did provide mechanisms through which at least a modicum of family security against the hazards of an exploitive system could be won, and they functioned as well to assert and preserve traditional life ways and values rooted in Old World customs and culture. They provided islands of resistance against the economic and cultural hegemony of the host society.

Through such natural networks of family and community, bonded as much by survival needs as by love and affection, came care and support—the taking in of an orphan (or half-orphan); shelter for a retarded child or a senile grandmother; a lead to a job; a bag of groceries, handed-down sweaters and shoes, or assistance with a month's rent; protection for an abused child or a battered wife; commonsense advice for a distraught family in times of death, desertion, or divorce; introductions or arranged marriages for widows and widowers. There is no need to romanticize these informal networks: They were composed of persons dispossessed and exploited, who suffered themselves from insufficient resources and often led fragmented and economically marginal lives in demoralized neighborhoods. Founded on the expectation of reciprocal assistance, "informal care givers," in the words of Froland (1980: 575), provided "concrete advice, emotional reassurance, an immediate response, long-term caring, and everyday assistance." The networks were in place, and if they

offered no instrumentality for achieving social change, they were effective and resilient beyond what history has generally credited.

Welfare programs in general, however, in both the private and public sectors, reflected the bourgeois ethos of a rapidly industrializing society. The suspicion of and hostility toward public outdoor relief, for example, was a tradition that carried momentum far into the twentieth century, and that skepticism expressed itself most strongly among those citizens who had assumed public roles as spokespersons for the moral conscience of the community in matters related to family assistance. In part this ideological distrust of government arose from libertarian notions of laissez-faire and the efficacy of the marketplace to allocate economic resources; in part it related to the Victorian notion that governmental administration of public assistance funds was inherently inefficient, wasteful, and corrupt. These attitudes of distrust were laced, as well, with a punitive distaste for classes of persons who could not care for themselves in a society marked by abundant resources and vast opportunities—to assist the "undeserving" was to pauperize the poor and to corrupt the "worthy."

HUMAN SERVICE MOVEMENTS

In the latter third of the nineteenth century there emerged three human service movements that in time would have implications for social intervention in the public arena. One related to the coming together of superintendents responsible for the management of welfare institutions and the creation, at the level of state government, of lay boards of control to oversee the activities of these diverse agencies. A second, the charity organization movement, sought to regularize and rationalize, to coordinate and make more efficient, the programs of charitable societies in the private sector. A third saw young women and men going to live in working-class and immigrant neighborhoods, where they inaugurated settlement houses and neighborhood centers. These movements—each in its own way, at its own pace, and in its own direction—were compelled toward political action.

State Boards of Control and State Institutions

The National Conference of Charities and Correction, founded in the mid-1870s, provided an annual occasion for practitioners to gather for the exchange of ideas and information in diverse fields, including public health, prisons and other institutions, family services, and neighborhood work. Not a professional organization in any modern sense of the concept, the National Conference deliberately refrained from taking positions on pressing public issues and concerns; yet it came to offer opportunities for increasing numbers of practitioners in burgeoning social service professions to share their concerns and discuss their need to become responsible spokespersons for the public good. In 1912, as we shall later see, and again in the 1930s and 1960s, delegates to the Conference, informally and unofficially, declared themselves on programs for industrial and urban reform, on the role of government in times of depression, and on the obligation to promote racial equality. If political action did not emerge directly from the National Conference, the proceedings themselves provided information and a sense of a shared mission, both essential to the effective participation of social workers in the political process in other settings.

The Charity Organization Movement

The role of agents in charity, as it moved toward family and children's services and evolved from friendly visiting to social diagnosis and what its leaders declared to be scientific philanthropy, was of a different order (see, for example, Watson, 1922; Lloyd, 1971; Huggins, 1971). Although the Victorian charitable perception of poverty as being rooted in personal failure, immorality, and bad heredity was never fully surrendered, persons engaged in doing family work came gradually to discern other causes. From constant observation and study of needy families, charity agents began to recognize the force of environmental factors. Poverty, they observed, most often arose from ill health caused by impure water and milk, open sewers, and rotting garbage strewn in alleys and streets adjoining tenement slums. Crowded housing and poor nutrition contributed to tuberculosis. Lacking parks and playgrounds, children of the poor played in the streets and were tempted to street crime. Poverty, simply put, derived from insufficient family income, which related to sickness, irregular employment, unemployment, low wages, and injury or death on the job. As Lilian Brandt (1908: 643, 646), a research scholar for the New York Charity Organization Society, put it: "The recognized causes of poverty are in fact largely symptoms and results of poverty. They are, to be sure, potent to produce more poverty, . . . but they are not the 'underlying' causes." The conclusion was clear—in order to alleviate the consequences of poverty while at the same time striking at its roots, society needed to "improve housing conditions, prohibit child labor, provide a rational system of education, purify the water supply, forbid all home work in the tenements, . . . ensure the purity of food and drugs, revise our entire correctional system, and, perhaps, even regulate wages."

The Settlement Movement

Leaders of the settlement movement recognized more quickly the environmental roots of poverty and advanced directly to involve themselves in politics (see, for example, Chambers, 1963; Davis, 1967; Trolander, 1975). Living in immigrant and working-class neighborhoods, settlement workers observed firsthand the injustices of society. Helen Hall, settlement resident and later head resident of the Henry Street Settlement on the Lower East Side in New York observed: "Personal encounter is a great spur to action," she insisted. "It helps you throughout the years from taking other people's misery for granted, as something bad but unavoidable, something you can treat but not cure. You are more likely to be stirred to social action if something is happening to people you know" (National Federation of Settlements, 1958: 12). Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch (1938: 73) of Greenwich House noted that charity workers heard only "one hard luck story after another," but that the settlements knew "the hopeful, the progressive, or at any rate the normal, life of working families." The settlements were more likely, as a consequence, to seek measures enabling their neighbors to play a larger role in shaping their community and to work *with* the neighbors for reforms in local and state politics. In many cities, moreover, settlement leaders promoted labor unions, especially of women working in highly exploitative industries.

It was in the realm of what that generation called "civic housekeeping" that settlement leaders invested their largest efforts: public health and sanitation, parks and playgrounds, schools, and criminal justice (especially for juvenile offenders). Only

rarely were settlement leaders able to win election or appointment to municipal political office—Jane Addams and her colleagues had finally to withdraw from office seeking and accommodate the local political machine; but they remained active and vocal in all political affairs bearing on the welfare of their neighbors. They were most successful in exercising political influence by encouraging participation on the part of their neighbors and, more important, by playing what a later generation would label "advocacy" roles, that is, representing the needs of deprived neighborhoods to the economic and political elites of their cities, representatives of which so often served on settlement house boards. In alliance with middle-class civic reform associations and labor and immigrant groups, the settlements were able to exert influence far beyond their numbers.

In state politics these settlement leaders exerted increasingly significant political leverage because they were well informed, well organized, and effectively trained in the techniques of exerting political influence. They came to any debate armed with empirical data—the facts of housing, health, infant mortality, and communicable disease; the number of children employed in street trades and in factories; school attendance figures; the hours, wages, and conditions of women workers; the extent and geographic distribution of crime. The findings of these social surveys they published in articles and books, demonstrated in exhibitions with maps, charts, and photographs, and carried in testimony to public meetings and before legislative hearings. They spoke to women's clubs, churches, social agencies, political caucuses, and governmental committees. Research and publicity, then, were the activities out of which their influence grew.

Of course, they depended on others to achieve their political goals, for they did not have the numbers or power to carry their programs through to success except through coalitions with progressive Republicans, representing for the most part middle-class and native-born constituencies, and with liberal Democrats, who spoke with increasing self-consciousness for immigrant and working-class citizens.

THE IMPULSE FOR SOCIAL REFORM

As the years went along, the programs proposed by settlement leaders were enacted in state after state: the severe limitation or prohibition of child labor; protective legislation for women workers; factory inspection to enforce standards of safety and sanitation; workmen's compensation; the inauguration of special procedures and courts for juvenile offenders; the enactment of state codes for the placement of orphaned, abandoned, and dependent children, and for protection of children against abuse. Together with their allies they also secured measures—most notably, women's suffrage—designed to enlarge the participation of citizens in the political process.

Out of such agitation, delegates to the 1912 National Conference of Charities and Correction endorsed a platform of Standards of Living and Labor. Among its more important planks were: an eight-hour day and a six-day week; the prohibition of tenement manufacture; the prohibition of child labor; and the enactment of a comprehensive national system of social insurance to cover industrial accidents, unemployment, and old age. When this advanced program, carried to the Republican National Convention by a coalition of social workers and social reformers, was rejected there, it was picked up by Theodore Roosevelt and parts of it were incorporated into his Progressive Party Platform later that summer. Endorsed by many prominent social workers, Roosevelt went down to defeat; but the welfare issues that he had embraced provided an agenda for political action over the next generation.

Again, in the midst of the Great Depression, a radical caucus within the 1934 National Conference of Social Work, led by Mary Van Kleeck, acting unofficially and outside the formal structure of the Conference, sent signals to New Deal politicians that moderate measures would not suffice to resolve the crisis of the capitalist world, that only a move toward democratic socialism would be effective (see, for example, Fisher, 1980). That the New Deal did, in fact, move moderately to the political left in the next several years (stopping far short of socialist measures) can be credited only in small part to this pressure, for the protests of aggrieved farmers and workers and the aged undoubtedly exerted far more effective pressure than did this handful of advanced thinkers among the social work profession.

It would be incorrect to conclude that social workers constituted a coherent profession, agreed on philosophy and program, or that during the era historians have labeled "progressive" public policy in the welfare fields moved steadily onward and upward. In fact, only a minority of prominent social workers played active roles in politics and government; a vast majority of those who practiced social service went about their daily routines with little engagement in the larger issues. To say as much is not, of course, to fault practitioners who concentrated on providing services to persons in true need. Thousands of persons, sick and needy, lacking access to medical care, could not have survived without the ministrations of visiting nurses; thousands of pupils, and their families, undoubtedly gained enlarged educational opportunities owing to the activities of visiting teachers. Nor should we feel compelled to romanticize the careers of those pioneers who did engage in political action. Their motives, being human, were mixed—a deeply felt and authentic desire to ameliorate oppressive conditions for alienated segments of society; a persisting middle-class anxiety about the consequences for American democracy should the nation be divided into conflicting classes; a compulsion, in many instances, to control the behavior of such working-class and immigrant communities that did not accept the normative values of a bourgeois society. Even at their most advanced, moreover, politically assertive social work leaders rarely went beyond amelioration, prevention, and reform to propose programs that might have challenged established norms of a capitalist market system. Many spokespersons continued to oppose public assistance in all its forms while providing charitable assistance that was niggardly and punitive. Among prominent settlement leaders, on the other hand, strategies were pursued that sought to enable workers, women, and minorities to achieve larger measures of self-determination in the workplace, in the home, and in politics. Still others labored to interpret the needs of less fortunate groups in society to more favored elites and to advocate, in their name, ameliorative measures and even social justice.

Mothers' Assistance: A Case Example

The ambivalent nature of political action in that generation is evidenced in the debate over the inauguration of systems for mothers' assistance that rocked so many states in the decade beginning in 1910. Some proponents had concluded by that time that families devastated financially by loss of husband and father—by sickness or disabling accident, by death, or by divorce or desertion—called for access, as of right, to public assistance in order that the mother, as single parent, could stay at home and provide loving support for her children and in order that otherwise dependent children could be kept off the labor market, in school, and under the nurture of their natural mother. Prominent leaders from family and children's agencies, on the other hand, argued against all forms of public assistance as inefficient, potentially corrupt,

and nondiscriminating among probable clients, some of whom, it was judged, would be "deserving," but others of whom would prove financially and morally incompetent. Indiscriminate assistance from the public treasury, they argued, would pauperize the "deserving" while rewarding those who were "unsuitable" mothers. Provision of family assistance was a delicate and complex task, in this view, and depended on sound, differential case work.

Although to some critics at the time it seemed that the initiation of mothers' allowance programs was a progressive step toward ensuring economic security, it appears in retrospect rather clear that these state programs, as enacted and administered, can be viewed with equal validity as socially regressive. Allowances—never enough to provide sufficient support in any case—were provided not as of right, but only to such mothers as could prove that they provided a "suitable home." Eligibility standards included not only a means test, but a morals test as well: Only those who could demonstrate that they were fit and proper guardians, only those who habitually made wise and prudent use of money, were considered eligible. Deserted mothers were rarely judged to be eligible, for to do so was deemed to encourage fathers to flee their legal responsibilities. The children of mothers found to be incompetent or mothers who fell from expected standards could be removed from their natural families and placed in foster homes. Here clearly were established precedents of moral surveillance that characterized aid to families of dependent children, whether by states or (after 1935) by the federal government, down through the 1950s.

The points to be observed are several. Political action on the part of social workers may be regressive and repressive as well as progressive, and judgments along those lines will be made against shifting criteria. Motives for participation in the political process are varied, inconsistent, and even contradictory. Social work is rarely of one mind or disposition on matters of public policy. And the consequences of particular programs, when instituted and implemented, may run counter to expectations of their proponents.

STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL ACTION

Social workers devoted to social change continued to move quietly, undramatically, and often effectively from administrative positions within government. The patient ways in which Julia Lathrop, Grace Abbott, and Katharine Lenroot advanced the causes of child health and welfare when each served as chief of the Children's Bureau provide notable illustrations of this tack. Working with limited funds and staff, laboring against the overt hostility of many conservative groups in Congress and in the White House, these bureau chiefs were able to set program priorities and to sponsor extensive research and publication on subjects vital to program success. Their work entailed the forceful, if also diplomatic, presentation of evidence before key congressional committees, and the winning of support by weight of empirical evidence and cogency of argument. The decision to focus first on infant health and maternal care rather than on more controversial issues indicated a high level of political sophistication, a talent particularly important during the 1920s, when the times were not auspicious for welfare. On the issue of health, moreover, Children's Bureau personnel were able to rally the support of myriad women's groups around the country whose influence on state government could be manipulated to these desired ends. This network of women's organizations, in which local social and public health workers often played primary roles, helped to create coalitions of concerned citizens

whose active support was essential to the enactment of enabling legislation by state and local governments.

This strategy is also illustrated by the skill with which public servants within the social security system shaped a series of amendments, beginning in 1939, for the broadening of coverage, extended forms of assistance, the application of civil service standards to system administration, and the initiation of new programs such as medicare. Thus one can cite the extraordinary power for policy initiation exercised by such officials as Arthur Altmeyer and E. E. Witte, who, in concert with advisory boards, set priorities, initiated new proposals, oversaw the process by which they were shaped into legislative bills, and then saw the bills through to congressional enactment. The technical complications of social security required contributions by experts in actuarial science and related disciplines in any case, but the fact remains that most of the major amendments were initiated, with presidential support and encouragement, by public servants whose lead members of Congress were eager to follow.

On a wider range of welfare issues, it goes almost without saying, secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare, and their staffs of undersecretaries and permanent assistant secretaries, enjoyed an initiative in the fields of federal policy that reflected both the growing centralization of governmental authority after the 1930s and the growing complexity of economic and social programs, a complexity that demanded high-level expertise and coordination. The same kind of political influence must be ascribed to commissioners of welfare in the several states, some of whom at least were drawn from professional careers in social work and all of whom had to consider (if not to accept) the information and advice provided to them by experts within and without government.

It is equally clear that the tradition of research, publication, public agitation, and legislative lobbying was another form of participation in the political process. Social workers assumed the responsibility of bringing their competence and experience to bear on social issues. Thus it was that social work, in the years of "normalcy," continued to agitate for old-age security, unemployment insurance, slum clearance and public housing, fair labor standards, and the right of all workers to organize and bargain collectively. When panic and depression spread, it was primarily social work leaders who insisted on adequate standards of relief, preference for work relief and public works over the cash dole, and the assumption of responsibility for public assistance by state and federal government.

Some forces militated against these strategies. The conservative temper of the 1920s put more faith in free enterprise and progressive technology than in government programs. The expansion of the community chests in the 1920s tended to dampen the social enthusiasms of persons working in the voluntary welfare sector. The chests were generally dominated by the industrial and financial elites in any given city, and they did not favor agencies that rocked the boat. Order, efficiency, and incremental budgeting took precedence over social criticism and innovation; in many cities, for example, settlement houses that surrendered independent funding and came under the chest umbrella also gave up their autonomy in political and community affairs. Those agency executives who might presume to speak for the poor or for victims of social injustice were tamed. In the tumultuous 1960s heroic efforts were required to raise the funds essential to the financing of new programs for blacks and other urban minorities.

A further dampening of activist spirit was associated with the emergence of psychiatry and casework as the preferred career for a second generation of professional social workers. The impulse of professionalism made political work and advocacy appear amateurish. Social work, in the words of Porter Lee (1929) before the Na-

tional Conference of Social Work, moved from "cause" to "function." Both were legitimate obligations, but while "cause" called for zeal and enthusiasm, once institutionalized into "function" it required the more "humdrum and routine" qualities of intelligence and efficiency. The profession, turned inward, tended to neglect the concerns that political activists had cherished.

One cannot appreciate the speed with which Franklin Roosevelt initiated welfare measures of the New Deal without crediting the foundation of research and public information laid down in the postwar years by welfare leaders who would not stay quiet. Francis Perkins, already a chief adviser to FDR when he was governor of New York, was influential in leading him to recognize the fundamental necessity for social insurance, work relief, public works, and the rights of labor. In Eleanor Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Molly Dewson, Jane Hoey, and others she had effective allies. Deepening depression made action, any action, all but inevitable; FDR proved the consummate politician, imaginative, clever, and nimble; bankrupt farmers, unemployed workers, and the dependent aged could not be ignored; from the farmer-labor movement in the Midwest, from Huey Long in the South, from Upton Sinclair and Francis Townsend in the West, came pressure for action. But leaders in social work and allied professions had kept the faith, and in the 1930s they provided the know-how to carry through appropriate measures.

During the Depression a grassroots movement within social work emerged to challenge New Deal liberalism from the radical left. Declaring itself the "Rank-and-File" movement, its leaders formed alliances with councils of the unemployed and of relief recipients while seeking to organize public assistance workers and other social service agents into unions. From 1934 to 1942 it published a monthly journal, *Social Work Today*, in which the editorial policies criticized the New Deal for not addressing fundamental flaws in the capitalist system. The times, they said, called for a restructuring of basic economic and political institutions; moderate reforms, in their view, were mere palliatives, a patching up of institutions that demanded more drastic rehauling. The movement found formidable spokespersons in such notable figures as Jacob Fisher, Harry Lurie, Bertha Reynolds, and Mary Van Kleeck, whose writings and speeches provided coherent and sharply critical alternatives to the prevailing liberal consensus that marked social work generally in that era. By providing forums in which dialectic processes could function, the rank-and-file movement helped to clarify basic economic issues and political strategies, but its views never prevailed and its practical political influence remained relatively weak. When grassroots radicalism shook the establishment again in the 1960s, proponents of the rights of minorities and the poor pursued many of the same ideological and tactical courses without ever being aware of the protest tradition of the 1930s.

Mention must also be made of the political role played by professional associations. The National Social Work Council, founded in 1923 out of the informal cooperation of diverse agencies in the voluntary sector, concerned itself both with providing opportunities for an exchange of ideas on methods and forms of practice in different settings and with coordinating their public information and political responsibilities. (The changing emphases of its work are partially reflected in the names employed to identify the association—the National Social Work Council, 1923-1945; the National Social Welfare Assembly, 1945-1967; the National Assembly for Social Policy and Development, 1967-1973; and National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations, since 1973.) In the years following World War II, the Assembly, under the direction of Robert Bondy and Elizabeth Wickenden (the latter serving as secretary to its Committee on Social Issues and Policies) labored to coordi-

nate the political activities of hundreds of national associations and their state affiliates on such welfare issues as juvenile delinquency, employment of older citizens, standards of public assistance, civil rights, taxation, health care, and like concerns. A study of the voluminous files of the Assembly indicate how terribly complicated legislative analysis had become by the postwar years. There was the constant task of following legislative proposals through hearings, debate, amendment, and enactment, and, in addition, the logistical burden of advising affiliated associations and coordinating their lobbying efforts. During the 1960s, with the sudden launching of the War on Poverty, the Assembly sponsored regional workshops to address the role of volunteers at the local community level and to explore means for encouraging the poor to participate in program planning.

Similarly, the American Association of Social Workers, from its founding in the early 1920s, attended to concerns of social policy—when it could claim the time, that is, from the more demanding mission of promoting the internal professional interests of its members: standards of accreditation, forms of education, recruitment of personnel, salaries, and ethical codes. In the years of the Depression, however, it did represent the concern of the profession in advancing employment exchanges, work relief and public works, and social insurance. A Conference on Economic Objectives for Social Work, sponsored by the AASW in April 1933, opened with an assertion of the "duty" of social work to "educate public opinion" and concluded with positions endorsing access to public relief as of right, a system of comprehensive and contributory social insurance, the establishment of industrial minima for laborers, and other measures that over the next several years were enacted into law.

It can be observed with assurance that the proliferation of diverse professional associations during the interwar years compounded the difficulty social work faced in influencing public policy. The move toward consolidation, then, that eventuated in the merging of several professional groups into one National Association of Social Workers in 1955, was a step essential to the coordination of effective political action. From the AASW the new Association took over, extended, and greatly strengthened the work of a Commission on Social Policy and Action. From that time forward the NASW maintained a Washington office, directed for many years by Rudolph Danstedt, whose chief responsibility was to represent social work's public policy concerns to federal government. The Commission, for its part, prepared research reports and recommendations, proposed resolutions and platforms to the annual NASW Delegate Assembly, and set priorities from among many competing welfare initiatives. It worked with other civic groups and with organized labor to facilitate the passage of legislation. Its member met frequently, in both formal and private sessions, with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and with members of his staff, to discuss the substance of legislative proposals, administrative procedures, and personnel (the appointment of HEW officers and advisory committees). Very much a part of a liberal consensus and coalition, the NASW had to watch over purely professional agendas; its political role was more often to support proposals set in motion by others than to inaugurate its own programs. In response to the popular pressures of the 1960s, and to forces within its own house represented by militant blacks, Asians, Hispanics, American Indians, and feminists, the Commission on Social Policy and Action embraced civil rights and plans for income maintenance, and favored the use of government funds to enfranchise and empower neighborhoods and citizens repressed by poverty and racism. In the late 1960s it extended, by interpretation, its code of ethics to incorporate the responsibility of social workers to act as advocates for their clients.

THE DIALECTIC OF "FUNCTION" AND "CAUSE"

Looking back on a century of political action on the part of social workers, one can see that it took many forms. Most prominent were investigation, research, and publication; advocacy of the rights of needy groups not easily articulated by the disinherited themselves; the presentation of evidence, principles, and programs before legislative and executive bodies; and the action role of experts within government in shaping policies and implementing programs in health, welfare, and corrections. Such efforts, over the generations, involved an enormous investment of time, energy, and talent on the part of social work activists.

Intervention, however, aimed more at reform of social arrangements and institutions than at fundamental systemic alteration. The substance of policy goals has, for whatever mixture of motives (altruism, or social control, or loyalty to professional standards and codes), stayed well within prevailing institutional and ideological bounds. Leaders in the profession have tended to prefer consensus to conflict, and have usually felt uncomfortable when challenged by radical alternatives. They have chosen, in most instances, to seek incremental progressive reforms and to draw back from the consideration of alternative systems. This is merely to say that the recurring expectations of radicals that somehow the professional can be converted from amelioration and reform to a drastic restructuring of society and its institutions appears to be unrealistic.

Social work embraces both "function" and "cause." "Cause," in turn, comprehends the elaboration of programs enabling a more efficient, more humane, more just, and more democratic operation of welfare policies. Such missions demand high levels of technical competence and a continued dedication of effective political action in all its diverse expressions.

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2

Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Social and Community Change

Magoroh Maruyama

CROSS-CULTURAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMPARISON

The European epistemology is based on the concepts of substance, identity, and permanence. It sees change as something unusual that requires a special explanation. On the other hand, many (but not all) African, Asian, and Native American cultures see change as something natural and normal. These cultures regard human society as part of the ecosystem that is evolving, while Europeans and white Americans tend to believe that the ecosystem should be kept unchanged.

The European/white American perspective fosters the view that if there is change, there must be an agent or combination of agents that causes it. Therefore, theorists look for a hero, a catastrophe, a Big Bang, an accident (Monod, 1970), or some combination of these to explain change. Aristotle forbade "circular argument." Since then, and for many centuries, even the causal loops that exist in most biological, ecological, and social processes became conceptually tabooed. On the other hand, the Mandenka of West Africa (Camara, 1975) and many others outside the European and white American logical system believe that causal loop interactions among many elements generate change, and that neither causal priority nor a causal hierarchy are needed to explain many changes.

The third conceptual error in the European/white American tradition is the assumption of a zero-sum game, which says that one's gain must be someone else's loss. For example, it is often advocated that if industry grows, the ecosystem deteriorates, and therefore industrial development must be halted. In fact, there are ways in which both can gain. Consider the following example: The undulated landscape created by strip-mining on an otherwise flat land can actually *enrich* the ecosystem. Deep furrows become ponds, which not only provide habitats for animals and plants but also increase the water retention capacity of the land for flood control. The cliffs that flank the deep furrows allow animals and birds to build burrows and nests. On slopes, new species of plants can prosper. More importantly, the mix of many types of ecological niches—ponds, cliffs, and slopes—within a small area, such as an abandoned mine site, generates new interactions between species. Another example: The cooling systems of some industrial facilities in the United States and Canada discharge heated water into lakes. This was previously called "thermal pollution." However, the fish community can be enriched by the raised temperature of the lakes. In Europe, some factories discharge carbon dioxide. This would be air pollution if the gas were released into the atmosphere, but the discharge is channeled into greenhouses to make vegetables grow faster. Not all industrial discharge can be used directly for ecological enrichment, but these are some ways in which it can.

The fourth conceptual fallacy that dominated nineteenth-century European social science was that all social and biological developments followed the same path, and therefore if two cultures were different, one was more advanced than the other; societies could be rank-ordered, and the Europeans were at the top. The Americans reached a similar conclusion in the late 1940s and 1950s: The American way of doing things was the best in the world, and everybody else should follow it.

The fifth fallacy, which may seem identical with the fourth but must be distinguished from it conceptually, is the belief that the goal of social change is homogenization and equalization. While the fourth fallacy is strongly hierarchical, the fifth is homogenistic. It is based on the assumption that homogeneity is basic, normal, efficient, or ethically necessary, while diversity is due to errors, accidents, abnormalities, or deviances. It regards sameness as the basis of peace and diversity as a source of conflict.

Actually, as we will see, hierarchy and homogeneity are two sides of the same coin: Aristotelian logic. We will also see that there is a third side: independence and isolationism, both of which favor heterogeneity but consider interaction a harmful, negative-sum relation. Hierarchism and homogenism tend to regard interaction in terms of competitive zero-sum games and trade-offs. Furthermore, none of the three sides of Aristotelean logic allows for causal loops.

Altogether different are some of the non-Aristotelean logics that regard heterogeneity in mutually beneficial, positive-sum, causal loop interactions. Consider the old Mandenka view, that diversity enables mutually beneficial cooperation, while sameness ferments competition and conflict (Camara, 1975). This view is ecologically correct and is shared by many other cultures of the world, such as the Navajo of Arizona.

The advantages of heterogeneity can be appreciated in several conceptual dimensions. The most frequently considered is that of resource diversification. The richness of life in a tropical rain forest or on a coral reef is due to the heterogeneity of species. If all animals ate the same food, there would be a food shortage, and if not all species were eaten by some others, there would be an intolerable accumulation of corpses. Even solar energy is used maximally if different organisms use different methods to absorb it, such as tall trees, short trees, vines, and algae. The second frequently discussed consideration is risk dispersion. In case of a disaster, some would survive if there were many different species. The argument for resource diversification focuses on zero-sum game relations, while the concept of risk dispersion centers on independent survival. Both are true and valid, and yet both overlook another advantage: mutually beneficial positive-sum loop interactions.

Animals convert oxygen into carbon dioxide by metabolism, and plants do the opposite in their photosynthesis. If sameness is the basis of peace and diversity the source of conflict, animals and plants should be fighting each other. Instead, they help each other; animals need oxygen, which plants produce, and plants need carbon dioxide, which animals exhale. Consider also birds that eat food debris from between the teeth of alligators. The alligators get their teeth cleaned, the birds get food, and any potential predators of the birds are scared away by the alligators.

The sixth fallacy, which is related to the fifth, is the use of the unanimous consensus method in decision making. It assumes the existence of one "best" solution and tries to maximize the total benefits and minimize the trade-offs for the individual. It is often based on the principle of "sticking to the point on which everyone agrees," as if disagreements were due solely to errors, ignorance, or lack of objectivity.

By way of contrast, the Mandenka use the principle of polyocular vision. Binocular vision works not because two eyes see different sides of an object, but because the *differences* between the two images of the object seen from almost the same direction enable the brain to compute a dimension which is *invisible to both eyes.* If we discard the parts of the object on which the two images differ, what is left will be only the flat surfaces perpendicular and equidistant to the viewer. The result is far from the reality of the object, and much less real or "objective" than monocular vision.

In the Japanese, Mandenka, and Navajo cultures, it is taken for granted that different persons have different views on the same situation, and these differences, rather than being discarded, are incorporated in obtaining a richer understanding of the situation. In Japanese culture, the concept of "objectivity" never existed and even today is unimportant. When the foreign word "objective" had to be translated, the Japanese invented the expression "kyakkanteki," which means "the guest's point of view," while "subjective" became "shukanteki," or "the host's point of view." This does not mean that the Japanese are subjectivists. It is more correct to say that they attain a realistic or "objective" understanding by including different points of view. The Mandenka have two methods of educating people in polycular vision: social duty rotation and joking relations, as will be discussed later. Polyocular vision is very different in nature from the American concept of "consensus."

How is a decision made in a polyocular vision system? Suppose a community must decide whether or not to build a bridge. In the consensus system, a unanimous decision is implemented and the matter is "democratically" and legitimately settled. On the other hand, in a heterogenistic system, the following is considered: If the bridge is built, some may suffer. If the bridge is not built, others may suffer. Either way, some people will be disadvantaged. The important point is to give compensation to those who suffer, regardless of which way the decision goes. In some cultures the compensation is often informal. At the time of decision making, the nature of the compensation may not yet be specified, but the need for it is acknowledged and the compensation is eventually made in one form or another.

To be fair, it must be added that in many cases Americans use various compensation methods to assist disadvantaged individuals. The city of Portland in Oregon once contemplated a plan to close every other downtown street to vehicle traffic and convert it to a pedestrian mall (Alexander, 1975). The problem was choosing which streets to close. Stores facing pedestrian malls would have some advantages as well as disadvantages compared to stores facing vehicle streets. No matter which streets were chosen, some stores would benefit and others would suffer. One solution was to modify the tax structures to compensate for the differences. This solution was sophisticated and on a different level from the usual type of consensus method (homogeneous agreement). Moreover, the solution was compatible with American culture.

In this chapter I would like to discuss not only the cultural differences in social and community change but also the epistemological differences underlying social and community change.

The fact that some cultures have changed rapidly and successfully is well known and well documented. Within a span of 25 years, Manus changed from a "stone age" culture to a "modern economy" culture (Mead, 1956), and in another 25 years to a "bureaucratic" culture (CCU, 1981). Alaskan Eskimos changed in 20 years from a hunting culture to an electronics culture (Hughes, 1965; Maruyama, 1966). Japan is considered to have changed, within a time span of one century, from a feudal state to nearly "postindustrial" society.

It is also well known that in many parts of the world even slow technological, social, political, or administrative changes have been culturally "disruptive." Even in the Alaskan Eskimo culture, which bypassed written communication and began using two-way radios and cassette tapes instead of letter-writing, there were many cultural disruptions. The traditional food-sharing system and mutual generosity were eroded by the arrival of the paycheck system, which made the community quite individualistic.

While such facts are readily observed, what remains less well understood are the epistemological bases that enable some cultures to change naturally and easily, while other cultures suffer from disruptions caused by slow and small changes. Even the perception of what is disruptive is affected by epistemological factors. For example, outsiders may assume that the introduction of certain technologies would be harmful to cultures such as the Mandenka of West Africa because it would change their lifestyle or social interaction pattern. But the Mandenka themselves see the problem in an entirely different dimension, at a different level. They are afraid that westernization will make a specialist out of each individual, who will consequently become unable to see social situations from other persons' point of view.

In order to gain some understanding of the epistemological differences, I would first like to introduce the concept of "mindscapes," meaning cognitive/cogitative/praxological patterns that may vary from individual to individual, and that may be influenced by cultural factors. Detailed discussion of mindscapes may be found elsewhere (Maruyama, 1980); I will merely touch on some points relevant to social and community change.

MINDSCAPES

The pattern of reasoning, cognition, conceptualization, decision making, planning, and designing may vary from individual to individual. These patterns are called mindscapes (Maruyama, 1979, 1980, 1981). In any given culture, there are all types of individual mindscapes. However, the percentage distribution of various types may vary from culture to culture; different types are predominant in different cultures. The extent to which mindscapes are inborn, learned, and relearnable is not yet clearly known.

Though there are many mindscape types, it is useful for practical purposes to recognize the following four, keeping in mind that there are other types, as well as mixtures of types.

Type	Characteristics
H	Homogeneous, hierarchical, classificational
I	Heterogeneous, isolationistic, random
S	Heterogeneous, interactive, homeostatic
G	Heterogeneous, interactive, morphogenetic

Aristotelean logic and Newtonian physics belong to the H-type of thinking. This type sees homogeneity as basic, natural, desirable, and scientific. Diversity is seen to be due to accidents, errors, abnormalities, deviance, or mere statistical distribution with no advantage. The H-type regards homogeneity as the basis for peace, and heterogeneity as the source of conflict, inconvenience, and inefficiency. The world is seen as consisting of categories, subcategories, and supercategories, each consisting of homogeneous

individuals. The H-type represents the belief that one's gain is someone else's loss (zero-sum game assumption). Finally, it prohibits the concept of causal loops.

The I-type of thinking sees individuals as different, independent, unrelated, and random. It does *not* make positive use of individual differences, nor does it try to make mutually beneficial combinations among heterogeneous individuals. In fact, it assumes that individual separation will result in higher productivity and efficiency (negative-sum assumption). It is not interested in causal loops. In terms of physics, it corresponds to nineteenth-century thermodynamics, which assumed that the most probable and natural state of a closed system is random distribution of independent events, each behaving with its own probability. Inside such a system, nonrandom structures tend to decay toward randomness.

The S-type and the G-type consider heterogeneity to be basic, indispensable, and desirable. They regard sameness as a source of competition and conflict, and diversity as the basis for mutually beneficial cooperation (positive-sum assumption). They make use of causal loops, and look for and make positive-sum combinations of heterogeneous elements, both within and between units. The difference between the S-type and the G-type is that the former is oriented toward stability or cycles, while the latter is oriented toward change. In science, the S-type corresponds to the first cybernetics, developed in the 1940s and 1950s to study and design change-counteracting and pattern-maintaining causal loop interactions. The G-type corresponds to the second cybernetics, which began in the 1960s to study heterogeneity-increasing, symbiotizing, and pattern-generating causal loop interactions (Maruyama, 1963).

The four types and their characteristics (Maruyama, 1980) should not be taken too rigidly. In fact, the way one reacts to the list of characteristics indicates one's mindscape. If one looks for universality, exhaustiveness or mutual exclusiveness, does not find them and tries to construct one's own universal, exhaustive, and non-overlapping list, one is of the H-type. If one takes the listings flexibly, realizing that they depend on their context and that their items may vary from situation to situation, one is of the S-type or the G-type. If one reacts strongly against any list of this sort, one is of the I-type. And of course one may be of a type other than the listed four, or of a mixed type.

Of the four mindscape types described above, the H-type and the I-type are two sides of the same coin: Aristotelean logic. They are also predominant in some of the so-called "non-Western" cultures. Islamic logic is almost super-H, and the Korean pattern is often strongly of the H-type. As will be seen later, Japan has three cultural origins: morphogenetic Jomon, homeostatic Yayoi, and hierarchical Yamato. Therefore, there are H-type components in the Japanese way of thinking.

The S-type and the G-type are relatively unfamiliar to Europeans and white Americans because they are based on causal loop interactions that are taboo in Aristotelean logic. Since 1910 various branches of science have begun to study causal loop interactions (Maruyama, 1961, 1963; Milsum, 1968; Buckley, 1968), but the concept of such interactions still remains psychologically somewhat unnatural to many scientists, and even some of the most avant-garde, including Prigogine, show epistemological hang-ups (Maruyama, 1980).

MANDENKA WISDOM

Against this background, it is quite instructive to learn from Mandenka logic (Camara, 1975), which is of the G-type. Let us examine three of the many aspects of it: the concepts of change, heterogeneity, and polyocular vision.

The Mandenka Concept of Change

The Mandenka see the universe as having evolved according to a principle of heterogeneity. In nature beings differ greatly, and the differences are amplified by the constant interactions between things, living beings, and elements of the universe. Therefore, life develops as a process of incessant change. A Mandenka proverb says: "The human being does not cease to change as long as he lives." At each contact with another person, something from the other's being enters one: something from his wife, from his neighbors, from the plants he eats, from the trees he fells, and from the animals he hunts. Thus all things keep changing. During the course of one's life, an individual goes through several phases of activity and experience. One acquires the ability to see things from different points of view. The Mandenka honor persons in their old age because of the wealth of diversity in them and because of the wisdom that they have acquired in order to hold this diversity together.

The Mandenka Concept of Heterogeneity

The Mandenka see the universe as a set of infinitely complex elements. Nothing is simple, elementary, or homogeneous. There is always a potential openness of beings and things toward one another.

Each animal is born under unique circumstances. Even blood ties cannot create the notion of a homogeneous species. Often a Mandenka is able to distinguish up to seven individuals among one species of bird, each having its own name depending on the tree on which it perches habitually, or on the manner in which it alights by slowing down the movement of its wings. Human imagination runs out in its admiration for such a diverse and heterogeneous universe. Unlike the Western concept, the Mandenka concept of change is not oriented toward becoming identical with some other thing. Persons cannot contribute anything to one another unless they remain different.

If people are forced to be homogeneous, they will inevitably try to find ways to be different. They attempt to top one another, eliminate one another, distance one another, or set up obstacles to the enterprises of others whom they consider to be competitors or adversaries. This creates conflict. The Mandenka tell many stories similar to the following: A sage once passed by the court of a great king. It was teeming with the king's healthy youngsters. The sage exclaimed: "What disastrous ruins we see here!" His disciples were puzzled. The sage explained: "This stupid king has kept his grown-up children around him. They all live in the hope of taking over the same inheritance. When the king dies, the internal conflicts among his children will ruin the kingdom." For a Mandenka, wisdom consists of orienting his children in different directions *before* his death, because common interests, far from uniting them, more often divide them.

Polyocular Vision

The Mandenka have two methods for developing polyocular vision: social duty rotation, and joking relations.

Adolescents are assigned certain tasks to perform in the society. Young adults perform other tasks. In their early 30s the men assume the administrative responsibilities of the society. Their roles are often misinterpreted by Western scholars as those of

"chiefs." However, they are more like caretakers. They have no real authority. They must do all the worrying for other people, but they have no special privileges. In their late 30s the men retire from this heavy responsibility and take up other functions. Moreover, during the adolescent initiation period, youths learn to role-play different social responsibilities.

The other method used for polyocular vision training is that of joking relations. Joking relations also serve another purpose—that of providing feedback loops. Formally, the Mandenka society has a hierarchical structure. However, there are many effective feedback channels called joking relations. For example, a man must obey his father, who in turn must obey the former's grandfather. But the man is in a joking relationship with his grandfather, and this gives him an effective feedback channel over his father's head. There are many other feedback channels. A man's joking relations include his older brothers' wives and his maternal uncles. A woman also has several sets of joking relations. And in the entire social structure, there are official clowns who can criticize and ridicule anyone with impunity, including kings. Obviously, joking relations are important as feedback channels. However, a less visible but more crucial function of joking relations is that they improve one's polyocular vision. Persons in joking relations to one another can criticize each other and must take criticism without getting angry. One is forced to see himself or herself from others' points of view. During one of the initiation phases a person will have taken the role of a clown, enjoyed the role, and so later can identify him- or herself with his or her critics, and is therefore able to "internalize" the others' criticisms. Thus polyocularity becomes psychologically internalized instead of remaining as external input to be processed intellectually.

Because of their concepts of change, heterogeneity, and polyocular vision, the Mandenka culture is strongly of the G-type.

HOW JAPAN COULD CHANGE

Now that we have seen a conceptualization of mindscapes and an example of a culture belonging to an unfamiliar mindscape type, our next task is to see whether this new epistemological framework helps us to understand successful and unsuccessful social and community changes in some cultures. It turns out that an understanding of mindscape types is extremely useful in untangling some of the confusion and misinterpretation regarding the so-called "success story" of Japan. .

Many foreigners are puzzled by the apparent contradictions in Japan: traditionalism versus modernism; rigidity versus flexibility; hierarchy versus mutual trust. Much of the confusion resides in the minds of foreign interpreters who make assumptions that are inappropriate in Japan but natural in their own cultures. They assume that: (1) traditionalism means resistance to change; (2) Japan is homogeneous; (3) paradigm shifts occur as successions.

In reality: (1) many cultures have a *tradition of change.* (2) Japan has at least three different cultural origins—(a) the morphogenetic Jomon culture, which began 9000 years ago and was of the G-type; (b) the homeostatic Yayoi culture, which began 2300 years ago and was of the S-type; and (c) the hierarchical Yamato culture, which arrived via Korea 1500 years ago and was of the H-type. (3) All three currents still coexist in Japan, and every Japanese incorporates all three cultures and consequently all three mindscape types: H, S, and G.

While European philosophers developed their concepts in written forms, Japanese thinkers articulated, refined, and expressed theirs in nonverbal design forms

such as architecture, garden landscapes, and flower arrangements. It is from archaeological and anthropological studies of such designs that we gain an understanding of the development of the Japanese mindscapes.

Some of the basic principles of Japanese garden design and flower arrangement are: (1) the avoidance of repetition; (2) the harmony of *dissimilar* elements; and (3) the interrelationships between *heterogeneous* elements. Japanese designers themselves are often not conscious of these principles because they take them for granted and never verbalize them. They automatically ("without thinking") use these principles. Beyond these basic principles, however, more detailed principles are quite specific and verbally spelled out. There are more than 2000 different "schools" of flower arrangement in Japan, and each has its own rules of design, clearly specified, to which its students must strictly adhere.

I often conduct public lectures and seminars with slide projections of designs from various cultures based on different aesthetic principles. I sometimes ask my American audience to identify the principles used in the designs. The way in which my listeners respond tells me much about their mindscapes. I show, for example, a Gothic cathedral or a palace, and ask my audience: "What are the principles of this design?" The usual response is "symmetry." This indicates their preoccupation with symmetry. I then suggest that there are other, more basic principles and ask them to find these. Usually no one responds to this question. These principles are so taken for granted that the audience has never become conscious of them. These basic principles include (1) unity by repetition and similarity, (2) hierarchy, and (3) reflection of the main theme in subthemes. These principles were also used in much of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European music composition. Next I show a slide of a Japanese garden and ask my audience what the design principles are there and how they differ from those of the traditional Italian or French gardens, such as Versailles. The most usual answer is "asymmetry," which does not explain anything about the Japanese garden, but again indicates the audience's preoccupation with symmetry. Another frequent answer is "natural." When I ask further what they mean by "natural," they usually come up with "random." It does not occur to them that nature has patterns. For them, there is only one kind of pattern: symmetry. Anything that is not symmetrical is frequently perceived to be random or chaotic.

Let us now compare Japanese architectural principles with those in Europe. Some basic European principles are: (1) opposition, (2) tension, and (3) extension. The mass of the building protrudes into space and opposes space. Space is defined as something between masses. Space itself is a transparent mass possessing volume, identity, boundary, specialized function, and immutability. Houses are intended to separate humans from the environment. Curves are contours of an actual physical mass. The straight extension of the lines and surfaces of a building can generate streets, spaces, and other masses, and tension between points causes something to be built in between.

Compare these principles with the ones used in traditional Japanese houses: (1) lack of boundaries, (2) the outside-in principle and (3) the black hole principle, (4) convertibility and connectability, and (5) imaginary curves and flows. For example, the garden penetrates into the house like a deep recess and as a sort of room. The outer shells of a house can be removed, creating an instant outdoor setting. Eaves can extend over the stepping stones in the garden, and floors can extend beyond the cover of the roof. A house can appear inconspicuous and dark when seen from outside, almost camouflaged, but it is bright inside because it sucks in the outdoors like the black hole in astronomy. Furniture is stored when not in use, and the same room can be used for

many different purposes depending on the time of day. The partitions between rooms can be removed, and with the furniture stored away, the entire house becomes a free space continuous with the outdoors.

In American business circles it has become fashionable to talk about the high productivity in Japan and about Japanese management practices. In search of the "cause" of their success, Americans tend to look to factors intelligible to them, such as the semiannual bonus or employment stability (which is a myth rather than reality). As a result, they tend to miss considerations such as the following:

Similar to the Japanese concept of convertible and connectable rooms, the individuals in a Japanese firm are also convertible and continuous. Temporary interdepartmental transfers of workers or job rotation of managers between divisions is very natural to the Japanese. The worker in large Japanese factories is rotated between many types of jobs (Koike, 1978a, 1978b), learns many skills, and understands the entire process in his factory. The workers can fill one another's thoughts, not just their shoes. When a worker finds a defect in a product caused by someone else's error, he feels obligated to correct it and has the know-how to do so. Such a practice reflects a work philosophy deeper than the bonus system.

How has such a philosophy developed, as reflected in the concept of space? For the answer, we must look into prehistory. The earliest conceptualization of space is related to the concept of Mononoke (Tange and Kawazoe, 1965), which may go back in time as far as the late Jomon period or the early Yayoi period. Each locality has a Mononoke which, like the "mana" of the Polynesians, permeated the locality. In the beginning, the Mononoke was quite undifferentiated and undefined, but later it was considered to condense into rocks, not very large in size, often less than a foot. Rocks came to represent the special quality of the Mononoke of the locality. Hence, a rock *represented* the space instead of *opposing* it. The rock was the *quality* of the space, not just mass. This concept was incorporated into Japanese garden design and architecture. As a result, there is no opposition between space and matter.

With the cultivation of rice, the concept of land as property arose. Land was marked with stakes, ropes, or pebble carpets, not by physical mass or walls. Such spaces still had continuity with the outside. The concept of a space enclosed by fences or walls arose with the arrival of the hierarchical Yamato culture via Korea, some 1500 years ago. This hierarchical culture had a considerable influence on the Japanese, especially among the ruling class. When the middle class expanded in the nineteenth century, it embraced many of the ethics of the ruling class. However, all three cultural streams are fused in every Japanese of today, with individual variation as to their relative preponderance.

From archaeological and anthropological studies of various designs and objects we may infer that the Jomon culture, which originated 9000 years ago, was quite morphogenetic and vigorous, while the Yayoi culture, which began 2300 years ago, was eminently homeostatic and lyrical (Maruyama, 1980, 1981). Life was hard during the Jomon period, and people struggled for life, clinging to myths of regeneration and powerful change. During the Yayoi period, life became easier. Harvests were abundant, and thanksgiving festivities seem to have been held around grain storage houses, giving rise to a shrine architecture. Even after the arrival of the hierarchical Yamato culture, the vigor of the Jomon culture and the lyricism of the Yayoi survived in architecture and garden design, and are still very basic components in modern Japanese thought and action. In fact, the three cultural currents seem to have enhanced one another at various times. The nobles, whose existence depended on a hierarchy, sat in a boat on a lake in a garden and played poetry games all day, or sat in

a house, smelling the outdoor flowers and wet soil after the rain, watching the leaves change color, and listening to insects sing, autumn winds rattle the leaves, and snow lumps fall from tree branches, thus refining the Yayoi lyricism. The famous Katsura Palace (Tange, 1972) was designed by an aristocrat to recreate scenes from the Tales of Genji with the help of a garden designer from the vigorous morphogenetic farmers class. It also incorporates the principle of changeable patterns; as it was built over several generations, its gardens and main building complex combine many different styles into a meaningful whole.

We are now ready to return to the question: How could Japan change? First, the change-oriented morphogenetic Jomon tradition has always been powerful in Japan, sometimes relatively latent, but other times more fully expressed. The "tradition" was for change. Second, the homeostatic Yayoi principles, particularly the black hole principle and the outside-in principle, enabled the Japanese to absorb foreign technology and knowledge easily, while the heterogenistic interaction principle allowed them to convert foreign elements into forms compatible with Japanese culture. Third, the principles of convertibility and continuity between individuals within a factory enabled Japan recently to surpass American and European productivity. Fourth, as has been repeatedly discussed in business circles, the positive-sum, morphogenetic relations between the government and business have enabled Japanese business firms to undertake long-range projects, while in the United States zero-sum, adversarial government/business relations and labor/management relations have retarded economic development. Japan owes much of its recent success to the mistakes made by the North Americans.

THE NORTH AMERICAN FAILURE AND REMEDY

In business and government circles, much is being said about the causes of the declining economic productivity in the United States: obsolescent production facilities, low scientific literacy, adversarial relations between sectors and so forth. I will not repeat these arguments. Instead, I would like to point out a consideration that is often overlooked for epistemological reasons. That is the process of *mutual amplification of goallessness* between sectors, which I call the "goal moratorium syndrome" (Maruyama, 1979). It is overlooked because it is a causal loop process. Many people talk about "vicious circles," but they tend to miss one crucial characteristic of such a process—the fact that the result of mutual amplification can be *disproportionally* large compared to the "initial kick," and that its remedy consists in modifying the loops instead of attacking a strawman, such as the energy shortage. The nature of this disproportionality cannot be fully appreciated without some mathematical discussion (Maruyama, 1963). For our purposes, let us simply say that if we want to look for a culprit, it is the causal loops, not the initial kick. In other words, the internal interactive system within the United States is to blame rather than some isolated external or internal event such as an oil embargo or an election.

An example of causal loop interactions is diagramed in Figure 2.1. The elements in the diagram are mostly self-explanatory, but two need some explanation. "Noncontextual application of regulations" can be illustrated by an example we have seen—strip-mining. In many states, regulations require that the land be restored to its original shape after strip-mining. In some areas, though, strip-mining enriches the ecosystem. It is thus irrational to apply regulations noncontextually. "Regulation changes" also need explanation. The uncertainties that business firms face are often



NOTES: Arrows show the direction of influence:
* indicates that the influence can be halted by the element giving it.
æ indicates that the influence can be resisted by the element receiving it.
* indicates that the influence cannot be resisted by the element receiving it.

FIGURE 2.1 Causal Loop Interactions

quite different from what outsiders assume them to be. They come less from a predictable energy or material shortage, and more from unpredictable changes in consumer or government behavior. Regulations per se are not necessarily detrimental, as long as they are predictable, but unpredictable regulation *changes* (in either direction) are. Such changes, or even the fear of them, can paralyze a business firm's ability to plan and invest. Sudden regulation changes often occur as a result of public pressure, of which a considerable portion comes from "environmentalists" and anti-technology, anti-business, anti-government organizations whose members are also misled by H-type mindscapes.

Not included in the diagram are positive aspects of intersectorial causal loop interactions. If we switch from the zero-sum assumption to the positive-sum assumption, the diagram can be rewritten in a very different way.

There are active as well as passive incentives which a government can provide to the business sector. Detaxation and deregulation are passive incentives based on the zero-sum assumption. On the other hand, long-term, low interest loans, risk-absorbing measures, direct investment, expenditures in scientific and technological researches, and the like are active incentives based on the positive-sum assumption. Furthermore, within active incentives, we will need a new type, one that can be called "morphogenetic incentives," to encourage "morphogenetic joint ventures" (Maruyama, 1982a). In the future, complex technological developments such as solar energy collection and utilization in outer space will require multibusiness joint ventures in which many types of industries must synchronize their activities. Since a failure or a delay in one industry will delay others, there will be a tendency for various industries to wait for each other to begin. This may result in a mutual amplification of stalling and deadlock. Therefore, synchronized active incentives must be given to many industries at the same time.

We can also make use of "morphogenetic management" (Maruyama, 1982b). In the past, workers were to perform standardized works and were rewarded for their capacity to be standardized. Two recent developments have changed this situation: one is technological, the other psychological.

A new type of production efficiency is achieved by tailor making products with direct input of specifications from each customer to the factory via computers. This eliminates both the costs of carrying inventory and loss from stock out, as well as the preproduction market research costs and postproduction advertisement expenditures to make the customer buy what has already been manufactured. This is true in such industries as garments and automobiles, in which the efficiency was attained in the past by the mass production of standardized products, but it is even more true for the technology-intensive, capital-intensive, and research-intensive industries such as aircraft manufacturing and computer manufacturing. Not only human workers, but also robots are adjusting to this new situation. Until now, the main advantage of robots was thought to lie in their ability to perform the dirty or monotonous work that human workers did not want. However, the new generation of robots can do much more. By changing the instructions, we can program the same robot to do different jobs and more complicated jobs. Production in small batches, as well as customized production, can be increasingly robotized.

The second factor necessitating heterogeneous principles and morphogenetic principles is psychological. The new generation of workers will want not only participation in decision making, but also the right to be human beings and individuals. They want to adapt their work to the individual, not the individual to the work. In the traditional homogeneous way of thinking, such individualization would have been a disruption. However, in the new heterogeneous and morphogenetic mode, individual differences are an asset and an advantage. What we need is a science to study all the possible combinations of heterogeneous elements and to discover what types of combinations are mutually beneficial for those elements. This science can be called "morphogenetics" (Maruyama, 1978). The management method that makes use of this science can be called "morphogenetic management" (Maruyama, 1982a, 1982b).

I hope that future workers will want to know and understand the total context of the factory in which their work takes place. If this happens, the temporary job transfer method, like the Japanese practice, will become useful. This experience by the worker may lead to another type of heterogeneity: Each worker may want to combine several

jobs instead of being confined to one job. This may take the form of several simultaneous part-time jobs or a cyclic sequence of different full-time jobs, all tailored to the individual's preferences. The scheduling of many individuals with different job patterns can be facilitated by computer programs.

ESKIMOS, NAVAJOS, MANUS, AND MANDENKA

How can the social and community changes in developing countries be made more satisfactory with the knowledge gained in cross-cultural, epistemological comparisons? Let us return to the cultures we have used as examples.

Alaskan Eskimos

We have mentioned a disruption of the Eskimo culture by the introduction of wage labor. Until the paycheck system arrived, the Eskimo economy was based on the mutual distribution of food. The Alaskan Eskimos used their family ties as the food distribution channel, while the Canadian Eskimos (who prefer to be called "Inuits" rather than "Eskimos," which means "eaters of raw meat") used a community food rack, on which everyone's catch was deposited and from which anyone could help himself. In either case, food distribution was accomplished efficiently. One day a hunter might catch a big walrus and distribute its meat to others; the next day another hunter might have the luck of catching another animal, and he distributes the meat. In this system, the Eskimos needed no concept of individual savings. They were generous. They gave away to one another what they had. If for some reason a family did not have a sufficient number of hunters and consumers, they invented new family ties in various ways. In a culture in which wives' sexual hospitality to guests was commonplace, a nominal family tie could be established just by having a visitor. A man could go visit someone in another village, return home, and tell his children that they now had new uncles.

This system of generosity was disrupted by the arrival of the paycheck system. On his first payday, one Eskimo who had migrated to California treated his friends to a taxi trip to a beach fifty miles away, and to his dismay found that his family had to starve for the rest of the month. Learning from such experiences, Eskimos gradually became less generous. Welfare checks also eliminated family care of old people.

To reduce such disruptions, we can make social and community changes to adapt to various cultural patterns. For example, Aleuts who worked in fish canneries preferred to have their paychecks issued to their families rather than to individuals. Extending this idea, a paycheck to an Eskimo may be "distributed" by a computer program to his or her relatives. This makes the paycheck system compatible with the Eskimo system of mutual help and generosity. They can again give their earnings to one another. The same idea can be used in many other cultures.

The Alaskan Eskimo culture is nonhierarchical, interactive, practical, and highly change-oriented. It is mainly of the G-type.

Navajos

Another variation of nonhierarchical, interactive food distribution systems is found in the Navajo culture (Maruyama, 1967). When someone has become ill, the

person's family holds a curing ceremony called a "sing." Anybody can attend a sing. Many persons within walking and driving distance come, bringing whatever food they can. All contributed food is cooked together, and anybody can eat as much as he or she wants. Sings are held frequently. During the summer, a Navajo can find two or three sings a week within walking distance. It is important to note that all these take place spontaneously, without centralized planning or coordination. The sings also serve as an occasion for social activities, artistic expression, and as a psychological outlet (Kluckhohn, 1949).

The Navajos are heterogeneous and interactive. They are also individualistic and cooperative, but their readiness for cooperation is not based on obedience to a supreme order or on a centralized administrative system. On the contrary, it stems from their respect for the individual (Dyk, 1938). Even children possess their own livestock and are free to dispose of it in any way they wish. Men and women are equal. Each person chooses his or her way of doing things. For example, a husband may choose to own a horse, while his wife chooses to own turquoise necklaces, or vice versa. When they travel together, the one who has a horse goes on horseback, and the other walks.

For Navajos, the universe consists of humans, animals, plants, ghosts of the dead, and natural and supernatural forces. None is superior to another. They can all influence one another. There is no hierarchical prime mover. The Navajo religion consists in restoring the harmony of the universe, which may be disturbed from time to time. In order to restore harmony, ceremonies are performed according to a formula derived from knowledge of the details of the interactive processes in the universe, and by means of artistic expression. Note that the Navajo religion consists of science (knowledge), engineering (formulae), and aesthetics (artistic expression), and that the religious ceremonies serve economic, social, and psychological purposes. Therefore, in social and community changes, the sing system can be utilized in a new form.

The Navajo culture is strongly of the S-type, with some I-type ingredients. Over the centuries, the Navajo culture has incorporated many elements from foreign cultures: horses and women's dresses from the Spanish, jewelry techniques from the Zuni, and others. It therefore has a G-type component as well.

Manus

In switching from their "stone age" culture of 1928 to a "modern economy" culture by 1953 (Mead, 1956), the Manus did not actually change their epistemological pattern. They simply translated their old system of debts and repayments to "modern economy" activities. However, from 1953 to 1978, the Manus moved to a "modern bureaucracy" society by proliferating their jobs with the government (CCU, 1981). They found an easier way to live compared to their traditional debt/repayment system, in which young adults were made to work extremely hard to repay debts to their older relatives. The old creditor relationship has now been replaced by a system of bureaucratic favoritism along family lines. Is this a cultural disruption or a clever adaptation to a new situation? Unfortunately, we have insufficient data to answer this question.

Mandenka

We have seen that one of the main worries of the Mandenka is that Westernization will lock each person into a specialized job and make him lose his polyocular vision.

This defect of Westernization can be reduced by the use of the job rotation method and the temporary transfer method practiced in Japan.

We have also seen that the Mandenka epistemology is compatible with the postindustrial logic of heterogenization and symbiotization. Therefore, the Mandenka can skip the Western industrial logic of standardization and move directly to the era of computer-aided heterogenitization and symbiotization. They have the opportunity to implement and develop immediately morphogenetic management, morphogenetic joint ventures, and morphogenetic incentives.

CONCLUSION

A cross-cultural, epistemological comparison can help troubled industrialized societies and communities pull themselves out of their internal zero-sum conflicts and standardization, and enable Third World societies and communities to move directly to heterogenistic and morphogenetic methods of social and community change.

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3

Unexamined Premises of Social Problem Solving

Edward Seidman

A wide array of contemporary social policies and programs do little more than perpetuate the status quo. As illuminated in Parts IV and V of this volume, most social interventions seem to reify existing policies, practices, and inherent values. The process is both insidious and unwitting. By unraveling its intertwined elements, we hope to understand the process more clearly, thus enhancing our ability to reframe the problems, its unexamined premises, and potential alternative solutions.

Logically, social problem solving consists of several sequential questions. An initial set is concerned with the selection, definition, and formulation of a social problem: What is a social problem? How is a social problem selected and defined? Who (i.e., legislators, service deliverers, social scientists, recipients, others) selects and defines a social problem? Subsequent questions include: Does the social problem warrant intervention, by whom, when, where, and how? The answers to all of these are ultimately important to the nature and efficacy of the resulting solution(s). However, the responses to the initial set of questions delimit and circumscribe the potential answers to all subsequent questions. This chapter focuses on the selection, definition, and formulation of social problems and on their respective solutions, interrelationships, and unexamined premises.

In the first part of this chapter, the process of reifying existing policies, practices, and inherent values is explicated through the use of several intriguing notions, developed primarily by Mitroff and Turoff (1973) and Watzlawick et al. (1974), which separately and together provide a metaperspective to understand the selection and formulation of the "wrong" problem. Such problem selection and formulation will be referred to as an *error of conceptualization*. In the second section, the determinants or unexamined premises facilitating the selection and formulation of the wrong problem are analyzed. In the third and final section, strategies and tactics for reframing and negating the unexamined premises and determinants will be explored in an attempt to increase our awareness of both the diversity of problems that could be chosen and of their particular definitions and potential solutions. It is hoped that this will stimulate development of a more refined set of guidelines that will eventually force us to make our choices with greater intentionality.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *The author wishes to express his appreciation to Barton Hirsch, Julian Rappaport, and Debby Salem for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, and to Fern Chertok for urging me to write this chapter. Though applied to a somewhat different set of concerns, this chapter relies heavily on the ideas expressed in a previous manuscript (see Seidman, 1978).*



FIGURE 3.1

In an effort to demonstrate concretely the points discussed, three social problem-solving endeavors of contemporary significance are employed—aging, poverty/unemployment, and juvenile justice policies and programs. These examples have been chosen because of the range of issues and problems they address.

UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS

At the most general level, a salient set of intended goals and objectives of social intervention is the enhancement of human and social welfare. The major thesis put forth for examination is that, while this set of objectives may ostensibly represent *intended* outcomes, more often than not the functional result falls far short and too often is antithetical to it. The potential alternative solutions available at each successive phase of the problem-solving process are increasingly circumscribed by the problem's initial selection, definition, and formulation.

Often unknowingly, and usually for unexpressed reasons, it is agreed to solve some problem before full consideration is given to whether it is the "right" problem. This situation increases the likelihood that interventionists, almost before realizing it, will select the "wrong" problem. Mitroff and Turoff (1973) have aptly titled this mistake an *error of the third kind* or E_{III}. They discuss E_{III} as an error of conceptualization, one of the most important errors associated with the problem-solving process.

In an effort to understand and create change, Watzlawick et al. (1974) utilize several mathematical theorems to understand problem definition and its relationship to problem solution (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 contains an arrangement of nine dots. Your task is to connect the nine dots with four straight lines without lifting your pencil from the paper. If you have never done it before, try it.

> *Almost everybody who first tries to solve this problem introduces as part of his problem solving an assumption which makes the solution impossible. The assumption is that the dots compose a square and that the solution must be found* within *that square, a self-imposed condition which the instructions do not contain. His failure, therefore, does not lie in the impossibility of the task, but in his attempted solution.*



FIGURE 3.2

Having now created the problem, it does not matter in the least which combination of four lines he now tries, and in what order; he always finishes with at least one unconnected [*Watzlawick et al, 1974: 25*].

Whether through the self-imposed or implicit acceptance of the premise that the nine dots compose a square, the problem solver is inhibited from examining this alien premise. Thus the problem solver has accepted and addresses the "wrong" problem. There is no way out of this bind until one alters or questions what appears to be the "given." Ignoring, failing to accept, reframing the question, or changing the assumption that the nine dots need compose a square might lead one to the solution presented in Figure 3.2.

Solutions that accept implicit but unnecessary assumptions are referred to as *first-order change* and are derived from the mathematical Theory of Groups. This refers to change that can occur within a system that itself stays invariant. But as we have seen in the nine-dot problem, the solution cannot be found within the system as it first appears. One must instead ask what the rules, assumptions, or premises of the game are. Now seen from outside the system, the solution requires a change of the premises, rules, or assumptions governing the system as a whole. This is referred to as *second-order change*, derived from the mathematical Theory of Logical Types. The Theory of Logical Types is not concerned with what goes on inside a class (i.e., between its members—dots), but gives us a frame for considering the relationship between member and class and the peculiar metamorphosis that is in the nature of shifts from one logical level to the next higher. These authors go on to point out that if we accept this basic distinction between the two theories, it follows that there are two different types of change: one that occurs within a given system that itself remains unchanged, and one whose occurrence changes the system itself, i.e., the body of

rules governing the system's structure. The rhetoric of most problem solvers suggests that social policies and programs should be aimed at second- not first-order change. Therefore, as in the nine-dot problem, the analyst is required to step outside the system and question the implicit rules or assumptions governing the system. Only then is a new problem definition and second-order change strategy possible. When the distinction between member and class is obscured or ignored, an *error of logical typing* is committed. Consequently, the attempt might be to solve the "wrong" problem (e.g., a first- versus a second-order solution).

Let us refer to this error of logical typing or error of the third kind more simply as an error of conceptualization. If we try to understand the precise nature of an error of conceptualization with regard to social policies, we will quickly realize that unlike the nine-dot problem there is no single simplistic premise to uncover or expose. Here there are numerous unexamined rules, values, and premises originating from multiple sources that create and/or maintain an error of conceptualization. Several important domains of unexamined premises or determinants will be more closely analyzed in the following section. But first, let us return to two of the areas of exemplification noted earlier in order to illustrate what is meant at the most general level by an error of conceptualization and how the understanding of a first- versus a second-order solution helps to clarify the nature of such an error.

With regard to social problem solving and the elderly, Estes has noted: "One prominent ideology in American Society defines old age as a problem characterized by special needs that require special policies and programs. This belief supports governmental intervention that separate the aged from the rest of society" (1979: 4). Underlying this prominent ideology is an excessive concern "with the psychological and social-psychological processes of aging, focusing largely on *individuals*" (Estes, 1979: 12). Inactivity and decline have often been seen as problems for the elderly. With this type of problem definition solutions (programs) that expect, permit, and almost encourage these outcomes of segregation and special designation have flourished. Functionally, they agree with the often implicit premise that the individual is the source of the problem. To the extent that the problem may lie outside the individual, this is an error of conceptualization. Thus the problem definition or conceptualization itself must be challenged.

Without a struggle to break out of our usual modes of thinking and acting, it is quite difficult to understand how or why this might not be the problem to address (as the square seemed to be in the nine-dot problem). If we were to ask whether there are other conceptualizations possible regarding the rules, assumptions, or premises of policies and programs for older adults, we are on the road to developing different conceptualizations, including, perhaps, one that addresses the right problem. Perhaps the intended outcome of action should be an alteration of the social system itself. Attempting to change individual "deviants" may help to maintain the social system in an unchanged fashion, resulting in a first-order change. If one were to step outside the system and look, as Watzlawick et al. (1974) imply, at the relationship between the identified target group of individual deviants and the larger society, instead of exclusively within the group of so-called deviants, a novel conceptualization might become apparent. This could lead to a second-order change.

Envisioning such a scenario in the prior example, one might identify the problem as inherent in the relationships among societal values about aging, the means by which our institutions and organizations behaviorally convey and reinforce these values (e.g., compulsory retirement policies), and the elderly themselves. Conceptualizing the problem in this way may lead to solutions aimed at altering compulsory retire-

ment laws and regulations. This may not only inhibit the increasing special designation and segregation of the elderly, but may ultimately lead to more varied and active roles for many of our senior citizens and a gradually altered conceptualization of the meaning and process of aging for many segments of our society. This would represent a second-order change.

As a second example, consider income transfer policies, or more specifically, the negative income tax experiments. One would expect the goal of such policy to be a more equitable distribution of resources in this society. However, on closer inspection it can be discerned that in regulations and outcome criteria such policy is preoccupied with minimizing disincentive effects, that is, the extent to which a negative income tax program removes individuals from the work force. Thus there appear to be competing, and somewhat contradictory, implicit and explicit purposes of such income policies. Underlying the concern with disincentive effects is the notion that the poor have low interest in work and advancement and consequently are in large part responsible for their own plight. Once again the individual is implicitly viewed as the problem, and herein lies a possible error of conceptualization.

Potential errors of conceptualization identified in each of the preceding examples can be culled from an analysis of the unexamined premises, assumptions, values, or rules. On occasion, these premises receive some attention, but it appears to be only pro forma consideration: They are rarely seriously questioned or challenged. One negative long-range consequence common to both areas is that the process of continually investigating each area based on the preexisting problem formulation reifies that endeavor and the error of conceptualization in particular. In this society, that usually serves to preclude the investigation of alternative conceptualizations.

DETERMINANTS FACILITATING AN ERROR OF CONCEPTUALIZATION

What are the assumptions, rules, premises, and/or antecedents that lead to an error of conceptualization and make it difficult to recognize such an error in the arena of social problem solving? "The choice of formulation has less to do with data than with the traditions, value, world outlooks, and the spirit of the times" (Sarason, 1978: 376). In this section, we shall endeavor to unpack Sarason's statement. The constraints imposed by several factors—world outlooks or mindscapes, the spirit of the times or sociopolitical *zeitgeist*, dominant societal values and traditions, and stakeholders with divergent roles and positions—are systematically discussed. Despite the obvious fact that the determinants are mutually interrelated and causal, they are presented separately for ease of explication. The discrete and sequential structure of this presentation should not obscure these interrelationships.

Mindscapes

Maruyama (Chapter 2, this volume) refers to an individual's structure and pattern of reasoning, cognition, conceptualization, decision making, planning, and designing as a *mindscape*. There are many variations of mindscapes, but different types seem to be predominant in different cultures. Culture seems to play a major role in the development of a particular mindscape. The concept of mindscape is similar to Sarason's (1978) world outlooks or *weltanschauung*.

For illustrative purposes we shall focus only on two of a number of possible mindscapes. These provide us wth a clear contrast and simplify the discussion. One mindscape discussed by Maruyama in this volume that is quite common to Western logic (referred to as the "H-type") views homogeneity as basic, natural, and desirable, while heterogeneity is seen as abnormal and the source of conflict, inconvenience, and inefficiency. Thus change is not "natural," and when it occurs it needs to be explained. The H-type also sees the world in a hierarchical and competitive fashion where resources are finite, elements and people are rank ordered, and one's gain is another's loss. Furthermore, the world is seen in a classificatory sense, consisting of categories, subcategories, and supercategories, each consisting of a homogeneous set of members. The homogeneity bias leads to the expectation that what is best for the majority is to be applied uniformly. The H-type mindscape is similar to Rappaport's (1981) discussion of *convergent*, or single solution, reasoning.

A dramatic contrast to the H-type is what Maruyama refers to as the "G-type" (similar to *divergent* reasoning; Rappaport, 1981). G-types view the world through heterogeneistic lenses regarding differences as both desirable and valuable, while sameness is seen as a source of competition and conflict. Furthermore, classification is not possible since interdependence is the rule, as is continual change, which generates increased diversity and benefit, as is illustrated below.

Maruyama portrays the Mandenka culture as an exemplification of a G-type mindscape. The Mandenka do not see aging as a process of inevitable decline and inactivity, nor do they see the need for isolated, homogeneous, and protective care settings. Quite to the contrary, they honor persons in their old age because of the wealth of diversity they have mastered and possess to enrich the rest of the society.

Within a culture, or subculture, a particular mindscape may have evolved over decades, or more often, centuries. Mindscapes not only predetermine how a social problem and/or remedial action will be formulated, but whether it will be identified as such at all. Being steeped within a particular culture's or subculture's mindscape makes it extremely difficult to see any other formulation of a social problem, except as wrong or ludicrous. We are rarely cognizant of our mindscape or its underlying premises (e.g., hetero- versus homogeneity), or how they constrain problem selection and formulation.

Spirit of the Times

Within a culture, changes in the sociopolitical *zeitgeist* further constrain and determine our selection and formulation of social problems and their solutions. The sociopolitical milieu of the moment is of considerable significance. In their historical analysis of human services, Levine and Levine (1970) noted that in conservative times individuals were seen by professionals as the source of their mental health problems, while during more liberal eras the environment was seen to be at fault. The nature of the solutions followed logically from the problem definition of the time. In a different, but somewhat similar, vein others have described historical emphases in human services as alternately focusing on the "needs" or "rights" of the dependent and neglected individuals (Rappaport, 1981; Rothman, 1980).

Recall that during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration a variety of welfare and employment programs were initiated for many people. Yet the problem was not laid at the doorstep of poor and unemployed individuals. The Reagan administration's formulation of similar problems is quite different. Clearly, the spirit of the times

(sociopolitical *zeitgeist*) determines and constrains the selection and formulation of social problems and their solution. Thus the constraining elements, unique to a particular sociopolitical *zeitgeist*, facilitate errors of conceptualization.

Dominant Societal Values and Traditions

As definitions of reality become widely shared, they are institutionalized as part of the "collective stock of knowledge" (Berger and Newhaus, 1966: 67). Although socially generated, such knowledge and expert opinion take on the character of objective reality, regardless of inherent validity. This "knowledge," in turn, heavily influences both the perception of social problems and ideas on how to deal with them (Estes, 1979: 6). This phenomenon has been referred to as the "social construction of reality" (Berger and Newhaus, 1966). Let us turn to an examination of some components of our cultures' dominant social construction of reality.

Individualism

The notion of individual motivation and responsibility has always been a cherished, dominant, and pervasive value in this society. It is at the root of our legal and constitutional structures. It has led to what Caplan and Nelson (1973) and Ryan (1971), among others, have referred to as a person-centered, causal attribution bias, or "victim blaming," ideology. This refers to the tendency to find individuals responsible for their own problems, despite the antecedent and contextual economic, social, and political factors. The premise that the individual is not only the culprit but also the proper focus of social intervention is characteristic of problem solving in Western culture.

A Single Standard

Victim blaming is part of a larger set of social processes in which our institutions work toward the socialization of almost everyone to a "single standard"; those who fail to behave in conformity with the norm are labeled deviant (Rappaport, 1977; Ryan, 1971). Consequently, diverse standards of success, competence, or living are eschewed.

Pragmatism and Rationality

The dominant cultural groups in Western society hold pragmatism and rationality in high esteem with regard to personal, organizational, and institutional functioning. This is accomplished by a quantitative supply-and-demand orientation with a tendency to convert cultural, social, and psychological considerations into monetary or tangible values.

Uniform Solutions

The prevalence of victim blaming, a single standard, and pragmatism and rationality combine with other societal values to enhance the premium placed on uniform solutions to social problems. Based on victim blaming and a single standard, deviants are identified. These so-called deviants (who undoubtedly exist, though in very small numbers) serve as exemplars for the generation of social policy solutions. Thus, from the

atypical members of a designated group, a solution is developed. The resulting solution is then inappropriately and unfortunately applied to large numbers with a particular deviant label. Rationality and pragmatism enter in the form of demands by the social policy process for rapid, simple answers that are easily implementable. Consequently, uniform solutions are often mandated for a wide array of particularistic and heterogeneous problems.

Collectively, the components of our dominant societal values and traditions explicated above bear a striking resemblance to Maruyama's description of the H-type mindscape. To further crystallize how the dominant societal values substantially determine and curtail the selection and formulation of social problems and solutions, two illustrations are provided.

Aging itself is often seen as a process of deterioration and decline. Complete psychological, social, and physical well-being is the standard from which the elderly deviate. These deviant individuals come to be viewed as the problem. While this social construction may accurately depict a small proportion of the elderly, it comes to serve as our construction of *most* elderly. The rational and pragmatic demands of the policy process help to create solutions based on this unitary construction of the elderly. Consequently, uniform solutions are usually applied to many who are labeled elderly, thus reifying and perpetuating the initial problem definition that aging is inherently a process of deterioration and decline and therefore that those "afflicted" must receive special designation so that they can be cared for in segregated and protective settings. Such a social construction of aging is accepted, and consequently fostered, by elderly individuals, family, friends, policymakers, and others.

The poor and unemployed are frequently seen as unwilling to engage in hard work in order to make a living. Given that economic achievement is the societal standard, the unemployed themselves are seen as the problem. Consequently, income and employment programs and policies are preoccupied with not facilitating the likelihood that recipients will decrease their efforts to seek gainful employment; all the poor and unemployed are treated as if their only motivation is to "free load," once again reifying the initial problem definition.

In summary, this culture's proclivity toward individualism, a single standard, pragmatism, rationality, and uniform solutions constrains and (without awareness) predetermines the selection and formulation of social problems, as well as their possible solutions.

Stakeholders

The social problem-solving process involves a variety of actors or stakeholders. The unique roles and positions of the stakeholders often lead to their differential problem selection, definition, and formulation, as well as resulting solution. Let us refer to one major group of stakeholders as *officialdom;* the other groups are recipients and social scientists. Below I shall explore the similarities and differences in each type of stakeholder's respective vested interests that facilitate errors of conceptualization.

Officialdom

Officialdom is construed as being composed of three types of stakeholders—those in the donor, administrative, and delivery systems.

Donors. According to Goodwin (1973: 86), the donor system is composed of "persons who, through legislation and appropriations, define and provide resources for meeting the problem." Such donors exist for solving social problems not only at the federal but also at the state and local levels.

Goodwin (1973) describes former President Nixon's efforts to reform the welfare system. In support of his proposals, Nixon stated:

> *I advocate a system that will encourage people to take work, and that means whatever work is available. If a job puts bread on the table, if it gives you the satisfaction of providing for your children and lets you look everyone in the eye, I don't think that is menial. But it is just that attitude that make others, particularly low-income workers, feel somehow that certain kinds of work are demeaning—scrubbing floors, emptying bedpans. My mother used to do that. It is not enjoyable work, but a lot of people do it. And there is as much dignity in that as there is in any work to be done in this country, including my own.*

The Senate Finance Committee, dominated by a conservative chairman and membership, espoused the view that "increasing welfare payments would markedly decrease the productivity of our economic and social system" (Goodwin, 1973: 90).

The attitudes of the more powerful members of the donor system, in this case the president and the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, clearly illustrate the mindscape, spirit of the times, and many of the dominant societal values and traditions discussed above. Members of the donor system have strongly vested interests in developing and implementing solutions based on their social construction of the problem. The values and premises of the particular individuals depicted above are, however, probably neither unexamined nor unintended. Nevertheless, these premises delimit the number and nature of potentially creative problem solutions. By no means do all of the stakeholders from the donor system simply behave in line with a set of carefully examined premises; for most, the situation is more ambiguous.

Administrators and deliverers. According to Goodwin (1973), two intermediary systems—administrative and delivery—can be distinguished. The administrative system is composed of persons charged with the duty of administering programs aimed at implementing the mandate; they set the guidelines. The people comprising the delivery system "interact with recipients and actually provide, under the guidelines of the administrative system, the services mandated by the donor system" (Goodwin, 1973: 87).

The administrative system can be negligent in fulfilling the objectives of the donor system and may substitute different goals or organize procedures that are out of sync with the nature of events in other systems. "The delivery system can sabotage the efforts of both the donor and administrative systems by various forms of non-compliance" (Goodwin, 1973: 94). One common way in which this noncompliance occurs is when the "street-level bureaucrats" (e.g., social workers) transform the administrative guidelines into rigid routines that make them more capable of dealing with the tasks within the constraints of their job while subtly sabotaging the ostensible objective (the term "street-level bureaucrats" is from Weatherly and Lipsky, 1977).

Welfare guidelines written by the Department of Labor seem to reflect the premises of the donor system in that they imply that if failure occurs, it will be the fault of the trainees' lack of a work ethic and not of the program itself. Goodwin (1973) reports

that staff members of the delivery system have deprecating views of the poor, similar to those of the influential members of the donor system described above. This occurs despite data that indicate that poor peoples' self-esteem is just as strongly related to work as is the nonpoor (Goodwin, 1973).

The stated goals and values of officialdom usually have to do with improving human and social welfare. This goal may be expressed in attempts to adequately or efficiently achieve certain program objectives, but it is implicitly assumed that the attainment of such objectives would in no way bring about the death of that agency or subsystem. This is psychologically not hard to understand in that entertainment of such a possibility threatens the very administrators who have, to say the least, a vested interest in maintaining their jobs, status, and power. The question of how an administrative or delivery system can attain its lofty objectives usually means, in a functional way, "How can we more adequately or efficiently, by doing what we already know how to do, attain these objectives and maintain, or better yet increase, the quantity and quality of our jobs, status, and power?"

Any subsystem will find it inordinately difficult to change, if change implies an alteration in the nature of its role relationship with recipients or any other subsystem (Fairweather, 1972; Watzlawick et al., 1974). A change in role relationship means a change in the ongoing pattern of transactions; thus if one system consistently made the decisions and the other system conformed, an altered role relationship would result if they now alternately shared the decision-making role. An analysis of the functioning of any social system from a general systems theory perspective would lead us to a similar recognition (Buckley, 1967, 1968). In this way, a hidden agenda severely constrains the scope of the particular problem formulation from the point of view of system officials. Consequently, a second-order solution, one that requires a shift in relationships, will not be logical or feasible from their point of view.

Beyond the question of vested self-interest, there is a second, more subtle factor that contributes to an error of conceptualization. Most program managers and decision makers, as indicated above, hold to the dominant cultural theme of attributing responsibility to individuals. The acceptance of person-blame explanations for deviance tends to turn program managers away from a social policy that looks outside the individual and focuses on the social system itself. This, then, interacts with their own vested interests to allow first-order change and prohibit second-order change. None of these factors is intended to cast doubt on the genuine motivations of these stakeholders.

In summary, we have seen how the self-interests of the varying stakeholders, threat of altered role relationships, and dominant societal values and traditions converge to restrict severely the nature of social problem solving.

Recipients

It may appear from the analysis to this point that one major stakeholder has been omitted: the recipients or clients of a policy/program. This is not an oversight. They are often ignored or exert little if any pressure on the formulation of the problem and are most often themselves labeled as the problem. Since the ostensible goal is the recipients' welfare, would it not make sense to incorporate their views into problem selection and formulation in a central fashion? While I shall return to this later, it should be noted that recipients are part of the culture and frequently assimilate a social construction of reality similar to that of other stakeholders embedded in the same macrosystem.

Social Science

Sarason (1978: 373) has stated that in the arena of social problems, science has not tended to ask what the "basic" problems are, but instead, "to seek problems that fit its problem solving style: clear problems that have unambiguously correct solutions." Furthermore, social scientists themselves are no less immune to certain problems (nor are they value free) than is officialdom (for one discussion of this, see Gouldner, 1969). They often share the same person-centered causal attribution biases, as well as a concern with their own vested interests. More often than not, they accept as given the premise that individual performance is a function of individual motivation and responsibility. In fact, the outcomes of many research investigations have, implicitly or explicitly, given credence and scientific respectability to such biases among the lay public, program managers, and politicians, precisely because of the assumptions inherent in problem definition. That is, the assumptions inherent in the social scientist's definition of a particular problem cause one to structure the question in a fashion that frequently leads to a verification of those inherent biases—victim blaming. Thus officialdom's "sponsorship can only emphasize the existing tendency in the social sciences to concentrate attention on the personality structures of the least influential of all constituents" (Green, 1971: 18), such as the poor and the elderly.

What additional factors interact with these societal values to further constrain the definition of problems addressed by social scientists? Several major factors can be culled from what Moore (1973) has called the "research organization set" in her discussion of sociological research on minorities. Two of these factors are funding agency and university administration constraints, and what I shall call "paradigm" constraint.

Funding agency constraint. Most funding exists through some governmental agency. "It seems obvious that if social science is to have a practical short-run application, a given research problem must be defined in terms which are familiar to public officials" (Green, 1971: 15). A special issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* was devoted to an extensive discussion of this general topic ("Social Science and the Federal Government"; Lyons, 1971). It is not difficult to imagine the ramifications of governmental funding patterns on formulating problems of study by social scientists. For example, the Reagan administration has stated that there will be no research on urban social problems and, on the other hand, that aging research is to be encouraged. Investigations of preselected problems are more likely to support biases inherent in their definition. As long as social scientists allow funding agencies to determine the type and formulation of research problems they address, they are bound to continue making errors of conceptualization.

University administration constraint. Moore (1973: 69) indicates that the academic researcher is constrained by the administration's demand that one publish, acquire large grants, and "avoid generating controversy that would 'offend' the non-university public." Anyone remotely associated with academia knows the salience and potency of these issues.

For example, funding agencies and universities are currently supporting and encouraging research on aging and preferably, on its biological, not social, aspects. This favored research provides investigators with a great deal of control, approximating the rigor of the experimental laboratory situation and at the same time being "relevant" by presumably improving human and social well-being. Such a course is begin-

ning to produce numerous publications (in fact, the creation of many new journals) and a resultant increase in academic status and prestige for these scientists, individually and collectively.

Paradigm constraints. Perhaps the most difficult to recognize of all constraints on problem formulation for the social scientist are those rooted in the scientific models subscribed to by most contemporary social scientists. Maruyama (1974) delineates the structures of reasoning or, as he labels them, "paradigms" that lie beneath different cultures, professions, and disciplines. Scientists and others seem unaware of these structures of reasoning. Maruyama explicates a dimension of paradigms ranging from unidirectional causal to mutual causal, similar to his more recent descriptions of H- and G-type mindscapes, respectively (Maruyama, this volume). The unidirectional, causal paradigm is essentially a traditional "cause"-and-"effect" model. This paradigm appears to be uncritically employed most often by social scientists in an apparent attempt to emulate the physical sciences. It is heavily based on a classificational logic, as alluded to earlier.

From a different perspective, Watzlawick et al. (1974: 159) have commented on the negative consequences of such classificational logic:

> *For instance, the handling of many fundamental social problems—e.g., poverty, aging, crime—is customarily approached by separating these difficulties as entities unto themselves, as almost diagnostic categories, referring to essentially quite disparate problems and requiring very different solutions. The next step then is to create enormous physical and administrative structures and whole industries of expertise, producing increased incompetence in ever vaster numbers of individuals. We see this as a basically counterproductive approach to such social needs, an approach that requires a massive deviant population to support the raison d'etre of these monolithic agencies and departments.*

Summary. To buck the tide of the underlying societal, funding agency, university, and discipline-based rules, premises, pressures, and assumptions described above would seriously jeopardize an individual investigator's understandable striving for academic and material success. Nevertheless, not to question them forces the researcher into a number of predetermined actions that are taken for granted and may constrain the social problem-solving process. This is not meant to imply that most researchers do not also exhibit a genuine quest for knowledge, but rather, that social-scientific activities have multiple determinants, not all of which are encompassed by the search for "truth." Furthermore, all of these determinants comingle in a complex fashion with those of the host organization to form a mutually beneficial exchange relationship. The frequent but unwitting consequence may be an error of conceptualization or the investigation of the "wrong" problem. Paradoxically, the "real" problem goes unaltered and is, instead, ofter perpetuated. Successive phases in the research process are subject to similar determinants, but the selection and formulation of the problem is most critical.

Unfortunately, the social scientist's acceptance of preselected and preformulated research problems adds credibility and legitimation to the values inherent in such conceptualizations. Individually and collectively social scientists must take a much more active role in the process of problem selection and formulation, to maximize diversity in the conceptualization of research problems.

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR PARADOX GENERATION

Having followed the line of reasoning presented to this point, the reader may feel quite powerless in dealing with the multitude of forces and pressures impinging on selection and formulation of a social problem. The convergent values inherent in many of these determinants make it quite difficult for the resulting policy/program to address a problem other than one to which the answers will most likely perpetuate the status quo, rather than foster an increase in the quality of human and social welfare. Given this situation, how can we more effectively select, define, and address social problems, the potential answers to which have a greater possibility of enhancing equity and social welfare? Obviously, there are no simple answers. In some ultimate sense what is required for each stakeholder is a heightened level of consciousness and responsibility that transcends personal and social pressures and needs. The fact that few, if any, of us are such "superpersons" necessitates a set of guidelines, or strategies and tactics, to minimize the likelihood of our falling into these "traps." This tentative set of strategies and tactics is offered in the hope that it will make it more difficult to unwittingly select, conceptualize, and address the "wrong" problem. Nevertheless, each stakeholder *must not* shirk his or her individual responsibility in actively seeking to achieve the essential message conveyed by these guidelines, through yielding to the omnipresent personal, social, and organizational constraints and pressures.

Strategies

Demonopolarization

The precursor to any actual steps needs to be what Maruyama (1974) has called "demonopolarization." Monopolarization is the tendency of persons, particularly of Western heritage, to develop a dependency on *one* right theory, *one* truth, and so on (Maruyama, 1966). Consequently, demonopolarization is necessary; that is, we have to become aware that there are other ways of thinking.

Criticism

Similarly, Johnson (1975: 90-91) has discussed the importance of including criticism per se as a formal step in public policy evaluation. He defines criticism as including "both the examination and advocacy of alternative policies, based upon alternative outcomes," and goes on to state that "doing criticism means exposing the implicit values that guide our research and recognizing that research which precludes implications for alternative policy choices is not worth doing." Sjoberg (1975: 45) further suggests that "criticism alone will not advance the cause of human dignity. We must formulate research orientations that emphasize the development of alternative structural arrangements that transcend some of the difficulties inherent in the present-day social order."

Reframing

To begin in this direction, it is useful to return to the metaperspective offered throughout this chapter, i.e., the notions regarding first- versus second-order change.

In the examples presented earlier, despite the frequently expressed intent of the social policies they represent, the problem selected, formulated, and addressed could only lead to solutions of a first-order nature, in that the solution was sought given the extant rules of the game. It is precisely the rules of the game that need to be seriously questioned as a precondition to further action. As we saw in the nine-dot problem presented earlier, failing to question the implicit rules precluded solution of the real problem, and only through a reconceptualization of the rules and premises could a second-order solution be discovered. The way most people approach the nine-dot problem or social problem solving in general is by accepting the problems as defined, with all their inherent-values, and without questioning the appropriateness of the problem definition per se or its selection. Given the pressures against questioning our most basic premises, how might we proceed?

Watzlawick et al. (1974) suggest that the major means of extricating ourselves from this bind is a *reframing of the question.* To reframe means to place the "facts" within an alternative conceptual framework. While the facts should fit equally well, their new context should change the entire meaning attributed to the situation (i.e., its underlying premises) and, therefore, its consequences. An important key to this reframing is to look at the pattern of transactions or relationships *between* levels or systems (e.g., donor, administrative, delivery, and recipient systems) that represent the rules governing the game (Seidman, 1976). To stay within a system or level means that one accepts the premises or the rules of the game as they exist.

Let us concretize the process of reframing by presenting a non-service-based intervention policy for older adults.

> *In simple expenditure terms, resource solutions to the problems of aging (e.g., Social Security and SSI) comprise the largest segment of public response to the needs of this population group. At the same time, however, conceptions of the problems of the elderly as ones of individual deficiency seem to permeate the ways such programs are designed and modified over time. The Social Security benefit structure is designed both to provide benefits on the basis of prior earnings levels and to provide a minimum benefit level to those with the lowest earnings levels. The political success of the system was predicated on the notion that the preretirement earnings success of individuals should determine their benefit levels at retirement, and that those who earned least (i.e., failed to earn more) should receive less at retirement. . . . This relative preoccupation with individual earning performance is not merely of historical importance. It seems instead to permeate much current thinking about ways to modify Social Security in light of changing demographics and the fiscal plight of the trust funds* [*Benjamin and Estes, Chapter 19, this volume*].

Many of the determinants facilitating an error of conceptualization should be evident from Benjamin and Estes's analysis, particularly the dominant societal values and traditions of individualism, a single standard, pragmatism, rationality, and uniform solutions. These are all consistent with an H-type mindscape.

The structure of these policies serves to maintain the same rank ordering of available resources among older individuals as was characteristic of their earlier years. Older individuals, and those with the least resources, continue to have the least access to, and control of, their destiny; they remain relatively powerless. If one were to try to reframe the question one might begin by questioning, at a minimum, the implicit individual deficiency assumptions, and instead look at the relationships among older adults, governmental policies, bureaucratic structures, and access to resources. Thus the target becomes institutional patterns.

To the extent that the provision of legal services and access services addresses institutional patterns that shape the quality of life of the elderly, they represent important alternatives to services designed to deal with individual shortcomings. For example, if bias in hiring or the pension rights of workers are addressed under legal services, and the need for community transportation networks responsive to living patterns of older adults is dealt with as part of a commitment to transportation services, then allocations to these services represent meaningful (if modest in expenditure terms) approaches to institutional issues" [Benjamin and Estes, Chapter 19, this volume].

Thus the social problem is reframed, at both the conceptual and action levels.

Negation

Sjoberg and Cain (1971) describe what they term "countersystem analysis," which can produce a significant reformulation of the problem to be addressed. The countersystem analysis is described as a form of dialectical reasoning in which the existing social order (or social structure) is negated, and a logical alternative is suggested.

Let us reconsider the negative income tax experiments, or for that matter, any one of a number of other federal income transfer policies or employment programs. As indicated earlier, most of these policies and programs are preoccupied with disincentive motivation, i.e., the likelihood that as a function of the policy/program individuals will decrease their efforts to seek gainful employment, or drop out of current part- or full-time employment. With the use of countersystem analysis, disincentive reasoning can be negated. The negation of a disincentive rationale leads to an incentive rationale. This implies that a minimum guaranteed annual income provides recipients opportunities to expand their modes of instrumental activity. That is, the incentive premise may encourage individuals to: (1) seek employment, though probably in a form that provides personal satisfaction and meaning rather than simply a "job," (2) intensify their efforts at child care, (3) continue their education, (4) seek technical training, (5) provide voluntary services to the needy or to charitable organizations, and/or (6) engage in any of numerous other socially, or for that matter, personally, useful and rewarding roles. An underlying incentive premise pinpoints the locus of intervention in the structure of the relationship among donor, administrative and delivery systems, and the recipients, as opposed to at the individual level. Thus policy and program would be developed and structured differently, and undoubtedly would be less demeaning in their effects on recipients. One can easily imagine the potentially diverse consequences resulting from the latter problem formulation as opposed to the one originally proposed.

A Self-Contained Illustration

In a further attempt to concretize the issues discussed in this chapter, a self-contained example concerning juvenile delinquency and based heavily on the writings of Schur (1973) is portrayed in Table 3.1. With regard to several issues (e.g., underlying assumption, causal perspective—see left-hand column of Table 3.1), three perspectives are contrasted. A person-centered perspective is contrasted with, in some respects, its opposite—a situation-centered perspective. The fourth column presents the emerging synthesis resulting from a juxtaposition of the two previous perspectives in the area of juvenile justice. The final column presents some brief

commentary illustrating the determinants and reframing process with regard to each issue. It is hoped that this will help the reader in thinking about other illustrations.

Summary

Reframing or negating the social problem definition's implicit premise should lead the policy analyst to question its utility and suggest an alternative formulation. One such alternative premise might be to disrupt the homeostatic balance, equilibrium, or rule of the game. To change the system, deviation-amplifying positive feedback mechanisms must be employed (Maruyama, 1968). Only through such deviation amplification (as opposed to negative feedback) can the calibration of the system itself eventually be altered. Thus a different system with a new equilibrium could be created.

In order to put these metaperspectives in their appropriate context, we must state emphatically that questions resulting from a reframing or negation of the original problem have no greater priority on truth than do those traditionally posed, despite an implicit bias of this author. What is imperative is that we examine the premises underlying the selection and formulation of social problems, generate alternative conceptualizations, evaluate each empirically, and thoroughly examine their respective intended and unintended social consequences.

Tactics

Thus we are led to the posing of a set of dialectical tactics that force the generation and examination of paradoxes. Ideally, the ultimate problem definition and solution, and not simply the other pole of the paradox, will result from an emergent synthesis. In order to be systematic I shall draw on the list of determinants facilitating errors of conceptualization explicated earlier to guide our discussion of tactics.

(1) *At least two "radically distinct" mindscapes must be brought to bear on the formulation of any social problem solving endeavor.* What is implied here are two mindscapes like Maruyama's H- and G-types described earlier. These structures of reasoning have a unidirectional and a mutually interdependent causal paradigm as a central characteristic, respectively. These divergent mindscapes can be found in cultures or subcultures with divergent reasoning structures. The relevant prevalence of different mindscapes changes with the spirit of the times.

From the vantage point of philosophical models, two divergent inquiring systems may be brought to bear on the formulation of a social problem-solving endeavor. For example, a Leibnitzian inquiring system (i.e., an abstract formal, mathematical, or logical system) could be contrasted with a Hegelian inquiring system (i.e., a conflictual system; Churchman, 1971).

Additionally, two previously discussed frameworks could be employed. A first- versus second-order formulation (Watzlawick et al., 1974), as well as the system and countersystem conceptions, i.e., negation (Sjoberg and Cain, 1971), can be brought to bear on problem selection, definition, and solution generation, as was previously exemplified. As Johnson (1975) has pointed out, everyone, including self- or other-appointed critics, is in a sense trapped within his or her own conceptual framework. What is most frequently needed here is someone who formulates problems contrary to the traditional expectancies of the mainstream, e.g., a divergent as opposed to convergent conceptualization. Such mavericks or critics are often

TABLE 3.1 Conceptualizations of Delinquency and Their Consequences

Facts: Youth violating societal rules. Oftentimes, the rules violated are those that apply solely to youth, i.e., status offenses.

Issue	*Perspective*			*Comments*
	(A) Person centered	(B) Situation centered	(C) Relational centered	These are ideal types; they are not mutually exclusive. They also represent a historical progression from A to C.
Basic underlying assumption	Offenders are *different* from nonoffenders and differences are assumed to be a function of *individual* variables.	Offenders are *different* from nonoffenders, but differences are assumed to result from *social conditions* to which they've been exposed.	*Reactions* to certain behaviors largely determine their social meaning (i.e., "deviance") and consequences (i.e., further rule violations).	Orientation C's frustration with the lack of efficacy of orientation A and B's policies led them to reframe the basic underlying problem (or error of conceptualization) of A and B. A and B are basically similar because of the common assumption of concern with differences. A and B are heavily influenced by dominant societal values.
Favored research methodology and focus	Comparison samples of delinquent and nondelinquent youth matched on demographic and other social variables. Thus social system variables are held constant and *personological factors are free to vary.*	Comparison of rate of rule violations in different social classes, neighborhood settings, group and subcultural contexts. In a sense, holds constant individual variability, leaving *social and cultural variables free to vary.*	Self-reports, observations and legal analyses focused upon *pattern of interactions between* "deviants" and social control agents.	In A and B one or the other is the focus (individual or social system variables), while the focus of orientation C is on the pattern of interactions between the two. Reframed conceptualization of C leads to a different methodology and focus.

Implicit causal perspective	*Unidirectional causality:* individual difference variables are "set up" to be the cause of rule-violating behavior.	*Unidirectional causality:* environmental or social parameters are "set up" to be the cause of rule-violating behavior.	*Mutual causality:* patterns of interaction are "set up" to be source of rule-violating behavior.	A's and B's causal perspectives are similar in attempting to emulate the physical sciences. The reframed conceptualization of C implies a different causal model than A and B.
Social policies created (or implied)	*Treatment and rehabilitation of "deviants":* agents of social control must act on behalf of the violators' "best" interests.	*Treatment and rehabilitation* of "deviants," with increased attention to social factors and causes.	*Narrowed scope of juvenile court jurisdiction.* Decriminalization of status offenses. Treatment only on a voluntary basis.	Social policies stem directly from prior issues.
Long-range effects on the "facts"	Increased numbers viewed as "deviant" and in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Problem has reached crisis proportion.	Increased numbers viewed as "deviant" and need for social reform is emphasized. However, functionally is translated to increased services. Problem has reached crisis proportion.	Increased tolerance of diversity. Fewer individuals viewed as problematical.	The manner in which C reframed the basic assumption of A and B leads to drastically different long-range consequences.

SOURCE: This table is adapted from Table 1 of Schur (1973: 29).

viewed with disdain. We really need to cultivate a group of persons who are able to walk with only one foot in our camp.

One likely consequence of the actualization of this mechanism is what Maruyama (1974) has called "transpection," the process of getting into the head of the other, and second, of letting the other person transpect one's own paradigm.

Dominant societal values and traditions are usually embodied in the dominant cultural mindscape, but highlighting each of its major components will aid the paradox generation process. Therefore, an individualism bias needs to be countered with a system bias, a single-standard bias with a diverse and pluralistic bias, pragmatism and rationality with inefficiency and intuitive values, and uniform solutions with multiple and particularistic solutions.

(2) *At least two "radically distinct" stakeholders must be incorporated into the social problem-solving process, including problem selection, formulation, and solution generation phases.*

Recipients, who are presumed to benefit in the short or long run, can no longer be excluded or incorporated in only a token fashion if the process is to be truly meaningful and beneficial to them. They may have a dramatically different conceptualization. These individuals rightfully deserve a major role of influence in problem selection and formulation. Other stakeholders to be incorporated come from the ranks of officialdom and social science. The involvement of multiple different stakeholders facilitates divergent definitions and solutions, and perhaps a creative synthesis.

Even if all these paradox-generating strategies and tactics were implemented, there is obviously no assurance that problems would not be conceptualized in such a way that their results would not simply perpetuate, directly or indirectly, what is. Furthermore, the guidelines may be viewed as impractical. However, the point to be emphasized is that we should not ignore or sidestep their importance because they are not foolproof or practical. Rather, we must, individually and collectively, strive to actualize as much as is possible for the ultimate benefit of society and the quality of knowledge. At a minimum, they should make us more aware and cautious of the "traps" in problem selection and formulation.

CLOSING COMMENTS

While this chapter emphasizes an examination of the unexamined premises and their determinants with regard to problem selection and conceptualization, it should be recalled that this is primarily because the initial stage in the process is viewed as the most influential. However, similar concerns could be raised about each successive choice point in the process. The strategies and tactics for generating paradox can and should be applied at each successive choice point, although the phase of problem selection and formulation remains most essential.

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II

RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Part II presents five chapters concerned with issues of research design and measurement in social and community intervention. Boruch and Shadish (Chapter 4) are primarily concerned with issues of design; Davidson, Redner, and Saul (Chapter 5), with both design and measurement issues; Miller and Glass (Chapter 6), with the use of quantitative indicators; Moos and Lemke (Chapter 7), with ecological assessment. Mitroff (Chapter 8) provides a metaperspective on traditional research design and proposes an alternative method.

As Mitroff and many others have suggested, the social problems and interventions on which we have focused in this volume are of an "ill-structured" nature.

> *Ill-structured problems not only vary in their definitions from stakeholder to stakeholder; they vary over time as well. They are dynamic. A solution for one time period and one set of conditions is not necessarily a solution for another. Unlike well-structured problems, which can be decoupled from their historical context (and hence if they can be solved, can be solved once and for all), ill-structured problems have to be defined and solved anew for every generation.*

Traditional, empirically based social science research methods are most appropriate for well-structured problems. Unfortunately, the terrain of social science research inherently consists of ill-structured problems.

With full awareness of the complex, dynamic, and ever-changing nature of social problems and interventions, Boruch and Shadish describe the optimal use of experimental and quasi-experimental research designs. Design sophistication alone is inadequate without well-developed managerial, negotiative, and legal skills and expertise for the responsible social scientist.

Boruch and Shadish discuss the importance of research questions and how they are framed, the nature and complexity of the audience to whom the "answers" are intended, cost-benefit analysis of research information, and the anticipation of answers and their use, among other issues. The specific outcomes of these issues should play a conscious role in design decisions. A wide array of design issues in social intervention research are given thoughtful attention and discussion. Rules are provided to aid the social intervention researcher in making these design decisions.

Boruch and Shadish recognize the extremely limited attention given to the implementation context of programs by designers of social intervention research. The implementation context is less amenable to traditional methodology, in part, because it does not follow from an underlying scientific framework that focuses on well-structured problems. Lack of a rigorous and empirical understanding of the implementation context and its relationship to desirable and undesirable outcomes proves to be a major stumbling block of most of the research reviewed in Parts IV and V of this volume. However, Moos and Lemke (Chapter 7) provide one set of assessment instruments that may prove helpful in understanding implementation contexts in the future. This issue also receives some attention from Davidson and his colleagues.

Finally, Boruch and Shadish bemoan the fact that applied social research and substantive theory have not been joined. They need to be. Each will ultimately enrich and improve the other. This theme is taken up in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.

Davidson, Redner, and Saul are less pragmatic. They suggest an ideal model for social intervention research that incorporates simultaneously the strengths of four different methodological traditions—experimental, quasi-experimental, environmental-ecological, and ethnographic models. They refer to this as a hybrid model. Here, the role of interventionist and active, involved researcher is joined.

They view the hybrid model as useful for hypothesis generation and exploration, not simply for the hypothesis-testing goals of much prior research. This is seen as a more appropriate route for the enrichment of future theory.

The hybrid model takes advantage of multiple perspectives and methods; it focuses both individual and system impact, as well as on change processes and the salient implementation context. The model is illustrated with an actual example in the area of juvenile justice and a hypothetical one from energy conservation. As the authors indicate, such research is costly, and its utility requires a longer time frame. Nevertheless, such research remains crucial for future theory development and ultimately for beneficial social change outcomes.

Miller and Glass explore the sources, uses, and technical problems associated with quantitative indicators of social and community change. A large number of quantitative indicators are collected automatically by both governmental and private administrative units (e.g., insurance claims for burglaries, attendance records, student test scores, police records, tax revenues, building permits, census data). Special surveys administered periodically also provide a valuable source of quantitative indices.

These quantitative indicators can be employed to monitor and plan community change or assess the impact of various policies. The latter employs interrupted time-series analysis to assess change over time. This has proven to be an important and useful technique. With the availability of periodically collected indicators and relatively statistical techniques, both planned and unplanned local community and large-scale interventions can be assessed with both relative ease and minimal cost. Creative employment of time-series designs offers us considerable utility for both action and theory development.

Moos and Lemke discuss a comprehensive battery of instruments primarily for the environmental assessment of residential settings. These, and other methods of nonresidential environmental assessment, should prove to be of considerable importance in enabling us to understand the implementation context of social programs and their interrelationship with outcomes and other variables.

Instruments are described that assess the physical and architectural features of the environment (e.g., physical amenities, architectural choice, community accessibility),

policy and program features (e.g., tolerance for deviance, resident control, availability of daily living assistance), suprapersonal factors (e.g., resident heterogeneity, utilization of health services), and perceived social climate (e.g., cohesion, organization). These instruments can be employed in a wide variety of settings. Moos and Lemke illustrate how this information can be used via feedback mechanisms to improve the social environment and as a tool in organizational consultation.

Mitroff provides a quite divergent alternative method to the social science research designs and measurement strategies discussed in the previous chapters of Part II. He indicates that when problems are ill structured, different competent and well-intentioned observers legitimately disagree with regard to the construction of the question itself, as well as to the interpretation of results (see also Chapter 3). He suggests a methodology that is deliberately and systematically designed to capture the structure and logic of opposing belief systems. Complex or ill-structured social problems do not have a single consensual formulation for all stakeholders. Various bits of evidence are eventually brought to bear on the argument by divergent stakeholders with the ultimate goal of a synthesis or integration. *One* legitimate source of evidence is data generated from social science research. Specific rules by which this process is to be guided are explicated. In general, this procedure bears some resemblance to the adversarial procedure, common to the law, and recommended as a viable alternative to traditional methods of proof in the social sciences by Levine (1974).

In the future, we need to develop complex, empirically based research methods and data analysis schemas to match more adequately the complexity, turbulence, and ever-changing nature of the world of ill-structured social problems and their alteration. At the same time, we must realize that this is only *one* of many sources of problem definition and solution that merit legitimate consideration in a more formalized and rigorous decision-making process than has previously characterized the social policy arena.

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4

Design Issues in Community Intervention Research

Robert F. Boruch
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RESEARCH DESIGN AS A PROBLEM OF CHOOSING APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY

During the thirteenth century, an extended rabbinical dialogue concerned whether one should take a systematic sample to determine the value of a crop for tithing purposes or an informal opportunistic one, the precision and cost of each approach being different. The resolution was to decide that the level of technology warranted in such cases depends on the user of the information. Roughly speaking, if the demand for data is biblical in origin—if God wants it—the information ought to be precise and the cost of precision is justifiable. If it is rabbinical in origin, one could be satisfied with an opportunistic approach.

The argument and its resolution are pertinent to designing all research, of course. Crude work *is* useful at times and for some purposes. A manager may, for example, be satisfied with an attempted *census* of institutionalized children that is only 70 percent complete because in observing that (say) 50 percent of the group has a specific handicap, it is still possible to put algebraic bounds on its true relative incidence of 35 to 65 percent. The limits are crude, but for some decisions, adequate. Similarly, one might be satisfied with an estimate of program effect that contained bias of unknown magnitude, so long as its lower and upper bounds could be realistically guessed, especially where any more sophisticated methods would be considerably more demanding and as temporary in value as the "poorer" estimate.

This chapter is dedicated in part to identifying issues in research design that must be resolved by rule. It is dedicated as well to design issues that are frequently unrecog-

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nized in community research and demand some technical sophistication to determine whether they are resolvable at all, much less how to resolve them.

Not all the ideas that underlie what follows are new. The theme is compatible in spirit with Campbell's precedent-setting work on quasi-experiments (see Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Ideas can be traced to an older statistical tradition of determining how to minimize sample size for a given cost (Seng, 1951), and they are reflected in recent attempts of government agencies such as the U.S. General Accounting Office and Inspector General's Office to understand how and when to undertake credible applied social research (see Hendricks, 1981).

Intellectual Parochialism and Appropriate Research Design

It is reasonable to argue that research designers, expert or otherwise, have a responsibility to recognize that in order to use good designs, they must also develop skills and expertise of other kinds—managerial, legal, and negotiative. Problems of each kind, after all, persist in the execution of any research design. The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Social Experimentation (Riecken et al., 1974), for example, took pains to examine a variety of research management problems, including getting better judgments about the pool of individuals eligible and available to participate in experiments, inventing alternative methods of making randomization more attractive or less unpalatable in field experiments, identifying feasible conditions for such experiments, and controlling and tracking randomization. That such problems demand administrative as well as technical creativity for their resolution is clear from field tests of the ex-offender programs mounted by Chicago's Safer Foundation (Rezmovic et al., 1981), among others.

Political-institutional difficulties that demand considerable negotiating skill include making decisions about why and when formal tests are warranted, building policy, law, or ordinance to facilitate better designs, and understanding the way organizations can be used to foster better research. Illustrations of difficulties are not hard to find in research on local Comprehensive Employment and Training Act programs (Hargrove, 1981; Hedrick et al., 1981), schools (Billington et al., 1981; Hendrickson and Barber, 1980), and others. But the solutions—requiring bureaucratic, political, and similar skills—are more difficult to identify, especially when obstacles are as complex as they have been.

Some of the problems are ethical. They may require the invention of organizational devices that assist the evaluator in reporting with integrity and independence to sometimes hostile audiences (for example, formal policy developed by a school district to enhance the researcher's ability to report candidly). They may involve creating technical, procedural, or statutory solutions to privacy problems, to problems engendered at times by randomization in randomized experiments, and to other problems (Boruch and Cecil, 1979, 1982).

Any of these kinds of problems can affect the quality of "technically" well-designed research. It seems sensible, then, to develop a battery of managerial, statutory, and procedural solutions to each so as to encourage the use of appropriate methods. Developing different kinds of solutions to a given problem is not a unique notion. Nonetheless, it has not been pursued with much vigor, despite its import for the progress of applied research. It is hard to see how good designs can be exploited better at the local, state, and national levels of government without a more ecumenical effort.

Community Intervention Research

The illustrations given here, and the issues and lessons we discuss, are drawn primarily from field studies undertaken in communities. The studies were designed to inform the public, various branches of government, or private service providers about interventions in mental health, transportation and accident control, criminal justice, education, police work, health, and other services. This broad coverage is deliberate: The issues transcend the boundaries of government jurisdiction and academic discipline.

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AS A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE

It is obvious that the questions to be addressed in research must be made plain. No "design" can be laid out, no methods can be chosen, no strategy for reasoning from the data can be exploited without some notion of what those questions are or should be: The word "appropriate" in applying the technology has no meaning without some definition of questions.

Much less obvious is the fact that one often has to dedicate considerable time to framing questions, identifying who is interested in the answers, and, if one is very fortunate, anticipating how the answers might be used. Moreover, the durability of audience interests, and thus the questions, has to be pinned down.

The Options: Questions and Their Variants

A good deal of community research is designed to answer one or more of the following sets of questions:

- Is there a problem, and, if so, what is its scope and severity? Who needs service and how can potential recipients be identified?
- What is the nature of services, programs, intervention, or change designed to resolve such problems? How well are they provided and at what cost?
- What are the effects of services on recipients and others with a vested interest? How do these effects come about?
- What are the costs and benefits of alternatives?

Considering the first question, comparative surveys of pedestrian accidents in New Orleans, for example, uncovered the remarkable fact that half of those killed and injured had positive blood alcohol concentrations (Blomberg et al., 1979). The problem, merely suspected until the study, is now sufficiently clear to make decisions about whether countermeasures should be created. In another example, economical telephone surveys of probability samples in Wilmette and Evanston, Illinois, will help, among other things, to decide where and how to improve the cities' recreational facilities (Lavrakas and Tyler, 1982; LeBailly and Lavrakas, 1981).

Answers to questions about the nature, frequency, and cost of services are often poorly documented, but better information has become available as questions about service and implementation are posed more frequently by the researcher. Oklahoma's Department of Mental Health, for instance, revised reporting systems for

local alcoholism treatment centers recently, and the information appears to have been remarkably useful in comparing fee-for-service and block grant approaches to center support (Gregory et al., 1981). Similar efforts are as common at the community level for managers as for researchers (e.g., Attkinson et al., 1978).

Questions bearing on the effects of programs, program alternatives or components, or terminations of programs are perhaps the least frequently answered because good answers are very difficult to produce or because no one is interested in the results. Consequently, efforts to estimate effects deserve special attention. Santa Barbara's police, for instance, have cooperated in Berk et al.'s (1980, 1982) time series analyses of the local impact of special programs to increase police responsiveness to domestic violence. Salt Lake City's Second District Court has been the site for randomized experiments on alternative methods for handling alcohol-related offenses among youths (Lynn, 1980). Other illustrations follow. The main point is that questions have to be made explicit sooner or later, and moreover they drive research design.

Variations on the questions are mundane but critical. A party at interest that resists a question such as, "What's the problem?" may, for instance, advocate "Where are we doing well or poorly?" Variations in the way those who request information view the words "research," "intervention," "evaluation," "sample," and so on are critical, too. The lexical promiscuity here is great, and this influences whether it is possible to clarify questions and how long it will take to do so. So, for instance, a fair amount of time was required to establish that Chicago's Safer Foundation was amenable to estimating the effects of its new program for ex-addicts. Still more time was necessary to establish that the Foundation was willing to pay the cost of that question—cooperating in a randomized experiment.

The time and effort required to develop questions are a function of the extent to which audiences for results are mixed. Responding to a legislature—with some of the brightest and dumbest representatives of the public—is more complicated than responding to a centralized authority. This seems clear from Havens's (1981) description of activity at the U.S. General Accounting Office, which must satisfy diverse congressional interests, and Hendricks's (1981) description of the Inspector General's Office in the Department of Health and Human Services, an agency that reports directly to the Secretary. Analogues at state level are not hard to find—Alexander Law has set up a system to cope routinely with a changing legislature in California.

The Questions That Are Addressed Frequently

Few data exist on the relative frequency of questions that are addressed in state- or community-based research. But order of magnitude estimates are possible. For instance, Novaco and Monahan's (1980) review of six years of articles in the *American Journal of Community Psychology* suggests that only 22 and 24 percent of the research reported there concern process investigations and outcome studies, respectively. The McClure et al. (1980) review of 176 studies in community psychology suggests outcome studies account for less than a fourth of published research efforts. In community mental health center evaluation, causal investigations of the efficacy of treatments are scarce relative to studies designed to establish costs, activities, and client satisfaction (see Cook and Shadish, 1982; Flaherty and Olsen, 1978; Majchrzak and Windle, 1980). Examining *federal* educational evaluations, we find about 80 percent being dedicated at least partly to management and operations, some 40 to 60 percent to needs for service and 20 to 40 percent to impact (Boruch and Cordray,

1980). At the school district level, many studies are designed to monitor processes, but their purpose may be labeled otherwise and there is a great deal of variability.

The statistics raise the issues of whether the questions actually addressed are appropriate and how much of what kind of question is enough. Questions about impact are less frequent, probably because public interest in them is low and costs of answering them are high. That the community researcher can afford this is doubtful. Social research is weak in many respects, and this seems to be one of them: not knowing what works, because asking what works has not been addressed often enough. This is *not* to denigrate alternative questions or the difficulty of answering them. It is merely to emphasize that making one choice often eliminates others, and the choice may be wrong.

Who Is Interested in the Results?

Where the demand for information involves several groups, agreeing on appropriate questions is usually more difficult simply because the groups' members differ in opinion. For example, Shadish et al. (forthcoming) identified distinctly different interests across ten groups, each of which had a stake in evaluating community care for mental patients. In evaluating alcoholism treatment programs, attention may be directed toward cost and efficiency by a legislature, to the process of service delivery by treatment providers, to family relations by the alcoholic's spouse, to success rate by critics of programs, and so on.

Matters are less complicated if those seeking information speak with a single voice or can be convinced to speak as such *and* are well informed. The Johnson Foundation, for example, has enjoyed this benefit partly through staff members who are capable of framing important research questions or of helping their board of trustees do so (see Aiken et al., 1980, for example). In other cases, the researcher must exert unusual efforts. Robert Berg of the U.S. Agency for International Development, for instance, has managed to persuade different congressional subcommittees to act in concert if not reach consensus about their interests in research questions.

It is usually essential that *some* interests be put aside, managed rather than met, because research resources are not sufficient to respond to the questions posed or because the questions posed are immaterial, stupid, or self-interested. The U.S. General Accounting Office seems to have done well with its fragmented audience, the Congress, but it has had over sixty years of experience. For less established organizations, it demands great skill. Hill (1980) handled a three-year study of Title I compensatory education programs by focusing on congressional interests, giving fragmented but powerful external political interests a lower priority. The choice may be correct at one point and, as time and audience interests change, can become irrelevant (see Havens, 1981, on GAO experience, for example).

The point is that choice of audience *is* a legitimate design issue and will continue to be as long as we aspire to encourage the use of information. Ignoring the matter, failing to establish which audiences are primary, and failing to develop strategies for handling the remainder are unlikely to serve community research well.

Ephemeral and Durable Questions

That questions posed at one time may become irrelevant later can be disappointing. But it should not be unexpected. The reasons for gradual obsolescence include

change in government. For instance, the Reagan administration simply ignored reports initiated during the Carter administration and completed during Reagan's, because results, however precise and unbiased, were irrelevant. That is, some programs were eliminated on grounds that the federal government has no business supporting them rather than on grounds that the programs are not effective. Less obvious reasons for obsolescence are the varying interests of executives and legislators and the way their ability and willingness to take action changes (Havens, 1981). A minority vote may be nice in principle; but ignoring the evidence because one can no longer vote or vote in a particular way may be even more sensible *and* ethical.

The point is that answers and audiences must be durable to a point. At the very least, the risk of irrelevance on account of indurability has to be recognized.

ANTICIPATING ANSWERS AS AN ISSUE IN RESEARCH DESIGN

How research results will be used, indeed whether they will be used at all, should affect the investment one makes in designing community studies. In the following remarks, we pay special attention to issues bearing on anticipated use of information, issues that have not been addressed well in the orthodox design literature.

Design for Early, Interim, and Late Results

The usefulness of some research, such as program impact evaluations, depends heavily on managers' willingness to wait for results before making changes, since *some* stability is often required for fair estimates of a program effect. Generally, however, the changes that occur in both the program and in the social context imply that options other than simply demanding stability and waiting for results must be examined.

To the extent that the manager's impatience is in some measure justified and persistent, researchers should develop designs that provide supplementary information *early* in a long-term study and perhaps better administrative information *during* the research, and be able to identify changes occurring in midstream that theoretically have some notable effect on outcome in the experiment. It also seems sensible to develop techniques for anticipating context or program changes whose effects are unlikely to be negligible and for adjoining small tests to detect those changes in the interest of estimating program effects with some confidence.

Paul and Lentz (1977), for example, used an ongoing measurement system to detect changes in the effects of treatment for chronic mental patients, allowing them to estimate the magnitude of these effects and adjust treatment toward a more efficacious level. Community mental health centers use management information systems for related purposes (Davidoff et al., 1977), and similar examples can be found in state mental health programming in New York (Endicott and Spitzer, 1975) and local criminal justice research (Lipsey et al., 1981). In the absence of formal research designs, it is clear that measurement and management information systems cannot always yield interpretable data on what works best. Still, such systems can be an economic vehicle for monitoring program implementation, assisting controlled tests of innovations that are inexpensive, and so on. See Riecken et al. (1974) on the more general use of archives and information systems for research.

The impatience of an audience for results is unwarranted to the extent that community problems are chronic. They are resolved in small steps over a long period, despite ameliorative projects and inspirational rhetoric. The quest for quick solutions is often frustrating. For instance, hospital costs do not clearly decrease by merging services (Whittaker, 1981); more frequent police patrols do not always reduce crime materially (Risman, 1980); dog litter is reduced, but only briefly, after behavioral intervention (Jason et al., 1980).

For these and other reasons, such audiences as city councils, state legislatures, and regional governing boards need to be reminded discreetly and regularly about ingenuous expectations (Zweig and Marvin, 1981). Some members of these groups *are* educable; some *are* well informed and thoughtful about the matter. How we cope with the remaining clients is not clear. Legislative committee structures (such as Wisconsin's) that facilitate the inclusion of able researchers as members are a promising vehicle for this task. At the local level, a few school boards have addressed this problem, as have some community mental health centers (Silverman, 1981; Dinkel et al., 1982). High turnover of politicians—council members, legislators, and some executives—and their staffs, however, makes better plans for dealing with this impatience imperative at all levels of governance.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Research Information

In principle, the decision to conduct a particular kind of community research, or to exploit a particular design, ought to be made after considering the costs and benefits of the alternatives. Such an assessment, if made at all, usually occurs informally. The informality can and does lead to bad choices.

Formal cost-benefit analyses of applied social research, however, are rare, partly because defining benefits is difficult. Benefits are often not clear, for example, unless the research results are actually used, and "use" is typically neither well documented nor understood. For instance, an experiment's finding that a new program was unsuccessful relative to a control condition might imply a decision that an increased budget is warranted, so as to salvage a product in public demand. Others, using the same information, may infer that a decreased budget is warranted, in the interest of reallocating resources to more promising projects. Finding that a program is successful can also lead to choices that may seem paradoxical. For instance, Liptzin et al. (1977) point out that the federal government took the position that the community mental health center demonstration project evaluations showed the demonstrations were successful and concluded that, because of this, further federal support was unnecessary. These alternatives imply a risk of defining benefits of research so broadly as to make the label meaningless. Narrow definitions of use are equally misleading. Reports, for instance, often shape attitudes and understanding though they cannot be linked to specific decisions (Weiss, 1977). The difficulty of specifying political decision options beforehand exacerbates the problem of linking information to action.

There are a few good illustrations of orderly accounting of costs and benefits in field research—for national evaluations of day-care services, for example. But no broad theoretical treatment analogous to Spencer's (1980) benefit-cost analysis of statistical survey data appears to have been produced for community- or state-based work.

Available evidence suggests that there is indeed a class of evaluations that is amenable to cost-benefit analysis, but more serious attention is warranted. The more general

point is that the benefits of the information ought to be anticipated whether or not they are measurable. The decision about whether the benefits justify the cost of the research ought to be conscious and at best made before the fact.

Anticipating How the Answers Will Be Used

One function of research is to inform decisions. One might then think that the state of the art in laying out the relation between results of research and possible decisions is well developed. It is, in a few respects. Locatis et al. (1980), for instance, advance the evidential basis for understanding options by laying out the factors that influence decisions. Ross (1980) and Guttentag and Snapper (1977) lay out partial theory and methods for modeling the way decisions are reached. But the area is underdeveloped in many respects and presents major issues in research design.

A recent pertinent development here is so-called evaluability assessment, a nontechnical approach to addressing the question of how information can be used before the answers are obtained. The idea is to identify audiences for results, to make plain what information may emerge and what its implications might be (Wholey, 1979). One clear decision that can often be made based on a survey, for instance, is that there is indeed a problem and that it is severe in quantitative terms. If case studies or a process investigation of an organization is added, this may help to identify where problems lie, to illustrate them, and to communicate their import. These are humble matters, to be sure, but they are important: Funds *are* appropriated to nonexistent or infrequent problems in community action just as they are in medicine (as in the swine flu episode) and physics (for example, polywater).

Specifying decisions about what actions should be taken on the basis of data is often considerably more difficult. In the first place, audiences for the research disappear; for example, legislators fail to be reelected. That *no decision* may be based on the data is a real possibility and ought to be taken into account. Where interest is durable, the task is still complicated because (1) the options will often not be clear beforehand, (2) even if they are clear, time and events may make them obsolete or immaterial, or (3) the decision maker may be unwilling or unable for a variety of legitimate reasons to make the options clear. Democracy is based at least partly on distrust and constitutionally based jealousy among powers, and this implies secrecy in planning action. This is offensive at times, but it may also be essential to taking any action. No researcher is likely to change this unless the benefits of candor outweigh the costs.

Whether the task is easy or hard, failing to specify options puts the researcher at two special disadvantages. First, the possible changes that are likely to come about as a result of decisions will not be incorporated into the research design; the evaluation will be less well designed than it might otherwise be. Second, the researcher will be able to answer one class of questions. But being blessed with no other information, he or she may be a target for assaults by requestors who have forgotten original agreements, who see unanswered questions that are pertinent now, and argue that it is the fault of research, not of decision making, that the answers are unknown. The problem appears, for instance, in complaints by the National Institute of Mental Health (1977) that evaluation technology is not well developed because it cannot answer certain questions, despite its being ignored as a device for answering others, and elsewhere. It is part of a more general problem that decision makers themselves encounter in asking for any research; that is, "I won't know whether it's what I want until I get it."

Few professional journals attend to decision options and the decisions that are actually made as a consequence of research. Decision makers are often not able or even willing to discuss their options in professional forums. There appear to be no efficient tracking mechanisms at the federal, state, or local level to understand whether any decision is reached, much less how it is reached, in research on mental health, education, housing, and other topics. Community intervention research is not alone in this of course. The decision options and decisions taken based on economic analyses in banks and many other large commercial enterprises are typically informal at best. This often leaves us with little more than codified gossip and imagination to guide research. For the moment, these may suffice. But it is unlikely that we will do much better unless more effort is dedicated to accumulating corroborable evidence on the matter.

ISSUES IN DESIGNING PLANS TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS

Judging from our own work and from others', several *technical* issues of designing intervention research deserve much more attention from methodologists and statisticians. They are pertinent to national and state-level studies. For a variety of reasons that we discuss, they are critical in local and regional research.

Designing for Statistical Sensitivity

The use of experimental designs in assessing community interventions is not a new phenomenon, to judge from Fisher's efforts to understand the effects of school milk programs in the 1930s and from Syrian tests of hygiene innovations during the same period. Still, able applications of the technology are still novel, perhaps must be novel simply because the contexts of application vary so. More important, this transfer of existing technology to new settings often engenders new issues. These issues are not treated in classic statistical texts such as Fisher's, Kempthorne's, or Winer's.

The first difficulty in this arena concerns the fact that programs are often not delivered as conceptualized or as advertised, that they are not "fixed" in the same sense that treatments are fixed in the physical sciences, and that their implementation is difficult to measure well. The work by Rezmovic et al. (1981) on the lack of uniformity in adherence to regimen in a Chicago program for ex-addicts, Papsidero et al. (1979) on variation in level of program services in community-based home health care, Sechrest and Redner (1979) in Michigan on integrity of treatment in penal institutions and communities, and others, suggest that the problems are typical rather than exceptional. The second cluster of problems involves response variables (that is, outcomes) that are measured poorly or are irrelevant to the treatment (see Shadish et al., 1981). The reasons for this range from poor craftsmanship to wishful thinking about what the effects of intervention will be.

Both problems can have dramatic effects on the research design's capacity to detect the real effects of a program, that is, its statistical power. The problem of maintaining power is exacerbated in community research because conventional approaches, such as increasing the sample size, are not always feasible.

Power

Simple mathematics shows that statistical power in field experiments can drop badly with moderately degraded integrity in treatment delivery and in the quality of measurement of response. For instance, when crude models are used to represent integrity of each in power computations, and when the integrity is reduced by 25 percent, power drops to only a third of the value it might be expected to take in laboratory settings (Boruch and Gomez, 1979). This multiplicative decline in power can occur in testing any social program. And although the problem may be more severe in this quarter, it also occurs in experiments in weather modification, agriculture, and medicine (Boruch, 1981). This difficulty, pervasive as it is, deserves more attention from able statisticians to identify stereotypical ways in which treatment integrity can be degraded, to represent them mathematically, and to educe their implications for power and products of research designs.

Quite apart from the realities of imperfect measurement and integrity of programs, power can be chronically low in otherwise well-designed outcome studies. In reviewing 44 field tests of innovative alternatives to traditional outpatient treatment of the mentally ill, for example, Straw (1982) finds power to be about .50. Thirty other studies of alternatives to hospitalization appear to have power of 40 percent or so for small effect. (See Cohen's [1977] fine monograph on power for references to earlier work.)

Sample Size

We expect to obtain small samples in community-based work, relative to state, regional, or national research, and so we expect low statistical power on these grounds alone. The number of individuals who might be assigned randomly to program variations, in a field test, say, will be further reduced because of competition for clients, lack of access to clients, clients' indifference or resistance, and other reasons. For instance, in their randomized tests of economical health services in Michigan communities, Papsidero et al.'s (1979) access to clients was restricted in *some* measure by health care organizations already rendering health services in those communities. The so-called Section 222 experiments, on homemaker services and day care for the chronically ill, encountered severe problems in several communities since the expected number of needy never materialized *despite* physicians' guesses about the size of the client population. In experimental tests of bilingual-bicultural education, Head Start agencies in the South Bronx and Lower East Side could not produce the children promised, though others did (Juarez and Associates, 1981).

Some sample size problems are predictable. Illinois, for instance, recently decided to mount child abuse prevention programs in four to six communities. Data are sufficient to estimate that about 1 percent, not more than 2 percent, of parents abuse or neglect their children. To determine whether the programs do indeed prevent abuse, sizable communities and samples within communities will have to be selected. In particular, to detect a 50 percent reduction in abuse rate reliably under common conditions, over 800 families would have to be sampled in each community. Similar problems occur in attempts to assay effects of community ordinances that ban gun ownership (for example, in Morton Grove, Illinois) and that govern litter, pollution, child abuse, and other problems in which base incidence is relatively low.

A major lesson is that the researcher must expect discrepancies between predicted number of those in need and the number actually available for research; one must

somehow anticipate and accommodate limits on number of clients. Unless one does so, statistical power of the research is likely to be too low to yield useful results. Apart from thorough scouting and management solutions to this problem, the options include cooperative trials, as in the Papsidero et al. (1979) health services tests in five Michigan communities and in the Agency for Children, Youth, and Families' tests of bilingual-bicultural programs (Juarez and Associates, 1981). A radical reorientation of the research design may be in order. But choices are not often easy—for example, case control or time series analyses in which the length of the time series rather than the size of a sample of respondents is critical.

Quality of Measurement of Response

Where sample size cannot be manipulated easily, it *may* be possible to improve measurement of response sufficiently to produce a sensitive design. Concern about sensitivity of response is important regardless of sample size, since response variables are measured on scales that do *not* have (roughly speaking) equal intervals and whose range of measurement is restricted. Consequently, estimates of program effect may be biased by a high floor or low ceiling on the scale of measurement. The problem is especially severe in nonrandomized tests where changes in reliability of measurement of achievement and differences in reliability across groups can make programs look bad when they are merely useless. This makes analyses of massive programs such as Head Start discouragingly ambiguous (see Rindskopf, 1981, for example). But it can deflate estimates in randomized tests as well (Campbell and Boruch, 1975).

One clear approach to these problems is to adjoin side studies on measurement quality to research on program impact. That side studies are feasible in community research but can be complicated seems clear from Lipsey's (1982) efforts to exploit generalizability theory in evaluation of a juvenile diversion program in California. That one may have to defer attempts to estimate effects because too little is known about measures to justify confidence in them is also clear. Papsidero et al.'s (1979) experiments in community health care, for example, rely on ten years of earlier work to improve measures of the responses of the elderly and chronically ill to such care.

Accommodating stereotypical forms of corruption of measurement has received scientific attention only recently. For example, statisticians have recently outlined solutions to problems engendered by individual reluctance to reveal sensitive information such as income, sexual habits, and drinking patterns—solutions such as dual system estimates (Krotki, 1978), probabilistic approaches to detection of cheating, and randomized response designs (Boruch and Cecil, 1979). There is still a need to invent, in a similar spirit, for research settings that are especially susceptible to indifference, incompetence, and corruption. Though such problems have been documented in isolated cases (Cochran, 1978), there are few efforts systematically to outline solutions to them (Shadish, in progress). More generally, there are important measurement problems that have not been well articulated in the orthodox literature on research design. Bringing high-quality designs into community research means we have to solve them, and this can lead to technical innovation.

Implementation, Termination, and Context

Little serious intellectual attention was dedicated until recently to implementation of programs by the designer of experiments. Still less has been dedicated to context.

We have, as statisticians, assumed innocently and often that programs are delivered as advertised, that context plays no *formal* role in design. The assumption is partly an accident of statistical history. Treatments have been denominated as fixed or random in orthodox literature, for example, but neither is often true in the social sector. The advances beyond the simple assumption, however rudimentary, are rarely discussed in intermediate texts.

That attention has been imperfect seems clear from evidence at hand. Straw (1982), for instance, reviewed about thirty published and well-designed field tests of alternatives to hospitalization, such as day care, halfway houses, and foster families, and found decent information on implementation in less than a third of them. Of 44 other field experiments, involving tests of alternatives to traditional outpatient treatment, less than half dealt at all with basic implementation issues such as compliance with drug regimen. Thomas and Boruch (1980) reviewed 61 randomized field tests in education, finding that only a third took pains to get at implementation and, of these, only 13 generated enough data to give a thoughtful reader some assurance that implementation was decent. About 9 had levels of implementation that could be characterized as being at the 50 to 100 percent level. Economic research in cities has fared a bit better recently. The Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments, for instance, exploited earlier mistakes to assure that better information was available on receipt of income subsidies, recipients' understanding of rules governing subsidies, attendance in manpower counseling sessions, and so on (Robins et al., 1980).

That it is important to get at the actual versus advertised delivery in community research seems clear. Outcome evaluations mean little or nothing without pertinent qualitative and numerical evidence. Failed implementation of formal programs, the confusion between program and rhetoric, as in PUSH FOR EXCELLENCE in cities outside Chicago (American Institutes for Research, 1982) is important to understand even tentatively.

What are the research design issues? Two seem remarkable: first, that we do not have uniform methods and theory for the tasks at hand, and second that we are more ignorant than we should be about how to exploit what we do have. There are, however, lights to guide us. Gottfredson et al. (1980), among others, have been productive in generating systematic approaches to measuring community attributes—ecological and social cohesion of neighborhoods, for example. In doing so, they stand on the shoulders of great sociologists in trying to describe coherently community processes, interest groups, and power (Rossi, 1961). Moos (1975), among others, has contributed to systematic observations of environments, notably prison and other facilities, and his work is being adapted to other community-based institutions as well. Ethnographic and managerial approaches are less formalized and typically less numerical, but no less important. Despite these contributions, the need for advances in cheaper methods of observation, whose utility can be gauged better, which can be integrated from micro to macro levels of observation, persists.

What use is any of this, apart from assuring that our presumptions about what is out there are not too dull witted? A great deal, we believe. There is for instance no coherent theory of implementing community innovations, of terminating institutions, or of changes in character of the services they provide. There is no substantial body of numerical indicators of process to help summarize available information. We can reasonably expect these products when implementation and context are regarded as a legitimate target of research design, especially in probability surveys and experiments.

As a practical matter, we have evidence that ecological variables do enhance prediction, in criminal recidivism for instance (Gottfredson et al., 1980), in education

(Walberg and Moos, 1980), and elsewhere. It is possible that orthodox measurement theory can be adapted to institutional and community measurement, and because there are remarkable differences between these units and individuals who have usually been the basis for measurement theory, we can expect advances too. Finally, we have a right to expect less provincialism in research as a consequence, since efforts to assay implementation and context requires managerial, theoretical, and substantive skills.

Nonrandom Tests When Assignment Is Prescribed

Twenty years ago, Donald T. Campbell formally proposed the regression-discontinuity design, based on the idea that one could generate fair estimates of program effect if selection to a program is based on need or merit measured numerically. In the simplest case, the researcher knows there is a linear relation between a continuous response variable and the measure of merit for program services, then assigns individuals to services in accord with a clearly defined cutting point that separates the needy from the others. The estimate of effect is based on the difference, in elevation, say, between two regressions of response on the selection measure, one based on observations above the cutting point, and one based on observations below the point (Riecken et al., 1974: chap. 4).

In principle, the design solves a major specification problem; that is, numerical information about how people are selected into a program, usually absent or ambiguous, can be exploited to produce unbiased estimates of program effect. The idea of assignment to a program based on need, rather than on randomization, for instance, is also nominally more attractive to some program developers. In practice, the design is subject to a variety of problems that have not received sufficient attention from statisticians, managers, or researchers. For instance, the mathematical form of the relation between need and outcome under null conditions, essential for estimating effects, must often be guessed. Moreover, both the response and selection variables are fallible and may be measured on scales whose units are unequal, especially at extremes; treatment effect may be nonadditive; and assignment requirements may be badly met at the cutting point. The problems have occurred in studies of local juvenile diversion programs (Lipsey et al., 1981), local and state education programs for disadvantaged children (Trochim, 1982), and elsewhere.

The statistical problems underlying them have not been completely resolved. But the design is being used, and some of the problems are indeed being addressed in evaluating Title I compensatory education programs and programs elsewhere (Trochim and Spiegelman, 1981). Because many local programs are influenced by federal and state regulations, it is possible for the statistician to mount good investigations of the technique. The studies are more important to the extent that the idea can be exploited in federal statistical policy and federal and formula allocation laws to estimate the impact of allocated resources on communities.

Coupling Randomized Experiments and Nonrandomized Tests

The technology of designing randomized tests has not developed independent of the technology of nonrandomized tests such as quasi-experiments or time series analysis. Yet disciplinary separation is often sufficient to prevent researchers from

thinking about both in design of outcome evaluations. There are good reasons to avoid parochialism here and to couple the approaches when the opportunity arises.

Part of our suspicion of nonrandomized tests, for example, is based on our ignorance about misspecification—that is, what the proper causal model is and competing explanations for what caused the effect. So it seems reasonable to design simultaneous randomized and nonrandomized field tests to accumulate gradually empirical estimates of bias in nonrandomized tests. Such information can be critical for future evaluations in which randomization is not possible. Early illustrations of the approach have been forced by circumstance rather than by interest in comparison. The Salk polio vaccine trials, for example, accommodated state prerogatives by setting up a randomized design and one kind of nonrandomized design in parallel. The benefit of combination in some cases is likely to be better estimates of effect; for example, a few expensive randomized tests and a larger group of cheaper nonrandomized tests might be combined using regression estimators in the interest of obtaining both accuracy and precision in a multisite trial (Boruch, 1976). Finally, benefit may accrue on one hand from the fact that *some* quasi-experimental designs can yield less equivocal estimates of program effects than an experiment that fails on account of unspecifiable attrition. On the other hand, the well-executed randomized test may illuminate data generated by quasi-experiments in which inferences are more ambiguous. A technology of contingency designs does not yet exist. It should.

More generally, it is not clear whether and how to design for sequential trials in which randomized tests alternate with nonrandom tests in the interest of accommodating guinea pig effects and other problems induced perhaps by randomized experiments but not by nonrandomized tests. It is not clear how one ought to design simultaneous randomized and nonrandomized trials in anticipation of internal analyses that must ignore the randomization feature but that are used to inform policy. Nor is it clear how to decide whether combining estimates of effect is warranted and how to combine when confronted with a set of ostensibly independent trials of varying levels of quality. Pillemer and Light (1979) are assaulting the problem in education, and Smith et al. (1980) are doing so for psychotherapeutic studies.

A different aspect of this issue concerns the use of both conventional analysis of variance and structural analysis of data from randomized experiments. Each employs different assumptions and variables and so influences technical research design. Each may differ in implications.

The Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME), for instance, were designed as randomized field tests to estimate the effects of new income subsidy programs on the work activity of recipients of income subsidies. The effects of a subsidy on labor supply are addressed using simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) models and more elaborate structural models by Robins and West (1981). The basic ANOVA provides interpretable evidence that there is a work disincentive effect for some groups; in other words, subsidy lowers hours worked. It exploits randomization to make the cause and effect relation clear. The structural models also exploit this known directionality and relation. But they incorporate more theory into analysis to help one understand why this result occurs—that is, how the results fit into a larger framework of economic theory—and they help one compare the field test results with conclusions based on earlier nonexperimental work. The structural models employ continuous, theoretically important variables such as net wage rate and net change in disposable income to represent unmeasurable latent variables rather than dummy variables or continuous variables that register receipt of treatment. For an illustration from field tests on postprison subsidy in Texas and Georgia, see Rossi et al. (1980).

The point of the example is that analyses of data from orthodox randomized experiments can benefit from application of multiple approaches, such as ANOVA and structural models. Each makes different assumptions and illuminates findings in a different way. That some sophisticated methods, such as structural modeling and path analysis, have developed independent of experimental design should not prevent their exploitation in planning research.

Substantive Theory as a Research Design Issue

The state of the art in applied social research, especially evaluation, has advanced remarkably over the past few years. But it has not always been joined to substantive theory. On the one hand, theory has not often been used to advantage in designing innovative programs or their evaluation. On the other hand, the implications of the results of contemporary applied research for construction, rejection, or revision of theory are even less clear.

For example, Novaco and Monahan (1980) report that only 30 percent of the 235 community psychology research articles they examined had any direct link to substantive theory. The problem is particularly severe in intervention research, partly because of the relative youth of this kind of research. Reviews of the investigations suggest that they have rarely investigated the systems-level interventions that community theory implies (McClure et al., 1980).

On the other hand, implications of the results of contemporary applied research for theory construction, rejection, or revision are even less clear. Most community research has not been examined in this respect. Examples abound, even in literature reviews of research. Anthony et al. (1972), for example, review the research on efficacy of psychiatric rehabilitation but do not draw out implications for theory.

To illustrate a partial success, consider the efforts by the staff of the System Development Corporation to develop and evaluate new Upward Bound programs for disadvantaged youth. Their approach involved identifying over fifty theories of educational achievement and then selecting the half dozen most promising ones. The six theories would then be used to develop model programs that would be tested in the field. The range of theories at SDC's disposal was large, but not all such theories are independent. It included theories of racism that stress the influence of attitude toward minority groups to understanding how to develop education programs, for example, through alteration of teacher behavior. They included economic theories. For example, the theorists speculate that students choose alternatives that yield the greatest tangible good at lowest cost; therefore, a special program ought to minimize personal costs, through, say, subsidy of education, living expenses, and so on. They included affective, educational, and other theories.

It does not seem unreasonable to propose that for theories to be regarded as good, they should have strong implications for research design. A theory of educational achievement, for example, should be able to guide research in determining: (a) what hypotheses are plausible and testable and what concepts are important in their testing (Kaplan, 1964; Shadish, 1981); (b) what the proper target population is, such as children, families, or schools; (c) within population, which subgroups are most susceptible to change; (d) the likely size of a program effect, or maximum possible impact of a theory-based program; (e) the likely interactions between type of child and type of instruction, and reasonable blocking variables, such as race and SES; and (f) the likely level of corruption or dilution of the program and probable ceiling on imple-

mentation. Each of these has some obvious implications for design of an evaluation of a theory-based program. The fact of the matter is, however, that few theories are sufficiently elaborated and empirically supported to specify them well. Without specification, research designs will be less sensitive, less appropriate, and less informative than they could be.

The complementary view, stressing the implications of intervention studies for theory, is very poorly documented. We know a little: that the Negative Income Tax experiments, for example, have helped to refine economic theory. We know a little about how the two or three hundred educational evaluations can be used to adjust theory of cognitive growth in children. To learn more, it does not seem unreasonable to identify the highest-quality studies and to examine them for theoretical assumptions that underlie program development and for theoretical implications of the program evaluation. At the very least, the estimated size of the effect may imply a theoretical link between a variable and achievement simply cannot be found, and perhaps is not worth specifying the theory.

It is true also that field research, community-based or otherwise, has implications for a theory of accuracy in reporting. For example, Campbell (1975) proposed the notion that once a government begins officially to use certain data for decision making, one will observe some corruption of the data by the people providing it. Does community research yield results that support the theory? Does it help us to understand when and why it might be reasonable? To get at a related but distinct problem, Soderstrom et al. (1981) review the methological characteristics of conservation program evaluations, and Shadish (forthcoming) does a similar review of pregnancy-related programs. Both are designed to assist in design of future evaluations, and the work is likely to contribute eventually to better theory of evaluation in special contexts.

The practical implication of all this for research design is that both theorists and research designers are legitimate audiences for the products of research. In the simplest case, this means reports on results of community intervention research should be presented in professional forums. It also means that the information used to generate conclusions ought to be made available for reanalysis because it can be useful for both theoretician and practitioner. There are obstacles to this to be sure: researchers have few real incentives for documenting data well and making them available (Boruch et al., 1981). Nonetheless, it is crucial for increasing the utility of information.

The beginnings of a more cordial relation between theory and empirical field study have begun to emerge partly as a consequence of recent stress on meta-analysis. One combines studies to decide, among other things, how often or how well particular approaches work when tested repeatedly (Smith et al., 1980). There are lots of problems in the approach, to be sure. Quality control over the studies included in the sample and poor reporting is critical; lack of independence among studies is more subtle but important. Still, such work can be used to guess at the size of probable treatment effects, to inform research design decisions, particularly power calculations, and, with some elaboration, to inform theory development.

Structural Models and Causal Inference

A structural model is a statistical equation often used to represent a causal linkage among variables. The variables in the equations, their sequence and placement in causal chains, and their causal and noncausal relations are supposed to be based on decent theory, reasoning, and evidence. Because most social phenomena are complex, a number of compatible models are constructed to represent the observations. The approach does *not* demonstrate that A causes B. It merely helps determine

whether some causal linkages are consonant with the data; this is an old idea despite the new technology (Cooley, 1979; Magidson, 1977).

The approach is demanding and exploits information in an explicit way—that is partly where its merit lies. One must be plain in laying out each causal equation, so as to assure orderly thinking and, perhaps more important, to open the process to criticism. The approach is numerical, permitting quantitative statements about change and difference. It invites sequential testing and model fitting so that one gradually develops a verifiable and thoughtful characterization of reality rather than an unverifiable one. Finally, the advanced work encourages realism in recognizing errors in measurement and misspecification of models, problems that are not always treated in conventional texts (Joreskog, 1973, 1977, 1979).

There are some major disadvantages. Structural models may give considerably more mathematical legitimacy to data than the data deserve, as any analytic technology may do. It may then distract attention from alternative and better sources of evidence, such as good randomized field tests or ethnographic approaches, depending on the objective. It may obscure flaws: The difficulty of the mathematics is sufficient to prevent able criticism from the critic who is substantively expert but mathematically inept. Finally, the more powerful techniques are applicable only to large samples of individuals or institutions, especially when the social phenomena under examination are complex. This requirement often makes these techniques perfectly useless for many institutional projects.

All this is much easier talked about than done of course, and the appeals to theory are often scientifically pious and glib. An exception to the usual treatment that is laudable in some respects is Rossi et al.'s (1980) report on randomized field tests of income subsidy for men and women paroled from prison in Texas and Georgia. For instance, they recognize that though there are many theories of how crime is deterred, those theories are not pertinent to individuals who, like parolees, have not been deterred. Because little sociological theory is applicable to this group, the authors also exploited theory from economics. Economic theory is no better than others in laying out specific causal expectations, so the process of building little theory to understand parolee recidivism was tailored and ad hoc. (*Ad hoc* has a bad name, but remember splendid exploitation of the spirit by Watson and Crick in their search for DNA's structure). So, for instance, the sociological culture of dependence among ex-cons, the stereotypical ways that parolees spend their money and time, and the determinants of these are not clearly covered by economic theory. One can, as Rossi et al. did, exploit variables regarded as important in economic theory—allocation of time to work and leisure, job skills, and so on. One can be, as they were, sensitive to the commonsense idea that different outcome variables may imply different causal models, such as recidivism for property crimes versus disorderly conduct. Because most criminal theory is developed on the basis of data on males and because causal influences on recidivism can differ across gender (as work opportunity, training, time allocation, and so on differ), the authors try to determine if the models that stand for men are also applicable to women. Their post facto explanation may be wrong, but it is explicit, provocative, and can be independently reexamined.

Red Herrings and Red Flags

An alarming number of gratuitous squabbles occur in negotiating the design of community or social intervention research. Most are handled decently when both the research designer and client are armed with patience, a willingness to learn, *and*

ability. Still, one ought to be prepared for both illegitimate and legitimate assaults. A variety of common ones, including the following, are discussed in Boruch (1976). Here we discuss only two because they are chronic: the tension between qualitative and quantitative camps, and issues engendered by randomized experiments.

Quantitative versus Qualitative Research

The debate here typically involves those who advocate traditional qualitative methods for social research, using case studies or participant observation, for instance, and those who favor traditional quantitative methods such as randomized experiments or probability samples (see, for example, Guba and Lincoln, 1981). Only a little is new in this debate, despite the production of papers on the topic by essayists, arguments among interest groups, or grumbling by journalists who are often neither lexically nor numerically capable. Its early history is clear in Salvioni's "Ai Confini della Statistica," whose ideas were summarized by S. F. Weston in a 1892 issue of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. Salvioni stressed that statistical investigations are characterized by extensivity, that is, scope, rather than by the intensivity of methods of research more commonly used through the eighteenth century. He was politic in stressing the legitimacy of each approach, saying that "they are coordinate departments of investigation of social phenomena." But he evidently regarded the statistics as a clear advance in scientific knowing, insofar as conventional inquiry is often "satisfied with indeterminate knowledge while statistics give definite numerical expression to the facts collected" (1892: 261). At the time, he was right.

The claim made by the advocates of qualitative knowing, that the social researcher is misguided in not exploiting a qualitative approach, is based on the wrong premise: A qualitative view is always exploited, at least implicitly. It does not take much wit to see that the choice of hypotheses to be tested cannot be made solely on technical grounds. It depends on what is important about the program being tested and whether indeed it can be tested. Similarly, decisions about which response variables to measure depend on substantive understanding of what the program is supposed to do and how it is supposed to do it, decisions that often cannot be framed numerically. Judgments about whether the experiment is sensitive enough often depend as much on value and unverifiable experience as on computation.

The main issue here is not whether there is a pervasive qualitative theme to quantitative experiments. Obviously, there are several such themes. Nor is the issue whether the qualitative theme can be broadened, since no experiment or survey precludes relying on qualitative indicators of a social intervention's implementation or effect. The main issue appears to be the ways in which one might combine the two perspectives. Lacking general rules for resolving this, we can appeal to examples for insight.

Impressionistic information, for example, has been used nicely by Weikart and Banet (1975) and their colleagues to understand how teachers react to new compensatory education programs; still, the program's effects are appraised through randomized experiments. Anthropological studies have been adjoined to the randomized Experimental Housing Allowance Program to help us understand how well different types of government agencies can administer new income subsidy programs (Field, 1975). Similarly, process evidence has been collected in fertility control research to generate hypotheses about why contraception programs fail when there is reasonable experimental evidence that they have indeed failed. The virtue here is that bald intuitions and disciplined qualitative research are coupled at times with systematic

research designed to help verify those intuitions. This is not to imply that all researchers of a quantitative turn of mind recognize the qualitative ideas implicit in their efforts. Nor do we mean that qualitative approaches capitalize adequately on information that is primarily quantitative; qualitative evaluations have at times been needlessly parochial. But with more experience in applied social research there is likely to be an increasing emphasis on the benefit of joint approaches, as Campbell (1979), Cronbach (1982), and others suggest. Ignoring the duality will put community research in no better position to understand problems, much less to build solutions to them.

Randomized Experiments

Naive advocacy *and* rejection of randomized tests are commonplace. Opponents of randomized tests, for example, are often uninformed in presuming that random *selection* rather than random *assignment* to alternative programs is warranted, that a "no program" control condition is required, that programs cannot change during the experiment, that alternative statistical methods provide estimates of relative effect that are as interpretable as those generated in experiments, and so on. In fact, none of these bald claims is true. Though experimental tests are infrequent relative to other kinds of research, they have been mounted in communities to assay state court procedures in Virginia (Lynn, 1980), Utah (Glines and Byrd, 1978), California (Reis and Davis, 1980), and elsewhere to estimate effectiveness of bilingual-bicultural programs (Juarez and Associates, 1981), to understand whether health care modules increase satisfaction and improve health status in Michigan cities (Papsidero et al., 1979), determine how well alternatives to hospitalization work in caring for the mentally ill (Straw, 1982), and for other purposes. See Boruch et al. (1978) for a list of earlier work in these areas and in research on police, welfare subsidy, employment and training, and other topics.

The ingenuous advocate of experiments, on the other hand, believes that the estimates based on experiments are unequivocal, rather than that they are probabilistically unbiased; that experiments answer all questions that are of interest, rather than that they answer only one class of questions; and, often, that audiences for results are willing (or even able) to act on their estimates. The least informed advocate will presume that the thoughtful amateur can manage experiments. On the contrary, the likelihood of bringing a randomized field test about is probably of the same order of magnitude as mounting a successful new intervention. For instance, in only one of eight sites (East Los Angeles) dedicated to randomized tests of bilingual-bicultural programs were tests successfully executed; in three others, randomization was degraded; in the remaining four, sufficient numbers of children could not be found despite city predictions (Juarez and Associates, 1981). Less than one in three recent attempts to field test new Head Start programs succeeded, again because of management problems including time constraints. All this suggests that pilot tests must be used in the absence of precedent and experience.

The political, institutional, and ethical arguments and available evidence on randomization have been summarized elsewhere (see Boruch, 1976). They have been used, for instance, by Thomas Cook of the Research Triangle Institute in developing randomized trials of urban programs for ex-addicts. The point is that the researcher also needs to be aware of specious arguments for and against experiments. They can be damaging and certainly distract attention from more important issues.

Research Design Under Ethical and Legal Constraints

Field research *often* engenders no serious conflict between scientific interests and legal or ethical standards. The conflicts that occasionally emerge can be vexing, however. If they remain unresolved, they make research difficult or impossible. The serious problems that have appeared concern experimentation and individual privacy.

Over the past ten years, a variety of solutions to such problems have been developed, and it behooves the thoughtful researcher to learn about them. For any given problem, assuring individual privacy, for instance, the solutions are partial: They will satisfy some interests but not others. They are multiple in the sense that generically different techniques have been developed to resolve issues and they are improved periodically.

Consider the randomized experiment, for example, to estimate the effects of new programs, components, or program variations, relative to control programs. It is often attacked on grounds that randomized assignment puts some research participants in jeopardy. The solutions, apart from redesigning research, that researchers *must* be aware of in order to avoid inappropriate compromises in design include legal ones. Law can be specific in authorizing, *not* demanding, randomized tests (for example, Section 505 of the Social Security Amendments of 1980, Section 222 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972). The courts have upheld the government's right to experiment where certain conditions are met to assure needs of the research participant or client for services are protected, notably through IRBs—*Aguoyo* v. *Richardson, California Welfare Rights Organization* v. *Richardson,* and others (Breger, 1983). For community research supported by private rather than public sponsors, foundation rules are applicable; they do not have the authority of law, but they are influential. The Johnson Foundation's attention to quality in research design, for instance, is thoughtful and worth imitation by other foundations when their resources are sufficient.

Empirical work has also been done to assure that spurious ethical and legal arguments are not unknowingly accepted as a constraint on design. For instance, Gilbert et al. (1977) estimate the likelihood of success in innovative surgery, and Gordon and Morse (1975) do so for social programs. The implication of their results is that ethical claims about risks of being deprived of innovation are specious to the extent that innovation is as likely to hurt as it is to help. Still other empirical approaches to resolving problems involve assaying attitudes toward randomization and capitalizing on them (see Boruch, 1982) and research on understanding level of informed consent (Riecken and Ravich, 1982).

Statutory or empirical approaches may satisfy. If not, a battery of designs might be exploited to meet both the researchers' interests in decent information and their interest in meeting legal and ethical standards. For example, randomization at the margin, that is, where individuals are equally likely to merit a resource, to be equally needy, or to be equally at risk, appears to have worked well in experiments on home versus hospital care for myocardial infarction victims in Britain, in community-based day-care and homemaker services for the elderly and chronically ill in the United States, and elsewhere. Other approaches, including so-called regression-discontinuity designs, are worth testing. But their utility in providing unbiased estimates of program effect in a variety of settings is not yet clear.

Meeting individual privacy interests in community research is also possible, using

statutory, procedural, or technical approaches. It is reasonable to expect researchers to understand, for example, the extent to which information on their respondents can be legally protected. Statutory protection has been worked out for some research in criminal justice, mental health, and health services that is supported by the federal government. New bills have been proposed to strengthen protection (Alexander, 1983; Boruch and Cecil, 1982). Where legal solutions are inappropriate or insufficient, the researcher can exploit procedural approaches that range from the use of aliases and brokers to complex insulated file systems for linking records from proprietary information systems. The approaches are often feasible, to judge from precedent; they can be strengthened to reduce their vulnerability to corruption.

Statistical techniques for assuring privacy in face-to-face interviews were reported in the 1960s by Stanley Warner. But only recently have they been recognized by social scientists and tested in field studies of fertility control, child abuse, alcohol and drug abuse, tax fraud, and other topics (Boruch and Cecil, 1979). More recent work exploits the methods for community telephone surveys, such as that of Lavrakas and Tyler (1982) on gun control in Skokie, Illinois, but the methods need to be tried out much more frequently. Some of the techniques, such as randomized response, involve the respondent's injecting his or her report with random error in a way that prevents the interviewer from knowing the actual state of the individual but permits sophisticated analyses. Other methods involve merely adding frequency of (say) charity donations to alcohol use, in one sample, and obtaining frequency of charity donations in a second sample, to generate two little equations that can be solved for the unknown frequency of alcohol use. Technical details on randomized response and other methods, and the empirical evidence for their utility, are reviewed in Boruch and Cecil (1979). The methods do have disadvantages. Some are useful only in large samples, all require some technical expertise to apply, and all are pertinent only to numerical data. The benefits—protection of individual privacy and often increased quality of response—need to be judged against those costs.

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5

Research Modes in Social and Community Change

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The purpose of this chapter is to present an alternative paradigm for carrying out research in social contexts. The methodological and conceptual issues are germane to the fields of evaluation research (Struening and Guttentag, 1975; Rossi et al., 1979), policy analysis (Nagel, 1977), social experimentation (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Fairweather and Tornatzky, 1977), social ecology (Insel and Moos, 1974), and therefore cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. Research in social contexts demands a set of conditions that we believe to be quite distinct from those encountered in traditional research settings. While some authors (e.g., Rossi et al., 1979) have stated that evaluation research is nothing more than the utilization of standard methodological tools in less than ideal environments, it will be argued that an expanded research paradigm is necessary to fulfill the unique needs of social scientists pursuing intervention research in social contexts.

The arguments presented here rest on demonstrating the uniqueness of conducting research in social contexts. First, the issues that distinguish social innovation research from traditional social research are described. Next, selected research paradigms are presented that currently dominate the fields of policy analysis, evaluation research, and related disciplines. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of existing paradigms, a hybrid model for social/community intervention research is proposed. This model attempts to combine the methods of exploratory and confirmatory paradigms within a longitudinal perspective. Major emphasis is placed on monitoring the salient outcroppings of social problem phenomena. It will be argued that such a hybrid model is essential to understanding the impact of contemporary social programs. Finally, the feasibility of operationalizing such a model is illustrated with two examples, the first in the area of diversion of juvenile offenders and the second in the area of energy conservation.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, RESEARCH FOCUS, AND RESEARCH GOALS

The last two decades have seen an emergence of participation of social scientists in various applied domains. Internal and external pressures on the traditional do-

mains of social science have increased the need for revision of theories, paradigms, and professional roles. The impetus for conducting research in social contexts was neither unitary in its focus nor motivated by consensus. The country's war on poverty, war on educational deprivation, and war on crime (e.g., President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967; Rappaport, 1977; Zigler and Valentine, 1979) all created tremendous demand for the involvement of social scientists in applied domains. The resulting fervor within the traditional disciplines of social science called into question the accepted domains and modes of inquiry, the strategies and tactics of intervention procedures, the political responsibility of the social scientist, and the scope of professional roles.

For instance, the changing role of the social scientist from researcher to activist/researcher is the result of such pressures. Traditionally, social scientists remained within the ideological and methodological frameworks of their particular disciplines. They collected data in order to develop and test mdels that identified or described natural laws. In contrast, many historical as well as contemporary advocates of new roles for researchers in social contexts point to the need for active participation in social change endeavors (e.g., Fairweather and Tornatzky, 1977; Heller and Monahan, 1977; Neitzel et al., 1977). Such social changes have usually been aimed at enhancing human living conditions, providing equitable resources and effective services to disenfranchised groups, and so forth. The recently rediscovered role of activist/researcher implies that researchers have a responsibility not only to deal with socially relevant topics but to be directly concerned with the utility, implementation, and ultimate dissemination of scientific findings (Campbell, 1969; Fairweather, 1967; Heller and Monahan, 1977; Rappaport, 1977).

An important implication of this role change involves the goals of research. A distinction can be made between hypothesis *testing* and hypothesis *generation* or exploration. McGuire (1973) and others have expounded on the perceived overemphasis on hypothesis-testing methodology and ideology at the expense of sophisticated approaches to generating quality hypotheses for appropriate tests. Such statements have concerned the premature application of sophisticated testing paradigms to underdeveloped hypotheses. These concerns are especially pertinent to methods of research in social contexts. The complexity of the phenomena often addressed, the lack of control likely in the applied setting, and the pitfalls of existing measurement modalities all highlight these concerns.

Beyond issues that relate to the utilization of research findings, considerations unique to the social context must be accounted for. The domain of research involving naturalistic settings and encompassing a wide variety of content or problem areas, demands that the social scientist be equipped with research paradigms robust to the task at hand. Conducting research in a diversity of settings (e.g., education, mental health, environmental degradation, energy conservation, criminal justice) demands that research paradigms accommodate views of human behavior that focus on characteristics of the individual, as well as characteristics of environments, and person-environment interactions. Measurement methods must also accommodate the assessment of change within each of these dimensions. Because naturalistic settings are often viewed as open social systems, as opposed to closed institutional or experimental settings, there is a need to examine impacts of interventions at multiple levels (Kelly, 1972). For example, an intervention aimed at changing classroom procedures should not only be examined at the level of individual students in that classroom, but must also include the level of classroom environment, teacher/student interactions, relationships to the school building, the social system, and the like. Kelly stated that

> *it is not enough to be paid for service, the service must change the system. . . . We know very little about how the social context effects persons, and we know less about how to find out. To create knowledge of the social context is the most important single challenge . . .* [*1972: 123*].

While Kelly and other authors have emphasized the need to examine systemic level events when one starts with an individual focus, the reverse is also true. A good deal of contemporary policy analysis examines only the question of systemic level change without examining the impact at the individual or group level. The overall thrust of such statements has resulted in a considerable expansion of the appropriate scope of inquiry.

A final implication of conducting research in the social context concerns questions of values and professional loyalties. At the very core of the issue is the notion that research and practice are, by their very nature, value laden. Thus, by intention or otherwise, such research and practice have important political implications (e.g., Cronbach, 1975; Rappaport, 1977). The basic argument has been that powerful groups have had the benefit of social scientists advocating their position and the time has come to balance the scales (Weber and McCall, 1978). At a minimum, it is demanded that social scientists be explicit about their values and loyalties. This demand for honesty applies to the theoretical assumptions and goals for a program of research and intervention (Davidson and Rappaport, 1977).

It can be seen from this brief description that as social scientists have returned to the conduct of research in social contexts, a multitude of demands have and will continue to press on existing research paradigms. If such research paradigms are to account for human behavior from multiple societal levels, assess longitudinal developmental processes, be used in naturalistic settings, provide maximally interpretable and useful data, provide a base for advocacy, and provide conclusions and policy implications, new approaches will be necessary. With even the most superficial consideration of such issues, it is not difficult to discern the basis for the existing turmoil concerning the adequacy of contemporary research models.

COMMON RESEARCH METHODS AND MODELS

A particularly serious problem for the social/community researcher has been the use of relatively simplistic, static approaches to measurement in the face of the enormous complexity of the phenomena of interest. To make this point in more detail, this section will briefly review existing major research methods. Experimental, quasi-experimental, environmental-ecological, and ethnographic models of assessing social and community change will be examined. It should be noted from the outset that the following brief review is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, the intent is to provide an overview of the major methodological approaches that presently dominate the field.

The Experimental Model

This model of research draws heavily on the work of Campbell and Stanley (1966), Campbell (1969), and Fairweather (1967). Use of the experimental model purports to provide strong inferences about the causal relationship between variables of interest through random selection of individuals from a population, random

assignment of individuals to experimental or control conditions, systematic manipulation of independent variables, and presumed consistency of extraneous variables across conditions. Thus, the model seems particularly well-suited to the evaluation of planned social innovations.

The traditional form of the experimental model is the pretest/posttest control group design. The most common application of the model in social contexts would be the comparison of a social innovation with one or more control conditions. It should be noted that the control conditions can be either a no-intervention control group, or a control group that receives the traditional treatment. The researcher would preassess the sample of interest and then randomly assign individuals to the experimental and control groups. After the implementation of the intervention, postassessments are taken on the experimental and control groups. If after analysis, an acceptable level of statistical significance is achieved, the resultant group differences, differences between pre- and postassessments, or interactions between the groups and time of assessment are attributed to the experimental intervention. If the researcher adheres to the requirements of the experimental model, then the certainty of the causal inferences will be very strong.

From the perspective of the social/community researcher, the advantage of this model is that of active control over an intervention and maximally interpretable outcomes. The primary disadvantage is that active control of the phenomenon of interest is not always possible. In addition, assessment of multiple levels or dynamic aspects of the intervention process are not usually included.

Quasi-Experimental Policy Analysis Model

One of the better examples of quasi-experimental designs is the time series analysis. In addition to receiving support from Campbell and Stanley (1966) on a variety of methodological grounds, the time series design has the potential for wide applicability. That is, the design is amenable to use with either macro or micro levels of data and thus can be utilized by a wide variety of disciplines. Originally derived from an experimental design that characterized nineteenth-century physical sciences, the time-series model has more recently been used by researchers to assess the effects of some naturally occurring event. Like the experimental model, use of the time-series design allows the researcher to make causal inferences about the relationship between two variables of interest. Although random assignment, active manipulation, and control groups are possible (and preferred) with the time-series model, the model can also be utilized when none of the above elements are possible. Repeated measurements of the target behavior before and after the policy change (independent variable) are examined to reveal any causal connection. Thus, the number and reliability of measurements becomes vitally important to the design (Box and Jenkins, 1976; McCleary and Hay, 1980; see Miller and Glass, Chapter 6, this volume).

In its most common application, a comparison would be made between behavior occurring in time periods prior to the implementation of a new policy or social program and behavior occurring in time periods after the implementation. In the case of policy or legal changes, the measurements on the target behavior would be collected after the policy initiation, but would cover pre- and postperiods (ex post facto model). There are more complex variations of the time-series model involving multiple comparison groups and temporary or continuous events, but the principle of multiple observations remains. Once data has been collected, the researcher examines it for

definite changes in level or direction associated with the policy change. The results can be presented in graphic form, but statistical analysis specifically designed for the time-series model is usually required. As with the experimental model, if significant changes are observed then the effect is attributed to the policy change. Generally, the strength of the causal inferences will vary with the degree of control that the researcher can exert over sources of variation.

The Environmental-Ecological Model

What we have called the environmental-ecological model encompasses two related approaches to assessing the impact of environmental variables on behavior. Moos (1975), whose work best represents the first approach, has been concerned with the assessment of perceived environmental demands or press. Barker (1968), whose work best represents the second approach, has been involved with the assessment of the natural rules for behavior in a particular setting. Other environmental aspects addressed by these approaches include physical and architectural environments, organizational structure, psychosocial and organizational climates, the reinforcement contingencies that operate in a setting, and the average background characteristics associated with individuals in an environment (Moos and Insel, 1974). These approaches are generally passive in nature, not requiring the manipulation of variables; however, experimental techniques have been used to supplement environmental-ecological assessments. The results of these methodologies are descriptions of environmental characteristics associated with behavior or perceptions. It should be noted, however, that while the approaches do not focus on change or the effects of change, the techniques developed could be utilized within an action paradigm (see chapter by Moos and Lemke in this volume).

A researcher applying the methodology developed by Moos would examine a single environment, or compare two or more environments. Questionnaires administered to those involved in the setting would be utilized to determine environmental dimensions reflective of the social climate, that is, involvement, support, autonomy. The findings could be applied in various ways: to examine differences between intended and perceived environments (Moos, 1975), give systematic feedback to setting participants (Insel and Moos, 1974), or assess the relationship between social climates and setting outcomes (Moos et al., 1973). A researcher interested in a comprehensive description of behavior in a setting would use Barker's methods. The setting of interest could range from the level of the community to a single office space. Trained observers, through the use of behavior-setting surveys, record what individuals do in a setting rather than assessing their feelings or perceptions. Therefore, longitudinal observations result in behaviors not related to specific individuals, but to the setting. The methodology depends upon the construction of sufficiently inclusive networks of observations to rule out the influence of extraneous variables, for example, specific individuals.

This methodology meshes very well with some of the tenets of social/community researchers. The emphasis is upon the effects of the person-environment interaction rather than the individual in isolation. In addition, for Moos's approach, the perceptions of setting participants are considered important and valid. The two major problems posed by the model for the community researcher involve the passive nature of the approach and the lack of assessment of multiple levels. The individual by definition becomes irrelevant as a source of variation in Barker's model.

The Ethnographic Model

Dominant as a research methodology in cultural anthropology since at least the 1920s, the objective of ethnographic fieldwork is a comprehensive understanding and accounting of a particular culture or subculture. The goal of rendering an account of a particular group's view of reality is achieved through a long-term association with the culture in its territory (i.e., participant observation). As with the environmental-ecological model, the method focuses on detailed descriptions rather than manipulations of variables. However, ethnographers are not only concerned with environments or behaviors, but they are also concerned with the phenomenology of the culture (that is, the meaning that is ascribed to events or people by members of the culture). Unlike the Barker ecological model, ethnographers must be active observers, not merely recorders of behaviors. They must interact with the members of their target group, although they do not intervene. Thus, the result of an ethnography is one researcher's description of group members' behavior, environment, and feelings or perceptions. To accomplish the ethnography, researchers may use various techniques: questionnaires, surveys, archival data sources, conversations, and observations. Unlike previously described research models, ethnographers collect and interpret data simultaneously, constantly verifying the accuracy of their observations and interpretations.

Social/community researchers would apply this method in order to understand the group in which a social innovation is to be or has been implemented. This would require that they become participants of the group. Initial informal interviews asking about daily routines or life histories provide the basis for behavioral observations that confirm or refute the ethnographers' interpretations of the interviews. Field notes, which are generally more informal than the behavioral observations, can also be used to confirm or refute data gathered. As a final step in the ethnography, researchers attempt to systematically test their findings by asking group members to role-play or repond verbally to real or hypothetical situations. Again, the goal is to confirm previous interpretations of data. Using this method, researchers could assess the amenability of a situation for a social innovation, generate ideas for social programs, or assess the functioning of some social intervention. The benefit of the ethnographic approach is that it attempts to describe complex, dynamic, and multilevel situations. As with the environmental-ecological model, however, there has been a lack of use of this method with active change efforts. Again, this is not impossible, it has just not typically been done.

The primary obstacle to using this method involves the certainty of interpretations. While many of the techniques of the method are aimed at verifying interpretations, replicability of results with a different ethnographer remains problematic. Differences in the sampling of members of the culture or differences in ethnographic style can lead to major controversies over interpretations of cultures (e.g., Agar, 1980).

Critical Examination of Major Models

While the brief prior review is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive, the four models represent major traditions of research methodology available to the activist/researcher. The experimental model gains legitimacy by control and direct attempts at establishing interpretable causal inferences. The quasi-experimental model at-

tempts to establish causal relationships when the researcher has less control over the research situations. The environmental-ecological model represents the methods of an individual differences prediction scheme, historically prominent in psychology, applied to environmental characteristics along with the traditions of systematic observation. Ethnography provides a rich perceptual description of events and processes by an individual deeply involved in the situation in question. Each of these models is a set of minitraditions within research in social contexts.

At this point one might conclude one of two things. First, it is obvious that the methodological traditions available to the social/community researcher are quite different. Each offers strengths and weaknesses, and individual activist/researchers will have to select the method most appropriate for their own situation or profession. This would appear to be the situation in which the field stands currently. Single-method efforts are the rule rather than the exception. However, if the field is to approximate the goals it has set for itself rather than stagnate within the traditions of normal science, single-method research is not indicated. Alternatively, one might conclude that the field must await the conceptualization of some new method of inquiry to adequately address the questions the field has proposed. Unfortunately, the pressing nature of the social problems being addressed does not comfortably allow such a stance (Fairweather, 1972).

As a third alternative, we suggest that more systematic inquiry utilize a hybrid of the methods available. We propose using a combination of experimental, quasi-experimental, environmental-ecological, and ethnomethodological research methods.

A HYBRID MODEL

Assumptions

Given that the goal of the proposed hybrid model is to provide methods that deal with the issues outlined above, it is important to understand the model's assumptions. First, the position is taken that the current state of the field demands an equal investment in the traditions of confirmation and discovery. That is, hypothesis generation and testing are both necessary, but neither alone is sufficient. The second assumption is that the field has the social and professional responsibility to design research that will provide maximally interpretable outcomes. In short, adherence to the goal of providing internally valid research should continue to be emphasized. This is the basis for the experimental component of the model. Within the view of the goals detailed, the confirmatory component of the model provides the least hope of fruitful scientific inquiry but the most hope of producing research upon which sound policy decisions can be based. The research process must focus equally on longitudinal, exploratory, and participant-oriented measurement methods. While no specific measurement method is dictated, it is further assumed that multiple methods (questionnaires, observation, interviews, archival records) need to be included. It is suggested that our measurement paradigms go inside the black box of programs, problems, or settings they are investigating and examine the processes linking program intervention with outcome. It is anticipated that examining processes will necessitate continual fluctuation between strictly empirical and experiential modes. Examination of convergence and divergence between these modes will provide a rich base of information.

Implications for Designing Research

Simply stated, designs are needed that incorporate experimental and exploratory components. Regardless of the initial unit of analysis (individuals, groups, or organizations), monitoring components of the design must focus on the original sampling unit plus the operation of variables at other levels. It is also absolutely necessary that the experimental component of the proposed model suffer no intentional relaxation in the original criteria established for true experiments: random assignment, systematic manipulation of independent variables, and control of extraneous variables. The basic experimental-control design with pre-, post-, and follow-up intervals is viewed as a central component of the hybrid model.

The exploratory components of the model will undoubtedly draw more heavily on the measurement strategies determined by the particular type of research problem. The beginnings of the exploratory component are quite similar to the notions of manipulation checks prominent in social psychology research laboratories (e.g., Wuebben, 1968) and field settings (Cook and Campbell, 1979). However, much more is intended here than is implied by the term manipulation check. The complexity of many social intervention programs necessitates a dramatic broadening of this notion. Even given the most strenuous attempts at standardization, considerable variability in the implementation of social programs will exist (Rogers, 1978). This variation could be a source of new information which can then be examined in relation to intervention outcome. Second, the manipulation check notion will need to be expanded. Developing systematic assessments from the perspective of participants can provide extensive new sources of information. A similar approach would be taken with those actually carrying out the manipulation (e.g., program staff). Such assessments should focus on the internal qualities of the intervention and the relationship of these qualities to other institutions, organizations, critical individuals, historical events, or outcomes. Finally, the exploratory component must include longitudinal monitoring of concomitant events at other levels of behavior. This is often construed as measuring the impact of a social program on a systemic level. However, the impact of a social program on relevant social systems is actually only one specific case of the general strategy intended. The results of radiating impact (e.g., Kelly, 1972) to levels of behavior surrounding the intended effects should be assessed.

The goal of the proposed hybrid model is an expansion and liberalization of the methodological suggestions outlined by Cronbach (1957, 1975) in two influential papers. In an attempt to further specify the implications of the proposed hybrid model for planning research designs, Figure 5.1 represents a model hybrid design. This design calls for random assignment of target individuals (or groups, organizations, and so on) to intervention A and to control condition B. Further, it calls for pre-, post-, and longitudinal follow-up assessment of relevant outcome variables on multiple measures. The assessments are designated by O. The T symbols represent longitudinal tracing of participants in the intervention. The focus is on the operation of the intervention, its organizational functioning, its interaction with other participant related events, and its relationship to other historical events. The P symbols represent similar assessments of the service providers or deliverers of the intervention. A unique focus here would be on intraorganizational phenomena not observable by the participant. The S symbol represents longitudinal monitoring of two categories of phenomena. The first are the intended systemic impacts of the intervention. The second are the relationships of the intervention to other social systems, organizational groups, historical phenomena, and so forth.



NOTES: S = systems assessment T = participant assessment P = provider assessment
A = experimental condition B = control condition O = outcome assessment
R = random assignment

FIGURE 5.1 Hybrid Model Research Design

Implications for Assessment Strategies

Currently, measurement procedures of sufficient scope or specificity to handle the many social problem areas, situations, and populations addressed in contemporary social contexts are not available. One major implication of the hybrid model is that measurement development will necessarily become part of research efforts occurring simultaneously with intervention development, initiation, and evaluation. A corollary of this implication is that measurement procedures may become highly idiosyncratic. For example, item wording and category definitions will need to reflect the specifics of the program and the situation being investigated. While the creation of measurement procedures during research creates problems for the confirmatory components of the model, it is essential to the exploratory focus. In short, a philosophy of measurement placing major emphasis on construct validation rather than operational identity will be necessary.

A second major implication is that measurement procedures must allow maximum input by participants in the designing of assessment procedures. While this suggestion is hardly new or unique, having been offered by several previous authors (e.g., Caplan and Nelson, 1973; Goodwin and Tu, 1975), it has rarely been implemented. As mentioned earlier, the participants' perceptions in a given social context provide an excellent tracer of events. If measurement procedures are determined prior to the study, any information from participants will generally be ignored. It should not be inferred that what is being suggested is a freewheeling narrative of participants' impressions. Rather, it is suggested that participants' perceptions can provide as legitimate a base for empirical measurement construction and validation as do theoretical perspectives or existing standard measures in the field.

A third major implication is that multiple variables will have to be considered in any particular research and, further, that their operation should be assessed through multiple modalities. Convergence across measurement source and critical examination of the relationships between variables provides the most hopeful direction for accurately reflecting the impact, operation, and processes of social interventions (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).

A final implication for measurement procedures involves a heavy reliance on replication. However, more than standard notions of direct replication are intended. Earlier, the need for setting specific measurement construction was emphasized. However, the processes and principles observed with such methods will obviously have low generalizability. It could be argued that this may have the effect of severely limiting external validity. However, the goals of naturalistic, longitudinal, maximally interpretable, participant-oriented research may also lead to more generalizable principles. Replicating the principles of intervention, relationship to historical events, and radiating impact will enhance the generalizability of research findings.

APPLICATION OF THE HYBRID MEASUREMENT MODEL

The detailing of an alternative hybrid model of inquiry has thus far been intentionally general and prescriptive. To clarify the proposed model, this section will provide two examples of the application of the model's principles. The first example will describe an innovative program in the juvenile justice system. The second example will describe a major policy change in the area of energy conservation. These two examples were selected as representative of intervention research in social contexts. The research concerning a diversion program for juvenile offenders originally started with an individual focus. It represents an example of the bottom-up approach to applying the hybrid research design model. The second example on energy conservation represents a top-down approach. Two studies in the area of energy conservation are used as the basis of a hypothetical example. Major attention will be given to those aspects of the research exemplifying the proposed hybrid model.

From Individuals to Systems—Application in the Field of Criminal Justice

The project in question involved diverting adolescent delinquents from the juvenile justice system at the point of arrest (Davidson et al., 1977; Ku and Bleu, 1977). In lieu of formal juvenile court processing, youth referred to the project were paired with college student volunteers on a one-to-one basis. The research was actually con-

ducted over several years. Given the project's multiple foci and its community research concerns, a hybrid model of change was employed. The research design and modes of measurement had multiple foci. First, it was concerned with the relative efficacy of a specific volunteer-based intervention approach to adolescent delinquents. Every effort was made to experimentally evaluate outcomes while at the same time examining the project's salient processes and relationship to other social systems, specifically the impact on the juvenile justice system. Second, it was concerned with the impact of diversion-based services on the prevention of delinquency. Finally, it was focused on systemic change by providing an alternative disposition for police juvenile officers.

Experimental Component

The design was experimental in nature. Delinquent youth were randomly assigned, according to a stratification procedure to control for sex, race, and order of referral, to an experimental diversion alternative or an outright release control condition. Preassessment on four major self-report measures in the delinquency area were administered at court intake (prior to random assignment to condition) to the referred youth, his or her parents, and a nominated peer. The same procedures were followed at the postassessment. In addition, police, court, and school records were checked for the year prior to the project, the intervention interval, and one and two years following termination of the program. The experimental conditions involved one-on-one assignment to an undergraduate student who had been extensively trained in the methods of behavioral contracting (Stuart, 1971) and child advocacy (Davidson and Rapp, 1976).

Exploratory Component

In addition to the experimental design, the research included extensive longitudinal exploratory elements The core of the exploratory component involved extensive interviews with the program participants at approximately 6-week intervals throughout the 18-week duration of the program. The interviews were conducted with the youth, his or her parents, the student providing the intervention, and the graduate student supervising the student service provider. A second component involved monitoring the decision-making processes of the juvenile justice system with which the project was involved.

Perspectives of the program participants. The exploratory methods had several aims. They were to provide extensive information about the operation of the project and its relationship to other historical events. They were also to be primarily focused on information, perceptions, and behaviorally specific observations in terms of the perspective of the program participants. Initially it was difficult to get the interviewers to grasp the notion that what they were going after was highly descriptive information from the perspective of the participants. They had all been well trained in a more closed model of research in which the investigator prioritizes variables of interest and provides a detailed interview schedule. At the end of training and pilot interviews, the interviewers had developed a rather global outline of the areas to be included in the interview and the notion of the open-ended interviews that could lead to highly specific information through sequential probing of the participants.

At the first wave of exploratory assessment, the interviewer began questioning a

"youth system" (youth, parent, student, supervisor). The goal was to detail what was going on in the fabric of the youth's life (e.g., family, school, employment, free time), including the intervention. The primary object of these interviews was to describe in detail what the youth did, how the project was involved or not involved, and what other interactions he or she was having with significant social systems.

All of the interviews were audiotaped to facilitate the interviewer's maximal involvement in the interview process. Following completion of the first wave of interviews, the audiotapes provided the basis for generating an extensive list of participant-generated items for the interviewers to rate on each youth. Each tape was reviewed and an information inventory taken. The interviewer transcribed every piece of information provided by the participants in the terms that the participants had described it. This resulted in an extensive list of items that was submitted to a subsequent item inventory. The original set of nearly 2000 items was reduced to approximately 1200 items through combining items with similar content and removing highly idiosyncratic items. The second and third waves of process assessment were accomplished in a similar fashion. Following completion of all three waves of interviews, the interviewers then reviewed the audiotapes and made ratings on all items for all sources for each of the three time periods.

Monitoring juvenile justice system decision-making processes. The second major element of the exploratory component of the model involved monitoring juvenile justice system decision-making processes. The research addressed the question: "What impact did the initiation of the Diversion Project have on the processing of juvenile offenders?" In order to examine this question, the monthly dispositional summaries of the police department were recorded for 24 months preceding the project and for 12 months following its operation. The dispositional patterns were examined by treating the data within a time-series framework (McCleary and Hay, 1980). Results from the analysis indicated the project was in fact reducing the proportion of youth processed by the juvenile justice system.

Nature of referred youth. In a later replication of the project (Saul, 1981), the system-impact component of the evaluation was expanded to look more closely at the types of youth referred to the project. Additional investigative measures were included to examine concerns that diversion programs may actually widen the nets of the justice system by accepting for referral youths who would otherwise have been merely warned and released from the system (Blomberg, 1980; Klein, 1979). A focus on the radiating impact of social programs is essential to producing maximally interpretable outcomes. The replication experiment involved a court-level diversion project, such that issues of referral were focused on the behavior of court intake referees. The net-widening issue was investigated in four ways:

(1) Examination of the eventual dispositions of control group cases sent back to court referees for an alternative disposition.
(2) Analysis of referee/referral questionnaires in which referees were asked to give their preferred alternative dispositions for youths sent to the diversion program.
(3) Discriminant analysis of a random sample of court cases and subsequent classifications of diversion referrals based on their similarities to the sample as categorized by dispositional type (dismissed, informal probation, or formal processing).
(4) Time-series analysis of juvenile court system processing rates for four years prior to the project and three years following its inception.



FIGURE 5.2 Example Hybrid Design

Contrary to the earlier project, it appeared that only about one-quarter to one-third of the diversion referrals were actually in jeopardy of formal court handling, a finding that indicated some degree of net-widening was occurring.

Summary

While detailed presentation of the specific results of the diversion research is well beyond the scope of this chapter, highlights of the results and the general strategy followed are exemplary of the approach suggested. As noted in Figure 5.2, several aspects of the ideal hybrid model outlined earlier were employed. The project involved experimental examination of program outcome, systematic monitoring of its operation, and examination of its impact on the relevant social system.

The research on juvenile diversion programs provides a clear example of the importance of a multiple-method, multiple-level approach to evaluation. The outcome-oriented experimental component of the analysis indicated the effectiveness of the program in reducing recidivism compared to the control group. However, the process-oriented experiential component added clarity to the results and gave some indications as to *why* and *how* the intervention worked the way it did. For example, recent analyses of the process data suggested that the more parents attempted to control their youth, the greater likelihood there was of the youth recidivating (Parisian, 1982). Beyond these individual-level concerns, the research produced additional information regarding diversion's system-level impact. For example, it appeared that diversion did not reduce the case load of the court, as would be expected if court officials were in fact diverting those youth they would have ordinarily processed (Saul, 1981).

Without this there would have been no way to evaluate the program's effectiveness in changing the way justice system officials process juveniles in legal jeopardy. Additionally, there would have been no clues as to whether diversion clients had been truly diverted from the justice system or were, in fact, victims of net-widening.

From Systems to Individuals: Levels of Measurement for Evaluating Electric Utility Load Management Programs

The hybrid model of measurement also applies to interventions designed primarily to have a system-level impact. Examples of such interventions occur frequently in the area of electric energy conservation. Several interventions have been developed in this field as a means of affecting the overall, system-wide pattern of electricity usage in a utility service area. While these interventions work through individual customers, the major outcome criteria concern their effects on the utility system demand for power.

Electric utilities often face problems of high peak loads—high system-wide demand for power—at particular times of the day or of the year. Electric load management programs can take several forms, including rate structure changes (time-of-day, or time-of-use rates) and direct load control by the utility (interruptible service). With time-of-day (TOD) rates, customers pay considerably more for their electricity during peak hours of the day. This load-management technique should therefore induce a shift of some electricity usage to off-peak hours and enable the utility to avoid the large strain on its generating capacity usually occurring during the peak usage periods. Direct load control (DLC) allows the utility to have central control over certain major customer electrical equipment, such as water heaters and central air conditioners. Using radio signals, the utility shuts off the power to this equipment for a few hours during periods of system peak demand.

Social scientists need to understand the various dynamics of load-management programs in order to conduct adequate evaluations. Application of the hybrid, multimethod model of measurement can help ensure that evaluators cover all aspects of the interventions. Evaluation of a load-management program may seem deceptively simple. One can initiate the program and compare peak energy demand between participants and nonparticipants. However, concentration on simple outcome measures is likely to obscure important process variables and perhaps lead to faulty interpretation of the data. Concentration on the system-level impact of the intervention may be done at the expense of significant individual-level processes that can profoundly change the meaning of the findings.

With this perspective in mind, the various levels and types of data needed for a comprehensive evaluation can now be discussed. Much of what follows relies on two recent important articles on load management programs—one that discussed problems in TOD studies (Messé and Crano, 1981) and one that discusses problems in DLC studies (Dyer, 1981). These articles reported on some specific programs, while the present treatment of the issue is intended to be general and hypothetical in nature. Each area of evaluation will be discussed in turn.

Extent of Program Participation

For load-management interventions to have a significant effect on system peak load, there must be considerable participation by customers in the utility's service area. Since participation is usually voluntary, it is necessary to measure more than just the total number of participants. Volunteers are typically different from nonvolunteers, and a useful evaluation should provide some information as to why people chose to volunteer. In summary, the following types of data should be collected:

- rate of response to the program
- reasons for participation
- reasons for nonparticipation
- comparisons of participants versus nonparticipants on demographic, descriptive, and attitudinal variables
- extent, type, and response to program marketing strategies
- customer expectations of program's system impact
- customer expectations of program's individual impact
- customer preferences about utility system planning options: comparisons of preferences for new power plants, load-management techniques, conservation programs, rate changes, use of renewable energy devices, and the like
- customer awareness and knowledge of utility system planning options

These expectation and preference data could be correlated with participation rate to shed further light on reasons for volunteering.

Participant Awareness and Knowledge of Program

Once a customer volunteers and begins the program it is often assumed that the customer is fully aware of how the program operates. However, as shown in Messé and Crano (1981), this is not always the case. Some participants in TOD programs have not even been aware that they were paying more money for usage of electricity during peak hours, and therefore did not change their usage patterns accordingly. People who were aware of the price differential made significant usage shifts to off-peak times, but the total effect was small because so many had not done so. Mere calculation of system-level outcome results can therefore ignore this important finding and lead to improper conclusions about potential program impact. Thus, researchers should perform what is in essence a manipulation check—finding out if the group receiving the program is actually implementing it as intended. To this end, the following types of data need to be collected:

- participant knowledge of program details including rate changes, rate differentials, hours of implementation, equipment affected by DLC interruptions, and so on
- participant behavior related to household electricity use: thermostat settings, timing of major appliance use, use of auxiliary fans if air conditioning service is interrupted, and so on

Participant and nonparticipant behavior concerning electricity usage should ideally be collected such that a pre- versus postprogram analysis can be performed.

Participant Acceptance and Satisfaction

In addition to finding out whether the participants know about the program and are acting accordingly, it is important to find out how they like it. Dissatisfaction can lead to program subterfuge and the unlikelihood that participants will remain in the program or encourage others to do so. If load-management programs remain mostly voluntary, customer acceptance will continue to be a prime consideration. In this respect, the following types of data should be collected:

- customer rating of satisfaction with the program
- customer perception of benefits of program (e.g., Did customer get lower rates for shifting to off-peak usage or agreeing to have interruptible service?)
- customer perception of value of incentives to program participation (some load-management programs offer incentives to participate, such as rate rebates, free equipment maintenance, and so on)
- customer perception of comfort and convenience due to program participation (e.g., Did customer notice when water heater service was interrupted? Did customer mind changing to a different laundry time?)
- customer willingness to remain in program and at what cost to the utility? (e.g., What other incentives are necessary?)
- customer promotion of the program to friends and neighbors

Measurement of these variables will give valuable information about the likelihood that the program can be done on a large scale—and ultimately have significant system impact. Note, of course, that this determination requires data collection at the individual level.

System Impact of Program

This is obviously the most significant area of measurement. Utility planners will want to determine if load management can reduce peak demand to the extent that additional use of peaking power plants is not needed. Beyond this basic criterion, however, there are other considerations that should be measured:

- average demand and usage per program participant versus nonparticipant
- overall change in total system electricity usage
- potential system impact (assuming various levels of future participation rates in load-management program)
- cost-benefit analysis of program (Are the costs of running the load-management program, including marketing, promotion, additional metering equipment, direct load control equipment, and evaluation, less than the savings generated?)
- effects on utility financial situation (Does revenue loss from lower electricity usage as a result of the program create cash-flow problems for the company? Are savings from the program significant enough to postpone investment of capital in new peaking plants?)

Political/Contextual Considerations

Related to the system-effects on the utility company are other program effects that relate to broader, contextual issues about load-management programs. These considerations may seem tangential to the actual program evaluation, but have significant meaning for the extent of load management implementation. These considerations include the following:

- utility company motivations and interest in load-management program implementation (Are there sufficient incentives for the utility to actively promote the program? Utilities are traditionally power-generation companies, not interested in reducing power usage, and their regulation by state utility commissions may promote the addition of new power plants rather than the widespread use of techniques like load management [GAO, 1980].)
- regulatory commission perspectives on load management (As noted above, regulatory agencies may not be encouraging load management through real financing incentives.)
- consumer group reactions (Are there protests about possibly excessive utility control over household energy use? Are there equity arguments against load-management implementation because of possible harm to those who cannot easily shift electricity usage to off-peak periods?)

All of these areas of measurement point to the need for comprehensive, multimethod evaluations of load-management interventions. Actual methods of gathering these various kinds of data can next be considered.

Measurement and Design in Load-Management Research

Multiple types of measurement techniques can be applied to the load-management situation, just as were described for the juvenile diversion program evaluation. Again, essential elements of the proposed hybrid model of evaluation research should be included. The need for experimental design, longitudinal exploratory measurement of program processes and effects, and system-level impact examination are all pertinent to load-management program evaluation, as well as to juvenile diversion.

For individual-level information, much of the data can be collected through fairly low-cost telephone interviews with participants and nonparticipants. These interviews would be carried out according to a repeated-measures time-series design, so that trends across time could be analyzed. Some behavior variables might best be collected through a sample of personal in-home interviews, during which household energy use behaviors could be more directly assessed than in a phone interview (e.g., checking thermostat settings, existence of fans, major appliances). In addition, data collection for the load-management program could be integrated with utility home energy audits, in which very comprehensive household characteristics are measured.

System-impacts of the program can generally be measured with adequate access to utility consumption records—both for individual homes and for the utility service area as a whole. In addition, utility financial records would be needed for the cost-benefit analysis suggested above.

Broader contextual issues and information can be assessed by various methods. Interviews with regulatory officials and consumer group representatives would be one method of assessing their reactions. Another would be to have a series of public forums or panel discussions to determine opinions about the intervention. More detailed evaluation of regulatory incentives and constraints would of course require more sophisticated and costly economic analysis.

Summary of Load-Management Evaluation

While this type of comprehensive evaluation may seem ambitious, it is obvious from prior efforts that anything less leads to inconclusive and misleading results (Dyer, 1981; Messé and Crano, 1981). Evaluation of this type of intervention must necessarily be broad in scope and generate information at every possible level of program impact.

Just as neglect of system-level impact in diversion programs can obscure unintended program effects (such as net-widening), so can neglect of individual-level variables in load-management programs obscure faulty program implementation.

IMPLICATIONS

Each of the examples from the preceding section have detailed the application of the hybrid model. Each represents a type of approach to social/community research in which multilevel assessment is essential. In a relatively new area of investigation, namely energy conservation, it was demonstrated how assessing the operation of independent variables could lead to more accurate conclusions regarding the impact of rate structures. For example, examining the degree to which there was individual awareness of rate change cast a very different light on energy consumption outcomes. Similarly, deriving process variables from the point of view of participants in a diversion program for juvenile offenders led to a new understanding of how experimental manipulations interacted with other life events. Further, examination of systemic level impact raised questions as to the extent of true diversion. This issue was seen to have implications for addressing the representativeness of the experimental sample as well as assessing radiating impact.

The hybrid model suggested obviously has extensive implications for the future of research in social contexts. The prescription of a professional role requiring the increased involvement of the researcher in intervention is an important implication. The isolated principal investigator model does not provide the level of involvement necessary to execute the model of research presented. Similarly, more than social action for its own sake is intended. The viability of the activist/researcher model is central to the implementation of the hybrid methodology.

The hybrid methodology also increases the demands for constructive replication. Social experiments designed to test single critical hypotheses are not likely to deal with the conceptual complexity demanded. Given that several levels of independent variables are dealt with in an exploratory fashion, examination of their operation in a variety of settings becomes critical to the development of complex explanatory networks. This position definitely increases the need for replicated research with particular social change models. Obviously, easily and quickly executed research products will not be possible. The level of research being prescribed is longitudinal, multifaceted, and more complex than the modal applied research project. Quick solutions are not likely to emerge.

Obviously, the hybrid model raises the potential cost of social research. The reader may be impressed by the demands the hybrid model places on the researcher in terms of the pragmatics of field research, the fiscal implications, and the time demanded. These demands appear particularly troublesome in the face of the worldly realities of fiscal constraint and the need for timely policy recommendations. Two major points are relevant to the use of the hybrid model in this regard. First, the goal of the hybrid model is to provide maximally interpretable findings. While the spectrum of information considered is broadened within the model, the hope of examining convergent and divergent data across measurement modality should lead to more accurate and parsimonious conclusions. Second, the cost of carrying out research using the hybrid model is expected to be high in terms of dollars and time. However, the efficiency of examining multiple levels of phenomena in an interactive framework is greater than the current strategy of investigating single phenomena in independent research efforts.

Possibly the most central implication of the hybrid is the call for going inside the black box of social programs. It is suggested that salient outcroppings of social programs and their relationship to contextual events be assessed. A marriage of the positivist and experiential traditions of social science should be consummated. In other words, there is a need for careful assessment of independent variables (experimental conditions). We have for too long overgeneralized our experimental methods from the laboratory setting. It is typically the case that we take the investigator's word for the critical aspects of the experimental program (as is done in the procedures sections of most major journals). Given the complexity of the social phenomena of interest, assumptions about the salient aspects of social programs appears unwarranted.

Another major direction must be the increased inclusion of participants in the action-research process. In many ways this is a throwback to the early days of psychology when the research subject was taken on as a coinvestigator in the description of cognitive and perceptual events. The participants provide an often untapped avenue of information and data. This will involve further entanglements for the planning and execution of the action-research process, but is highly critical if important phenomena are to be accurately included in conceptualizations of social interventions.

Finally, social scientists will have to be active in advocating institutional support for the type of research model prescribed. Current academic and societal-political expectations are at odds with the prescribed professional role. The last several years have witnessed a waning of interest in supporting experimental social programs. Many politicians have argued that social scientists have had their chance at social experimentation and the results were dismal.

In conclusion, it can be seen that research in social contexts places heavy demands on the research process. These demands are such that they render existing research paradigms impotent for dealing with the problems faced by the social/community researcher. The hybrid model proposed here is a beginning attempt to bring the research methods in line with the conceptual stance of the field.

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6

Quantitative Indicators of Community Change

Thomas I. Miller
Gene V Glass

Second only to humankind's intense acquisitiveness is its dogged insistence on counting the fruit of its acquisitions. Having accumulated income, progeny, years of education, housing, and health longevity, men and women wish to examine the trail of their worldly possessions to know both what has been left behind and what may lie ahead. Keeping track of such mundane information is like following a road map—often in more than a metaphorical sense. Not only do these time-series data maps help us discover where we came from and where we are going, but unexpected bumps or curves in the graphs may signal important consequences of public policy.

Although monitoring and anticipating local conditions and testing for the consequences of public policy decisions are useful to municipal and county governments, conscientious social accounting by small government bodies is especially expensive and requires considerable foresight. In this chapter, a brief history will be presented of the movement to quantify and track community change. This short history will be followed by a discussion of the sources and uses of quantitative indicators and the technical problems associated with their use. Great reliance is placed on specific examples of the uses to which local governments put quantitative indicators.

HISTORY OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

Historians do not agree about the Western origins of social accounting. Authors have found the beginnings of social accounting hidden among history's great events, and each author seems to trace the origins to successively more remote and momentous occasions. Bauer (1966) reports that not only did the Lord command Moses to undertake a census of the Jews just after the escape from Egypt, but that Mary and Joseph traveled to Bethlehem for enumeration purposes. Because all the hotels were full of citizens awaiting the count, they reluctantly retired to a stable. Other authors have not traced the quantification of society's characteristics to such lofty beginnings. However, like Bauer, most attribute governments' early accounting motivations to taxation and military conscription. Zautra (1978) credits Herbert Spencer with being one of the first in the late 1800s to advocate quantification of population characteristics relevant to issues beyond the economy and the military. Spencer recommended

that information about citizens' values, leisure activities, and education be catalogued regularly. Perhaps Spencer was recoiling from the rise in the 1600s of the "political arithmeticians" (Lazarsfeld, 1961) who provided quantitative analysis of populations. The work of these political accountants was inspired by a burgeoning insurance trade that required actuarial analyses.

Several twentieth-century publications represented an expanding movement to quantify societal trends in areas other than economics. The 1933 two-volume report, *Recent Social Trends*, by a committee of scholars appointed by President Hoover, is one of the earliest documents to provide solid data about changes in American youth, cities, women, labor, crime, leisure, and health (see President's Research Committee, 1933). Around the same time (1931), Angoff and Mencken accumulated a set of social indicators that permitted them to identify "The Worst American State" (reported in Wainer and Thissen, 1981).

Thorndike (1940) later produced a classic book that marked the first comparison of the quality of life among American cities. He measured and ranked 301 U.S. cities of 30,000 or more residents on a measure he called "General Goodness of Life." Using a "ten-item yardstick" that provided a formula to weight infant death rates, expenditures on recreation, library circulation, and seven other city characteristics, he estimated that the best life was provided to citizens of Pasedena, California; Evanston, Illinois; Oakland, California; Springfield, Massachusetts; and Grand Rapids, Michigan. This concern about quality of life was shared by most writers who sought to loosen the nation's single-minded attachment to the cost-of-living index, which stood alone as a measure of life quality. Although Renis Likert's work on attitudes for the Department of Agriculture led to the establishent of the Institute for Social Research in 1940, the potential for using quantitative indicators to measure life quality did not assume great importance until funding came from the space program in 1959.

The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) contracted with Raymond Bauer to investigate the "social impact of space exploration" (Bauer, 1966). National and local attention to policy impacts of government programs began to sparkle. Bauer (1966: ix) practically flaunted the revived interest in the broad-based social accounting as a reaction to the "economic philistinism" of the 1940s and 1950s. With the Depression, war, and economic recovery behind them, social scientists and policymakers were excitedly fashioning ways to measure the quality of life by other than periodic assay of employment, productivity, wages, and prices.

President Johnson ordered a collection of statistics relevant to health, education, and welfare to supplement those prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Council of Economic Advisors (President Lyndon B. Johnson, message to the Congress on domestic health and education, March 1, 1966; in Bauer, 1966: xiv). In 1966, a national commission on technology, automation, and economic progress called for an annual social report to the president (see EPA, 1973).

In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a storm of literature rained on avid planners, policymakers, and social scientists, who soaked up the latest innovations in the measurement of social indicators (Land and Spilleman, 1975; Ross et al., 1979; Schmalz, 1972; Sheldon and Moore, 1968; State of California Office of Planning and Research, 1977; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973, 1976), quality of life (Campbell et al., 1976; EPA, 1973; Liu, 1974; Systems Development Institute, 1978), and psychological well-being (Bloom, 1975; Myers et al., 1974; Srole et al., 1962; Zautra, 1978). The appearance in 1974 of the *Social Indicators Research* journal provided a forum for research on problems related to quantitative indicators. In fact, over one-third of all publications on social indicators published between 1975 and 1978 listed in a

recent annotated bibliography were published in *Social Indicators Research* (calculated by Miller and Glass from Gilmartin et al., 1979).

Along with inspection of administrative records, the quantitative indicator movement spread to include direct survey of citizens, statistical methods for analyzing indicators, and computer systems to store and retrieve survey data. *Social Indicators III* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980) is a recent example of time-series data from national opinion polls as well as the U.S. Census, national educational testing programs, and administrative records. The national excitement over the potential utility of quantitative indicators spawned and was supported by advances in time-series analysis (Box and Jenkins, 1970; Cook and Campbell, 1979; Glass et al., 1975; McCleary and Hay, 1980). Development of the affordable computer brought large-scale data collection within the capacity of local governments, where management information systems were put to use to catalogue and report municipal and county data (Hearle, 1970; Kraemer, 1974). A 1977 annotated bibliography prepared by the State of California Office of Planning and Research cited 40 local planning information systems and indicator projects in 22 states and Washington, D.C. Special computer applications have produced valuable local indicator systems in, among other places, Denver, Colorado; Fairfax County, Virginia; Contra Costa County, California; Columbia, Ohio; and Washington, D.C.

The remainder of this chapter contains an exploration of the sources, uses, and technical problems associated with indicators of community change.

SOURCES OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

Three types of data typically are drawn upon to produce indicators of community change: administrative records kept by local governments, administrative data provided by agencies outside the local government, and periodic direct surveys of local citizens.

In-House Administrative Records

Government employees produce and store reams of administrative information. This information is kept primarily for accounting purposes and is made available to citizens who have questions about services. Water billing problems, city employee paycheck errors; insurance claims for burglaries, extensions for building permits, and student test scores or attendance records can be explored by simple examination of individual files. More and more of these files are automated.

Monthly time series of municipal water consumption over a five-year period, accounting for seasonal trends, number of water taps, and rainfall could provide the data needed to assess the impacts of a water conservation program. Quarterly summaries of rental property code violations written by the housing inspection team could provide an indication of the improvement or deterioration of the rental housing stock.

Despite their relative accessibility, these data often remain disaggregated and consequently uninformative on issues of community change. Once a year, a brief time series may be constructed manually by counting or averaging to justify budget increases. It is the uncommon administrator who orders, along with the new computer, software that permits statistical manipulation of the massive files.

As they looked at ten years of revenue figures wrenched from ill-kept files, one city's staff was recently faced with the realization that future plant investment (water

and sewer hook-up) fees would very likely increase at a much reduced rate. Although the administrative records existed, no one had bothered to graph the annual revenue time series from all inside-city sources or from a large water and sanitation district located outside the city limits. Cursory examination of the graphs showed that although city revenues were relatively constant over the decade, a gradual reduction in the revenues from outside the city was occurring. This revenue reduction resulted from the gradual completion of the subdivisions served by the water and sanitation district such that no reversal of trend could be expected. It became clear that a new fee policy should be studied if revenues were to rise to earlier levels.

Police records of personal and property crimes are not generally difficult to obtain. Municipalities must complete standard monthly reporting forms for the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Unfortunately, like weekly crime maps that show the location of different types of city crime, the monthly data are usually stored and forgotten. Budgets and citizen complaints provide the typical motivation to exhume the information and examine it in some detail.

Often, cities of populations over 50,000 do inspect other internal data for purposes of corporate management. Monthly sales tax revenues, government vehicle gasoline consumption, fire calls, and building permits are among many types of internal indicators that may be graphed to help understand city operations.

External Administrative Records

Agencies outside local governments frequently collect data or estimate statistics about local circumstances. These data can be particularly helpful to cities where limited revenues preclude the costly data collection associated with producing time series. The U.S. Census is the most complete source of local information on demography, household characteristics, housing adequacy, income, and occupation. Although census data are available only once each decade, survey data are available more frequently from the Bureau of Census Current Population Survey program. Because in this national survey only about 50,000 households are typically sampled, reliable data for small geographic areas, especially cities under 100,000 population, are not usually available.

For the 1980 Census, a group of Summary Tape Processing Centers, better informed and better prepared than their 1970 counterparts are providing localities with computer printouts of Summary Tape Files. Summary Tape Files will be produced as five sets of tapes containing aggregate responses at several levels of geography for the 100 percent and 20 percent census questionnaire items.

The geographic aggregations most useful are for states, counties, cities, census tracts, block groups, and blocks. Summary results for uniquely defined geography such as neighborhoods, precincts, and school districts must be produced by special computer analyses, which may be too costly for small communities. The Bureau of the Census also has developed the computer software (called CENSPAC) needed to produce the myriad frequency distributions and cross tabulations of the summary data. Staff in the Summary Tape Processing Centers have practiced using CENSPAC on tapes from the Census trial run conducted in Richmond, Virginia, in 1978. Such practice no doubt speeds availability of the census data to local governments.

Although the Bureau of the Census is the greatest outside source of local quantitative indicators, other government agencies contribute to local data bases, as well. The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, publishes the consumer price

index for most large urban areas. Unfortunately, small cities are usually subsumed in standard metropolitan or labor market areas (statistical confections that define multicity aggregations) so that their local price index changes are not reported.

Many state agencies collect data about urban jurisdictions within their purview. State departments of health can provide birth, death, and disease rates for cities. State divisions of employment and training can provide labor force and unemployment rate estimates for locales. State planning offices or councils of government (COGs) make local population and income estimates from dicennial census benchmarks and some COGs provide local vacancy rate and housing price estimates. Most state departments of revenue calculate estimated vehicle miles traveled from gas tax income in local areas. State social service agencies can provide counts of county families receiving federal transfer payments. Even a public service company providing gas and electricity throughout the state can calculate local cubic foot and kilowatt consumption. County offices, too, can provide useful data to municipalities. The county clerk produces the number of divorces and marriages in town as well as local voting records. The county coroner records the number of suicides each month.

Unfortunately, it is rare for agencies collecting data to create identifying codes for city boundaries. Even if such coding is part of data collection, it may be uncommon for data to be aggregated for locales except by special request. When local data are requested of state or county agencies, the sophistication of their storage and retrieval systems and the degree to which limited staff time is already overcommitted determine whether results can be produced in an hour or a decade.

The vagaries of budgets mean that even estimates of local population, income, or vacancy rates will not occur with reliable regularity. The array of mundane problems associated with generating useful time series often seems the result of some conspiracy against city researchers charged with developing a municipal data base of quantitative indicators.

Special Surveys

Administrative records, whether internal or external to the community, cannot provide information on every important issue. Even if administrative data are well targeted to issues, they too often miss the relevant geographic unit or are not timely. For example, communities of under 100,000 population, with budgets spread too thin to fund other data-producing schemes, relied on increasingly obsolete 1970 census data to estimate household size, elderly and infant populations, resident income, and commuting patterns. When citywide energy consumption data, by guile or by threat, can be extracted from the local energy utility, it is unlikely that areas within the city would be identifiable for evaluation of, say, a neighborhood conservation program. To provide more current data and information on topics not addressed and locations not identified in data from other sources, special community surveys must be conducted.

Not only are community surveys needed to update out-of-date reports or to tailor geographically ill-fitting records, they are needed to determine citizens' sense of personal satisfaction and community health. The Mott Foundation undertook just such a project in Flint, Michigan (Systems Development Institute, 1978). Over 3700 residents of 37 Flint school districts were interviewed for about 45 minutes to generate information on citizen demography, neighborhood activities, knowledge of the community, personal well-being, and satisfaction with government, medical services, home, cli-

mate, neighbors, and trees. Citywide or neighborhood surveys can verify or discredit statistical estimates of dubious credibility such as population counts, number and relationships of dwellers in households, rental and vacancy rates, labor force participation, and household income. Other items, such as satisfaction with government services and quality of life, criminal victimization rates, occupant tenure, and length of residence, can be reliably collected in no other way but through direct surveys.

In fact, there is some argument about whether quantitative indicators from administrative records, no matter how timely or geographically specific, can substitute for direct citizen opinion. Schneider (1975) correlated questionnaire results on, among other items, job, housing, income, and government service satisfaction with observed levels of unemployment, income, and crime in 15 cities. He found almost no relationship between the "objective" and "subjective" data. Liu (1974: 187) notes: "Recently, more and more people have been commenting on the paradox of affluence. Discontentment with the quality of life has seemed to accelerate proportionately with technological progress and increases in material wealth."

When surveyed, Watts residents identified their three most serious problems. Each was unlikely to be discovered in typical administrative records kept by the community: stray dogs, garbage, and noise (EPA, 1973: 1-14). Unfortunately, it is the rare community that collects answers to a standard set of questions from its citizens with enough regularity to provide useful time-series data for monitoring and projecting trends or evaluating the impacts of policy. Instead, mediocre surveys of insufficient scope proliferate as interest groups attempt to justify needs for shopping malls, dental services, care for the elderly, banks, and hospices. Such surveys have become as commonplace as salt and make about as solid a foundation for community decisions.

NONEXPERIMENTAL USES OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

Two uses of quantitative indicators can be distinguished that do not depend heavily on causal analysis: monitoring and planning community change.

Monitoring

The definition of quantitative indicators usually requires that measures be employed at regular intervals over a period of time (see, for example, Freeman and Sheldon, 1971). This is an essential characteristic of quantitative indicators. Making decisions using information good for one point in time is like having to decide by one brief touch of broadcloth if that is the fabric you ought to buy. At the very least, one must run a finger along the cloth to get a sense of uneven wear, out-of-place thread, and other inconsistencies in weave. Making decisions or drawing conclusions from communitywide data also requires examination along the line of the data fabric. Far more understanding can come through reading the bumps, dips and curves of longitudinal data than by looking at only the most recent number available.

Monitoring community change requires little more sophistication than graphing and inspecting local time-series data. In fact, it is often the experience of a knowledgeable resident that provides descriptive richness to examination of municipal longitudinal data, rather than the methodological expertise of a researcher. The researcher's job in monitoring quantitative indicators is to ensure that data are comparable from one time period to the next and from one place to the next. An

unusual drop in sales tax revenue from the local shopping mall in December 1975 can be explained by the great snowfall that forced people to purchase through catalogues and at stores that were within walking distance. The sharp rise in December revenues five years later might be due to the completion of an interstate highway that provided access to the mall for residents of eastern communities long forced to shop at home. Such explanations of time-series anomalies prove to be salutary for monitoring trends and searching out problems. Abrupt or even just noticeable shifts in the graph may provide motivation for policy reassessment if the data changes are fair warnings and not false alarms. Shopping center tax revenue decline that cannot be explained by bad weather, fuel shortages, or other temporary alterations in interacting phenomena may signal the need for redevelopment of the retail mall.

Similarly, zoning or police records monitored for neighborhoods each year can help identify areas where specific problems are developing, such as burglary, noise, illegal duplexes, crowded parking, or incomplete snow removal. Simultaneous examination of building density increases or demographic shifts may shed light on the correlates of the problems. For example, the number of citizen complaints about neighbors was graphed for four neighborhoods for the decade of the 1970s. Two neighborhoods were known to have increased substantially in building density, while the other two had remained stable. Results are displayed in Figure 6.1. The neighborhoods increasing in density (D_1 and D_2) showed no obvious trend toward greater frequency of complaints. However, one neighborhood without building density increases had experienced a gradual transition (ND_1) from owner-occupants to renter-occupants. It was this neighborhood that exhibited the greatest increase in citizen complaints over the decade, suggesting that density per se may be less the culprit in community disruption than change in resident tenure.

Several other quantitative indicators are often monitored. Pollution levels of ozone, particulates, or carbon monoxide can be reported as often as daily and in some areas even hourly. Infant mortality rates and disease rates often are viewed as indicators of the well-being of the community and the health risks associated with life there. Annual population growth and growth in building are important business indicators for municipalities. Trends in costs of housing and labor force commuting patterns enlighten community growth policies.

Planning

In addition to merely inspecting periodic quantitative indicators to identify problems in the community that may require remedy, quantitative indicators conscientiously kept can provide the basis for predicting changes in city circumstances and needs.

School enrollment forecasts enjoy venerable status among predictive uses of quantitative indicators. Due to delayed childbearing and reduced fertility rates, such forecasts lately have become more prominent as school board members decide which underenrolled neighborhood schools must close. Not only are school-age population predictions critical for efficient school district planning, but communities attempting to plan for infant care needs may wish to predict the pre-two-year-old population to estimate the number of future infant care placements required. Such projections require time series of birthrates, infant mortality rates, net migration, household income, and number of women in the labor force.

Predicting the need for capital improvement projects provides further motivation to enlist quantitative indicators in the planning process. Population projections are



D_1 and D_2 = Neighborhoods increasing in density.
ND_1 and ND_2 = Neighborhoods not increasing in density.

FIGURE 6.1 Zoning Complaints per 100 Dwelling Units (1970-1979)

part of almost every city's comprehensive plan since the number of residents and their location determine the need for streets, sewers, and water. A recent study (Brennan et al., 1981) examined the need to build a new city jail by, in part, making-time series forecasts of selected crimes. Monthly crime counts were predicted for 5 years into the future. Assaults were expected to rise at a rate of 2 per month; burglaries were to increase by 5 per month; larcenies by 21 per month. New jail policies were recommended to avoid the inevitable overcrowding that the numbers predicted.

EXPERIMENTAL USES OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

The most powerful use of quantitative indicators is for assessment of policy impact. What is salutary? What is harmful? What reduces costs? The questions are categories in the broader quandary that thoughtful community leaders must resolve, and that is: What works?

Interrupted Time-Series Methodology

To the researcher wishing to assess the social impact of an intervention, the time-series graph of a typical quantitative indicator presents a confusing pattern of wiggles and twists. Counts of social phenomena are typically subject to so many influences, known and unknown, that the task of discerning the effect of a particular intervention is greatly complicated by the numerous perturbations the time-series picture reveals. Figure 6.2 is a graph of the percentage of students in Ireland who passed the intermediate- and senior-level school examinations each year from 1879 to 1971. The numbers in circles are keyed to the following national and international events:

(1) slaughter of British at Khartoum
(2) wireless patented in Britain by Marconi
(3) World War I
(4) Easter Monday Rebellion in Ireland
(5) Irish Free State established
(6) Irish Board of Education adopted new finance policy
(7) the Great Depression
(8) Edward VIII abdicated
(9) World War II
(10) British Labor Government nationalized mining and railways
(11) Sputnik I launched
(12) Arab-Israeli War

Which of these events truly affected the student passing percentage and which did not but only appeared to have an influence—the actual influence lying in some other event—is a problem of separating signal from noise, to use communication theory jargon, or deterministic effect from random error, in the jargon of statistical theory. The statistical theory required to distinguish an intervention effect from the probabilistic perturbations of unknown influences goes beyond what is typically presented in the graduate training of most social scientists. A simple t-test comparison of the average levels of a time series before and after an intervention would fail to distinguish cases A and B in Figure 6.3; the t-statistic would be large and positive in both in-



FIGURE 6.2 Percentage of Students Passing Intermediate and Senior-Level Examinations in Ireland (1879-1971)

stances. Yet, the case that the intervention, I, has had an effect on the quantitative indicator is clear in Case A and dubious in Case B. This logic is as old as sociology itself, as an early quotation from Durkheim illustrates:

> *It is a well known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on the suicidal tendency. In Vienna, in 1873 a financial crisis occurred which reached its height in 1874; the number of suicides immediately rose. . . . What proves this catastrophe to have been the sole cause of the increase is the special prominence of the increase when the crisis was acute, or during the first four months of 1874* [quoted in McCleary and Hay, 1980: 21].

Even if the rising time-series curve in Case B, Figure 6.3, could be "tilted" or "detrended" so that it lay smooth and horizontal across the graph, the mechanics of the t-test of mean differences would still not be appropriate, although the t-test would then distinguish Cases A and B in a crude and, probabilistically, inexact way. The problem of statistical theory that would remain is one type of nonindependence known as autocorrelation. Autocorrelation of a time series can be defined at varying levels of abstraction; suffice it to say here that the positive autocorrelation of a time series is a reflection of the fact that generally today will resemble tomorrow more closely than it will the day after tomorrow.

More precise attempts to account for the autocorrelation of a stochastic time-related process result in statistical models such as *moving-average* and *autoregressive* models. In their most general and elaborate form, these models constitute a system of stochastic time-series processes known as autoregressive-integrated-mov-



FIGURE 6.3 Illustration of the Inability of the t-Test of Mean Differences to Distinguish Two Importantly Different Cases

ing-average models (or ARIMA models). The properties of this class of models have been known for some time, and they have been systematized and codified comprehensively since 1970, the date of the publication of Box and Jenkins's *Time-Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control.* In 1975, Glass et al. showed how the ARIMA processes could be transformed into the form of the general linear model with uncorrelated errors, the basis of most well-known and commonly used statistical analyses. Some statisticians have recommended that the autocorrelation of time-series processes be taken into account by means of generalized least-squares analysis (Algina and Swaminathan, 1979; Simonton, 1977). Kliegl and Glass (1981) showed that this suggestion yields exactly the same analysis arising from the application of Box and Jenkins's methods as applied by Glass et al. (1975). These techniques have now been made even more general and mathematically elegant; they have been competently explained to social scientists by McCain and McCleary (1979).

Experience with the analysis of time-series experiments has shown that there exists one critical act of judgment that largely predisposes a statistical analysis to determine significance or nonsignificance, namely, the decision whether the basic time-series process is *stationary* or *nonstationary.* The effect of an intervention is shown by the abrupt displacement or deflection of the quantitative indicator. Nonstationary processes are subject to what appear as numerous unpredictable changes of level and direction of the quantitative indicator. Hence, one has the difficulty of distinguishing between an interruption in the path of a quantitative indicator due to the putative causal agent (the intervention) and other changes in its path emanating solely from the nonstationary stochastic character of the time-series process. Perhaps an illustration will help clarify this point. In Figure 6.4, the graph of 40 points from a stationary time-series process is represented; this particular process is a first-order moving-average process with coefficient equal to +.5, that is, half of each time period's random shock is present for one additional point in time. This process is stationary, one evidence of this fact being that the graph never wanders far from the region of 50, its typical value. In Figure 6.5, the graph of a nonstationary process appears; the process in question is a second-order moving-average process in the second differences of the observed series. As can be seen clearly, the nonstationary process in Figure 6.5 stays in the vicinity of 50 for about 20 time points, then it takes off and climbs to the vicinity of 55 and 60. The point worth stressing about the nonstationary series in Figure 6.5 is that its movement from one level to a higher level was the result of a purely random momentum, so to speak, and not the result of a deterministic effect of an outside intervention.

It should be clear that what would count as evidence of deflection in a time-series would depend greatly on whether the shift of the quantitative indicator in question occurred in the context of Figure 6.4 or Figure 6.5. For example, notice for the exact same string of ten observations one is led to think that I has had an appreciable effect in Case A of Figure 6.6 but no effect at all in Case B.

The most critical decision a data analyst must make in studying interrupted time-series graphs is whether the basic process observed is stationary or nonstationary. The best preparation for making the decision wisely is long baseline periods (notice how the nonstationary process in Figure 6.5 *looks* stationary for the first 20 time points) and an understanding of the process that produces the observations.

Finally, against the possibility that one may be misled into interpreting random shifts of a time series as effects of an intervention, the best protection is clear expectations for exactly *when* and in *what form* the effects of the intervention should be reflected in the quantitative indicator and the courage not to grasp for post hoc explanations should the initial expectations be disappointed.



FIGURE 6.4 Forty Observations of an ARIMA (0, 0, 1) for Which L = 50, θ = .5, and $\sigma^2 = 1$

Two examples of time-series analysis follow. The first is a nonquantitative search for causes of peaks in child abuse indicators, and the second is an application of the interrupted time-series analysis to housing sale prices that were aggregated to test the consequences of the Boulder, Colorado, growth limitation ordinance.

Child Abuse Indicators

Examination of 42 months of child abuse report counts from Boulder County permit some causal interpretations of community-level data without the standard ARIMA analysis.

In Figure 6.7 the monthly frequencies of reported and of substantiated child abuse cases between January 1976 and July 1979 are presented. The September 1978



FIGURE 6.5 Forty Observations of an ARIMA (0, 2, 2) for Which L = 50, $\theta_1 = 1.6$, $\theta_2 = -.7$, and $\sigma^2 = 1$

peak caught the attention of everyone attempting to understand the factors that contributed to the ebb and flow of abuse cases in the area. Although county population was on the rise, there was no apparent increase in abuse reports after the slow period during early 1976 when the child abuse team was just being organized. Neither were there clear seasonal features to the time series that would predict a rise of reports in September 1978.

Investigation of an unexpected lead explained some of the series variation. The movie *Sybil* was broadcast on national television November 14 and 15, 1976. *Sybil* provided a visceral portrayal of child abuse. A spokesman for NBC (the network on which the movie aired) contacted by phone, said that *Sybil* was widely viewed (receiving a "42 share") but the corporation could not be held responsible for the rise in child abuse observed in Boulder. In fact, substantiated cases did not increase as greatly as did reported cases. When *Sybil* was rerun on March 6 and 7, 1978, the total reported abuse statistics rose to their second highest peak. Further investigation revealed that in August 1978 one of the most publicized child abuse cases in Denver's history hit the regional press. The Gaynell Mann case was covered in gruesome detail by print and electronic media for over a month while police searched for the mother



FIGURE 6.6 Illustration of How the Same Ten Points (in brackets) Are Strong Evidence of Intervention Effect in a Stationary Process and Weak Evidence in a Nonstationary Process



FIGURE 6.7 Child Abuse Reports (Boulder County)

of the victim and her lover. The lesser peak in July 1978 may have been the result of a less publicized Denver abuse case or some other event that has gone undetected.

The September 1978 peak could not be traced to a media event except as spillover from the Mann publicity. Local caseworkers recalled that month as the first in a consciousness-raising program that brought unprecedented response from parents the first month of school after summer vacation.

Such commonsense time-series analysis can help explain abrupt shifts in level or slope of community indicators, and in this case alerted child abuse team members to the need for increased staffing during special school programs and high media exposure of abuse.

For politically volatile issues requiring greater methodological rigor, the more sophisticated ARIMA analysis of longitudinal data may be required. A relevant case study helps point out some of the analytic and political problems associated with analyzing quantitative indicators.

City of Boulder Growth Limitation Ordinance

Against the well-advertised warnings of local realtors, bankers, and a considerable part of the rest of the business community, the voters of Boulder, Colorado, passed an ordinance in November 1976 to limit the number of new residential units that could be constructed each year within the city limits. The growth limitation ordinance, com-

monly called the Danish Plan, after its author, was modeled on the antecedent ordinance of Petaluma, California.

Among the many negative side effects anticipated from limited growth, the putative increase in the cost of housing predominated. The Danish Plan stoked the fires lit by Boulder's historic high housing costs and the economic upturn in 1976 and 1977, which elevated prices everywhere. Assessing the effects of the growth limitation ordinance on the sale price of houses required a long housing sale price series to permit use of the interrupted time-series design.

Design. Five areas in Boulder County were chosen as comparisons to the city of Boulder, because none had growth limitation plans like Boulder's and each was under similar local pressures to grow. Monthly mean sale prices for each community from 1973 to 1980 were generated from the county assessor's automated record of sales (Miller and Fitch, 1981).

Analysis. Fitting the housing price model for national and regional economic trends, seasonality, immediate intervention and lagged expectations, and preparing the data for the computer became the analysis problems to solve.

The home ownership component of the consumer price index for the Denver SMSA was taken as a covariate series to control for economic factors affecting the Rocky Mountain Region. Monthly index scores were interpolated from the semimonthly series provided for Denver by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The covariate series was smoothed by calculating a three-month moving average to eliminate inexplicable perturbations near the intervention points. Four other parameters were entered into the time-series model: preintervention slope, postintervention change in slope, and April 1978 change in slope. The preintervention-level parameter was removed by subtracting the lowest monthly mean price from all other monthly means. This was done to permit use of the time-series program (TSM; Bower et al., 1974), which estimated no more than five parameters simultaneously.

Curiously, no seasonal parameter was required to fit the model because, although one could see a winter slump in the *number* of homes sold, there was unexpectedly no concomitant drop in mean *sale price* of homes sold in winter.

Initial analyses identified the series signatures as 0, 0, 1—a moving averages model in which differencing was unnecessary because the covariate was used. The intervention month was identified as April 1977, since that month, the month of the onset of the plan's implementation, showed the most consistent effects. Mean monthly sale prices of all houses, new, previously owned and standard houses (any three-bedroom house with five or six rooms and at least one full bath), were tested in Boulder and each of the five neighboring communities.

Results. Boulder housing sales alone showed a significant, abrupt jump in level at April 1977. The magnitude of the price increase was about $5000. This precipitous increase was visible for price series on all homes, previously owned homes, and standard homes. New homes showed no precipitous price hike. People buying older homes in Boulder during May, June, and July or later in 1977 paid, on the average, about a $5000 premium because of the implementation of the Danish Plan.

This shift in level of all but the new homes suggested that the immediate effect of the Danish Plan was psychological. Speculating buyers bid up the older home market, which represented the lower end of the price continuum and therefore the better up-side investment. The manner in which standard homes were defined described older homes and the all-homes-sold series carried heavy representation of older



FIGURE 6.8 Schematic Representation of Monthly Sale Price Changes in Boulder

homes as well—98 percent were previously owned, while only 2 percent were new in 1978, for example.

The immediate effect of the Danish Plan's implementation was clear to policymakers if not critical four years later. Granting that a large segment of the market was awash with inflated purchase prices around the onset of the Danish Plan, policymakers wished to know if the price flood had receded. If the effects were transitory, with prices returning to previous trends, the short-term price increase would be dismissed as a momentary effluvium of greed, mistrust, and bad faith on the parts of government and real estate investors. If the effect endured, continuing to force prices up the banks of the housing market, some government clean-up effort might be considered.

The $5000 price jump that set Boulder apart from surrounding communities in April 1977 appeared not to endure over the next three years when the entire housing sale stock was considered. This conclusion derived not only from the ARIMA time-series analysis but from examination of percentage and constant dollar increases in homes in Boulder and other communities. The trend in new-home prices did not resemble the price series of the entire housing stock. Figure 6.8 displays the very different trends in the schematic monthly prices for all homes and new homes in Boulder.

Reactions to the study. Growth Management Task Force (GMTF) members to whom the sale price study was presented responded with relative dispassion and credulity. Little attention was paid to the abrupt level shift in the series or to the skyrocketing cost of new homes. Instead, task force members focused on the series for all houses sold in Boulder and, like the press, concluded that for the price of the entire housing stock in Boulder, the Danish Plan had no enduring effect.

The University Regents, Board of Realtors, and National Association of Homebuilders did not approach the research with the nonpartisan equanimity shown by the Growth Management Task Force. The University Regents had long voiced their opinion that the city of Boulder was forcing junior faculty to rent in Boulder or buy homes elsewhere because growth limitations had driven up the cost of homeownership. They met with City Council members and charged that the housing price research had been a whitewash, claiming, in the case of one regent, that any staff like the city and university staff commissioned to perform the study would confirm the prejudices held by the research sponsor.

The Board of Realtors wrote a rebuttal to the research results, claiming in the case of the housing price study that "the GMTF relied solely on Boulder city staff data and interpretation. . . . Because of its involvement with the Danish Plan and self-admitted bias toward population control, city staff should not have been asked to perform this housing cost study." The realtors went on to recommend that real estate appraisers perform a study of housing prices in Boulder. As with the Regents, there was never an allusion to the substance of the reported methods, assumptions, or results of the time-series analyses conducted for the task force.

The National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) was undertaking a study of the impacts of the Danish Plan on sale prices of Boulder homes simultaneously with the city's study. The NAHB's research examined price changes before and after 1977 only in newly constructed homes. They found that, compared to two neighboring communities from which price data were also gathered, the price of new homes in Boulder had increased substantially. A news conference was held and NAHB officials proudly displayed their proof that Boulder's growth limitation ordinance had driven out the moderate-income home buyer.

By December 1981, the Growth Management Task Force had drafted a more lenient growth limitation ordinance to replace the Danish Plan of 1976. The business and university communities found it to be tolerable since the ordinance was viewed as a compromise between the liberal no-growth and the conservative free-market points of view.

TECHNICAL AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS WITH QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

Besides the problems of politics, several technical problems surround the use of quantitative indicators. Five have been identified and are described briefly below.

Construct Definition

Data bases that provide quantitative indicators with usefully long histories typically have served to inform administrative, economic, or legal issues. It is rare for stewards of these data bases to worry about changes in definitions of the indicators recorded. For example, in 1985, if a school district switches from the Iowa Test of Basic Skills to the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills to measure student achievement, there may occur a precipitous rise in percentile rank of the district scores because the two achievement tests are not perfectly articulated. Because the definition of school achievement has changed, the uninformed viewer may erroneously conclude that students suddenly have improved their basic skills.

The consumer price index (CPI) provides an example in which great cost is expended to keep index definitions consistent over long periods. Considerable research is conducted to ensure that one may interpret a 100 percent rise in the CPI as a twofold increase in the cost of comparable goods and services over the period. What is considered comparable depends on systematic reweighting of items to control for changes in product quality, such as the amount of real pork that remains in a can of pork and beans, and product availability, such as the hypothetical value of strawberries in the winter months.

Biderman (in Bauer, 1966) provided a classic discussion of problems in construct definition over the time periods of an extended quantitative series. He argued that unemployment rates changed in meaning from an indicator of economic hardship to one of economic opportunity. The change has been so profound that a higher unemployment rate may signal greater economic opportunity because persons marginal to the labor force (such as housewives and students), whose total livelihoods do not depend on full-time jobs, are counted as unemployed when they are enticed to seek employment in a robust economy. Similarly, Biderman warns that crime rates may reflect less on actual commission of crimes and more on altered police protection, coroner practice, citizen report, and the definition of illegal activity.

The accumulation and report of numerous quantitative indicators is the foundation of social accounting. Many writers have equated social accounting with the construct of life quality, but social accounting is no more a measure of quality of life than mental health center accountability is an estimation of treatment quality, though this activity has long been referred to as program evaluation.

Issues of Aggregation

The ideal municipal data base contains geographic and political boundary codes for each piece of data in the file. Traffic accidents, housing sale prices, social service client intake, recreation center use, and voter turnout would not only have associated with them unique location identifiers (such as street addresses), but other geopolitical codes as well (such as school districts, neighborhoods, census tracts, and voter precincts). With the proper computer software, analysts could then do area analyses for the community in which, for example, time series for resident demography, housing sale prices, assessed property values, crime, and traffic accidents could be examined to assess the impacts on a neighborhood of a HUD Section 8 low-income housing project.

Such an analysis requires aggregation of time-series data for a uniquely defined geographical area. The sophistication of the data base required for the task is usually beyond the resources of most communities. Without such a sensitive and flexible data base, most researchers are forced to perform neighborhood studies by estimating neighborhood demographic composition from two or three census tracts that encompass the area. County-level data may be as fine as one can cut the local divorce and marriage statistics, and crime data may be kept only citywide.

Normative Issues and Controlling for Population Differences Among Communities

The time series showing unemployment rising in a community is not without meaning, but what unemployment rates are doing in comparable locations can tell considerably more about the economy of the city. To return to an earlier analogy, if assessing community circumstances with time-series data is like running your finger along the weave of a broadcloth, then examining time-series data from other communities is like comparison shopping where a "good deal" depends on what is being sold next door.

Even though the crime rate is rising in Boulder, it may be lower and rising less rapidly than in any city of comparable size in the Rocky Mountain West. Such normative comparisons are especially difficult to make for small communities where few national data collection programs provide uniformly defined and collected time-series information.

To compare one city to another on level of crime, unemployment, energy consumption, costs of street repair and other capital expenses, number of housing sales, and other quantitative indicators, the number of citizens in the community must be estimated. This seemingly simple accounting problem is solved with questionable precision by most cities since in most cases the federal government comes in only once every ten years to count heads.

Monthly or quarterly time series that require per capita adjustments will never be precise because cities cannot keep such frequent tabulations of population. Even yearly counts are estimated by counting water taps, dwelling units, school-age children, or phone connections. The counts are usually adjusted by a multiplier that represents the average household size in cities. Because from 1970 to 1980 this multiplier was dropping at a rate unknown to planning department staff, many population estimates were too high. Such overestimates made per capita crime, energy use, street repair costs, and the like appear to be smaller problems than they were in fact.

Targeting the Collection

Willy-nilly collection of time-series data is not only inefficient, it is profligate. However, one can be certain that topics first thought to be on the periphery of public interest will one day become salient, like the cost and consumption of fossil fuels. If one waits to generate time-series data on suddenly critical topics, no relevant archival data may exist or what relevant data do exist may be so buried in trivial figures that excavation costs to exhume the important information would be prohibitively high.

Very little by way of theory has been produced to help confine quantitative indicators to a manageable yet complete set of statistics to guide communities toward life quality. Factor analysis has frequently been used to reduce a great variety of statistics to a few essential indicators. However, even this method requires accumulation of the time series that make up the factors and to report derived factor scores for an entire community means that the same indicators from several communities were entered into the calculations. Factor scores for neighborhoods or census tracts within cities would require consistent data for all those areas. The difficulties of collecting data from other communities and for areas smaller than the city have already been discussed.

It may best serve the sometime competing purposes of comprehensiveness and thrift to identify critical indicators by surveying councils, commissions, and boards whose members will use the data for decision making. What data already exist and are sufficiently precise should be collected and reported. Other data less central to decision makers but inexpensively gathered should be collected and stored for the unforeseen occasion when the data will become important. Data collection in surveys may be necessary when no existing statistics address critical questions.

Reliability of Indicator Estimates

When citizens must be surveyed, questions about the reliability and validity of population estimates are important. Not only is it important to train interviewers so that questions are asked without bias and with consistency, but control of response bias from citizens is critical. In one small community a firm self-described as a purveyor of survey research reported a 95 percent response rate to a questionnaire. It happened that 95 percent of all the people who agreed to complete a door-to-door survey did so. The firm could not estimate the number of persons who had been asked to complete the questionnaire but who declined to take the hour required to do it.

Too few private consultants in the survey research business understand that it is essential to estimate the attitudes and demography of people who refuse to or cannot respond to a survey (Kish, 1965). Without such an estimate it is impossible to determine the extent to which most survey results can be generalized to the entire target community.

THE FUTURE OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

In these times, if the cry for quantitative indicators seems somewhat muted compared to the rallying calls of the late 1960s, the problem can be traced to several factors. The behavioral sciences no longer command the respect they once did. In the press, social scientists can appear to approach research problems as lawyers approach litigation. Instead of dispassion, there is partisanship. The surgeon general's

researchers proclaim that smoking or cholesterol is dangerous to your health, and they are rebutted by researchers from the tobacco industry or the Dairy Council. Even pollsters are partisan. Each political candidate hires his or her own survey team.

The economy is ailing and federal government support of research on quantitative indicators is flagging. When community coffers are not full, expenditures on measures of community health are not embraced. Retreat to crisis management and short-term planning in times of revenue shortfall bodes ill for information systems that provide the data for life quality and long-range planning.

Some administrators and politicians may recoil from quantitative indicators because they have become overwhelmed by information. The information explosion has blown the patience and understanding for data right out of city managers and city council members.

Science in general may appear not to have fulfilled its promise. In an age of diminishing expectations, science is another institution that seems to have been unsuccessful in improving the lot of human kind.

If we are not to despair of the fate of quantitative indicators, it is important that well-targeted research be undertaken on their utility. Most persons' assessment of the utility of quantitative indicators to communities, whether or not such persons are professionals, is based on anecdote and unrepresentative experience. Assessing the impact of a quantitative indicator on policy, planning, or even people's vague images of a social system is an extremely subtle and complex problem. Such problems will not be solved by admonitions to adopt a more scientific-experimental frame of mind.

Sociological surveys of the use and impacts of quantitative indicators are needed, but also needed are case studies of the use of quantitative indicators. These case studies would draw upon a broad range of techniques of inquiry, including interviewing, analyses of documents, and historical analyses.

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7

Assessing and Improving Social-Ecological Settings

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The fact that individual and group behavior is typically a function of both personal and environmental factors raises several important questions: (1) How can environmental factors be systematically conceptualized and measured? (2) How are environmental factors interrelated? Specifically, do some sets of factors, such as physical features, influence other sets, such as the social environment? (3) How do environmental factors affect individuals? (4) Finally, how can new knowledge about these issues be applied to create more functional and adaptive human contexts?

In this chapter we address these questions by reporting on the portion of our work that has focused primarily on health care and therapeutic settings. The chapter is divided into four parts. First we introduce a formulation for classifying environmental factors into four domains and illustrate its application to the development of environmental measures by describing the Multiphasic Environmental Assessment Procedure (MEAP). In the second part we explore the interrelationships among the four environmental domains and the influence of environmental factors on individual and group behavior. The third part considers the role of staff and examines the influence of the work environment on staff morale and performance. Finally, we explore some practical applications of the foregoing material for interventions in social systems.

To guide our inquiry into the issues just raised, we have formulated a conceptual framework that considers health and adaptation to be affected by an environmental system and a personal system, as well as by stressful life circumstances, social network resources, and appraisal and coping responses (Cronkite et al., forthcoming). The environmental system encompasses such factors as the physical design of the setting, its organizational structure, the aggregate characteristics of the individuals in a setting, and the quality of interpersonal relationships. Personal factors include an individual's sociodemographic characteristics and such individual resources as health status, functional ability, self-esteem, and problem-solving skills. Stressful life circumstances are composed of both relatively discrete events of short duration and chronic life strains.

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The model we are using differs from the more commonly used person-oriented approach, in which changes in individuals' behaviors are traced back to features of the environment that may account for them. In contrast, we began our efforts by developing conceptualizations and measures of the environmental system; we then related these environmental factors to health and performance measures. This approach makes it possible to specify the environmental factors that are related to particular outcome criteria. These relationships between environmental variables and outcome criteria may vary as a function of other contextual factors, and our perspective makes it possible to examine these complex interrelations.

Portions of this social-ecological framework have been used to focus on the factors that affect students' mood and performance in high schools and colleges, to explore how the social environments of psychiatric and correctional settings affect residents and staff, and to examine some of the effects of population density and crowding on health and behavior (Moos, 1974, 1979a, 1979b). The use of the framework is illustrated here by focusing primarily on the conceptualization and measurement of the environmental system in health care settings, specifically in supportive residential settings for older people and the work settings of health care staff. Although the discussion focuses on health care settings, the conceptual and methodological issues we address are relevant to a wide array of environments. On the other hand, we recognize that personal factors and social network and coping resources need to be more fully considered in order to understand the complexity of individual and group behavior.

ELABORATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM

Since the development of better measures of environmental factors is an initial step in implementing a social-ecological perspective, we first describe a new procedure designed to assess environmental resources and then illustrate its use. Although there are an infinite number of environmental variables, we have found it useful to consider them in terms of four major domains of resources: physical and architectural resources, policy and program resources, suprapersonal resources, and social-environmental resources. A growing body of literature has indicated that these four domains can be used to characterize social settings and to explore their impacts (Moos, 1976, 1979a). Each of these domains can influence group and individual functioning directly, as well as indirectly through the other domains.

Measuring the Environmental Domains

Employing the formulation of four domains of environmental resources, we have constructed the Multiphasic Environmental Assessment Procedure to assess supportive residential settings for older people. The MEAP represents an attempt to create a comprehensive, conceptually based environmental assessment procedure. In brief, the dimensions were constructed using a set of six conceptual and empirical criteria: meaningfulness, applicability, distribution, discrimination, and interrelatedness of items, and independence of subscales. Each dimension is unified by a common functional implication for residents. The items represent opportunities or environmental "resources" for a given area of functioning. For example, the existence of a residents' council offers residents a formal opportunity to participate in policymaking and to experience a

sense of efficacy, as do other items on the dimension of resident control. Such an institutional structure commonly arises out of a general philosophy toward the older resident, which also manifests itself in other ways.

The MEAP was developed based on data obtained from a representative sample of 93 residential settings drawn from five counties in California. Further information on this sample, as well as on the psychometric and normative characteristics of the MEAP dimensions, is presented elsewhere (Moos and Lemke, 1979). Although the procedure was specifically developed for use in settings for older people, we believe that it is generally applicable (with minor modifications) to other types of group residential settings, such as those for retarded and mentally ill people (Wandersman and Moos, 1981).

The MEAP consists of four main instruments that can be used either separately or in conjunction with one another by a facility staff member or outside evaluator to obtain a comprehensive picture of a supportive residential setting. In general, the content of the instruments follows the conceptual organization of the four environmental domains previously described.[1]

Physical and Architectural Features

Physical qualities of the housing environment can influence an older person's activity level, social contacts, well-being, and general lifestyle. The perceived physical attractiveness of housing is related to tenant satisfaction, and better physical facilities are associated with enhanced resident functioning. Furthermore, the modification of specific physical features in a setting can exert an influence on resident perception and behavior. Potentially salient architectural factors include the quality of the physical milieu, the availability of facilities for social and recreational activities, and the provision of prosthetic and orientational features to enhance resident independence. Also important is the amount of public and private space available to residents and the centrality of location of a setting and its "permeability" to the community.

The first part of the MEAP, the Physical and Architectural Features Checklist (PAF), operationalizes these environmental factors in terms of nine dimensions (see Table 7.1); information is obtained through direct observation (Moos and Lemke, 1980). Two dimensions focus on the presence of physical features that add convenience and special comfort and foster social and recreational activities (physical amenities, social-recreational aids). Three dimensions assess physical features that aid residents in activities of daily living and in negotiating the facility environment (prosthetic aids, orientational aids, safety features). Two dimensions assess the extent to which the physical setting provides residents with potential flexibility in their activities (architectural choice, space availability). The PAF also measures the presence of features that make the setting more pleasant for staff (staff facilities) and the degree of physical integration between the facility and the surrounding community (community accessibility).

Policy and Program Factors

Variations in facility programs and policies can have important effects on elderly residents. Some of the characteristics observed among the elderly in group residential settings, such as depression, helplessness, and accelerated physical decline, have been attributed to the restrictive policies and overabundance of services in such settings. Residents are more alienated in settings that offer less freedom of choice, and

there is less life satisfaction and developmental task accomplishment in high constraint settings. Furthermore, Lieberman (1974) found that the outcome of relocation of elderly people was more positive in "facilitative" environments—that is, those that fostered autonomy, placed the locus of control in residents' hands, and treated residents in an individualized manner.

We operationalized these factors by constructing the Policy and Program Information Form (POLIF), a part of the MEAP that assesses ten dimensions of the policy and programmatic resources of a setting (see Table 7.1) as reported by the administrator or other responsible staff members (Lemke and Moos, 1980). The first three dimensions reflect how selective the facility is in admitting residents (selectivity) and the degree to which behavioral requirements are imposed on residents once they are in the facility (expectations for functioning, tolerance for deviance). The second set of dimensions taps the balance that exists between individual freedom and institutional order and continuity (policy clarity, policy choice, resident control, and provisions for privacy), while the third set measures the provision of various services and activities in the facility (health services, daily living assistance, and social-recreational activities).

Suprapersonal Factors

The use of average background and personal characteristics as measures of environmental factors is based on the belief that the "character" of an environment de-

TABLE 7.1 Dimensions of the Multiphasic Environmental Assessment Procedure (MEAP)

Physical and Architectural Features	*Policy and Program Features*	*Suprapersonal Factors*	*Social Climate Factors*
Physical amenities	Selectivity	Residents' social resources	Cohesion
Social-recreational aids	Expectations for functioning	Resident heterogeneity	Conflict
Prosthetic aids	Tolerance for deviance	Resident functional abilities	Independence
Orientational aids	Policy clarity	Resident activity level	Self-exploration
Safety features	Policy choice	Resident community integration	Organization
Architectural choice	Resident control	Staff richness	Resident influence
Space availability	Provisions for privacy		Physical comfort
Staff facilities	Availability of health services	Utilization of health services[a]	
Community accessibility	Availability of daily living assistance	Utilization of daily living assistance[a]	
	Availability of social-recreational activities	Utilization of social-recreational activities[a]	

[a]While measuring suprapersonal aspects of the environment, for ease of administration, these utilization indices are included in the POLIF data collection forms.

pends in part on the typical characteristics of its members (the suprapersonal environment). The work in residential settings for older people has focused primarily on the relative degree of age homogeneity. For instance, in comparison to those in age-integrated housing, elderly tenants in age-segregated housing had more new friends and visited more with neighbors and peers. However, they had fewer younger friends and interacted less with their children and other relatives (Sherman, 1975; Teaff et al., 1978). Other suprapersonal factors include the overall functional ability and activity level of residents.

We focused on these factors in the MEAP by developing the Resident and Staff Information Form (RESIF) to tap six dimensions that characterize the residents and staff in a facility (see Table 7.1). Information is obtained from records, from knowledgeable staff members, or from the residents themselves (Lemke and Moos, 1981). Two dimensions are based on the sociodemographic characteristics of residents. One (resident social resources) measures indicators of social competence, such as high educational and occupational levels and greater financial resources; the other (resident heterogeneity) measures the diversity of residents in terms of such factors as age, ethnicity, and religion. Three dimensions measure aspects of residents' current functioning. These are the ability to perform various daily functions independently (functional abilities), involvement in leisure-time activities (activity level), and participation in activities outside the facility (integration in the community). For staff resources, the RESIF considers staffing levels and includes a measure of the diversity, training, and turnover of staff and the contribution of volunteers (staff richness). For ease of administration, three dimensions measuring the extent to which residents utilize facility services and organized activities are included on the POLIF data collection forms in conjunction with questions about their availability. However, these three dimensions (utilization of health services, utilization of daily living assistance, and utilization of social-recreational activities) measure additional aspects of the suprapersonal environment.

Social Climate

The social climate perspective is based on the inference that apparently discrete events possess an underlying continuity and consistency that can be conceptualized in terms of environmental "press." For example, if older people in a residential setting have a say in making the rules, if their suggestions are acted upon, if they can try out new and different ideas, and if the staff are flexible in interpreting rules and regulations, then it is likely that the program emphasizes resident influence and the development of assertive responses on the part of residents. It is these conditions that help to establish the climate or atmosphere of a setting.

Based on extensive work in a variety of social environments, the underlying factors in this area have been conceptualized as representing three basic sets of dimensions. Relationship dimensions assess the extent to which people are involved with and support one another and express themselves freely. Personal growth or goal orientation dimensions measure the directions in which personal development and self-enhancement tend to occur in the setting. System maintenance and change dimensions deal with the degree to which the environment is orderly, clear in its expectations, and responsive to change (Moos, 1974).

The Sheltered Care Environment Scale (SCES), which comprises another part of the MEAP, assesses residents' and staff members' perceptions of seven characteristics of the social environment of a setting (see Table 7.1). The subscales cover quality of interpersonal relationships (cohesion, conflict), opportunities for personal growth

(independence, self-exploration), and mechanisms for system maintenance and change (organization, resident influence, physical comfort). Further information about the psychometric and normative characteristics of the SCES is provided elsewhere (Moos et al., 1979; Moos and Lemke, 1979).

Describing and Comparing Residential Settings

Together, these instruments permit a program evaluator to draw a comprehensive portrait of a setting from information derived from a variety of sources. The conceptual framework that guided the development of the MEAP serves to organize the detailed and wide-ranging data into a useful form. To illustrate, we present examples of the profiles of the policy and social climate results for two residential care facilities. Scores are expressed as standard scores (mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10) based on norms for similar types of facilities.

Figure 7.1 summarizes the policy and program resources of two nonprofit residential care facilities, each of which has about 100 residents. Facility A is one unit of a large rural facility which provides several levels of care. Residents of this unit are all men, half of whom are over age 75. In contrast, Facility B is located in an urban area, and its residents are predominantly women (80 percent) 75 or older (80 percent). Residents' ability to perform activities of daily living is similar in these two facilities and above average for residential care settings. Both facilities have a low turnover rate; more than 85 percent of the residents have lived there more than a year.

The program in Facility A is designed to provide extensive health care and daily living assistance for its residents. Residents have a full range of medical services available within the facility, including physicians, occupational therapists, and a medical clinic, as well as such services as legal advice and assistance with banking and laundry. Although few screening measures are employed (low selectivity) and substantial services are offered, residents are expected to function relatively independently; prolonged illness or impairment of functioning would necessitate a move to another facility with a higher level of care. Expectations concerning the behavior of residents and staff are transmitted through such formal mechanisms as orientation for new residents and a regular newsletter (policy clarity). This facility offers many supportive services to residents but little freedom to individualize daily routines, few opportunities for residents to influence the running of the unit, and little privacy (low policy choice, resident control, and provision for privacy).

In contrast, Facility B provides fewer supportive services but more freedom of choice and formal avenues by which residents can influence the operation of the setting. There are regular house meetings and resident committees, and residents can participate in planning activities, dealing with complaints, setting meal times and visiting hours, and selecting new residents. Initial screening and requirements for continued residence are stricter than average. For example, this facility has a substantial entrance fee, a minimum age requirement, and a long waiting list. Residents have private apartments and enjoy considerable freedom in the use of their own rooms and in structuring their daily routine (high policy choice). Meal hours are flexible, as are times for getting up, going to bed, visiting, and being in the facility at night. In

short, the facility imposes fewer controls on residents, but it also offers them fewer supportive services.

Figure 7.2 compares the residents' perceptions of the social environments of the two facilities. Residents in Facility A perceive somewhat above-average emphasis on independence and on the open expression of personal feelings and concerns. This open expression extends to conflict as well; residents report a considerable amount of anger and interpersonal conflict. For instance, residents tend to respond "yes" to such questions as "Do residents sometimes argue openly with each other?" "Are there a lot of angry discussions among the residents?" and "Do residents criticize each other a lot?" In contrast, residents in Facility B perceive other residents and staff as basically helpful and supportive. They feel that they enjoy a substantial degree of self-sufficiency and independence and that they can influence facility rules and policies. They are likely to respond "yes" to such questions as "Are suggestions made by the residents acted upon?" "Are new and different ideas often tried out?" and "Can residents change things here if they really try?" Thus, the social environment in Facility A is characterized by a high degree of conflict among residents, whereas that in Facility B emphasizes autonomy and resident participation in formulating policies.



FIGURE 7.1 Policy and Program Resources Profiles for Two Residential Care Facilities



FIGURE 7.2 Social-Environmental Resources Profiles for Two Residential Care Facilities

Although licensed to provide comparable levels of care, these two facilities set different tones by means of their policies. In both cases, residents are expected to maintain a high level of independent functioning and to conform to certain standards of behavior. Rules and procedures are communicated to staff and residents systematically. Planned communal activities in both settings are somewhat less varied and frequent than in the average residential care setting. Facility A provides richer services, but there is less individual freedom, resident control, and privacy. Facility B offers fewer services but imposes a looser institutional structure on residents' lives. Facility B, with its flexible policies and high resident control, is perceived by residents as emphasizing independence and autonomy.

The type of information derived from the foregoing profiles may be quite useful as the basis for systematic descriptions and comparisons among facilities. As new types of care settings are developed, the need for more accurate and complete descriptions of their environments grows. The POLIF and SCES, as well as the other parts of the MEAP, can summarize how a setting is functioning at a particular point in time and how its characteristics compare to a reference group sample. Such information can

provide useful feedback to staff members, increasing communication among them and anchoring their perceptions in a normative framework. The various parts of the MEAP can also serve as useful tools in program modification by indicating potential areas for change and by monitoring the results of change efforts.

EXPLORING ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAINS AND THEIR IMPACTS

The broad array of environmental features measured by the MEAP facilitates the examination of relationships among setting characteristics and of their potential impacts on resident functioning. We provide two substantive examples to illustrate these applications of environmental assessment procedures.

Determinants of the Social Environments of Supportive Residential Settings

How does a particular social environment evolve from the discrete objects and people that comprise it? Why is the social environment of one setting more cohesive, more independent, or more organized than the social environment of another? To what extent do physical and policy factors influence the social environment that develops in a setting? Do the aggregate characteristics of the residents affect the social environment? To focus on these questions we developed a conceptual model of the interrelationships among the four domains of environmental variables measured by the MEAP. We illustrate this model here by focusing on supportive residential settings, but it has also been applied to junior high and high school classrooms and university student living groups (Moos, 1979a).

The framework suggests that the institutional context (type of setting), as well as physical and architectural, policy and program, and suprapersonal factors each can affect the type of social environment that emerges in a setting (see Figure 7.3). With respect to physical and architectural features, for instance, more cohesive climates may develop in settings with more social-recreational aids. Physical features can also affect social climate through their impact on the other two environmental domains. Settings that have more available space may facilitate group activities and indirectly increase resident cohesion. In addition, physical features can influence the types of residents who decide to enter a setting, with facilities characterized by better physical features attracting more socially competent residents who are able to promote a sense of cohesion. We hypothesized that the type of setting, facility policies, and aggregate resident and staff characteristics could influence the social environment through similar types of processes.

We explored this framework using MEAP data from 90 residential facilities. The relative importance of each set of variables as predictors of the seven dimensions of the Sheltered Care Environment Scale was estimated using multiple regression procedures and partitioning of the explained variance. In brief, we conducted seven multiple regression analyses in which each of the seven SCES dimensions was the dependent variable and the overall context (type of setting) and selected architec-



FIGURE 7.3 A Model of the Determinants of Sheltered Care Setting Social Environments

tural, policy, and suprapersonal factors were the predictors. The order of entry of the four sets of predictors was varied systematically so that the unique and shared variance accounted for by each set in each of the SCES dimensions could be identified.

The findings supported the framework by showing, for example, that social environments high in cohesion, resident influence, and physical comfort were more likely to emerge in facilities with certain physical and architectural features: more physical amenities (such as attractive decorations in the halls), better social-recreational aids (such as lounges furnished for casual conversations), and more available personal space and architectural choice (such as individual heating controls in residents' rooms). Such settings also tended to be highly selective, to have more socially competent and functionally able residents (suprapersonal factors), and to provide their residents with broader personal choice, more opportunity to participate in making decisions about how the setting should be run, and a richer array of social and recreational activities. The emphasis on resident independence was also enhanced by these policy and suprapersonal factors, but it was somewhat less affected by physical and architectural features (Moos and Igra, 1980).

Residents in settings that emphasized cohesion and independence participated more actively in facility and community activities and showed lower rates of utilization of the health and daily living assistance offered in the facility, as well as lower three-month turnover rates (David et al., 1981; Moos, 1981a). These findings indicate that architectural, policy, and suprapersonal factors enhance the development of certain types of social environments. In turn, these social environments can have important consequences for aspects of health-related functioning among older persons (Moos and Lemke, forthcoming).

The findings provide some guidelines by which program managers and staff can understand the social environment likely to emerge in a residential setting. However, since particular architectural, policy, or suprapersonal characteristics do not inexorably lead to specific types of social environments, the relationships we identified should not be construed rigidly. In fact, they may make it possible to identify the types of settings that are most amenable to change and to indicate the directions in which change is likely to occur. For example, more heterogeneous residents with fewer social resources, who live in settings with fewer physical amenities and little policy choice, tend to create environments with more interpersonal conflict. Program managers and staff could intervene in such setting to help residents develop more activities and enhance their sense of community. By considering the sets of environmental factors in conjunction with one another, the conceptual framework provides a useful guide to the interpretation of prior studies as well as to the development of strategies for planning integrated programmatic change in residential and other settings.

Examining the Functions of Environmental Choice and Control

There is considerable controversy about the amount of choice and control that should be provided for elderly residents of supportive residential settings. Some investigators have suggested that an optimal milieu should maximize independence and individual choice (Fozard and Popkin, 1978), while others have noted the value of a stable, structured setting for the well-being of older people (Coleman, 1975). In this regard, recent studies have shown that experimentally induced increases in choice and control in residential settings may have beneficial short-term effects on the morale and adaptation of residents, but that long-term effects occur only when

such increases are due to stable factors that persist over time (Rodin, 1980). To further complicate the issue, policies that are thought to enhance flexibility and independence may not be perceived as such by residents, and the effect of policies may depend in part on residents' characteristics. For example, less functionally able residents may find a high degree of choice and control stressful and may benefit from a more structured environment.

Personal control in such settings can be fostered in two major ways: by allowing residents to determine their daily routine (policy choice) and by giving them responsibility for some aspects of facility programs and policies (resident control). The POLIF dimensions of policy choice and resident control measure the naturally existing, stable levels of choice and control available to residents of group settings. To explore the concomitants of variations in choice and control, we attempted to predict the quality of the social environment and of resident functioning from information about these two policy factors in combination with selected suprapersonal factors (residents' social resources and functional abilities and the proportion of women in the setting).

We found that women residents and residents with more social and functional resources were more likely to live in facilities high in choice and control. These suprapersonal and policy factors were associated with more cohesive, organized, independence-oriented social environments that had relatively little conflict. These factors also enhanced residents' activity level and may have helped reduce turnover rates by contributing to resident cohesion (Moos, 1981a). These sets of factors may mutually influence each other. For example, a cohesive resident population is more likely to be perceived as a social entity by the administrator and thus to be given a greater voice in running the facility. The turnover rate may be increased by resident dissatisfaction, but a higher turnover rate may also diminish the perceived need for resident input. Such reciprocal influences highlight the need to use comprehensive environmental assessments in evaluating the "impact" of specific setting features.

There was some evidence that those with more personal resources were better able to take advantage of environmental opportunities. A combination of high choice and control in a facility that had residents with greater functional resources enhanced cohesion, organization, and observer-rated pleasantness beyond what would be expected from the relevant policy and suprapersonal factors alone. We also found that women were more affected by a relative lack of environmental choice than were men. Apparently these older women were used to organizing their own pattern of everyday activities and found the absence of such choices as when to get up, go to bed, bathe, and eat especially irksome. In most settings in which a large proportion of residents are men, residents are also veterans. These veterans may be accustomed to more regimented group living arrangements and may be less affected by the relative lack of choice.

An important implication of these findings is that studies that attempt to increase choice and control in residential settings need to examine not only the existing opportunities for residents to exercise control but the levels of other environmental and personal resources as well. The impact of any one set of environmental resources is related to the types of individuals for which it is provided, as well as the general context in which these individuals function.

EVALUATING THE WORK SETTINGS OF HEALTH CARE STAFF

Supportive residential and health care settings provide a work environment for staff as well as a treatment or living environment for residents. Although these two facets of

the environment serve different functions, they are closely related. For instance, staff who feel little support from peers or supervisors and who are unclear about their job and role performance expectations may find it difficult to establish a supportive, clear environment for residents. The press of required activities may lead staff to use less time-consuming methods of care that are likely to reinforce passive dependent behavior of residents. Such behavior may in turn lead to negative stereotyping of older persons and to additional dependency-producing staff behavior, more rapid functional deterioration among residents, and ultimately lower staff morale. On the other hand, staff attention and positive expectations are powerful resources that facilitate resident functioning by enhancing cognitive and social stimulation and setting standards for acceptable behavior.

One of the most pressing issues in health care involves the relatively poor morale, impaired performance, and high rates of absenteeism and turnover among certain groups of health care staff. For instance, the average staff turnover rate in long-term care settings is over 50 percent per year, and many facilities have rates as high as 70 percent to 80 percent. In a cogent review of work in this area, Cartwright (1979) noted that the psychological strain associated with assuming responsibility for older people, the affective climate surrounding illness, and the contradictory and unrealizable aspects of the health care role are all implicated in staff distress. She points out that over five million people are employed in the health care sector, that many health professionals suffer from major physical and mental problems, and that the problems of providers can seriously compromise the quality of patient care.

One of the most insidious aspects of this problem is that demoralization is especially likely to occur among the most dedicated and energetic staff members (Pines and Aronson, 1981). In addition, the development and implementation of innovative rehabilitation and treatment programs may be severely hampered by staff resistance and lack of motivation. To increase staff morale and retain the creative energies of the most highly motivated and empathic health care professionals, it is important to identify the major stressors in health care settings and to formulate effective methods of managing these stressors. In this regard, there is evidence that the organizational design of health services programs can affect service delivery through its impact on work stress and staff motivation (Cherniss, 1980).

Measuring the Social Environments of Work Settings

In order to measure the characteristics of health care and other work settings, we have developed the Work Environment Scale (WES). The WES is composed of ten subscales that, like the SCES dimensions, assess three underlying domains of dimensions: relationship dimensions (involvement, peer cohesion, and supervisor support), personal growth or goal orientation dimensions (autonomy, task orientation, and work pressure), and system maintenance and change dimensions (clarity, control, innovation, and physical comfort). These dimensions measure the major chronic work stressors that have been identified in previous research (lack of autonomy and clarity and high work pressure and supervisor control), as well as the interpersonal resources that can help buffer the effects of such stressors (that is, involvement, peer cohesion, and supervisor support). Information about the normative and psychometric aspects of the scale is provided elsewhere (Moos, 1981b).

The WES is sensitive to differences in perceptions of work environments between men and women, supervisors and employees, and patient care and nonpatient care staff. The scale has been used to compare health care settings (including long-term

care facilities), to contrast actual and preferred work environments, to test theories about differences among work environments, and to focus on the relationship between individual adaptation and the characteristics of work environments, including outcome of psychiatric treatment. The WES can also help to describe the social environments of work settings, to contrast work groups with one another, to compare actual and preferred work milieus, and to facilitate and monitor changes in settings over time (for example, see Bromet and Moos, 1977; Holahan and Moos, 1981; Moos, 1981b; Moos et al., 1979).

The WES has been applied to more than 1400 employees in a representative set of general work settings and to more than 1600 employees in health care settings. Although the findings should be interpreted with caution due to the lack of matching between the two groups, employees in general work settings rate the degree of supervisor support, clarity of expectations, and physical comfort in their work milieus higher than do employees in health care settings. General work settings are also seen as somewhat more involving and cohesive, as allowing more autonomy, and as having less work pressure and supervisor control. These differences may reflect staff morale and burnout problems in health care settings that stem from the stressful nature of the work and the problems of being employed in bureaucratic organizations such as large hospitals and community mental health centers.

Morale and Performance in the Workplace

As noted earlier, stressful aspects of work settings may lead to poor staff morale and performance. For example, the Berkeley Planning Associates (1977) examined employee characteristics and organizational and work environment factors related to employee burnout in 11 child abuse and neglect counseling clinics. The WES showed that there was less worker burnout in settings that emphasized job involvement, peer cohesion, and supervisor support and that had an efficient, autonomous, task-oriented environment with explicit rules and policies. As expected, worker burnout was positively related to perceived work pressure. In addition, such organizational factors as high job formalization, centralization of program decision making, and large caseloads were related to employees reporting less emphasis on interpersonal relationships, autonomy, task orientation, and clarity and higher work pressure. The relationships between burnout and the work environment remained significant after these organizational factors and employee demographic variables were controlled.

The perceived stressfulness of the work milieu has been implicated in the development of mass "psychogenic" illness in some job settings. For instance, some workers in a shoe factory reported experiencing headaches, lightheadedness, and dizziness in response to a strange odor in the workplace. Since environmental testing in the plant produced essentially negative results, a behavioral factors evaluation was undertaken. In comparison to nonaffected employees, those affected generally perceived more work pressure, less peer cohesion and supervisor support, and a lack of organizational structure and clarity in the work milieu. Colligan and his colleagues (1979) concluded that psychogenic illness in the workplace may be precipitated in part by psychological job stress and perceptions of the work environment as lacking in orderly and coherent group functioning (see also Murphy and Colligan, 1979). In this regard, Chesney and her colleagues (1981) have shown that the provision of autonomy and peer cohesion may have more positive effects on individuals with a type A than on those with a type B behavior pattern.

Characteristics of the work environment that contribute to burnout are likely to affect employees' openness to innovation as well as the quality of their performance. As part of a larger study of an innovative problem-solving training procedure in a public middle school, McClure and his colleagues (1980) gave the WES to teachers in experimental and control classes. The teachers saw their work environments as highly pressured and as lacking in supportiveness, clarity, task focus, and innovation. This stress-inducing environment led the teachers to perceive the intervention study and associated inservice workshops as a burden rather than an opportunity. Together, these studies suggest that improving the work environments of health care and other human services professionals may be an effective first step toward improving the quality of the programs they provide for their clients.

FORMULATING ECOLOGICAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

We have provided a framework of four domains of environmental factors and described the development of procedures to measure these factors. In discussing these procedures, we have noted their applications in comparing supportive residential settings and health care and general work settings. We turn now to some implications of the foregoing material for planning intervention strategies.

Improving Social Environments

Information derived from measures of people's social environments can be used to facilitate and monitor change. For instance, Wetzel (1978) identified relationships between work milieu factors and depression among women and suggested interventions to increase involvement and cohesion, such as the development of peer-oriented activities among employees, and to reduce the number of restrictive and dysfunctional rules (see also Waters, 1978). DePiano (1980) employed a survey feedback approach in which results from an adapted form of the WES were used to teach high school principals how to lead school advisory councils (SACs). In comparison to SAC members whose school principals served as a control group, SAC members whose principals participated in feedback workshops perceived their councils as higher in involvement, peer cohesion, and support and as more autonomous, task oriented, innovative, and clear with respect to rules and procedures.

The Ideal Form (Form I) of the WES, when used in conjunction with the Real Form (Form R), identifies the areas and extent of staff dissatisfaction. We have used these two forms of the WES to help ameliorate work stress in three general medical units: a burn treatment unit, a surgical unit, and a neonatal intensive care unit. Staff members in these units were showing dysfunctional reactions, such as mild depression and physical and emotional withdrawal from patients, that seemed to be attributable to high work pressure, confusion about unit policies, and lack of personal autonomy and of support from supervisors. Staff were assessed and provided with feedback on the WES results and on the discrepancies between their actual and preferred work milieus.

In general, staff members perceived average or below-average emphasis on most of the ten WES dimensions and wanted increased emphasis on every dimension except work pressure. Target areas for change were identified, and a liaison psychiatrist worked with unit staff to formulate and implement changes. Staff in each of the units felt that the actual work setting was closer to their preferred work setting on one or more dimensions after the intervention period, as indicated by readministration of

the WES. Each unit showed significant positive changes on two of the three relationship dimensions, and two of the three units showed increases in task orientation and staff autonomy and decreases in work pressure. For example, compared to levels prior to the intervention procedure, the burn treatment team perceived more emphasis on involvement, peer cohesion, autonomy, clarity, and innovation and less emphasis on work pressure nine months after the intervention (Koran et al., 1981).

Information about other environmental domains, such as those measured by the MEAP, can be used by individuals to understand their settings better, to clarify their goals, to formulate and implement needed changes, and to monitor the results of a program of change. As noted earlier, our findings on the factors related to the development of cohesion and independence in residential settings can provide facility administrators and staff with guidelines for understanding and changing the social milieu. Knowledge regarding the "determinants" of social stressors and resources can identify directions in which change is likely to occur and indicate the types of settings that are most amenable to change. A focus on all four domains can help to ensure that changes in one domain are compatible with system functioning and to develop integrated strategies that involve related dimensions from different domains (for example, see Moos, 1979a, and Price, 1979).

In such an effort, Dean (1978) asked the residents and staff of a nursing home to evaluate the facility on a number of dimensions, including those tapped by the SCES. Interventions formulated on the basis of the resulting data included changes in the physical environment, establishment of a resident government and a resident newsletter, and development of role-playing sessions for residents designed to increase their cohesion, independence, and self-exploration. The interventions had the desired effect; there were increases in residents' space utilization and significant positive changes in both resident (independence, self-exploration, and resident influence) and staff (cohesion and organization) perceptions of the social climate (see also Waters, 1980).

These social systems intervention methods basically involve four steps: (1) environmental assessment, (2) feedback of the results of the assessment with particular emphasis on real-ideal setting differences, (3) planning and instituting change, and (4) reassessment. Since there is no specific endpoint to the change process, these steps may be repeated several times. An incidental benefit of using these methods is the exposure of program managers and staff to a differentiated perspective for thinking about their programs and policies. Instead of locating their setting in a one-dimensional space defined by the terms "good" and "bad," staff are encouraged to think about it in terms of the many dimensions that can be tapped by an instrument such as the MEAP. This cognitive shift can facilitate program innovation, since it provides many different avenues for instituting change.

We believe that the process of planning and facilitating change using data obtained from environmental assessment procedures can produce several other important benefits. In supportive residential settings, for example, these benefits include the following: (1) Resident and staff input is obtained in a manner that makes participants feel comfortable and competent. Although many residents and staff may not feel qualified to criticize a setting, they do feel able to act as reporters about its current functioning. (2) The issues raised by procedures such as the MEAP can provide relevant topics for staff training and development programs, such as discussion of administrator and staff roles or of facility sanctions and sources of resistance to change. (3) Since participants can concentrate their attempts to change their setting on a few commonly defined areas, the possibility of confusion or conflicting behavior is re-

duced and the likelihood that change will take place in an orderly manner is increased. (4) Staff members can redefine their roles to include program planning and design. The discussion of feedback often shifts concern from individual residents to the setting as a whole and its impact on all residents (for reviews of relevant studies, see Moos, 1979a, 1979c).

Implementing Organizational Consultation

Just as counselors build mental models of their clients to guide them in counseling, consultants create an image of an organization to assist them in their task. This image consists of observations and speculations about the structure, function, and dynamics of the organization. Tools like the WES and MEAP can provide a valuable contribution to this working image. In addition, the measurement-feedback-planning sequence enables a consultant to assess such factors as the amount of resistance to change, resources for generating and maintaining innovations, and values and priorities of program staff.

A discrepancy between the WES or SCES results and other information can be a source of new hypotheses for the consultant. For example, where a residential setting has policies that presumably provide residents with considerable choice and control yet where residents report having little autonomy or influence, the incongruity can be a sign to be alert for other factors that may be interfering with residents experiencing a real sense of efficacy. The reactions of program managers and staff to data gathering and feedback are also valuable clues to the functioning of an organization. Is the initial resistance to evaluation understandable in terms of job security? Does it reflect a conflict among staff members about the worth of program evaluation and change? By judiciously interpreting reactions to each phase of the assessment-feedback-planning sequence, the image of a facility can be further supplemented.

Schroeder (1979) has described a team-building environmental design process that can be used by organizational consultants. In the first stage he uses the Ideal Form of the Group Environment Scale (GES—see Moos, 1981c) to obtain information about staff members' social-environmental preferences. A measure of Jung's psychological types is used to identify staff members' preferences for extroversion-introversion, sensing-intuiting, thinking-feeling, and judging-perception. Intuitive types tend to prefer an open, independence-oriented social environment, while sensing types want their environment to emphasize formal structure and organization. Feeling types prefer environments to emphasize involvement, friendship, and supportive interaction, while thinking types want to be able to influence and control their setting.

Stage 2 involves sharing the data obtained from the first stage with group participants. Each participant receives a profile describing each staff member's perception of the ideal environment, as well as the leader's perception and the average perceptions of the total group. Discussion of the characteristics of an ideal staff team environment leads to stage 3, which is the actual environmental design process. The substages of this process involve selecting environmental values, setting goals, translating goals into specific actions, developing social contracts, and implementing the resulting plans. Approximately one month after implementing the design plan, staff members complete the Real Form of the GES to assess their current perceptions of the staff team environment. The resulting data are provided to the staff group and become part of the ongoing social-environmental design process.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

We have described research in which we formulated and measured four domains of environmental factors that influence behavior. Although it is only a beginning, we believe that this framework for conceptualizing environmental domains and their interrelationships can help to guide and integrate research in what typically are separate lines of empirical work. For instance, the framework can identify common dimensions that characterize different types of settings, as well as highlight the similarities of the person-environment transactions that occur in them. In helping to identify the general processes by which contextual factors affect individuals, environmental assessment procedures should broaden our understanding of the ways in which different social settings influence the individuals who reside and work in them. Furthermore, such procedures can help program evaluators and managers to conduct formative evaluations of social and community programs, to monitor stability and change in such programs, to evaluate the impact of program factors, and to improve programs by providing feedback on the results of evaluations.

Enhanced knowledge about environmental factors and their probable impacts should eventually lead to conceptual and programmatic advances that can improve individual and social systems functioning. However, future progress in this area depends on the formulation of conceptual frameworks and measurement procedures that adequately reflect the multicausal, interrelated nature of the processes involved in adapting to human environments. These frameworks need to allow for the interdependence of personal and environmental factors and for the fact that stressful life circumstances can foster personal competence and maturity as well as lead to illness and dysfunction. With improved knowledge, we can intervene to promote environmental contexts and adaptive strategies that are conducive to healthy and effective human functioning.

NOTE

1. In addition to the four parts described here, the MEAP includes a Rating Scale which covers evaluative judgments by outside observers on four dimensions: two tap physical and architectural resources and two tap resident and staff resources.

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8

Beyond Experimentation

New Methods for a New Age

Ian I. Mitroff

There is little doubt that one of the preeminent forms of obtaining knowledge (if not of characterizing and of constructing it) in the social sciences has been that of the experiment (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). There is also little doubt that the use of the experiment has added immeasurably to our understanding of human behavior. However, with the increasing use of experimentation on social problems of all kinds, magnitudes, and scopes, it has also become clear that the use of experimentation as a basis for obtaining knowledge and directing action is subject to severe limitations and difficulties (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978).

Two difficulties in particular are especially critical and central to this discussion. They are the issues of (1) problem definition and (2) relating knowledge to action. The first issue concerns the fact that individuals differ markedly in their perceptions/definitions of important social situations. To perform an experiment, then, with regard to whether one set of factors is responsible for producing a significant change in another set is to beg in part a fundamental question. The question is not only whether one set of variables is responsible for producing significant changes in other variables, but, much more important, which variables should be taken as fundamentally characteristic of a problem situation in the first place. To accept one set of variables is in effect to accept one definition of a problem as supreme over all other definitions. I think far too many proponents of the experiments as *the* means for obtaining knowledge about important social problems miss this vital point. While the experiment may be optimal (although even this is debatable) in answering precisely what caused what in a particular definition of a situation, the experiment is powerless to tell us what definition of a situation to choose in the first place. Thus, counter to the claims of its proponents, the place of the experiment in the grand scheme of obtaining knowledge is secondary at best, not primary (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978).

The second issue, that of relating knowledge to action, is no less important or problematic. In fact, in many ways it is an offshoot of the first issue. If individuals differ strongly in the first place regarding how they define a situation, then they differ no less strongly in how they see the link between knowledge and what should be done to alleviate a problem situation. And in fact one of the most damning complaints that can be leveled against the proponents of the classical experiment is that they have generally been content to view a separation between knowledge and action. While the former supposedly deals with pure matters of fact ("what is"), the latter suppos-

edly deals with strong matters of value, what "ought" to be done, what "should be," and so on. However, if the choice of a basic definition of a problem is also a matter of "values," then this supposed distinction collapses. There is not the strict gap between knowledge and action, between "what is" and "what ought to be," as the proponents would believe (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). However, by not addressing this issue in the manner that it deserves, the failure of experimentation as a general means of guiding knowledge becomes apparent. Indeed, any method of obtaining knowledge—more basic yet, of pretending to knowledge—that separates the process of obtaining knowledge from the use of knowledge may be called positivistic (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978).

Were we to continue this line of criticism or stop it here, this discussion would be like far too many in the past. We would be content merely to criticize without offering an alternative. However, our main purpose is not that of criticism but rather that of offering an alternative means of gathering and constituting knowledge that we believe is especially suited to the basic issue of problem definition. The fundamental purpose of this discussion is to confront the issue of how people can be said to have knowledge of complex situations wherein they do not share the same definition of those situations. In approaching this question, we will not, of necessity, survey all of the possible responses; rather, we will present a single method that is itself a composite of a large number of other methods. The composite itself shows the difficulties in fashioning a method for addressing complex societal problems. As such, the method itself provides a commentary, a metaperspective, on other methods.

The basic sources of inspiration for this chapter are John Dewey and C. West Churchman. Both men have over their long and rich careers continually argued for a fundamentally different conception of human inquiry. However, it is only within the last few decades that tools have appeared that even begin to approach the requirements necessary for operationalizing the complex methods of inquiry outlined by Dewey and Churchman. This chapter sketches the broad outlines of a methodology for coping with complex social problems.

THE CHARACTER OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

This chapter deals with a particular class of problems that has only relatively recently become the subject of formal inquiry. This class is known as "ill-structured" problems, to distinguish it from well-structured problems. The overwhelming body of social problems are ill structured (Churchman, 1971, 1979).

Kuhn (1962), among others (Mintzberg et al., 1976), has pointed out that the vast majority of problems that constitute the core of undergraduate training in the professions and sciences are well structured. These are the problems that are typically found in textbooks. They are problems in solution and, often, in name only. That is, typically the student is "given" *the* statement of the problem and *the* data required to solve it. The student's problem is to apply the right principles in the right sequence to derive a correct or optimal answer to the given problem.

Well-structured problems convey the appearance of orderliness or tidiness. Since the problem is "given," the impression is conveyed that the statement of the problem is not only unproblematic, but that it is the same for all interested parties, that is, all those who have a *stake* in the problem. As a result, the student is neither encouraged nor trained in the critical art of problem formulation or problem structuring.

Well-structured textbook problems also convey a false sense of orderliness in another but related manner. This is the impression of disciplinary separation, that complex problems can be partitioned neatly into a set of separate, independent problems or factors. Thus, for instance, since the social and the physical sciences are taught separately in different texts, the false impression is conveyed that the social and physical aspects of complex problems not only exist in separate ontological realms, but that they can be known and hence solved in separate realms.

As Ackoff (1971) has argued so persuasively, none of the foregoing is necessarily bad or wrong in and of itself. Rather, the point is that well-structured problems are the reflection and product of a particular age, the Machine Age. One of the essential characteristics of a machine is the fact that by definition it is an assemblage of parts; it can be "broken down." It is thus both fitting and natural that what an age takes as a fundamental image of reality ("the natural constitution of things") should be reflected in its pedagogy and philosophy of inquiry.

The transformation from the Machine to the Systems Age has changed the order of things, if not their perception, dramatically. Social and technical problems can only be decoupled from one another at the peril of the larger social system (Churchman, 1979). Social and technical problems neither exist in separate realms nor can they be solved independent of one another (Ackoff, 1971). More fundamental still, it has come to be recognized increasingly that the definition of a problem is not the same for all experts, interest groups, or professionals. In short, the problems of the Systems Age are increasingly ill structured.

The problems associated with ill-structured problems are deeper than those associated with well-structured problems. Ill-structured problems not only vary in their definitions from stakeholder to stakeholder; they vary over time as well. They are dynamic. A solution for one time period and one set of conditions is not necessarily a solution for another. Unlike well-structured problems, which can be decoupled from their historical context (and hence if they can be solved, can be solved once and for all), ill-structured problems have to be defined and solved anew for every generation.

Problems in morals, politics, social organization, and religion are not like problems of classical mechanics or, in general, those of "normal" science (Kuhn, 1962). Their definition, not to mention their solution, is not the same for all parties. The old saying that one should avoid reinventing the wheel is entirely *inappropriate* when applied to ill-structured problems. Reinvention is each person's and each generation's unique way of making a perennial concern of humankind distinctively their own. Reinvention is one of the great social mechanisms whereby a general problem of concern to all ages becomes meaningful to each individual (Churchman, 1979; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978; Sarason, 1972a).

From a philosophical standpoint, ill-structured problems are much more demanding. As a consequence, they necessitate a different approach. Problem definition, formulation, or structuring is at the heart of the treatment of ill-structured problems. The definition of such problems is variable because different stakeholders hold different assumptions about the nature of the social system of which they are a part. This in turn has a number of basic consequences. For one, in contradistinction to well-prescribed hypotheses, assumptions can be neither decisively confirmed nor falsified. Unlike the simplified world of well-structured problems, relatively clear-cut decision rules cannot be formulated for the testing of assumptions by data. The role of separating the false from the true is rendered more ambiguous because of the ambiguous nature of real-world data. In contrast, data in a well-structured problem are neither incomplete nor inconsistent. For example, the length of a beam is known and

the force on it is given in most engineering courses. Therefore, the civil engineering student can calculate the size of the beam required to span a given distance with a given force.

In the real world there are either too many or too few data, never exactly the right amount of the right kind. If there are too few, then by definition the data are never conclusive enough "to settle the situation." Hence, every conclusion will be open to challenge. If the data are too extensive, then inevitably they are contradictory. As a result, those with different assumptions can choose which data to emphasize. Hence, once again every conclusion is open to challenge. Further, even if the same data are selected by different viewpoints, they will more often than not be subject to different interpretation (Mason and Mitroff, 1981).

The contention of this chapter is that *all* of the fundamental problems of society and social research are in actuality ill structured. Some examples: Are standardized tests appropriate for a particular school district? If so, which kinds, administered when and by whom? Does "schooling" make a difference? Do private schools in fact do "better" than public schools in preparing students? What does "better" mean? Who defines it; who measures it? Do police make a difference in fighting crime? If so, how much? These issues are fundamentally ill structured because different competent and well-intentioned observers can legitimately disagree as to the nature of the questions and not merely their "answers." Indeed, we can say they will disagree in their so-called answers precisely because they will neither formulate nor construe the questions in the same ways. If we had to wait for widespread consensus to form before we could act or proceed, then we would be halted before we could even begin inquiry. The need for methodologies to treat ill-structured problems is thus acute. The need is to treat issues that contain strong conflicts that can be neither swept nor wished away.

The central concerns of this chapter can now be stated. If the social sciences—or, better yet, the *human* sciences—both treat and involve issues that have a strong philosophical component, then the human sciences are closer to philosophy in spirit and method than we have thought. But the question then becomes, which form of *applied* methodology is appropriate for treating ill-structured problems? In what critical respects does a methodology for treating ill-structured problems differ from a methodology for treating well-structured problems? Conversely, what is the role of knowledge and what kind of knowledge is appropriate in treating ill-structured problems?

APPLIED PHENOMENOLOGY: A PHILOSOPHY OF SHARED EXPERTISE

John Dewey is generally recognized and rightly praised for his immense contributions to the theory of educational practice. In my opinion, however, Dewey's contributions to a methodology for treating ill-structured problems are vastly more important, although these contributions have been less recognized as such.

Dewey's contributions to the philosophy of science—the philosophy of inquiry in general—have been well recognized and deservedly acclaimed by the philosophical community. However, I do not think it is appreciated by the general social science community that people like Dewey, Churchman, and Ackoff, to mention but three, were formulating a method of inquiry that was specifically designed to handle ill-structured problems. My colleague, Richard Mason, and I have been working to extend, systematize, and, especially, *operationalize* the work of Dewey, Churchman, and Ackoff so that it can be applied to complex social problems.

TABLE 8.1 Steps in a General Methodology for Treating Ill-Structured Problems

Step	*Activity(ies)*	*Purpose*
(1)	Partitioning of larger social group into small groups; team building	Effective group functioning, interaction, conditions for participation, explicit generation of different views
(2)	Stakeholder identification/generation	Identification of vested interest groups/actors affecting a social policy
(3)	Assumption generation/identification	Identification of premises that must be posited to derive competing social policies
(4)	Prioritization of assumptions and structured dialectical debate	Determination of the epistemic status of key knowledge claims
(5)	Argumentation analysis	Determination of the relationship between assumptions and social policies
(6)	Knowledge synthesis, group synthesis	Group integration, knowledge integration

Table 8.1 shows a set of *necessary* steps or conditions in a generalized methodology for treating ill-structured problems. That is, given current knowledge, each of the steps accomplishes a necessary function. Needless to say, we do not know at this time a set of sufficient conditions. In fact, we may never arrive at such a set, for social systems do not admit of this kind of strict determinacy (Ackoff and Emery, 1974; Churchman, 1971, 1979).

Each of the steps in Table 8.1 has been described in extensive detail elsewhere (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). The purpose of this chapter is thus merely to illustrate their nature and resulting importance in dealing with complex social problems. One of the first things that is apparent from Table 8.1 is that a great variety of different traditional and nontraditional academic disciplines are involved in the creation of such a methodology. The reason for this is the great variety of levels and types of systems and their associated functions that must be dealt with in treating ill-structured problems. We turn to an explication of each of the steps in Table 8.1.

Step 1: Group Formation

Any methodology for treating ill-structured problems must by the very nature of such problems be participative. Again, the fundamental reason is that the nature of problems lies in the eyes of the stakeholders. The issue of participation, in short, is critical. Participation cannot be confined to traditional conceptions of the expert. This is not only ruled out on ethical considerations, but on epistemic grounds as well. On grounds of equity, it is unethical not to involve in some significant manner those who are the supposed beneficiaries of applied social science (Churchman, 1971, 1979; Dewey, 1929a). On epistemic grounds, it is an illusion to think that one can know the true needs of a community, society, or culture without some meaningful form of participation. To paraphrase, an expert is not a special kind of person, but each person is a special kind of expert, especially when it comes to each person's problems or, more generally, troubles.

The issue of participation also arises from the fundamental epistemic consideration that the more complex the problem, the wider the set of expert skills required to define

the problem, let alone cope with it. That is, as we have stressed repeatedly, when it comes to ill-structured as opposed to well-structured problems, no one single expert or discipline possesses all the requisite knowledge to grapple with the problem. Further, since complex problems require for their effective management the cooperation of diverse individuals and social institutions, no one person, no matter how powerful, can command successful implementation of a policy. Time and again, the social science literature shows that for successful implementation of a policy to occur, people must be involved in the formulation of that policy (Mason and Mitroff, 1981).

The preceding considerations are a direct reflection of the particular kind of pragmatism formulated by Dewey, Churchman, and Ackoff. In brief, knowledge is teleological. It arises from the needs and *purposes* of particular social groups in their attempts to cope with certain problems. In the applied social sciences in particular, it may be impossible to find a set of propositions or knowledge claims that hold for the needs and purposes of all groups at all times. It may therefore make little sense to search for a limited and fixed set of *invariant, universal* facts or knowledge claims that govern an entire social system for all time. Instead, facts and knowledge are grounded in the needs and purposes of particular social groups. Conversely, one may define truth as the limit of that set of facts and claims that have relevancy for all social groups—if there be any.

There is another important epistemic implication that follows from a pragmatic perspective. A great deal, perhaps the most significant part, of knowledge about social systems resides in the heads of the participants themselves. Given the complexity and dynamism of social systems, relevant knowledge cannot be formally codified *in its entirety.* Further, if one had to await for such codification, along with its attendant validation, one might have to wait forever before action would ever be warranted.

From such considerations, three possibilities present themselves for the locus of informal or tacit knowledge about social systems: (1) the relevant informal knowledge is contained solely in the heads of "certified" experts, professionals, scientists, and so on; (2) it is contained solely in the heads of the broader class of clients, participants, and ultimate users, that is, the beneficiaries, sponsors, and users of knowledge; and (3) it is contained in the interaction between the first two classes and, conversely, in general it is contained in neither exclusively or completely. It is this latter possibility that pragmatism affirms. This is the philosophical justification of the broader meaning attached to the concept of expert touched on earlier.

To be more specific, consider an excellent paper by Miles (1980) in the field of education. Miles's paper does as good a job as any I know in asking, "What do we know about schools in general?" and, given this backdrop, "What are the implications for using this knowledge effectively to make changes in schools?" As Miles shows, one can go quite a way by traditional research methods (well structured!) in establishing what experts think we know about the system of education in general. However, the end result is generally a set of dilemmas, paradoxes, or what a philosopher would call a dialectic or an antinomy, that is, a standoff between a sharply contradictory pair of equally plausible propositions. That is, the outcome of the application of a set of research methods that are generally appropriate for well-structured problems to ill-structured problems results in a metaphysical standoff. This is exactly what Dewey, Churchman, and Ackoff have been writing about.

Whereas traditional research methodology typically regards an end state of metaphysical standoff with horror (worse uncertainty has resulted from the quest for certainty!), the method proposed here regards such a standoff as a fundamentally necessary *initial* starting point. That is, in a particular school setting, whether it be at the

class, school, district, state, or national level, a set of diverse participants would be identified as having interest or bearing on the particular issue under discussion. They would be brought together and then divided into small groups. Each small group would select that side of the antinomy that it believes best characterizes the particular situation and then proceed to develop the strongest case for its side in detail. As we proceed through the methodology, we will attempt to make clearer the justification and purpose of this.

The social science literature shows that small problem-solving groups of one to eight persons generally outperform large groups (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). The reason is that small groups, *properly trained* in team-building methods, are better at communicating and sharing ideas. The same literature, however, is also split on the issue as to whether homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups do better in creative problem solving. We have tried to combine the advantages of both factors by forming small groups that are as homogeneous *within* and as heterogeneous *between* one another as possible. The homogeneity within a small group allows it to deal more effectively with the *task* of problem solving. Needed psychic energy does not have to be diverted into dealing with interpersonal *process* issues such as conflict over personalities and the like. On the other hand, by deliberately constructing small groups that are as different from one another as possible, we have not left to chance the opportunity to witness and to debate later different perceptions of a problem (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). In short, the first purpose of the methodology is to structure the surfacing of as many different views of a problem or issue as possible. We thereby hope to minimize the chance of later solving the "wrong" version of a problem precisely.

There exist many methods by which to form small groups from a larger one (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). For instance, it is well known that individuals differ systematically in their personality and/or decision styles. Further, different styles tend to include very different perceptions of the reality of social systems. Putting persons who share the same style in a single group tends to sharpen even further the differences between different psychological realities. This technique also allows individuals to experience concretely one of the most difficult of all phenomena to observe, the influence of personality on the formulation and potential solution of problems (Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). The technique of putting like types together in effect allows one to make the phenomenon of personality visible to each individual. This part of the methodology thus represents the initial phenomenological aspect of ill-structured problem solving.

Steps 2 and 3: Stakeholder and Assumption Specification

Assumptions are the epistemic cornerstone of ill-structured problems (Churchman, 1971, 1979). Fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of humanity, social systems, and social science govern the production of different formulations of a problem (Dewey, 1929a). Also, since very few assumptions can actually be verified prior or even subsequent to action, they must remain problematic. In short, they must remain uncertain. They must remain as assumptions. Indeed, facts and assumptions bear a symbiotic relationship to one another. *A fact is an assumption about which we feel confident, that is, relatively certain. Conversely, an assumption is a potential but doubtful (that is, problematic) fact.* The point is that there is always a potential movement back and forth between the class of assumptions and that of facts. What is regarded as a fact by one social group at one point in time may be

regarded by another group at another point in time as an assumption, and vice versa (Dewey, 1929b).

Assumptions thereby become the basic ground of the construction of social reality (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). For this reason, the uncovering, analysis, and challenging of assumptions is at the heart of a methodology for dealing with ill-structured problems. Unfortunately, the surfacing of assumptions is something which in general cannot be done directly. Most people are as unaware of their assumptions as they are of their unconscious. Asking a person to produce his or her assumptions about reality is equivalent to asking a person to produce a map of his or her conscious and unconscious mind and to show the interaction between them—no small or simple task! Thus, from a behavioral standpoint, the injunction to "State your assumptions!" is virtually meaningless.

Fortunately, there is an indirect way of getting at assumptions that is both meaningful and simple. *Assumptions are in effect the properties of the stakeholders that make up a complex social system.* That is, complex social systems are composed of multiple actors, vested interest groups—in short, stakeholders. Stakeholders are called such because they represent those persons, groups, and institutions that have a "stake" in a social policy. Every social policy either depends upon, affects, or in turn is affected by certain stakeholders. The nature of the relationship between policies and stakeholders depends on the properties of the stakeholders that are posited, that is, hypothesized.

In brief, assumptions relate to such questions as (indeed, every assumption is a response to an implicit and generally doubtful question):

(1) Does a particular stakeholder or class of stakeholders (for example, an institution) have the *will, motivation, ability, necessary resources, power, authority,* or the like to do something?
(2) What are the true underlying *motives, goals, purposes,* and *needs* of stakeholders? What are they trying to *accomplish, achieve?*
(3) Is there a *gap* between *espoused* needs, motives, and so on and *actual* ones?
(4) What is the assumed *relationship* between stakeholders? How does one stakeholder *affect* another?

It should be patently obvious that different stakeholders would have different perceptions of something as huge and complicated as an educational system. However, it should also be equally obvious that a particular class of stakeholders is not alike in all its characteristics. For instance, in his provocative and stimulating book, *The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change,* Sarason (1972b: 140-141) relates the following:

> *As part of his work in a clinic* [sic] *seminar a Yale senior had been assigned to work with one of the first grade teachers, and shortly after he began he became aware, like everyone else, of the chaos during this particular recess. After several months, during which he tried to be helpful with the recess problem, the student suggested to the principal that a couple of seventh or eighth graders from an adjoining school be gotten to help out during recess by organizing smaller groups around certain games. The first response of the principal was that insurance policies might not cover the seventh and eighth graders if they were somehow injured. The second response, upon which the principal dwelled for some time, was that the superintendent would not accept students functioning as teachers. Close questioning by the undergraduate produced nothing to indicate that the principal was not sincere in her belief that using students in the proposed way was frowned upon, if not directly against the rules.* The fact of the

> matter was that other principals in the same system had been using older students in the proposed way for some time [*emphasis in original*].

From the standpoint of understanding the complex behavior of social systems, it should almost go without saying that many of the most basic assumptions that govern a system are so deeply buried, so taken for granted, that they can only be "seen" by one who is both a "part" of the system and yet "distant" or "detached" from it. This fact alone is the basic philosophical justification for explicitly creating different groups to represent the "same" situation. What one group often takes as a basic "given," that is, a fact, another often takes as an "unwarranted 'taken,'" that is, a dubious assumption. I quote again from Sarason (1972b: 175-177):

> *Almost all teachers meet a new group of pupils on the first day of school. The beginning phase of the school year certainly extends beyond the first day, but by the third or fourth week a routine is established, and teacher and pupils have, so to speak, sized up each other; the rules of the game by which everyone will be governed are fairly well known. How does this come about? How do teachers present and explain these rules of group living? Are these rules discussed? Are they for children only? What role do pupils play, if any, in the formation of rules? These questions and others comprise what I like to call the constitutional question because in each classroom there is a constitution, verbalized or unverbalized, consistent or inconsistent, capable or incapable of amendment, that governs behavior. Constitutions tell us a good deal about history, tradition, and conceptions of human behavior.*

Sarason (1972b: 175-177) found that certain assumptions characterize the unwritten constitutions between children and teachers:

(1) Teacher knows best.
(2) Children cannot participate constructively in the development of a classroom constitution.
(3) Children want and expect the teacher to determine the rules of the game.
(4) Children are not interested in constitutional issues.
(5) Children should be governed by what a teacher thinks is right or wrong, but a teacher should not be governed by what children think is right or wrong.
(6) The ethics of adults are obviously different from and superior to the ethics of children.
(7) Children should not be given responsibility for something they cannot handle or for which they are not accountable.
(8) If constitutional issues were handled differently, chaos might result.

It is also the case that the number of potential stakeholders that affect a social system is large. At times, it almost seems they are without bound, that is, infinite. For example, some of the more obvious stakeholders that affect the educational system are: students, teachers, researchers, unions, state departments of education, NIE, HEW, Congress, the news media, and parents. Slightly less obvious ones are: school janitors, bus companies, state highway departments, book publishers, journal editors, real estate agents, movie producers, drug addicts, the stock market, producers of Saturday morning television shows, cereal manufacturers, milk companies, and so on. Little wonder then why the establishment of a general set of knowledge claims for any social system is so difficult, if not "seemingly" impossible. *Every single one* of the models, findings, and evidence for or against them outlined by Miles (1980) is subject to significant qualification and variation depending on which particular set of stakeholders is paramount in a certain situation.

This does not render Miles's effort worthless. Quite the contrary. It not only helps to set needed boundaries for further research by specialists, but it sets the stage for something I believe is far more significant. Miles's paper can be used by select groups of participants as background to guide *them* in what they know and need to know in coping with their situation. A methodology for ill-structured problems does not need to turn its back on whatever well-structured knowledge is available. It is no more entirely self-sufficient than is any methodology for well-structured problems. In this sense, the role of experimentation (as a classic example of a methodology for well-structured problems) is not ruled out altogether, but merely becomes a part of the overall methodology.

Finally, the purpose for surfacing a group's stakeholders plus its assumptions is that this represents a concrete map of *that* groups' version of reality. Thus it should not be surprising that this part of the methodology represents an exercise in the *applied sociology of knowledge*. That is, it represents the visible concretization of a group's "frame of reference."

Of necessity, the reader must be referred to Mason and Mitroff (1981) for a more in-depth treatment of various techniques for identifying stakeholders and surfacing assumptions. Also discussed is the important issue of how one decides the degree of aggregation versus disaggregation appropriate for a particular situation.

Step 4: The Epistemic Status of Assumptions

Typically, a group feels more confident about the certainty or truth of some assumptions than of others. Additionally, some assumptions are felt to be more important to the success of a plan for action than others. Plotting the assumptions identified relative to one another on two simple dimensions, perceived importance and certainty, accomplishes three important functions: (1) It gives groups, often for the first time, a deeper, more concrete, externalized image or map of their internal belief system; (2) it allows for a concrete comparison between different belief systems; and (3) it allows for a more effective dialectical debate (see Mason, 1969) between belief systems.

The importance of each of these functions cannot be overstressed. So much of social debate is unproductive because it is designed to be unproductive. That is, the conditions are set up, often intentionally, but just as often unintentionally, for the irresolution of differences. The visualization of differences in the form of a clear and concrete map is essential prior to the resolution of such differences. Every step in the methodology needs careful design and management from a behavioral standpoint. The methodology for ill-structured problems is, to repeat, above all a people-oriented process.

The eight assumptions identified by Sarason (1972b: 176) as governing teacher classroom behavior can be used to illustrate this part of the methodology. Figure 8.1 shows two of the many patterns that are possible. In Map I, the eight assumptions largely fall into the certain-most important quadrant. This represents the belief system of a group that feels these eight assumptions are both very important to the effective management of a classroom and, further, that these eight assumptions are relatively certain, that is, factually correct. Map II, on the other hand, represents a group that feels that the assumptions are of roughly the same importance as the group shown in Map I, but they are nowhere as confident of the truth status of the assumptions as the Map I group. The stage is thus set for an interesting dialectical debate.



FIGURE 8.1 Two Belief Maps of Sarason's Eight Assumptions

In general, a debate accomplishes two main functions: (1) One group attempts to persuade another group by means of argument and evidence to change its importance rankings, so that what was previously regarded as important is now regarded as unimportant, and vice versa; and (2) one group persuades another to change its certainty rankings. These two functions, it is contended, are at the heart of change in complex social systems.

In the language of this chapter, *social inquiry* is conceptually defined as *the entire process by which (a) stakeholder assumptions are surfaced, (b) the importance and truthfulness of those assumptions are assessed, and (c) changed through argument and evidence.* Little wonder then that meaningful social inquiry is so difficult to affect. It can break down at any one of the three stages in the conceptual definition. We can fail to identify critical assumptions. We can misjudge the importance and certainty of key assumptions. And, finally, unless the right information is presented in the right format by the right person/group (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978), change will or will not occur for the right/wrong reasons.

The prime contention of this chapter is that the more complex the system (the larger the potential number of stakeholders, the larger the stakes, the larger the number of problems/issues and their interaction), the more representatives of differing stakeholders groups need to be assembled in some setting to explore their differences in fundamental assumptions. Unless this is done, problems will be continually hashed and rehashed at the surface level, that is, end policies. Information or knowledge will fail to affect deep changes in policies because it will not get to the real source of the underlying differences. While it is true that policies reinforce certain assumptions about the world and in this sense policies drive assumptions, it is no less true that assumptions drive policies. For this reason, it is of continual critical importance to study the mutual links between the two.

Step 5: Argumentation Analyses

It would take us too far afield to describe the last two steps of the methodology in detail (see Mason and Mitroff, 1981). It is more important to sketch very briefly what these two steps are intended to accomplish.

Recently, Richard Mason and I have married Toulmin et al.'s (1979) interesting framework for argumentation analyses to Rescher and Manor's (1970) provocative notions regarding plausibility (see Mason and Mitroff, 1981). The result is an expanded framework for capturing the structure and dynamics of complex policy arguments.

More specifically, assumptions play the role of premises in the body of a policy argument. The framework thus allows one to locate more precisely how, why, when, and where assumptions enter into the structure of a policy or action plan. Also, since plausibility analysis was designed to allow one to deal with explicit logical contradictions in an argument, the expanded framework allows one to deal with strong (that is, dialectical) challenges to a policy. The result is a mechanism for tracking the structure and shifting credibility of a policy over time. Also, as the plausibility of the assumptions upon which a policy depends varies, the variability in the plausibility of the resultant policy can also be studied or charted.

A simple example is helpful in explaining the framework and what it is intended to accomplish. Consider one of the assumptions relating to the setting of constitutional issues identified earlier by Sarason (1972b). Figure 8.2 shows what must be further assumed to derive or support the particular assumption, "Students are not interested



FIGURE 8.2 Toulmin Argument Analysis of an Assumption as Claim

in constitutional issues." In this case, the assumption functions as a claim, that is, as the outcome of an argument the merit or validity of which we wish to establish. The evidence (E) shown is an example of the kind of factual base we are required to posit in order to support the particular claim (C). The warrant (W) is an example of the kind of logical link or inference rule we are required to posit in order to go from the evidence to the claim.

Thus far, the structure of the argument merely reads like the classical syllogism. It is the introduction of the remaining two elements that makes the structure both different and more interesting.

The backing (B) is the set of deeper background assumptions required to posit or affirm if the warrant is not immediately accepted on its face value. The rebuttal (R) is the set of challenges or objections to any part of the main argument.

A number of things are apparent from this structure. One, no argument dealing with complex issues is ever free of significant rebuttals. The more significant and complex the issue, the more significant and numerous the potential Rs.

Two, the plausibility (p) or credibility of the R is never zero. Further, it is rarely the case that p(R) is less than all of the terms in the main body of the argument, p(E), p(W), p(B), and p(C). Hence, the reason that no matter how airtight an argument seems on its surface (that is, its conclusion or claim), it is always open to dispute. In fact, the inconclusiveness of any complex argument becomes literally obvious as soon as it is laid out in Toulmin form; hence the importance of the framework.

Three, an assumption can enter into any part of a Toulmin argument structure. Thus an assumption can function as claim, evidence, or whatever. Where and how it functions sheds deeper light on its meaning and purpose.

Four, it becomes obvious that every term of an argument can be derived from a previous argument. Thus, for instance, if the backing is itself not obvious, then a further argument is needed to establish it. How far back one goes is a function of what a group takes as "given." Thus, once again, we see the applied sociology of knowledge character of the methodology. The Toulmin framework allows us to get a deeper look into the belief system or frame of reference of a group.

Five, if this is true for the relatively simple assumption shown in Figure 8.2, what

ıust the case be like for all of the complex propositions identified by Miles (1980)? low could one possibly assess the basis (that is, evidence, warrant, or backing) for a ırge number of such complex propositions? Further, it is not the case that accept-ıce or rejection of any one of Miles's complex assertions is dependent *solely* on ⁄tter evidence. Rather, it is also a function of the establishment of the warrants, acking, and rebuttals of educational administration, practice, research, and theory. lowever, since these things mostly remain implicit, unarticulated, and unsystema-ed, there is almost no adequate basis whatsoever for knowing just what we can ccept or reject as being *highly plausible* about the system of education.

We seem again and again to pose the most complex questions about social sys-ems and then depend on the most primitive means and tools for the handling of such sues. We simply have to break out of this circle of epistemic nonsense!

tep 6: Knowledge Synthesis Through Group Synthesis

If groups are initially set up to be as different from one another as possible in order do everything in our power to encourage systematic differences—the nature of nportant problems is too important to go unchallenged—then new groups are com-osed later in an attempt to synthesize important differences. The point is that synthe-is as much a social psychological process as it is a logical one (Mason and Mitroff, 981; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). Hence, once again, we have to do everything we an to set up the appropriate *behavioral* conditions that will favor the emergence of a ynthesis, if one is possible. This entails the setting up of new groups to work around he win-lose, competitive psychology that is the basis of the initial groupings. Whereas such win-lose competition is appropriate to the earlier phases of the meth-odology, it is inappropriate to the later phases. The actual accomplishment of this is eyond the scope of this discussion (Mason and Mitroff, 1981).

ONCLUDING REMARKS

We have argued that the human sciences are concerned with problems that are undamentally different from those found at the end of textbooks or in the typical esearch journal. These problems require both a different methodology and a different et of criteria for their disposition. The criteria that have historically been developed and hat are appropriate for well-structured problems—widespread consensus, logical onsistency, disciplinary narrowness—are not appropriate for ill-structured problems. ndeed, they further exacerbate the "mess" of social systems (Ackoff, 1971).

This should not be interpreted to mean that experimentation and quasi-experimen-ation are entirely superfluous or have no role to play whatsoever. They do have an mportant role to play. However, it is a somewhat different one from that currently attributed to experimentation. The major role is not that of providing definitive or cer-ain knowledge, absolute checks on the impact of program interventions, or the like, for, ollowing Dewey, there is no such thing as knowledge that is absolutely definitive or ertain. The purpose of experimentation, like that of all other forms of interventions, is provide us with a "good indicator" of the status of key assumptions, that is, their *relative* certainty and importance. At its very best, experimentation can either upgrade downgrade our perceptions of the importance and certainty of key assumptions.

An open question is whether knowledge that is derived from experimentation is to

be given a preferred status in determining the certainty and importance of key assumptions. This is far from clear. An examination of the assumptions needed to establish the superiority of experimentation over all other forms and methods of establishing knowledge in the social sciences (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978) reveals that the assumptions are not warranted *in general.* Experimentation is neither superior nor preferable in all cases. It is only as good as the assumptions upon which it is based. Those assumptions, like all others, need constant reexamination (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978).

In summary, this chapter has argued that if there truly are any fundamental entities that form the organizational basis of social life, then those entities are assumptions. These assumptions pertain not only to individuals but to complex institutional entities as well. The conflicts within and between stakeholders can be construed in terms of the conflicts regarding assumptions. Such conflicts can neither be settled nor managed once and for all, but deserve constant monitoring and vigilance. To borrow a metaphor from physical science, assumptions have a "half-life." That is, assumptions, like problems, change over time; they are born, grow, decay, and die, but they never fully disappear. They reappear in different forms and different contexts for different times. Unlike in the realm of textbooks, significant social problems never stay solved. They have to be reformulated and solved anew in every generation. To paraphrase Dewey, the sooner this is appreciated and transformed into method, the sooner a new day in educational management, research, and practice will be ushered in.

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III

STRATEGIES

Part III presents five chapters describing a diverse group of strategies of social intervention: law (Champagne and Nagel, Chapter 9), social policy (Elmore, Chapter 10), "new wave" organizing (Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet, Chapter 11), mass media (Comstock, Chapter 12), and dissemination (Zaltman, Chapter 13). Of course, there are a number of other strategies of social intervention that could have been included; no claim of comprehensiveness is being tendered. Included here are chapters that examine three common (law, social policy, and organizing) and two less frequently considered (the mass media and dissemination) strategies of social intervention.

Each chapter is written to cover thoroughly the topic from the unique perspective of the respective author(s). Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to ascertain the similarities and differences among these chapters with regard to four major themes. The first theme is each strategy's major objective, goal, or target of intervention, and its nature, type, or form. The second is the levels or loci of social intervention. The third is the salient stakeholders or actors involved with each strategy. The fourth is the factors related to a particular strategy's efficacy.

Common to all chapters in Part III is the lack of pretense that any strategy functions in a simple, linear, causal fashion or at a static point in time. The authors are quite cognizant of the fact that change occurs in a complex social, economic, and political environment and is interactive and multiply determined in conjunction with numerous other factors, including values and history, and changes over time. A framework and context for considering the functioning of these strategies was outlined in the Introduction.

OBJECTIVE AND NATURE OF STRATEGY

The objective of the law as a strategy of social intervention, like other strategies, is social change. Champagne and Nagel employ Nagel's (1970: 8) definition of social change:

> *a restructuring of the basic ways in which people in a society relate to each other with regard to economics, government, education, religion, family life, recreation, language, and other basic human interaction activities.*

They discuss the impact of legal policy on society by analyzing the extent of compliance with law and the resultant attitudinal and behavioral changes other than compliance. Champagne and Nagel believe that we lack detailed knowledge of the interactive mechanisms by which the law produces social change. The goal of law as a social intervention is an alteration of the patterns of relationships between organisms (or specific aggregates of organisms) and micro- or exosystems, or between microsystems and exosystems, as discussed in the Introduction.

For Elmore, social policy is the rational use of central authority to alter the structure of political, social, and economic relationships in the form of both remedial action and redistribution. Historically, this has most often been done by the provision of benefits and the use of policy as a coercive tactic by those in authority. Elmore refers to this as "beneficient coercion." However, resources are severely limited, knowledge is not reliably related to solutions, and authority lacks the influence and coercive power to force compliance with its policies. This bleak state of affairs is a result of the breakdown of beneficient coercion and has led to the evolution of "frictionless solutions." These entail the use of vouchers and market competition, direct income transfers, wage subsidies, and tax credits. Here the goal of social policy is the donor subsystems' use of the administrative and delivery systems to alter the pattern of relationships among the components of the recipient system.

In a very similar vein, the objective of "new wave" organizing described by Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet is an alteration in the patterns of social power that allocate resources and opportunities. The goal here is change in the process of social justice and is based on the organizing of a collectivity suffering from adverse conditions and exploitation. The true goal is control by the presumed beneficiaries or recipients, and not their manipulation by others. Such organizing is issue and constituency centered. Tactics employed include consciousness raising, citizen mobilization, and empowerment. Furthermore, an analysis of macrosystem values and the power of the exosystems, as well as an emphasis on understanding local cultures and subcultures, is requisite. The key mechanism for this change is the organization of the recipient systems to alter their relationships with hierarchically higher systems. Change in recipients' attitudes, social construction of reality, and behavior is an initial and necessary stage in achieving the previous objective.

The objective of the use of mass media as a strategy for social intervention is quite different from that of organizing. Comstock describes the mass media's objectives as attitudinal and behavioral in nature. These objectives are targeted at both the individual and at aggregates of individuals. While attitudinal and behavioral change is both a desirable long-range outcome and a concomitant objective of the three strategies alluded to previously, it is not their primary goal. Changes between different levels of the social system are rarely the primary target of mass media social intervention, unlike the goals of legal, policy, and organizing strategies. Nevertheless, attitudinal and behavioral changes may ultimately lead to changes in patterns of relationships among different groups, levels, or components of the social system. One possible target of the mass media could be a change in macrosystem values; the potential radiating effects of such a change are quite salient and might incorporate altered relational changes among levels of the social system.

Zaltman's discussion of dissemination as a strategy of social intervention delineates an objective quite similar to that of the mass media. What is to be disseminated is a particular social construction of reality. The social construction's meaning, be it based on data, information, or other forms of knowledge, is accepted by the change agent. The change agent's goal is to influence the likelihood of the information's ex-

posure and the likelihood of its becoming part of someone else's (i.e., an organism, group, or social system) reality map.

In summary, the primary objective of law, policy, and organizing as social interventions is to alter the pattern of relationships among the social systems described in the Introduction, while this goal is of only secondary importance for mass media and dissemination strategies.

LEVELS OR LOCI OF INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

The law has several potential loci of intervention (e.g., state and federal levels). Legal policy can also be promulgated by several components of the donor exosystem (i.e., the executive, legislative, or judiciary branches, or the administrative or regulatory systems). Methods vary depending on the specific loci of intervention, and a great deal of discretion in enforcement exists within each of these branches and exosystems. As Champagne and Nagel point out, court decisions serve primarily as agenda setters, far more than do policy decisions.

Social policy too can be formulated at federal, state, regional, or local levels and among any of the various components of the donor or administrative exosystems. Elmore emphasizes federal policy. The policy initiatives he describes are structured so as to realize a narrow goal of compliance—the inducement of a specific local response—and not broader objectives such as the improvement of state and local competence, adaptability, and responsiveness. The focus on these broader objectives is the plight of both beneficient coercion and frictionless solutions, strategies that he considers to be "forward mapping" (Elmore, 1980).

Elmore presents an alternative strategy—"backward mapping"—that commences at a different level. Social problems are best understood at the level of ordinary knowledge (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) and the direct experience of the individual service delivery personnel, not at the level of the donor exosystem. At this level the knowledge, skill, and craft exist to initiate organized problem solving with genuine potential merit; social problems and intervention may be meaningfully redefined. There are no inherent solutions, simply correct places to commence.

Elmore goes on to state that the critical juncture of social problem solving is the boundary between broad and fine structures of action. The broad structures of action have to do with funding formulas, assignment of responsibilities, and operating routines, while the fine structures have to do with the ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft of the delivery personnel. Backward mapping consists of informing the broad structures of action with data gleaned from the fine structures of action. A likely place for such gleaning is at the interface of transactions between the administrative and delivery exosystems.

With regard to "new wave" organizing, Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet go one step further; that is, they state that organizing needs to be grounded in the experience of the recipients themselves. In some respects, this represents "true" backward mapping. However, organizing can, and needs to, occur at multiple levels—personal, organizational, and societal; only then can it be truly successful. This entails coordination and linkage among multiple organizing sites and constituencies. It needs to occur by means of the coequal participation of recipients and professionals (i.e., members of delivery, administrative, and donor systems).

Mass media's audience is society at large or particular segments of society. Dissem-

ination may be targeted at critical individuals and any or all subsystems, or components thereof, contingent on the intended objective.

In summary, the selection of the loci of intervention depends on the particular strategy employed. Several have a single locus, while others have multiple loci. Some strategies have a microfocus, while others have a macrofocus. Finally, some strategies emphasize forward mapping (law, beneficient coercion, frictionless solutions), while others offer a backward mapping approach (backward mapping policy, new wave organizing).

STAKEHOLDERS

Obviously, most everyone has a stake or vested interest of some sort in the outcome of any social intervention. We will concern ourselves primarily with the stakeholders for whom the strategy is of critical salience.

The donor exosystem has a large stake in legal policy. Donors' political careers and fortunes are based on their ability to forge legal policy that reflects their sociopolitical values. Implementing these legal policy initiatives is the livelihood of the administrative exosystem. Business interests exert a powerful influence on numerous components of the donor and administrative exosystems, while the only locus of potential influence for political minority interest groups is the judiciary.

Under both the beneficient coercive and frictionless solution forms of social policy interventions depicted by Elmore, the interests of the donor and administrative exosystems are similar to those described above for legal strategies. In backward mapping the delivery stakeholders have considerable influence and a good deal to gain. While it is assumed that the recipients also will gain, that remains to be demonstrated.

In new wave organizing the recipients, on a relative scale, clearly have the most to gain. Ideally, in the long run everyone gains in some way but in the short run some (e.g., donor and administrative exosystems) will no doubt perceive themselves as losers.

The controlling stakeholders in mass media interventions are distinctly different from those in the three prior social strategies. The major factors influencing the use of the mass media are the economic gain of the owners and second, their autonomy. These two factors disfavor propagandizing and foster the transmission of multiple messages, thus inhibiting social change.

In dissemination interventions the stakeholders and the nature of their interests are quite variable depending on the particular change agent(s), their objective(s), and the loci of intervention.

In summary, different strategies highlight and bring to the fore the interests of different stakeholders.

EFFICACY

Law as a social change strategy has had differential rates of efficacy. For the impact of law to be effective and significant, the policies and operations of multiple political institutions and systems of the social environment must work together in a congruent manner, as Champagne and Nagel point out. Thus, for example, while a political minority group usually can turn to the court as a last resort, the effective implementation of a favorable legal policy (or attainment of compliance) is not likely unless such

change receives support from other parts of the exosystem and the social environment. Consequently, a number of the social environment's systems and subsystems must act in unison for a legal mandate to have any chance of achieving its intended objective.

Economic incentives seem to be a critical mobilizing ingredient with regard to legal changes that face strong resistance from important components of society. For example, compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act increased when businessmen realized that by shifting the blame for an unpopular policy to the federal government, they could retain their white clientele and also attract black patrons.

Legal policy change has not been very effective in fostering integrated housing because there has been little or no support from other political institutions, nor have there been appropriate economic incentives. In the arena of school desegregation, the courts were useful, but by themselves, not sufficient. Resistance to change always exists, and persistence of reformers at all levels is therefore essential. Sometimes legal policy may be counterproductive, leading to negative unintended effects.

Elmore describes the failure of forward-mapped social policies to aid the very poor. As the percentage of personal wealth and income allocated to social intervention decreases, redistributive and remedial policies suffer, while those policies that are remedial *only* will flourish, benefiting the middle class, particularly those in the delivery and administrative exosystems. Tax and transfer policies put a premium on bargaining; the poor are already marginal and have the least resources to use in this "game." Beneficient coercion rarely benefits the most needy, particularly in a relative sense.

Frictionless solutions provide no assurance that they will increase either the responsiveness of agencies or the quality of services. What does occur is the substitution of new regulations and a new bureaucracy. To date, backward-mapping strategies have not been rigorously tested.

For new wave organizing, efficacy information is limited to anecdotal data.

Mass appeals via the media are weak. To be effective the media must respond to a less heterogeneous audience. In this way more purposeful messages can be delivered, as is done in advertising. A further difficulty in the use of the media is that information campaigns do not have favored placement; they are unplanned because they do not lead to the media's financial gain and rely on their voluntary cooperation.

Newspapers provide better information recall than does television. Information pertinent to social change communicated through television is most likely to be effective if it is transmitted through the entertainment medium, for example, as part and parcel of the message or theme of a story plot. We have alluded to some of the forces making the frequent use of the media for social change unlikely. The multiple messages coming across the airwaves also weaken the potency of such information. The chapter by Comstock provides theoretically based guidelines for increasing the efficacy of the use of television to promote social change.

Zaltman outlines a detailed set of principles for enhancing the efficacy of dissemination strategies. His primary concern is the change agent's understanding of self and of other frames of reference. The rules of thumb he describes are based on the concepts of ability, values, idea, circumstances, timing, obligation, resistance, and yield.

In summary, we have just begun to learn about the efficacy of various strategies of social intervention. We have some knowledge of strategy efficacy, and in each case, it is contingent on a complex comingling of goals, nature, domain and loci of intervention, and salient stakeholder interests, among other factors. We must continue to try to understand the complexity of these transactions in order to enhance the quality of our future efforts at social reform.

AN EMERGENT, GENERALIZED STRATEGY OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

Having reviewed the efficacy of the strategies described in Part III of this volume, the rudiments of a generalized strategy of social intervention begin to emerge. This strategy originates in Elmore's construction of broad and fine structures of social action. The reader will recall that broad structures of action have to do with funding formulas, assignment of responsibilities, and operating routines, or in other words, the policies or plans and implementation mechanisms. Typically, these are the functions of the donor and administrative systems. According to Elmore, the fine structures of action should be anchored in the ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft of the delivery system personnel. Consistent with the reasoning of Crowfoot and his colleagues, we take the notion of fine structures one step further. Thus the ultimate source for the fine structures of social action rests with the recipients of policy outcomes. This recipient system is composed of citizens, workers, and grassroot constituents. In the needs, values, beliefs, cultural mores, and skills of the recipients lie the critical ingredients, know how, and wisdom on which broad structures of social action can optimally be based.

These broad structures must retain the flavor of general principles. They must not become so detailed and specific that they dictate behavior at the level of the delivery and recipient systems and their transactions. The broad structures must permit ample latitude for negotiation, mutual adaptation (McLaughlin, 1976), and subsequent articulation of mechanisms for implementation to occur among the stakeholders, without compromising the central objective. It is important that these broad structures contain provisions to facilitate access to resources (technical, financial, and psychological) and build in incentives for the compliance or cooperation of disinterested or hostile parties.

The further development of broad structures or policies must also take into account the knowledge, skill, and craft of both the delivery and the hierarchically higher systems. Without such a genuine backward-mapping strategy, the creation of meaningful policies that could be successfully implemented is problematic. Furthermore, successful implementation of broad structures of social action requires not only their grounding in fine structures but their support, or at least congruence, with other forces and interests in the social system. For example, the economic gain to southern business interests was critical in achieving successful compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Such support or congruence, value based or otherwise, does and did not exist in housing legislation, and integrated housing arrangements have yet to succeed in a meaningful or significant fashion.

Grounding the fine structures of social action in grass-roots individuals and organizations, or in the delivery system, provides an important sense of ownership and empowerment to the affected parties. This is quite contrary to the denigration commonly experienced by the recipients of a variety of past social interventions, policies that often blamed them for being the victims (see, for example, Ryan, 1971).

The reciprocal commerce between such broad and fine structures of social action should avoid the coerciveness of continuing to impose uniform solutions on particularistic problems. This general strategy allows a variety of mechanisms that are sensitive to local culture, issues, and problems to develop. The result should be particularistic solutions linked to particular local circumstances and problems. These broad structures of social action can unfold in any number of donor exosystems at the federal, regional, state, or even municipal levels, depending on the intervention domain.

In summary, broad structures of social action are likely to fail unless they are informed, and further articulated, by local values and knowledge. On the other hand, fine structures of social action originating in unique local settings may not have access to the requisite resources (technical, financial, and psychological) necessary for successful implementation. Furthermore, fine structures are not very likely to be generalizable to a wide range of settings and times. A general social intervention strategy concerned with both broad and fine structures of action promises to be of considerable heuristic and practical value.

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9

Law and Social Change

Anthony Champagne
Stuart S. Nagel

More than any other event, the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) enhanced the interest of social scientists in law and social change (Handler, 1978). The decision declared unconstitutional state action which segregated public schools according to race. It heralded the beginning of the end of the state-required caste system which was so pervasive throughout the South. In effect, Brown was a judicially inspired effort to create social change and was a major challenge to the theory that stateways cannot change folkways. Brown provided an excellent opportunity for social scientists to study the relationship between law and social change and points out the enormous complexity of that relationship.

Law may be defined as directives to persons "to act in a specified manner lest they be compelled so to act or be punished by public officials" (DeGrazia, 1972: 39). Social change can be defined as "a restructuring of the basic ways in which people in a society relate to each other with regard to economics, government, education, religion, family life, recreation, language, and other basic human interaction activities" (Nagel, 1970: 8).

It is probably best to think of the relationship between these two concepts as an interactive one. That is, laws may cause societal changes and those societal changes may cause changes in the law. Law and society are probably so interwoven that one should not single out one as clearly being the cause of the other. While the Brown decision, for example, had a dramatic effect on southern society, it is useful to keep in mind that social changes led to the Brown decision. American racial values had changed sufficiently prior to Brown to create the appropriate social environment that allowed Brown to be decided as it was.

The relationship between law and social change is further complicated by the causation problem. There may be some event that occurs after a change in law or society, but it is usually difficult to know whether the change caused the event. The event may have occurred even if there had been no change or if there may have been other causes of the event which were unrelated to the change but simultaneous with it. Additionally, many events are likely to have multiple causes, so that it is either difficult or impossible to weigh the various contributions of the multiple causes of the event. Multiple causes may also be interrelated, so that one cause of an event may itself be caused by another cause of an event. When one is dealing with the issue of law and social change, it is often difficult to conduct an experimental study to isolate contributions of multiple causes or to more clearly identify causation (Feeley, 1973).

The Brown decision may provide a useful illustration of these problems. It would be extremely difficult to do an experimental study to determine the impact of Brown. One could not, for example, convince the Supreme Court to make Brown apply to Mississippi but not Alabama and thereby make it possible to have a control group. As a result, one might argue that Brown did not destroy the caste system in the South; it was caused by other factors, such as the increasing urbanization and industrialization of the South which were occurring in the era in which Brown was decided. Actually, the changed racial values in the South were probably due to Brown, the increasing urbanization and industrialization of the South, the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Lyndon Johnson's interest in civil rights, and other factors. Several of these possible causes of changed racial values may be interrelated. For example, it might be argued that were it not for Johnson's interest in civil rights, the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts would not have been passed. It might also be argued that were it not for the Brown decision, Johnson would not have worked to obtain civil rights legislation. The complexity of these interrelationships among variables is so great that necessary and sufficient causes of an event can not be readily isolated.

There is also a time problem, which makes it difficult to determine the relationship between law and social change. Laws may or may not immediately cause social changes, and social changes may or may not cause rapid legal changes. It may be that the effects of legal or social changes occur in the short, medium, or long run. Any attempt to examine the effects of legal or social changes are time-bound, the effects possibly being different during some other period. Additionally, the effects of legal and social changes may be of varying duration. A change that occurs at time 1 may or may not be present at time 2 or time 3 (Wasby, 1970). The Brown decision provides a good illustration of the time-bound character of such effects and their duration. On examining the effects of the Brown decision on politics in the South immediately after the decision, one may conclude that the decision exacerbated racial tensions in the South. Overtly racist campaign statements came to be a political requirement in many southern states. Yet, if one examined the effect of Brown and accompanying civil rights legislation after 1965, one might determine that commitment to segregation was not even required for election in the South any more (Black, 1976).

It may even happen that the effect of a legal change occurs before the law goes into effect, such as when there is some societal response in anticipation of a legal change (Feeley, 1973). A school board, for example, may have anticipated the Brown decision and integrated its schools. The student of law and social change, however, would likely assume that Brown had no impact on school integration in that district, not knowing that it was the anticipation of Brown that was the cause of the school board's action. The extent of the anticipation problem is unknown. It is an especially difficult problem in the assessment of law and social change, since only the most profound knowledge of each case under study, often an impossible standard, would recognize an action as being a response in anticipation of legal change.

The effects of legal and social change are also of varying types. It is possible that there will only be one effect or many effects. Effects may also be intended and unintended (Wasby, 1970). One might have suspected, for example, that the Brown decision would lead to the integration of public schools. If that was all that was a consequence of Brown, the legal change would have had only one effect on society. It would have been the effect that was intended by the courts. In actuality, Brown had numerous effects, one long-term effect being its intended consequence—desegregating schools in the South. There were other effects which perhaps could have been

anticipated but were unintended consequences of the decision. The legitimacy of the Court, for example, was called into question as a result of the Brown decision. Other unintended consequences were that it led to a revival of the Ku Klux Klan and an intensification of racist rhetoric in southern politics (Black, 1976).

There is also a problem in measuring the impact of legal and social change. The significance of a change naturally varies from one issue to another. Additionally, interpretations of the significance of changes will vary from one person to another. Because of the lack of any uniform measure of the significance of a change, only the most crude assessments can be made of the extent of both the change and the causes of that change.

As a result of these methodological difficulties, assessments of law and social change are plagued by pitfalls which require the assessments to be treated with great caution. The assessments are generally subjective analyses. There is little precision in reference to the measurement tools, nor is there clear concept definition. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that the interaction of law and social change does occur with varying consequences depending on the issue and the circumstances surrounding that interaction. It would be unwise to abandon an examination of that interaction because of a lack of methodological perfection. Numerous scholars have done research in this area, though it is mostly research of a subjective or speculative nature.

Within the United States, legal policies may originate in one of four arenas: the judiciary, the legislature, the executive, and administrative agencies. One may include administrative agencies within the executive branch, but it should be kept in mind that the executive often has loose control over some agencies. Methods for influencing policy vary from institution to institution. Additionally, there are different levels of decision making, primarily state and national levels within the four arenas. Legal policies are created within these various branches and levels of government in a variety of ways, including legal policies based on legal or normative principles from which narrow legal conclusions are deduced, the pressures of interest groups, and the personal values of the decision makers (Nagel, 1970).

Policymaking influences will not necessarily be uniform across policymaking institutions. As a result, conflicts will occur among some or all of the policymaking institutions. These conflicts lead to ambiguous policies, possibly less strict enforcement, and a lessened impact on society.

Once a legal policy has been made, its effect on society must be examined to determine if the policy has had its intended consequence(s). This examination of the impact of legal policy on society usually proceeds by examining the extent of compliance with the legal policy, changes in attitudes as a result of the legal policy, and behavioral changes other than compliance which occur as the result of the policy (Nagel, 1970). An example of the third point might be increased enrollment in segregated private schools as a result of the Brown decision.

Once a legal change has had an effect on society, there is likely to be a feedback effect (Wasby, 1970). Social changes created by the legal changes will have an effect on policymaking institutions. Those effects may be great or small, supportive or reactive. Hostility to busing, for example, caused the past four presidents to emphasize their opposition to the remedy for state-segregated public schools. Congressional hostility to busing has led to legislative proposals which would greatly restrict the power of federal courts to order this remedy.

Figure 9.1 provides an illustration of this interactive model of law and social change. The political and social environments have numerous effects on such policymaking influences as norms, interest groups, and the values of decision makers.



SOURCE: Sweeney and Seltzer (1981: 7).

FIGURE 9.1 An Interactive Model of Law and Social Change

These policymaking influences have numerous effects on policymaking institutions. The results are several policies, some conflicting, which are made by the various institutions and levels of government. These policies affect the political and social environment and also have feedback effects on the policymaking influences.

The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on aspects of this interactive process. In the second section we examine some of the reciprocal effects of law and social change by examining several issue areas. The third section examines the making and influencing of policy. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks on law and social change.

THE RECIPROCAL EFFECTS OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Legal Services and Law Reform

One program in Lyndon Johnson's Great Society was the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program. This program involved government-paid lawyers working from storefront law offices which were accessible to poor people. The primary function of the lawyers was to provide legal assistance to poor people in non-fee-gener-

ating civil cases. These cases involved domestic relations, consumer issues, welfare matters, and landlord-tenant problems. Beyond the provision of routine legal services, the lawyers were also to engage in law reform (Champagne, 1973). It is their law reform activities which are most interesting for our purposes. The law reform efforts were explicit attempts to bring about changes in society by changing laws which were believed to discriminate against poor people. These changes were to be accomplished primarily through litigation. The courts would declare various actions to be unconstitutional and provide remedies that would benefit the interests of poor people.

A number of major law reform cases were apparently aimed toward establishing a new legal doctrine that would establish a fundamental right to a decent life. It would lead to a significant redistribution of societal wealth and the betterment of the lives of poor people. Such a right-to-life doctrine would require significantly higher welfare payments, and poor people would be recognized as having a right to these payments. To bring about this doctrinal change a series of test cases would have to be won, each victory building toward the ultimate goal of establishing a right to life. First, tests for and exclusions from welfare aid would be challenged where those tests and exclusions were not related to need. Second, procedures which reduced the welfare recipient to client status would be challenged, so that it would be recognized that the welfare recipient had a right to welfare. Third, the state and local character of welfare would be challenged, and there would be a push for a national welfare program. Success in these three areas would then lead to an attack on the inadequacy of welfare payments and a recognition of the right to life (Krislov, 1973). The first three steps in the strategy were in large part rapidly accomplished. *Shapiro* v. *Thompson* (1969), for example, eliminated state durational residency requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits. *King* v. *Smith* (1968) struck down the "man in the house" rule, which terminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to those children whose mothers cohabited with men, even though the men were not legally responsible for and provided no assistance to the children. *Rosado* v. *Wyman* (1969) held that there must be reasonable justification offered for geographic differences in welfare payments within a state. *Goldberg* v. *Kelly* (1970) held that welfare recipients had a right to a hearing prior to the termination of their welfare. These law reform victories were impressive and benefited numerous poor people. However, for the grand social change strategy to be implemented, the fourth stage of the strategy, the right to life, would have to be achieved. It was in this effort that the legal services lawyers suffered dismal failure.

The case that destroyed the effort to establish a right to life was *Dandridge* v. *Williams* (1970), which dealt with Maryland's maximum welfare grants. This grant established a ceiling on the amount of money any family could receive from AFDC. No matter how large the family, Maryland would provide increments in AFDC payments for no more than seven children. The Supreme Court ruled that the maximum grant was constitutional and was a reasonable regulation on a number of grounds—among them that it was a reasonable way of allocating scarce state resources. The legal services lawyers had wanted the Court to adopt a "compelling state interest" standard, rather than a standard of reasonableness to determine the constitutionality of this provision. This standard is usually used for racial classifications, and forces the state to provide far more than a reasonable justification for a provision. If a compelling state interest standard had been used, the state would have had to convince the Court that there was a compelling justification for a maximum grant. It is unlikely that the state could have provided a compelling justification. Though the maximum grant may be a reasonable way of allocating state resources, it appears to lack the quality of

being compelling. However, in Dandridge the standard of reasonableness was easily met by the state, since virtually any justification was considered reasonable. If the maximum grant was constitutional, clearly the Court would be unwilling to establish a right to life and require higher welfare payments.

According to Krislov (1973), this attempt to use the Court as a vehicle for dramatic social change was a failure due to several factors. One problem with the right to life was that it did not proceed from well-articulated constitutional language, but was vaguely written. Another problem was that the effort to get the Court to adopt the doctrine proceeded at a very rapid pace when popular and political support for welfare was declining. As Krislov (1973: 239) points out, "There simply was no time to analyze, let alone refine, the 'right to life' doctrine, and the Court was asked in *Dandridge* to adopt a doctrine which was supported by the barest of precedent."

The failure of the attempt to create a right to life should not obscure the success in achieving social changes of a lesser magnitude. *King* v. *Smith* (1968), for example, kept thousands of children from being removed from welfare rolls because of the "immorality" of their mothers. *Goldberg* v. *Kelly* (1970) made all welfare recipients more secure by recognizing the right to a pretermination hearing. Such a procedure should discourage arbitrary treatment of welfare recipients and lessen errors in welfare terminations. A California case involving reductions in medical services for poor people saved $210 million for welfare recipients (Krislov, 1973).

These successes, though insufficient for the advocates of a right to a decent life, were displeasing to those who were hostile to social reforms. During the Nixon administration, for example, Vice President Agnew emerged as a leading critic of the program, and activist legal services offices frequently experienced funding difficulties. During the Reagan administration, hostility to the legal services program has reached a peak, perhaps in part because Reagan when governor of California, was successfully challenged in a number of suits by California Rural Legal Assistance (Champagne, 1973). It may well be that federal involvement in providing legal assistance to poor people in civil cases is at an end.

The experiences of the legal services program suggest several important points about the interaction of law and social change. One point relates to the difficulty of creating social changes through law. As Figure 9.1 suggests, it often involves a complex, long-range strategy, and there is no guarantee of success. The model of law and social change is far more complex than the simple model of the right-to-life theorists. It is far too limited for one to believe that a change in the law will necessarily produce a desired change in society. It may even be that the courts are unable to achieve on their own such major social changes as the redistribution of wealth contemplated by the advocates of a right to life. Other institutional support, along with popular support, may be necessary to accomplish such a goal. As Figure 9.1 points out, reliance on the courts alone overlooks other important potentially countervailing policymaking institutions. Even social changes of a more limited nature may eventually prove counterproductive for the group producing those changes. Those limited social changes may, as in the case of legal services, produce such a negative reaction, an unintended feedback effect, that they set into motion the opposition that causes the demise of the program. Finally, the effort to produce limited social changes may prove effective in theory without actually having much impact. One of the most heralded legal services law reform cases, for example, was *Shapiro* v. *Thompson* (1969). Shapiro struck down the durational residency requirements that often existed in high welfare-paying states. It was believed that these residency requirements discouraged the migration of poor people from low welfare-paying states to high-paying states. In theory, the elimi-

nation of these requirements was a great victory for poverty lawyers working in behalf of poor people. In practice, however, poor people from low welfare-paying states did not move to high welfare-paying states in proportionately greater numbers after the elimination of the residency requirements (Champagne et al., 1975). While Shapiro was a legal victory, it was not a victory in terms of improvement in the lives of poor people. Human behavior is complex, and Shapiro provides a warning to those who would use laws to create social change. Their assumptions about the causes of human behavior, and therefore their assumptions about the impact of laws, may well be inaccurate.

Race and Equal Protection

School Desegregation

As was suggested in the opening section of this chapter, *Brown* v. *Board of Education* is widely recognized as one of the Court's most significant efforts to bring about social change. Brown was the outcome of a long-term litigation strategy by the Legal Defense Fund, one which involved challenging the separate but equal doctrine at the graduate and professional school levels and building precedent for a favorable decision at the public school level. The Court held that racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional, and it turned implementation of the decision over to the federal district courts. The Supreme Court's pronouncement did not lead to much voluntary desegregation. Instead, states with segregated school systems tended to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, often treating the few attempts to desegregate in the immediate post-Brown period with hostility and violence (Kluger, 1975).

Congress did little to support the Court's decision. President Eisenhower was not supportive of the decision until the antics of Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas forced him to use federal troops to enforce a desegregation order. However, Eisenhower was never enthusiastically in agreement with Brown even after his actions at Little Rock (Black, 1976). Even some federal district judges refused to comply with the Court's decision in Brown and worked to maximize delays in the implementation of the decision (Peltason, 1961).

It was not until the Johnson administration that desegregation began to proceed at a rapid pace. Johnson was both effective in achieving legislative goals and committed to racial equality. As Figure 9.1 suggests, there are many policymaking institutions. When the policies of these institutions conflict, one can expect ambiguous policies and weak enforcement. However, when those institutions work together, the impact of law on society can be significant. Here the Court, the President, and Congress did work together and were able to begin the process of desegregation.

Several laws were passed which were to lead to the implementation of the constitutional theory of the Brown decision. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, among other things, forbade discrimination in federally funded programs. If discrimination in these programs was not ended, the federal government could cut off funding. The act was a formidable weapon in the fight against discrimination, since in 1965 there was a great gush of federal money for education, especially funds for the poorest schools. These schools tended to be located in some of the poorest states, such as Mississippi, which were also the most resistant to desegregation (Wirt, 1970). Since the schools were threatened with the loss of a huge influx of federal funds if they did not desegregate, desegregation proceeded to such an extent that by the 1970s the South had the

greatest degree of school desegregation. In 1975 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that while 53.7 percent of schools in the South have more than one-half minority enrollment, 71 percent of public schools in the North have more than one-half minority enrollment (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975).

The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the act which increased funding for education, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, were essential tools in the desegregation of public schools, but they were greatly aided by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which did much to change the political climate of the South and bring about the desegregation process. The voting rights law banned the use of such discriminatory voting registration requirements as the literacy test, often applied in such a way that illiterate whites were registered to vote but even well-educated blacks were found to be illiterate. In addition, federal registrars were used to register voters in those areas where discrimination in voter registration persisted. In conjunction with the act, civil rights organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, undertook massive voter registration drives to encourage blacks to register. The result was an astounding increase in the number of registered black voters. In the first two months after passage of the act, 110,000 blacks were registered by local officials and 56,000 by federal examiners (Champagne and Nagel, 1978).

With such an increase in the political power of blacks, an increase in southern states from little or no voting strength to over 18 percent of the South's electorate, politicians suddenly found racial moderation a far more attractive position than the fire-breathing segregationist position made popular by Orval Faubus of Arkansas, Ross Barnett and Paul Johnson of Mississippi, and George Wallace of Alabama (Black, 1976). This new moderation in the South led to compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and to the continued receipt of federal funds for education. Thus, the 1965 act led to support for desegregation at another policymaking level: the state. From Figure 9.1 it can be seen that with both state and national policymaking institutions supporting a policy, enforcement can be unambiguous and free of most resistance. The result should be greater success in achieving social change goals.

This is not to say that the transformation of southern society was a simple task after the 1964 and 1965 legislation. There was great difficulty in designing guidelines for the implementation of the 1964 act, and though segregationists were critical of the severity of the guidelines, civil rights advocates often felt that enforcement was weak or nonexistent and that the delays in desegregation were continuing (Handler, 1978). There were also occasions when it appeared that the reaction to desegregation would overwhelm the desegregation effort. George Wallace, for example, proved an extremely popular presidential candidate in 1968. Though Wallace's overtly segregationist days were over, one of his major issues involved opposition to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare school desegregation guidelines. Additionally, opposition to busing threatened to wreck the entire desegregation effort. Richard Nixon was elected and acted to reduce the federal government's commitment to desegregation. White flight to both the suburbs and to private segregated schools vastly increased. There has been a lively debate over the assertion, but it has been claimed that desegregation has led to white flight to both the suburbs and to private segregated schools (Armor, 1978; Coleman et al., 1975).

The gradual changes produced by the interaction between law and society is especially worthy of note. Law was not changed in one day; nor did social change occur the next. If the Brown decision was the beginning of the desegregation effort, it took decades of litigation by the Legal Defense Fund to reach that starting point. After Brown was decided, desegregation remained more dream than reality until Con-

gress and the President actively began to support the Court's decision a decade after it had been handed down. Richard Lehne (1978) has suggested that court decisions may function more as agenda setters than as policy decisions. That is, rather than having a direct impact on society, a court decision might place an issue on the political agenda, forcing other policymaking institutions to consider and deal with an issue they probably prefer to ignore. The Brown decision may have been such an agenda-setting decision, in that it forced the issue of school segregation to the forefront, provided encouragement to civil rights groups, and made the moral issue of racial segregation a question of legal rights as well. Brown and the defiance of the Court cried for action by the President and Congress. Brown thus illustrates the interaction of law and social change pictured in Figure 9.1. An interest group, the Legal Defense Fund, worked to influence a policy-making institution, the Supreme Court. The result of that effort was the Brown decision, which had an impact on the political and social environment. One effect was to provide encouragement for further efforts by civil rights groups. Another effect was to change decision-making norms. Brown, after all, did create a constitutional obligation to eliminate state-caused segregation. Brown also affected the values of decision makers. The result, over time, was a coherent desegregation policy of the courts, Congress, and the executive branch. Later support for desegregation was even generated at the state level. The result was considerable success in achieving goals of desegregation and racial equality.

That result, however, was not immediate. There was some delay until the political and social environments were more appropriate for national action. The initial outcry over Brown was given a chance to die down. With the advent of the Great Society, there was a liberal, expansive national mood. Even in the South, the interest in defiance was not what it had been during the Little Rock crisis. Such lawbreaking was, among other things, bad for business. The economic development of Arkansas was harmed by Faubus's defiance. Businessmen made it clear to politicians that they had difficulty getting skilled employees to move into a climate of hate and that plants would not relocate to such an environment. Even the practitioners of confrontation politics, such as Ross Barnett, made efforts to minimize the impact of defiance. Barnett, for example, entered into lengthy negotiations with the Justice Department over the staging of his political show against the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi (Black, 1976). The desegregation process was, however, a largely successful one in spite of delay and reaction. Perhaps this success is due to the multiplicity of powerful weapons which were available to the law reformers: litigation; withdrawal of federal funds from noncomplying school districts; the might of the federal government; and the increased power of blacks. Together they formed the kind of coherent strategy which appears necessary to create significant societal change.

Voting

The 1965 Voting Rights Act was the third and most effective of a series of voting rights laws. The first federal voting rights act in this century was passed in 1957, though it was not very successful in securing black voting rights. Its main provisions were the creation of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the elevation of the civil rights section in the Department of Justice to full division status, and the authorization of suits by black plaintiffs. In 1960 a voting rights law was passed which required local voting registrars to maintain their records for two years and to make them available to federal officials. If a pattern of voting discrimination existed in an area, the Department of Justice could sue local registrars and a court could appoint referees to regis-

ter voters. It was the broad challenge to voter discrimination efforts that made the 1965 act so effective. Not only were literacy and related discriminatory tests for voting barred by the act, but new criminal penalties for attempting to keep qualified persons from voting were established. Additionally, if voting registrars proved uncooperative, federal examiners could be used to register voters. The Johnson administration showed a substantial commitment to voting rights. Federal examiners and FBI agents were active in the South, though some civil rights activists desired an even greater federal presence. However, the act was successful in ensuring voting rights for blacks, especially because it was coupled with massive voter registration drives by civil rights organizations. The success of the act was also due to the clear and direct aim it took in attacking the two most serious problems blacks faced in voting: the intimidation of blacks who desired to vote and the use of such registration devices as the literacy test (Champagne and Nagel, 1978; Handler, 1978). Using the model in Figure 9.1, the act may be seen as a method of eliminating policies at the state level that conflicted with national policies and made the achievement of racial equality more difficult. The act encouraged interest groups trying to achieve racial equality by building the constituency of those groups. It also worked to change values of state decision makers by making it politically attractive to support desegregation goals.

Public Accommodations

Another aspect of the struggle for racial equality dealt with segregation in places of public accommodations. Prior to 1964 the courts had engaged in piecemeal efforts to eliminate parts of this type of discrimination. It was not until the 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, that full access to public accommodations involved in interstate commerce was guaranteed. The 1964 act made it illegal for a business to refuse service to blacks if the business served people who traveled in interstate commerce or if a substantial portion of produce used by the business flowed in interstate commerce. Private clubs were exempted from the act.

Contrary to many other civil rights areas where there was significant delay in achieving substantial compliance or where the coercive power of the federal government had to be used to enforce compliance with the law, there was widespread voluntary compliance in desegregating public accommodations. This rapid voluntary compliance is probably due to the economic incentive for compliance and the ability to use the act to shift blame for compliance. The economic incentive for compliance was that businesses would benefit from compliance by gaining black customers. The blame-shifting capacity of the act was that businesses could keep their white customers by claiming that the federal government was forcing them to serve blacks (Rodgers and Bullock, 1972). In this way businessmen could avoid hostile feedback that would be generated by compliance. The legislation also suggests that laws containing substantial economic incentives for compliance may be especially effective as social change policies.

Employment

The 1964 Civil Rights Act is the crucial weapon in the fight against employment discrimination. The act makes illegal racial, sexual, and religious discrimination in employment in all businesses involved in interstate commerce which employ 15 or more employees. The act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is responsible for investigating charges of discrimination, attempting

to resolve disputes through conciliation, and filing lawsuits in some cases. Though EEOC has had problems in enforcing the act, such as agency understaffing, delays in investigating complaints, delays in filing lawsuits, and large backlog of cases, there seems little doubt that the act and EEOC have had a significant impact in improving employment opportunities for those groups covered by the act. A key to the success of the 1964 act is the considerable financial burden placed on noncomplying businesses. Those businesses may not only be forced to pay large awards of back pay and provide other remedial measures, but they may have to pay the attorneys' fees of the victims of employment discrimination. The latter provision encourages private enforcement of the law. The provision is not very useful in many individual cases where awards tend to be small and awards of fees would be minute, but the awards can be substantial in class action cases (Champagne and Nagel, 1978; Handler, 1978). The real threat of substantial economic penalties may also be an effective mechanism for achieving social change.

Housing

The effort to overcome discrimination in housing has been far less successful than efforts in education, voting rights, or employment. Discrimination in housing exists in spite of some efforts by both legislation and court decisions to end discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court, for example, prevented courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants which banned sales of homes to minorities. The 1968 Open Housing Act outlawed discrimination in the sale and rental of homes by agents and realtors. Nevertheless, housing discrimination has persisted, especially since exclusionary zoning has generally been approved by the courts. Exclusionary zoning does not use race as an explicit zoning criteria, but restriction of housing to large lots or to a large number of square feet can so increase the cost of housing that minorities are priced out of the market. In numerous cases, where minorities have started moving into white neighborhoods, they have found it difficult to obtain necessary city permits and in some cases have had property condemned by cities and turned into parks. Efforts to integrate public housing projects have also met with failure because of suburban hostility to the construction of low-density public housing in the suburbs. In Chicago a court order required that future public housing be built only in integrated areas rather than in black areas. The result was no new public housing starts (Champagne and Nagel, 1978; Handler, 1978).

Handler (1978) has pointed out that opposition to the desegregation of public housing is great and that white neighborhood associations have amassed a considerable body of legal talent to maintain the status quo. In addition, the local nature of housing laws entails numerous, expensive, and time-consuming challenges to discriminatory practices. Housing discrimination also appears to have been given low priority by most civil rights organizations in comparison to education and employment issues. Government has shown little interest in becoming an ally of civil rights groups in battling housing discrimination. The national government appears to see housing discrimination issues such as those relating to exclusionary zoning as primarily local questions. Local governments appear to see housing integration as political dynamite. In general, even the courts have not been helpful. Realizing housing is a political thicket, courts have been reluctant to enter this complex area or develop extraordinary remedies. The result is that civil rights groups are in a weak position in the housing discrimination area, often allied only with housing developers whose common interest with the civil rights groups is in striking down exclusionary zoning

regulations, not necessarily in integrating housing. In terms of Figure 9.1, interest groups have been unable to obtain much support from policymaking institutions at any level of government. As a result, the policies aimed at combating housing discrimination have been weak and ineffective in achieving social change.

The First Amendment

An Overview

Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), political groups, and religious organizations have been involved primarily in attempting to create social change in areas dealing with the First Amendment. In attempting to achieve such changes, these interest groups are often at a fundamental disadvantage: They frequently must promote the interests of unpopular persons or groups in order to achieve their larger goal of bringing about fundamental changes in the way society treats First Amendment issues. Because the interests being promoted are often unpopular, such as freedom of speech for Communists in the 1950s, freedom to parade for Nazis in the 1970s, or banning prayer in the public schools, these organizations show an unusually strong reliance on the judicial process rather than the political branches of government. This reliance on the courts is based on a belief that certain groups or ideas may be so unpopular that elected officials will be unresponsive to those interests. In such situations, only the courts, which are somewhat isolated from public opinion and political pressure, can be responsive. American society's most undemocratic branch of government, therefore, is assumed to be the most responsive to those unpopular groups subjected to the tyranny of majority rule (Champagne et al., 1981). The experiences of these groups in free speech/free association cases illustrates several important characteristics about the relationship between law and social change, and this will be examined in the following two subsections.

Free Speech and Association

It was not until the early part of this century that the Court began hearing cases involving freedom of speech. Before long the Court held that freedom of speech was a fundamental right which applied to both the state and national government. The Court also rejected the "bad tendency test," which enabled the government to suppress all speech that might prove subversive at some point in the future. In its place, the Court, largely through the efforts of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, began using the "clear and present danger test," which allowed government to suppress speech only when the danger of unlawful action advocated by the speech was imminent. Holmes and Brandeis met considerable resistance from other justices, but by the late 1930s and early 1940s the clear and present danger test was the formulation used by the Court (Cortner, 1975).

What happened in the early 1950s indicates how tenuous Supreme Court victories can be. The early 1950s was a period of anti-Communist hysteria. Outrageous charges of Communist infiltration of government and treason at its highest levels were widely believed. It was a period of intense insecurity. The Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb, China had become a Communist country, Eastern Europe was Communist. Americans, accustomed to a position of superiority in the world after the defeat of Hitler and Tojo, could not understand the enormous

political and social changes going on around them. As a result, politicians such as Joe McCarthy rose to power with simple but frightening explanations of infiltration and treason in high places.

The result is readily explained by the interactive model of law and social change in Figure 9.1. The Supreme Court began to reflect those changes in the political and social environment. In *Dennis* v. *United States* (1951) the Court upheld the convictions of Communists for advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Holmes's and Brandeis's clear and present danger test was not used by the Court. Instead, the "grave and probable test" was used. This standard allowed speech to be suppressed if the danger produced by it was not imminent as long as that danger was a serious one. In Dennis, Communist overthrow of the government was not imminent, but it was a serious danger and therefore the convictions were upheld.

In 1957, with the anti-Communist hysteria on a downswing, *Yates* v. *United States* held that unprotected speech was the incitement of unlawful action, but advocacy of unlawful action in the abstract was protected speech. It was not until the 1960s, however, long after concern over Communism had died down, that the Court again embraced the clear and present danger test (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969). This summary of subversive speech cases illustrates several important points about the relationship between law and social change. One should note that judicial victories are tenuous ones, in that judicial interpretation of the Constitution proved quite responsive to dramatic shifts in the national mood. As a result, the courts may not be bastions protecting the rights of minorities. Most important, this summary points out the impact of social changes on legal changes. With the McCarthy period, the expansive clear and present danger test was replaced by a much more restrictive grave and probable test. It was only well after the McCarthy period that the clear and present danger test again came into use.

Civil Libertarians and the Nazi March

In 1977 Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist Party of America, announced his intention to have an assembly in Skokie, Illinois. The National Socialist Party is, according to Collin, a Nazi party. Its members wear uniforms which are similar to the uniforms worn by Nazi Party members when Hitler was in power. The uniforms include swastikas, and members often carry banners with such statements as "Free Speech for the White Man." Skokie is a Chicago suburb with 40,000 Jewish residents out of a total of 70,000. About 5,000 of those Jewish residents are survivors of the German concentration camps. As a result, such a march would have been disturbing to the residents of Skokie, and an injunction was obtained against a march in uniform in Skokie or display of the swastika or materials which incited hatred against Jews (Lockhart et al., 1980). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) entered the case on the side of the National Socialist Party. The ACLU, though certainly unsympathetic to the views of the party, saw the injunction as a challenge to First Amendment freedoms. The ACLU is committed to the defense of individual liberties. Those defense efforts are funded by contributions from persons who presumably have an interest in civil liberties and who value defending them enough to contribute money. It is not, however, an organization that will clearly and directly provide benefits only to the donors. That is, most donors will never receive legal help from the organization, and most will probably never be in situations where their exercise of rights will be interfered with by the government. It is almost certain that no ACLU members were also National Socialist Party members who desired to march in Skokie. The ACLU's existence depends solely on its

ability to maintain the goodwill of generous civil libertarians whose only benefit from the organization is its efforts in the expansion of individual freedoms for all in society. The problem was that the goodwill of many of the ACLU's contributors was wiped out by the defense of the National Socialist Party. Contributors were outraged that a civil liberties organization would defend the interests of a group whose goals were so opposed to those of civil libertarians. As a result, though the injunction against the march was ultimately stayed, the ACLU suffered a precipitous drop in revenues and membership. The party never marched in Skokie, though it did hold a rally in Chicago (Hamlin, 1978; Lockhart et al., 1980).

Groups interested in social reform are, as Handler (1978) has noted, frequently organized along the same lines as the ACLU. The National Socialist Party case shows the inherent weaknesses of such an organizational structure. Though ACLU won a victory in obtaining a stay of the injunction, its future efforts were damaged by the withdrawal of membership and contributions. These organizations already face a serious free rider problem, in that benefits from their efforts affect members and nonmembers alike, providing a reduced incentive for membership. Such organizations have only a tenuous hold on members, well illustrated by this case, which also shows the extraordinary difficulty such organizations have in using law to create social change. Policies promoted by such organizations can have a feedback effect which can be so hostile that the existence of the interest group is endangered.

Criminal Justice and Social Change

Introduction

Civil liberties organizations such as the ACLU and the Legal Defense Fund have been very active in using litigation to achieve better treatment for those convicted or accused of crimes. These organizations have been successful in achieving their litigation goals of court-imposed changes in criminal justice policies. However, the impact of those policies on convicted persons, criminal defendants, and society is unclear. The criminal justice area illustrates two of the most troubling problems for the student of law and social change: the difficulty in determining if ordered rule changes are implemented and the difficulty in assessing the effects of those changes. These problems will be examined by focusing on *Miranda* v. *Arizona* (1966), *Mapp* v. *Ohio* (1961), and *Gideon* v. *Wainwright* (1963).

Miranda v. *Arizona*

During the 1960s the Supreme Court became increasingly disturbed over coerced confessions. The result of that concern was *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, a Court decision that established procedures for police interrogations which were aimed at controlling police abuses. The Court provided that (1) prior to questioning, suspects must be warned that they have a right to silence; (2) suspects must be told that statements may be used as evidence; (3) they must be informed of their right to counsel and to have counsel present during regular interrogations; (4) suspects must be informed that counsel will be appointed for them if they are indigent; (5) suspects can waive these rights only if the waiver is knowing and intelligent; and (6) suspects are free to assert those rights at any point in the interrogation. The Court believed these warnings would lessen the intimidating atmosphere of the interrogation room and

ensure that the defendant could protect his Fifth Amendment rights through silence, an attorney, or both.

However, studies of the impact of these extremely controversial warnings indicate that they may not have had the effect anticipated by the Court. Stephens (1973: 199), for example, found that while police officers tended to be hostile to the decision, "There was simultaneous acknowledgement that things continued to go on pretty much as usual." A study of police files in Pittsburgh noted no significant changes in the conviction rate after Miranda compared to the pre-Miranda rate. Nevertheless, it is possible that there were some police behavioral changes. The study found that there was a 17 percent decrease in the proportion of cases in which confessions were obtained in the post-Miranda period compared to the pre-Miranda period (Seeburger and Wettick, 1973).

A study of the impact of the Miranda decision in Washington, D.C., found that only 7 percent of persons arrested for felonies and serious misdemeanors requested free legal assistance provided by volunteer attorneys. The study also found that 15 percent of the 85 suspects did not understand the right to silence warnings, 18 percent did not understand the right to counsel warning, and 24 percent were rated as failing to understand the right to appointed counsel (Medalie et al., 1973). Griffith and Ayres (1967) interviewed 21 Yale faculty members and students who had been questioned by the FBI about anti-Vietnam War activities. Few of the respondents showed an understanding of their rights, and most felt an obligation to respond to questions, feeling subtle pressure to do so in spite of the Miranda warnings.

The overall assessment of the effectiveness of the warnings in changing police behavior is unclear. Police officers believe they are hindered by the warnings, but they also believe that police behavior is not any different as a result of the decision. Suspects apparently do not fully understand the warnings and confess in spite of them, but there was a 17 percent drop in confessions in Pittsburgh after the Miranda decision. Suspects report receiving incomplete or no warnings, but other studies show high police compliance in reading the warnings to suspects (Medalie et al., 1973; Stephens, 1973). The result is that one can find evidence that Miranda has been both effective in changing police behavior and ineffective. Nor is this difficulty in assessing law and change an isolated case, as is indicated by the exclusionary rule imposed by *Mapp v. Ohio*.

Mapp v. Ohio

In an effort to prevent Fourth Amendment abuses by the police, the Warren Court in *Mapp v. Ohio* (1961) imposed the exclusionary rule on the states. This rule prevented the introduction of illegally seized evidence in court. As was the case with the Miranda decision, Mapp was a controversial case and has been subjected to enormous criticism. Essentially, the argument of the critics is that the exclusionary rule lets the guilty go free and punishes society for the mistakes and misdeeds of the police (Schlesinger, 1977). In spite of this criticism, some of it from the Supreme Court, the evidence is not conclusive that the rule has failed to deter police misconduct, though it is clear that misconduct exists with the rule. Spiotto (1973), for example, examined motions to suppress evidence in Chicago over a 20-year period and found that motions to suppress sharply increased over time. There was a high rate of motions granted, suggesting that the increase could not be attributed to increases in frivolous motions. As a result, Spiotto argued that the exclusionary rule had not been effective in deterring police misconduct, since an effective rule would have led to a decrease in misconduct and therefore

in motions to suppress. Oaks (1970) found that the exclusionary rule had no significant effect on narcotics and weapons arrests and convictions in Cincinnati. Thus, Oaks argued that the rule had done little to change the search and seizure practices of the Cincinnati police. Hirschel (1979) also did extensive research on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and concluded that the rule was ineffective. For example, only 66 percent of the 93 police officers who were surveyed in cities A and B indicated that the exclusionary rule discouraged police officers from making searches they would otherwise make. Only 43 percent of prosecutors and 39 percent of defense attorneys believed that the rule had such as discouraging effect. Similarly, only 57 percent of police officers indicated that admissability was considered in making a determination to search. Only 38 percent of the prosecutors and 33 percent of defense attorneys shared that view.

Canon (1973), however, has questioned such studies. He argued that the samples are too small to attempt broad generalizations. He made other criticisms that are specific to particular studies, such as being dated or covering a brief period. Canon's research suggests that the rule was more effective than much of the research on the exclusionary rule has indicated. Canon surveyed 59 police departments and found that 12 percent frequently dropped charges because evidence had been illegally seized. Of 43 prosecutors' offices surveyed, 21 percent responded that they frequently dropped charges due to illegal seizures. In only 10 percent of 65 cities were more than 25 percent of the motions to suppress granted. Such findings as these, argued Canon, indicated considerable compliance with the Fourth Amendment's requirements. Canon concluded,

> *For those seeking conclusive evidence about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, the findings reported are probably disappointing. Different measures point in varied and sometimes slightly contradictory directions and some of the results are subject to ambiguous interpretation. Taken as a whole, the main emphasis to be put on the findings is a negative one: they cast considerable doubt on earlier conclusions that the rule is ineffective in deterring illegal police searches* [*1973: 725*].

Though the impact of the rule is unclear, it has stirred great controversy. Less controversial is the right to an attorney, although assessment of the impact of that right is also uncertain.

Gideon v. Wainwright

Until *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963), a case-by-case approach was used to determine whether fairness required the appointment of attorneys for indigents charged in noncapital cases. Gideon established that indigents have a Sixth Amendment right to an attorney in all serious cases, cases where the punishment could be more than six months' imprisonment.

The decision was one of the most popular of the Warren Court criminal justice decisions, in large part because it was recognized that indigents could not receive a fair trial without the aid of counsel (Lewis, 1964). Rather than limiting the impact of Gideon or criticizing the opinion, the Burger Court expanded the Gideon decision in *Argersinger v. Hamlin* (1972) to include the right to an attorney in all cases where a jail sentence was possible.

Gideon and Argersinger have been implemented in two major ways: the public defender system and the assigned counsel system. Public defenders are attorneys

who are paid salaries by the government to represent indigents. They may be thought of as the indigent defense version of the district attorney. Assigned counsel are private attorneys who are assigned to a case by the court and are paid by the government to represent indigents on a case-by-case basis.

The effectiveness of the two systems in providing quality legal representation has been hotly debated. Perhaps the greatest condemnation of public defenders came from Jonathan Casper's (1972) interviews with prisoners. Casper asked, "Did you have a lawyer when you went to court the next day?" The response of one prisoner was, "No, I had a public defender." Both Casper (1972) and Sudnow (1970) have found that public defenders are actually public plea bargainers rather than advocates who promote clients' interests within an adversary system. In the relatively few cases where the public defender actually went to trial, it was because the attorney had been unable to get the client's consent to a bargain. The trial work of public defenders, according to Sudnow, is unimpressive. As he states, "The onlooker comes away with a sense of having witnessed not a trial at all, but a set of motions, a perfunctorily carried off event" (1970: 402).

Assigned attorneys have also been criticized for poor-quality representation of indigents. It has been argued that assigned counsel tend to be inexperienced and, perhaps due to the modest fee paid them by the government, prone to plea bargain rather than inclined to undertake a trial defense of the indigent defendant (Blumberg, 1967; Haney and Lowy, 1979; Nagel, 1975).

Levine (1975) and Skolnick (1970), however, have argued that the quality of legal representation by public defenders is comparable to that provided by privately retained counsel. Nagel (1975) compared public defenders and assigned counsel and did not find differences in their performance which were attributable to differences in the two systems.

Perhaps the most serious problem faced by public defenders, and probably assigned counsel as well, is client distrust. In a study of Legal Aid Society representation of indigents in Brooklyn, New York, Levine (1975: 235) found that in 56 percent of cases handled by Legal Aid lawyers a guilty plea was made, though the lawyer advised going to trial. In only 4 percent of cases involving private lawyers did such a situation occur. Levine believed that "paying clients apparently have faith in their lawyers whereas indigents treat their counsel with suspicion, incredulity, and disdain."

With the difficulty in measuring and defining quality legal representation, mixed findings on the effectiveness of retained counsel versus assigned counsel versus public defenders are probably not surprising. Yet, this difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of these programs does make it hard to determine the relationship between law and social change. In Figure 9.1, for example, uncertainty mars the impact of a policy on the political and social environment. It is hard, for example, to assess whether the criminal justice system is little more than an elaborate sham.

Summary

This section has examined some problems of law and change in four areas: (1) legal services and law reform, (2) race and equal protection, (3) the First Amendment, and (4) criminal justice and social change. From this examination, several important conclusions can be reached. The legal services illustration points out the difficulty in creating social change through law. Such efforts often require a complex, long-range strat-

egy, one that cannot be achieved without the support of the political and social environment and other political institutions (Handler, 1978). The difficulty in overcoming housing discrimination is directly related to this lack of political and social support.

Another related problem is the possibly transient nature of any legal reforms that might be produced. The changes in free speech/free association doctrines, for example, stress how responsive political institutions and legal doctrines are to major changes in societal values. Thus, a major legal victory, even in constitutional law, remains subject to modifications designed to reflect prevailing values (Friedman, 1977).

The legal services' right-to-life efforts also stress the difficulty faced in achieving social change with limited knowledge of how intended effects may be created. Jones (1968) suggested that one of the reasons for the inefficacy of law is the failure to communicate a law to its intended recipients. Both the legal services experience and criminal justice reforms suggest another important knowledge problem: the difficulty reform groups and policy makers have in determining which legal changes will produce desired effects. Often legal changes are made on untested and sometimes questionable assumptions about the likely impact of the changes. Indeed, there is an amazing lack of knowledge about how law produces social change and about which laws will produce desired changes.

The legal services experience, as well as the experience of the ACLU in the National Socialist Party case, point out another fundamental problem for social change organizations. That problem deals with the feedback produced by social change efforts. The effort to create social change may produce the effect of harming the social change group, as is illustrated by the demise of legal services and ACLU's loss of funding and membership.

The school desegregation policies show that a long-range, complex legal strategy can be successful. In that sense it differs from the legal services' efforts to ensure right to life. One explanation for the success of one strategy and the failure of the other is that school desegregation built on a stronger legal foundation of precedent and reason (Krislov, 1973). Another possible reason is that there was little support within society for a right to life and much stronger support for desegregation, though not in the South. The success of school desegregation policies also shows that while the courts are useful in achieving social change, they are probably not sufficient institutions to achieve that change. The success of the school desegregation effort is directly related to the belated support the courts received from the executive branch and Congress. Not only are governmental allies, as Handler (1978) suggests, desirable for social reform groups, but they are especially useful if the allies are within the political branches. While school desegregation policies might be rated as successful, it should be remembered that such success did not come easily. Reaction and delaying tactics must be expected when major social change is attempted and persistence by the reformers is essential.

The failure to forestall efforts to avoid a law's impact and the failure to enforce laws are two important reasons for the inefficacy of laws (Jones, 1968). With school desegregation multiple legal tools were used by reformers to bring about social change. The success of the voting rights effort points to related conclusions. That is, the government is an important, crucial ally for reform groups in their efforts to achieve social change. Additionally, legislation which is clearly and directly aimed at a problem can, with effective enforcement, dramatically remedy that problem.

Finally, the experience with public accommodations and employment discrimination laws is that an extraordinarily useful enforcement mechanism involves use of economic incentives and economic sanctions. With public accommodations laws,

businesses readily complied because they would gain black customers and yet would not lose white customers, since they could blame their compliance on the coerciveness of the government. In effect, the public accommodations law created such an economic advantage that voluntary compliance occurred because the law enhanced businessmen's sense of obedience. Even avowed racists were inclined to obey a law which improved their profits. Employment discrimination laws have created substantial economic penalties, and these penalties also provided strong incentive for compliance and offered opportunities for private enforcement through the award of attorney's fees as well as damages.

MAKING AND INFLUENCING LAW

Alternative Forms of Lawmaking

Although one typically thinks of the legislative process when lawmaking is discussed, it should be noted that other branches of government perform major lawmaking functions. The previous section noted the significant role played by the courts in making legal policies aimed at accomplishing social change. The executive branch has also been mentioned as having an important lawmaking function. Just as the courts function as lawmakers by exercising their powers to interpret the Constitution and statutes, the executive branch has also exercised lawmaking functions by exercising discretion in enforcement of statutes and by interpreting frequently vague and ambiguous statutes. Lax enforcement can often be the equivalent of eliminating a statute, while unusually aggressive enforcement may go beyond the wishes of the legislature. Regulatory agencies, including those outside the direct control of the executive or Congress, also have great power in interpreting and implementing statutes.

Figure 9.1 illustrates this diversity of lawmaking functions. Such diversity provides groups interested in social change with a number of forums for promoting their goals. Ideally, the interest groups will want to get involved in the policymaking process at the initiation stage. If they are unsuccessful at that stage or unable to get involved in the process at that point, interest groups still have the opportunity to affect the policy at later stages in the process (Zeigler and Tucker, 1981). The forums the groups choose and their activities and successes will depend on the groups' characteristics and goals. Groups, for example, may represent politically popular or unpopular interests. The ACLU would tend to represent the interests of the politically unpopular. As a result, it would concentrate its efforts in the courts, which would be less responsive to political pressure than would the other forums. Business groups, on the other hand, could be expected to have a voice in the political process. While business groups would not ignore the courts, their activities would also involve efforts to influence the legislature, the executive, and the regulatory agencies.

The political power of the interest group would also affect its choice of a forum. A group which could influence the voting behavior of thousands of members would likely be heard by the politically responsive branches, whereas small groups with little influence over voters would have less of a voice within the political process.

The resources of a group also affect its lobbying efforts. Groups with limited resources are less likely to have a voice in the political process, since they lack the resources to make campaign contributions or entertain political actors. Small resource groups would also be less likely to maintain the staff necessary for full-time lobbying efforts or to conduct lobbying efforts in many or all forums.

The relationships between government and interest groups also affect the lobbying activities of the groups. So much legislation affects the oil industry that it is necessary for that industry to maintain large staffs of lobbyists who work on a full-time basis in many forums. Other interests may be remote enough from governmental activities that they have little need to conduct any lobbying efforts within any forums.

The goals of the organization will also affect the organization's lobbying behavior. If the organization is interested in publicizing an idea, mass marches and testimony before congressional committees might be appropriate behaviors. If, on the other hand, the organization is interested in achieving a specific and immediate policy objective, litigation or election activity in favor of a candidate who favors that objective may be an appropriate behavior. The methods for influencing lawmakers vary from forum to forum, but throughout the following discussion, these differences in group characteristics and goals should be kept in mind (Handler, 1978).

Influencing Lawmakers

Figure 9.1 suggests that interest groups influence policymaking institutions. Interest groups hope to create norms or influence decision makers' values in ways that will cause policymaking institutions to respond to their wishes. The best-known efforts aimed at influencing lawmakers involve attempts to influence the legislative process. These efforts can take many forms, but one of the most common ways of influencing the process is through the contribution of money to a candidate's campaign fund. That contribution, of course, would be directed to the candidate who best reflects the group's interests. It is rare that one interest group can contribute enough money to a candidate to determine the outcome of an election, but interest groups with financial resources, especially when they are allied with other well-funded interest groups, can affect the views of politicians who know that money is a key to election (Zeigler and Tucker, 1981). Interest groups can also sometimes mobilize their members and supporters in favor of or against a particular candidate. This ability to mobilize the electorate can have a great effect on the attentiveness of the candidate to the groups' interests. The proliferation of single interest groups is a new development in legislative lobbying and an important one, since single interest groups are often able to mobilize almost all their members over a single issue (Ziegler and Tucker, 1981). Multi-issue interest groups may have more difficulty in mobilizing members, since members of such groups often do not agree with all positions taken by the groups. Multi-issue groups, however, are often able to ally themselves with other multi-issue groups so that they will take positions on issues of interest to other groups in exchange for the support of those groups on issues within their special areas of concern.

Interest groups may use public hearings to attract the legislature's attention and appeal to reason and the public. Perhaps most important, to influence legislation lobbyists try to cultivate the goodwill of legislators so that the legislators will be receptive to their ideas and depend on them for political aid, advice on legislation, and information (Ziegler and Tucker, 1981). The more a lobbyist is able to establish a bond between the interest group and the legislator, the more the legislator will become a spokesperson for the group. These efforts to establish goodwill include campaign contributions, mobilization of voters, information, personal contacts, and free meals. A recent example of an effort by an interest group to establish a bond between legislators and the group was the Texas Chemical Council's hunting trips for the Texas legislature. Thirty legislators, including Lieutenant Governor William Hobby and

House Speaker Billy Clayton, attended one or more all-expense-paid trips to Mexico. The trips included meals, whiskey, shotgun shells, and "bird boys" to retrieve fallen game. The trips helped to establish strong bonds between the chemical lobby and the legislature, so strong that one legislator said, "I always try to be nice to them [the chemical lobby] so I can go again" (Ellis, 1981: C3).

The groups that can afford the expense of establishing such bonds are at a great advantage in the legislative process. Groups that maintain full-time professional lobbyists are also at an advantage for at least three reasons: (1) The size of a legislature is large enough that full-time lobbyists are needed to maintain contact with legislators; (2) the large agenda of a legislature requires full-time lobbyists to keep the legislators' attention; and (3) the full-time lobbyists can maintain sustained interaction with legislators (Zeigler and Tucker, 1981).

The Executive Branch and the Bureaucracy

Interest groups influence elected executives in ways similar to their efforts at influencing legislators. That is, they appeal to the reason of executives and administrators. They also compete for the attention of executives through their use of financial resources and through the use of the political muscle associated with the mobilization of group members and supporters. As is the case with the legislative process, groups may often have influence over executives merely by maintaining an image of political strength or by threatening mobilization of members. Interest groups also attempt to influence lower levels in the bureaucracy. This may be done by establishing a close, long-term working relationship between the group and the bureaucracy. The Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, for example, maintain a close relationship with the Veteran's Administration and are often called on by the VA for advice, recommendations, and proposals. Infiltration of the bureaucracy by interest groups is also a well-established practice. This infiltration is accomplished by obtaining political appointments within the bureaucracy for interest group members and leaders. It is also done by maintaining a "revolving door" system of employment between interest groups and the bureaucracy, such that bureaucrats are hired by interest groups, sometimes again returning to the bureaucracy. The cozy employment relationship that exists between the Defense Department and the defense industry is an especially well-known illustration of this infiltration pattern. Though there is nothing necessarily corrupt about such an employment relationship, the concern must exist that defense contractors can have great influence with a Defense Department official who is interested in a well-paying job in the defense industry. While ethics legislation restricts such practices, it does not fully eliminate them. As was the case with the legislative process, well-organized, wealthy interest groups with full-time staffs appear to be particularly influential in affecting the decisions of the executive branch.

The Judiciary

The judicial branch is probably the most accessible to groups that are small, weak, unpopular, poor, or lack full-time lobbyists. This accessibility exists because of the strong reliance on reasoned argument and on objective decision making one finds within the judicial process. Thus, efforts by interest groups to influence the judiciary are somewhat different from efforts to influence the executive or legislative process.

Perhaps the three most important ways that interest groups act within the judicial process are (1) trying to influence the appointment or election of judges who support the goals of the group, (2) getting directly involved in litigation designed to forward the organization's goals, and (3) getting indirectly involved in litigation as *amicus curiae* or through lobbying efforts aimed at influencing legal or public opinion (Champagne et al., 1981).

Groups use their political power to influence the appointment or election of judges. This may be done by testifying against judicial nominees who do not support the group's interests and by mobilizing opposition to these nominees. One of the main reasons that John J. Parker, Clement Haynesworth, and Harold Carswell were not confirmed as Supreme Court justices was because of the opposition of civil rights groups and organized labor (Champagne et al., 1981). Groups may also endorse judicial nominees who appear to reflect their values. Pierce Butler, for example, was confirmed as a Supreme Court justice in part because of the support of the business community and the Catholic church (Danelski, 1964). Such interest group use of opposition and endorsements can also affect the election of judges.

Groups may also become directly involved in litigation. By sponsoring litigation the groups may accomplish their policy goals through judicial decisions. The groups may even be able to sponsor cases whose facts best create the chance of victory or whose arguments are most compatible with the groups' goals (Vose, 1958, 1972). In establishment of religion cases, for example, Sorauf (1976) found that three organizations were directly involved in sponsoring litigation in 20 of 67 establishment cases. In 21 other cases, the three groups became involved in the litigation after the case had begun. In 10 cases the groups were indirectly involved as amicus curiae, and in only 16 cases was there no involvement by the three groups. Groups may become indirectly involved in litigation by functioning as amicus curiae. Initially, the amicus curiae brief was a presentation of views in a case by a neutral third party. Over the years, this brief has developed into an instrument of advocacy (Krislov, 1963). Parties that are not directly involved in a case may obtain access to judges by submitting such a brief, which can be done with relatively little cost or effort. It allows the interest group to present legal arguments not presented in the main brief. Indirect involvement in litigation may also involve the funding of research in order to provide social science evidence for legal arguments (Berger, 1977; Lehne, 1978; Meltsner, 1973). It may involve the production of articles which favor particular positions. The hope behind such efforts is that judges may read and be influenced by the argument or that the arguments may influence opinions within the legal community or the community at large (Patman, 1961). Even in the case of judicial lobbying, however, the groups likely to be most successful are those which are well funded and organized enough to adopt a comprehensive legal strategy which utilizes the skill of legal experts over long periods (Vose, 1958).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the methodological difficulties that underlie any effort to determine the relationship between law and social change. It has suggested that the interaction of law and social change underlies many of these methodological problems. It is especially useful to think of law and social change as interacting. That is, while law may create social change, social change may also create changes in law. One might think of this interaction as occurring within a political and social environment that affects such policymaking influences as norms, interest groups, and decision maker

values. These policymaking influences affect policymaking institutions in varied ways. The results are policies which may conflict or which may be compatible with the achievement of a particular goal. The policies, in turn, affect the political and social environment, which then introduces new pressures on policymaking institutions.

The second section of the chapter applied this framework to a variety of situations. The complexity of this interactive model was stressed. It is often thought that a change in law causes an appropriate societal change. As this analysis points out, a change in law frequently has an uncertain impact on society. Changes in law also can result in unanticipated and undesired societal changes. Additionally, feedback from a policy may be so hostile that the policymaking group is greatly damaged by its reform efforts. The second part also stressed the importance of substantial, clear economic incentives and penalties as tools for achieving social change. Yet, it also pointed out that there is great difficulty in achieving social change given the diversity of policymaking institutions and the likelihood of ambiguous and contradictory policies being produced by those institutions. Effective efforts to use the law to achieve social change appear to require a coherent program from these diverse policymaking institutions. Obtaining such agreement on policy among the various branches and levels of governments is itself a formidable task.

Part three stressed the importance of interest groups in generating the norms changes and decision maker value changes which are necessary to obtain institutional support for social change policies. The section emphasized the diversity of interest groups, the variety of forums for the groups, and the range of techniques available for influencing policy.

Politically unpopular or financially weak groups, it was noted, are greatly restricted in their ability to influence policy. They have little access to the Congress or the executive and must rely heavily on the courts. However, as we suggested in part two, the courts are unlikely to be effective in achieving social change without the support of other branches and levels of government. Thus, the forum for the interest groups of the powerless is the most powerless forum.

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10

Social Policymaking as Strategic Intervention

Richard F. Elmore

> Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; . . .
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.
>
> *William Butler Yeats*

One thing can be said with virtual certainty about the foreseeable future of social policy: There will be less of it. Poverty has been displaced by the overall health of the economy as the central problem of domestic policy. Large-scale reforms of national transfer programs—health insurance, income guarantees, employment guarantees—have been pushed off the agenda by the more mundane concern of controlling existing expenditure commitments. Ambitious attempts to revolutionize delivery systems—deinstitutionalization in mental health and juvenile corrections, for example—have fallen into disarray and cynicism. Equity-based social regulations—affirmative action, rights of access for the disabled, rights to schooling for the handicapped and linguistic minorities—will have to struggle to hold their own in the face of growing opposition and skepticism toward regulation of all kinds. Simple ameliorist programs—fuel subsidies for the elderly and low-income, job training for high-risk youth, child care subsidies for working mothers, and so forth—will have some residual appeal as economic stop-gap measures, but not as the basis for renewed interest in broad-scale reformulation of social policy.

The optimistic view is that this situation will reverse itself with changes in the economy and political climate. This may be true, in the sense that economic and political shifts may again present the opportunity to make social policy. But there is a more pessimistic reading of the current state of social policy. It is that the reasons for the decline of social policy have less to do with short-term economic and ideological trends than with a fundamental exhaustion—of resources, of knowledge, of author-

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ity—brought about by past policy. If this pessimistic view is true, as I think it is, the decline of social policy will not right itself with better times. The mistakes of past policy will simply be reinvented. The remedy, if there is one, lies in acknowledging and understanding the causes of exhaustion, in coming to terms with the fact that the skepticism that presently characterizes informed opinion about social intervention is well founded. The result of this unpleasant reckoning is, I will argue, a severe narrowing of our vision of what the public is willing to invest in social intervention and what it is possible to accomplish by intervention, coupled with a broader reliance on organized problem-solving at the street level.

Up to the present, the growth of social policy has largely coincided with the growth of central government. Intervention has been thought of as the deliberate, rational use of central authority to alter the structure of political, social, and economic relationships. This view grew out of an essential optimism about central government's ability to know what causes social problems, to translate that knowledge into binding prescriptions, and to use beneficent coercion to implement its prescriptions. Furthermore, so long as a case could be made for intervention, by an appeal to data or political argument, the prevailing assumption was that the government would provide the resources necessary to make intervention work. The story of social policy over the past fifteen to twenty years has been the story of the unraveling of these assumptions. They have proven to be wrong on all counts, or at least sufficiently problematical to make them an unreliable basis for policy. The notion of cumulative progress, directed from the center with scientific know-how, orchestrated through the systematic, rational use of beneficent coercion, seems less plausible the more we know about the effects of past intervention. Our confidence in the center declines, as does its authority to provide benefits and to coerce. Things fall apart. The center, it seems, cannot hold.

The critical question, of course, is whether social intervention can be thought of in any way other than beneficent coercion directed from the center. If not, then its decline is synonymous with the decline of social policy. Such a view seems to be implicit in the sophisticated agnosticism that characterizes much current thinking about social policy. Having failed to change society by beneficent coercion, the argument goes, government should retreat to doing what it has always done best—writing checks. But this retreat has a darker side, since it can also be used as an argument for discrediting community institutions—schools, health care organizations, social welfare agencies, and the like—that have traditionally dealt with society's problems. Realism about the limits of beneficent coercion is a short step away from outright hostility to social problem-solving. The critical attitude that students of social policy have developed from analyzing past failures does not equip them well for redefining social intervention. Analysis of social policy has come to consist of explaining why things never work as intended; a high level of knowledge about social policy has come to be equated with a fluent cynicism. In the meantime, those organizations that take social problem-solving seriously operate in an increasingly hostile environment, since they represent an opportune target for both agnostics and opponents. The major contribution of science and analysis to social problem-solving, it seems, has been to discredit those who take it seriously as a practical matter. In social policy, more than any other area, the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity.

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to describe the causes of the current exhaustion. The second is to sketch, in the barest terms, what an alternative view of social intervention might look like. The whole analysis is couched in terms of "strategy," by which I mean general decision rules for deciding among courses of action

whose consequences are uncertain. Sometimes I will use the term "theory of action" synonymously with strategy to describe shared assumptions about how social intervention works. The first section looks at three strategic problems and how our thinking about them has changed. The second section describes a way out of the impasse created by current thinking about social policy.

Social policy can mean a multitude of things. For the purposes of this analysis, and for reasons that will become clear as it proceeds, I have chosen to define social policy as those government actions that are remedial and redistributive in intent. The conjunction of remedial and redistributive objectives might be considered the "core" of social policy, since it raises those questions that are most problematical and controversial regarding social intervention. "Remedial" carries with it the idea of treatment, relief, and redress for individuals who, for reasons beyond their control, cannot participate in the minimum benefits of society. "Redistributive" carries with it the idea of using government authority to extract money from one part of society and give it, in income or services, to another. Policies that are both remedial and redistributive present the most difficult problems of social intervention. Tobacco subsidies and accelerated depreciation allowances are redistributive in the sense that they use the taxing system to distribute income preferentially. But they are not remedial, except in the most trivial terms, since tobacco farmers and owners of large amounts of capital can hardly be thought of as lacking the wherewithal to be socially self-sufficient. Likewise, some policies—child care tax credits, unemployment, and social security, for example—are remedial without being explicitly redistributive. While they attempt to correct for differences beyond the control of individuals, the benefits and costs of such policies are widely distributed in society. College professors, advertising executives, and garbage collectors all share in the benefits and costs.

When the government tries to be explicitly redistributive *and* remedial in the same policy, it assumes a special and complex burden of proof that we have only recently come to understand. Compensatory education, employment training for low-income people, social services for the poor, and like policies carry with them the expectation that they will not only confer treatment for problems beyond the control of individuals, but will also ultimately redistribute income. In the case of tobacco subsidies, accelerated depreciation allowances, child care tax credits, and social security, we are satisfied that such policies have "worked" when the money has changed hands with a minimum of fraud and abuse. Such evidence is not sufficient for compensatory education, employment training, and social services, however, since we also demand that they produce long-run changes in individual behavior that will in turn result in higher incomes for beneficiaries. The problems of implementing these policies and their limited effect on individual behavior have led to a "strategic retreat" from the conjunction of remedial and redistributive objectives (Wildavsky, 1979: 41ff). One response has been to try to make social policy look more like tobacco subsidies and accelerated depreciation allowances—to say, for example, that what's wrong with the poor is that they do not have enough money, and to construct a policy that is designed to redistribute without remedying. Another response has been to abandon redistribution altogether, focusing instead on myriad little remedies with discrete constituencies—teenage pregnancy counseling, assistance for displaced homemakers, assistance for chemical dependents—that carry no long-term expectations for redistribution. Neither approach confronts directly the central problem of social policy, which is how to assure that some portion of the remedial problem-solving skills in society gets focused on redistributional purposes.

Society develops organized remedies for certain common social problems—education for ignorance, health care for disease, psychiatric care for mental illness, custody and supervision for law-breaking. For reasons that are difficult to discern, we treat some of these remedies—health and psychiatric care, for example—as almost purely "private" goods, allowing the market to be the major determinant of their price to individuals. Other remedies—education, for example—we treat both as "public" and "private" goods, using public taxation to support part of the system, but allowing a thriving private market for the rest. Other remedies—custody and supervision, for example—are largely "public" goods.

Economic theory can tell us whether, given certain conditions, it is more efficient to provide remedies through the market or through public monopolies, but theory does not speak directly to the question of how these remedies aggravate or alleviate inequities in society. The standard solution to inequities in economic theory is to tax "winners" and distribute the proceeds to "losers" for whatever kind of consumption is consistent with their preferences (Schelling, 1981). But simple tax-and-transfer solutions fall apart when it is difficult to distinguish winners from losers and when the quality of the remedy involves a high level of personal interaction between giver and receiver. We suspect, for example, that education is both a cause of and cure for certain social problems. The same can be said for health care, and for prisons. A certain proportion of these problems are inequities that cannot be remedied by simple tax-and-transfer schemes. We cannot "buy off" our collective portion of responsibility for the illiteracy of a black teenager with a cash settlement that reflects the foregone market value of a decent education. At the intersection of the remedy and the inequity lies the crux of social policy: To what degree are we, as a society, willing to focus remedies that are widely available on the redistribution of opportunities and income? This is not, I repeat, a question that can be answered fully with nifty tax-and-transfer schemes, since part of the inequity lies in the problem-solving ability of those who deliver the remedy.

This conjunction of remedial and redistributive purposes means that social policy cannot avoid dealing with organizations, the people in them, and the knowledge that those people possess. The strategic retreat into tax-and-transfer schemes leaves unanswered the central question of how remedial institutions affect the distribution of opportunities in society. A strategy of intervention, in other words, must deal explicitly with organized problem-solving in its various public and private forms.

THREE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

The decline of social policy has manifested itself in three ways: in the discovery that (1) the resources society is willing to allocate to social objectives are severely limited; (2) the accumulation of scientific knowledge is not reliably related to the solution of social problems; and (3) government often lacks the knowledge, influence, and coercive power to make policies binding on private choices. I will call these, respectively, the allocation, knowledge, and authority problems. In each instance, the discovery of these problems has led to the exhaustion of a previous strategy or theory of action, without replacing it by another, except possibly by a theory of *in*action that prescribes only acquiescence to the problem. Developing a new strategy, I will argue, entails facing each problem head-on and developing a positive theory of action based on the limits of prior policy.

The Allocation Problem

The notion that aspirations must be adjusted to resources has not come easily to social policy. Most current social policy, and the expectations that surround it, were shaped during a period in which beliefs about the scarcity of resources for social expenditures were not taken seriously. In 1965, economic advisors to President Lyndon Johnson thought they had discovered an important long-term shift in fiscal trends. Economic growth, they argued, would result in an enormous fiscal dividend, something like $35 billion dollars over the following five years. "Under the theory of fiscal management that evolved during this time, there was *no* option but to expend the surplus. The concept of 'fiscal drag' held that unless the revenue increment [was] immediately returned to the economy [it would] have a depressing effect. This [was], in a word, money you had to spend in order to get." Hence, the federal government underwent an "extraordinary reversal" of the "normal presumption" that "resources are scarce and the demand for them will outrun supply." Instead, in a "situation utterly without parallel in modern government," policymakers had to "constantly be on the lookout for new ways to expend public funds in the public interest" (Moynihan, 1970: 28-29).

In retrospect, this now seems a cruel hoax. The fiscal dividend turned out to be largely illusory, due in no small part to the war in Vietnam. The notion that "this was money you had to spend to get" overlooked, of course, the obvious alternative of simply not collecting the money in the first place. But these beliefs nonetheless had a profound influence on government expenditures, and consequently on shared perceptions of what was possible in social policy. Between 1965 and 1970, federal grants for payments to individuals more than doubled, from about $4 billion to about $9 billion. Between 1970 and 1975, they nearly doubled again, from $9 billion to $16 billion. During the same period, federal grants-in-aid to state and local government increased from $7 billion to $15 billion, and then from $15 billion to nearly $34 billion (Williams, 1980: 29; Office of Management and Budget, 1979: 225). This massive expansion was not confined to the federal level. State and local government expenditures roughly quadrupled in the same period (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981: 12). From 1965 to 1975, federal domestic expenditures increased as a proportion of the Gross National Product, from 7 percent to over 12 percent. During the same period, defense expenditures declined as a proportion of the GNP from roughly 10 percent to slightly over 7 percent (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981: 12).

This period spanned Democratic and Republican administrations. It was one of unprecedented growth and ambition, in which virtually any demand for increased social expenditures was treated with benign approval. "The idea of limits was not much in fashion" (Moynihan, 1970: 444). By design and by inadvertence, the federal government was drawn into a broad array of open-ended commitments to individuals and other levels of government. Income support, health care, and social service programs were constructed so that key expenditure decisions were effectively removed from federal control. Education, employment, and community action programs, while nominally subject to expenditure controls, increased at a generous rate. At the same time, political demands mounted from states for fewer restrictions on both the amounts and uses of federal aid, resulting in further erosion of expenditure controls (Derthick, 1975: 7-14, 25-34).

By the mid-1970s, the tide began to turn, at first in a barely discernible way and then in a series of sharp changes. Federal domestic expenditures, while continuing to

increase in absolute dollar amounts, began to decrease as a proportion of the GNP, from about 12 percent in 1975 to just over 11 percent in 1979. State and local expenditures also increased in dollar amounts but stayed about level in proportion of the GNP (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981: 12). The signals were there for those who chose to read them; society was turning down the thermostat on the proportion of economic activity it was willing to allocate to social expenditures.

In political terms, this shift manifested itself through a variety of actions. The Nixon Administration scaled down its midterm budgets and, when Congress refused to go along with reductions in the rate of growth, the administration tried to control domestic outlays by refusing to spend appropriated funds. A confrontation occurred between Congress and the Executive that produced a new congressional budget process in 1974, one explicitly designed to introduce expenditure controls.

Concern for expenditure growth also manifested itself in increasing attention to the "target efficiency" of social expenditures. Difficult questions of "cost, eligibility, administrability, and equity" were simply not being addressed, critics argued, with the result that as social expenditures grew, there was less and less assurance that they were being focused on those with the greatest needs (Lynn, 1977: 105-106). Expenditures initially justified on the basis of sensible, if vague, social needs quickly ballooned into large, conspicuous outlays with broad-based constituencies. Spreading benefits widely became the only way of assuring that some would reach their intended targets. The result, critics argued, was a "horrendously costly, frequently inequitable, and usually ineffective way of dealing with the nation's domestic ills" (Stockman, 1975: 26).

Furthermore, as expenditure controls were introduced, the target inefficiency of social expenditures worked against the most needy. "The poor" were "especially vulnerable to being whipsawed in the budget process," since proposals for tighter targeting of funds were met by "the inevitable protests from those who face reduced benefits and from provider groups." These reactions caused "Congress to compromise by retaining more liberal eligibility standards but limiting appropriations, leaving it to program administrators to ration the limited supply of appropriated resources" (Lynn, 1977: 100-101).

Finally, a number of critics saw in uncontrolled expenditures a loss of flexibility that virtually eliminated the possibility of reforms in major income transfer programs. By the mid-1970s, after two fruitless attempts to reform welfare, it was becoming clear that "there was no longer anywhere near the margin of uncommitted revenues even three or four years in advance that would be needed to finance national health insurance or the incremental costs of a decent national income guarantee program." The "built-in momentum of the federal budget" was producing "expenditure growth rates that not only out-pace current-year revenues but also absorb the 'fiscal dividend' of economic growth up to a half decade into the future" (Stockman, 1975: 5). When uncontrolled expenditure increases begin to erode the ability of elected politicians to initiate new programs, a political crisis ensues. The only new actions that are possible are those that control or reduce expenditures; hence, the political future of elected officials becomes tied to a declining fiscal margin and increasing demands for tighter control. By the first year of the Carter administration, this political bind was clear. The federal budget for fiscal year 1979, Carter's first, proposed an increase in federal outlays of nearly 25 percent, from $402 billion to $500 billion. Of this increase, 90 percent was due to the higher cost of existing commitments, and 10 percent to new policies proposed by the administration. Of the increases attributable to

existing commitments, 25 percent were the result of uncontrollable expenditures in income security programs (Heclo, 1978: 91).

In stark contrast with the optimistic fiscal theory of the mid-1960s, government now faces a situation that can only be characterized by severe limits and zero-sum politics. Social policy will be shaped in the foreseeable future by the view that expenditure increments for social objectives are financed from foregone consumption and investment. Gone, if it ever existed at all, is the idea that the opportunity costs of government expenditure can be concealed in "growth dividends" that "you have to spend in order to get." Social expenditures are now widely perceived as a fiscal and political liability, financed from otherwise productive resources, only at the expense of the well-being of key groups in society. "An increase in investment," the argument goes, "can be used to build more modern factories or devise more efficient techniques, [and] will, in the end, mean more income for consumers and more taxes for the government, even though it must be paid for, in the short run, by reductions in the shares claimed by the consumer or the government." Increases in government expenditures, on the other hand, reduce both investment and consumption without "adding to productive capacity in the long run" (Fallows, 1981: 5-6). The key weakness of this view, if there is one, is the assumption that government expenditures are "unproductive," but as we shall see in the following section, social research has done little to disconfirm this assumption with regard to social expenditures.

The inability to finance increased social expenditures out of a real or illusory growth dividend, then, leaves policymakers with an array of unpleasant options. They can choose to increase expenditures at the expense of investment and consumption, they can reallocate funds from one type of government expenditure to another, or they can severely limit all expenditures in the hope that increased productivity will restore the growth dividend that apparently made earlier increases possible.

Each of these options carries a high likelihood of political stalemate, because "each requires that some large group—sometimes a minority and sometimes a majority—be willing to tolerate a large reduction in their real standard of living." Coming out of an era in which limits were not much in fashion, we lack a political structure that allows us to "impose large economic losses explicitly." Political problem-solving in the current situation consists largely of "loss allocation."

> *But this is precisely what our political process is least capable of doing. When there are economic gains to be allocated, [we] can allocate them. When there are large economic losses to be allocated, our political process is paralyzed. And with political paralysis comes economic paralysis* [Thurow, 1980: 9, 10, 12].

Paralysis, however, does not mean stability; it only means that important allocation decisions will be made by inertia and inadvertence rather than by design. As the proportion of income and wealth allocated to the public sector declines, the losers will be social policies that are both redistributive and remedial, while the "winners" (in relative terms) will be policies that are remedial only. The reason is simply that the middle-class beneficiaries of remedial policy have both political and fiscal inertia on their side.

So-called uncontrollable expenditures currently constitute about 60 percent of federal outlays; two-thirds of that amount is in the form of entitlements for individuals, and one-third is in the form of interest on the national debt. Only about 11 percent of these uncontrollable expenditures, and about 6 percent of federal outlays overall, are in the form of highly targeted assistance to the needy—Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and food

stamps. The remainder of these benefits is distributed broadly, the largest share through the Social Security system. "The great majority" of benefits from uncontrollable expenditures "goes to *everybody*" (Fallows, 1981: 8).

The trend away from remedial-redistributive policies is even more pronounced outside of individual entitlements. Insofar as there are any expenditure reductions in the current federal budget, they fall on so-called controllable programs in areas like education, employment, and health care that were explicitly designed to augment state and local policies by making them marginally redistributive. The so-called uncontrollables will continue to increase at a decreasing rate, becoming less redistributive as they go, while the "controllables" will decrease in absolute dollars, also becoming less redistributive (Office of Management and Budget, 1982a; 1982b).

Nor do the politics of lost allocation look differently from the tax side. "Closing loopholes" as a means of increasing revenue and redistributing income has exactly the same consequences as controlling expenditures. The most potentially lucrative loopholes, or "tax expenditures," confer widely distributed benefits, many of which are focused on remedial social objectives. Tax deductions for interest on consumer credit, for mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes, and for property taxes all currently account for the equivalent of about $40 billion in federal outlays each year. Tax deductions for charitable contributions, child care, medical expenses, employment of welfare recipients, and income exclusions for disability benefits all account for the equivalent of about $100 billion in federal outlays. Taken together, these broadly targeted tax benefits are nearly six times the $25 billion in tax benefits conferred through preferential treatment of income from capital gains, which we tend to think of as the most lucrative of tax write-offs. Plugging loopholes, in other words, involves the same potential for stalemate and inertial drift away from redistribution as controlling expenditures (Office of Management and Budget, 1982c: 28-29).

The inability of government to make explicit loss allocation decisions, in other words, is based on its success in widely distributing the benefits of public sector growth. In social policy, the beneficiaries of remedial policies far outweigh, in both numbers and influence, the beneficiaries of remedial-redistributive policies. As long as increases in social benefits are regarded as "free goods" financed from "growth dividends," remedial-redistributive policies are treated favorably by policymakers, because they are simply a residual effect of more widely distributed remedial benefits. But when it becomes clear that social expenditures are actually financed from foregone investment and consumption, then policymakers are faced with the unpleasant and heretofore impossible task of explicitly allocating losses. Lacking a "strong normative structure" that will prescribe how to think about the allocation of losses, key allocation decisions are made by default, aggravating the drift from redistributive-remedial to simply remedial policies (see Nelson, 1977: 21ff).

One important lesson among many in this story is that income transfer and tax expenditure policies are not quite the benign and efficient instruments of redistribution that they are often made out to be. They are, like all instruments of policy, creatures of the political environment in which they were crafted. When we are told by economists, for example, that it is "more efficient," and ultimately more effective, to solve social problems with tax-and-transfer mechanisms, rather than with organizations and services, we ought to ask ourselves under what conditions this would be true. It turns out to be reliably true only when "politics are held constant," which is a little like saying that airplanes should be designed by holding the weather constant. Tax-and-transfer policies, as solutions to social problems, turn out to be just as inefficient in their own way as policies that use organizations. Tax-and-transfer policies

have one crucial disadvantage that organizational policies do not have, however: They do not institutionalize redistribution by building it into the knowledge, norms, and practices of individuals in organizations. Tax-and-transfer policies make redistribution a matter of bargaining on the margin; as long as the margin is a surplus, some redistribution will take place, but when the margin is zero or negative, allocation decisions will protect those to whom benefits are most widely distributed.

The Knowledge Problem

Just as the period between 1965 and the present saw a change from the allocation of gains to the allocation of losses, so too has the period seen a dramatic shift in the prevailing view of the relationship between knowledge and policy. With the growth of social expenditures came an unprecedented increase in the application of social science to social problem-solving. Social scientists were consulted in the construction of new policies; evaluation requirements became a standard feature of all new social programs; large-scale social experiments were launched in income maintenance, housing, health insurance, and education; and major research centers were established to track the effects of social policies. Between 1969 and 1974 alone, federal outlays for policy research increased roughly fivefold, from about $30 million to about $150 million (Rein and White, 1977a: 119). The motive behind this investment was the seemingly straightforward desire to "find out what works" (Rivlin, 1971: 86ff). The growth in expenditures forced an explicit debate about the differences between knowledge-for-its-own-sake and knowledge-for-policy's-sake, which ultimately drew a number of social scientists into the policymaking arena (Coleman, 1972).

The implicit model of the relationship between knowledge and policy during this period was "decision-driven" (Weiss, 1977b: 11). That is, major policy choices—reform measures, program authorization decisions, budget decisions, and the like—would be made on the basis of systematically acquired data on the effectiveness of various options. For a short time it seemed that any problem of social policy could be brought to heel with a judiciously designed piece of social research. The "dominant strain" of thought among "the educated, professional, managerial classes" was that "institutional arrangements could be imagined (indeed, could be selected by reason) which would produce whatever social circumstances were desired, and that technology had infinite capacity to produce the good life, at low cost" (Liebman, 1974: 14-15). Social scientists in government, recruited explicitly to make good on the promise of reason in the service of policy, promised "a new era in governmental support for educational and social ventures . . . in which the knowledge and technical expertise of the . . . specialist, the systems engineer, and the behavioral scientist would be brought into harmony with the pluralistic value structure of our society" (Elmore, 1975: 23). Limits of knowledge, like other kinds of limits, were not much in fashion.

Soon, however, this powerful connection between knowledge and policy began to attenuate. Large-scale evaluations proved extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and when they were done, decision makers showed a distressingly cavalier attitude toward their results (McLaughlin, 1975; Rivlin, 1971). Social experiments, ambitious in design and expensive in execution, produced enigmatic, tentative answers to questions that often were no longer being asked, or had never been asked in the first place (Rivlin and Timpane, 1975; Williams, 1972). Debates over the meaning of social science results often dissolved into a tangle of arcane methodological and statistical issues that were so remote from the concerns of policymakers as to make them

meaningless (Cohen and Garet, 1975). Cumulative assessments of income transfer and service delivery programs have tended to produce modestly positive or nonsignificant results surrounded by large margins of uncertainty. The direct effects on income of Great Society programs, initiated in the mid-1960s, proved to be small or nonexistent, but the spillover effects of introducing poverty criteria to previously untargeted expenditures resulted in small positive changes. Most of the spillover effects "were neither designed nor coordinated as part of the war on poverty and, in many cases, were unanticipated and, on occasion, opposed by policy planners" (Haveman, 1977: 9). "Research findings" on the work, savings, and income distribution effects of transfer policies "are too varied, too uncertain, and themselves too colored with judgement to serve as more than a rough guide to policy," leaving policymakers to wonder what the original purpose of such research was (Danziger et al., 1981: 1020). Whatever the vision that shaped the decision-driven model of policy research, it has been lost in detail and indeterminacy.

Among the first to become disillusioned were social scientists themselves. They "ceased to believe" in both the problem-solving power of social science and the practical value of research results; "they fell out of favor—or turned to self-doubt." As one intervention after another produced diffuse and equivocal results, "academics [became] blatantly skeptical about how much they knew; what sorts of problems they [could] solve." They began to "wonder openly whether problems *can* be solved. Is there really a technical solution to poverty?" (Friedman, 1977: 42). Having failed to change the language of policymaking into the language of rational problem-solving, many concluded that problem-solving itself was impossible. A few recognized that there is an irreconcilable "tension between the language of optimization, which is . . . used to describe policy analysis . . . , and the language of compromise and creative problem-solving, which is implicitly understood to be the proper language for looking at the real decision process" (Nelson, 1977: 33). As the results of research and analysis accumulated, the gap between optimization and compromise widened.

In the wake of this disillusionment, the decision-driven model gave way to more circumspect, less simplistic conceptions of the relationship between knowledge and policy. Policymakers, we are told, use social science not to make specific decisions, but to "think about and define the problematics of a situation," to "gain new ideas," and to "set the agenda for future policy actions." The relationship between social science and social policy is best thought of not as the "application of specific research conclusions to specific decisional choices," but rather as the "percolation . . . of concepts, theories, and findings into the climate of informed opinion" by a process of "diffuse, undirected seepage" (Weiss, 1977a: 533-534; also Rein and White, 1977b: 261-262). Solutions, if they exist at all, occur as the result of "the gradual sedimentation of insights, concepts and ways of looking at the world" (Weiss, 1977a: 535). In less than ten years, the terminology used to describe the relationship of knowledge to policy shifted from technical and cybernetic to geological and meteorological; from treating knowledge as a means of control, and policy as a form of engineering, to treating knowledge as diffuse intelligence, and policy as a marginal influence on complex and elusive forces. The earlier metaphors were calculatedly man-made; the later were drawn from natural forces. The change was rooted in a growing appreciation of the notion that "society's capacity for measuring results has outstripped its ability to cause consequences" (Wildavsky, 1979: 47).

With this new view of knowledge and policy came a broader understanding of how much social problem-solving depends on forms of knowledge other than science. Abstraction and precision, the hallmarks of science, are not free goods. They

carry costs, in the form of lost information and disconnection from direct experience. Reliance on abstraction and precision, to the exclusion of other ways of knowing, can lead to prescriptions that are remote from the everyday experience of politicians, administrators, and citizens. Further, because the theories that result from science are deliberately parsimonious and schematic, they present very limited pictures of the complex social problems that policy is supposed to address. Scientific theories "map experience most precisely where structures are simplest and structural variety most limited" (Roberts, 1974: 52); the greater the complexity and variety of factors operating on a problem, the greater the need to hedge the limits of abstraction and precision with other forms of knowledge.

"Ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft" are ways of knowing that rely less on abstraction and precision than on close proximity to experience and simple rules of thumb (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979: 12-13). Ordinary knowledge is a term that captures the "common sense, casual empiricism, [and] thoughtful speculation" used by most people, including scientists, to make most routine judgments and decisions (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). Ordinary knowledge focuses peoples' attention on problems worth solving, fills in the gaps between the abstract and precise results of science, and comprises that vast amount of experience that is either "controlled for" or considered to be random error in scientific investigation. Skill and craft are ways of describing the fine-grained knowledge necessary to perform complex tasks—arguing in court, teaching reading, supervising employees, and the like. Skill and craft are in many respects the opposite of science; they require immersion in the concrete rather than the abstract, a synthetic rather than analytic frame of mind, and a commitment to the task rather than detachment and disinterest. Yet useful science would be impossible without skill and craft, both in the execution of scientific research and in the translation of research results into actions. Skepticism about the relationship between social science and policy has resulted in more careful attention to distinctions among different types of knowledge and to the way they complement each other. "While we cannot fully formulate . . . what we know by means of . . . 'skills' and 'insights,' such knowledge can be reliable and perfectable; in fact, it comprises much of what we know about the world. The distinction between science and craft is thus a matter of degree" (Roberts, 1974: 51).

Whereas the earlier, decision-driven model stressed the direct application of facts to policy decisions, the new view argues that "a great deal of the world's problem-solving is and ought to be achieved through . . . social interaction" (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979: 10). Implicit in the notion of social interaction is a division of labor in the production and utilization of knowledge. Social scientists, legislators, administrators, street-level bureaucrats, and citizens, each with some interest in problem-solving (or avoiding), each with a way of knowing and valuing that is influenced by social position, use various kinds of interaction to sort out the consequences of what they know. Markets, voting, administrative delegation, organizational design, political debate, and bargaining are among the forms of interaction society uses to sift, sort, translate, and test competing conceptions of what we know and what needs to be done (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979: 19-29). Gone is the "insistence on control" (Wildavsky, 1979: 11) that characterized the decision-driven model. The ideal of a tight fit between theory, data, and policy has given way to a worldly realism in which the fit between knowledge and policy is loose, uncertainty about the effects of policy is commonplace, all forms of knowledge are placed on an equal footing, and the role of social science is devalued accordingly.

> *How are collective objectives set? They aren't; collective objectives are by-products of individual interactions. . . . Individuals make decisions; their social exchanges make outcomes. How is intelligence brought to bear on human activity? By many minds interacting. How is cooperation of these multitudes accomplished? Pretty much as crowds are coordinated when crossing the streets; by each individual adjusting to the others. Coordination does not require a coordinator; coordination takes place so long as there is mutual benefit in the individual transaction* [*Wildavsky, 1979: 115*].

Behind this view of the relationship between knowledge and policy is both a canny understanding of the limits of social science and a profound pessimism about the prospects for social intervention. Policymakers do not know, and social scientists can not tell them, what is required to make social intervention work. That knowledge consists of a multitude of pieces at all levels of precision and abstraction possessed by a multitude of people in many positions. The problem is not one of scientifically specifying the most parsimonious set of causal relations required to make a policy work, but of orchestrating many competing causal models and preferences. This orchestrating is best done not by hypothesis-testing and structured inquiry but by exchange and interaction.

For all its plausibility as a response to the limits of the decision-driven model, the interactionist view falls far short of an adequate alternative. It simply says that important questions of policy and practice will be settled by interaction; it does not say how one would know a good result from a bad one. It says that there is no hierarchy of knowledge, but it does not say how one would go about putting the right kind of knowledge in the right place at the right time. The "troublesome aspects" of the interactionist model are its "willfulness, messiness, and apparent disorder" (Wildavsky, 1979: 11). Pulled loose from its scientific moorings, knowledge is a peculiarly elastic and elusive thing. "Knowing what is right" is still crucial, but "since no one knows that for sure, going through the process of dealing with those who are judged to be knowledgeable (or at least continuously concerned) becomes even more crucial" (Helco, 1978: 103). In other words, knowledge is a currency of political exchange, but it is not a "hard" currency, since it is no longer anchored in the precious metal of science. Everyone's knowledge is equally (in)valid and can be traded for whatever the political market will bear. People who "regard each other as knowledgeable, or at least needing to be answered," are connected in "issue networks" where "public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated, alternative options worked out—though rarely in any controlled, well-organized way" (Helco, 1980: 104). The result of this view is either a debilitating cynicism or a kind of exploitative anarchy in which those with the gold make the rules. Even those who subscribe to the interactionist view most faithfully conclude that "selfishness and chaos lack appeal as organizing principles" (Wildavsky, 1979: 11).

The Authority Problem

Running parallel with the disintegration of the center's ability to make allocation decisions and to connect knowledge with policy is the growing crisis of governmental authority. The period between 1965 and the present began with the presumption that government institutions, given sufficient resources and guidance from policymakers, could solve most social problems; it has ended with the presumption that government is not competent to solve any problem until proven otherwise. This loss of

governmental authority is expressed as skepticism about both the moral authority of governmental coercion and about the competence of government organizations and the people in them. Proposals to reduce, consolidate, or eliminate governmental functions, especially those attached to social objectives, are treated with greater deference than proposals to expand the role of government. The burden of proof, in other words, has shifted. While this shift can be traced in part to economic necessity and short-term ideological trends, its roots run much deeper. They lie in a failure to specify the initial limits on governmental intervention, and hence to set expectations for outcomes at a level that bears some reasonable relationship to the means.

The theory of governmental action behind the Great Society war on poverty was that poverty was caused by a lack of adequate opportunity for education and employment, by a lack of adequate coordination among the various governmental activities designed to help poor people, and by the unresponsiveness of local politicians and bureaucrats to poor constituents. Broad-scale federal programs designed to augment state and local education and employment activities addressed the first need, federal mandates for coordination and planning addressed the second, and requirements for participation by the poor in decisions affecting them addressed the third. The result of this activity was supposed to be the eradication of poverty. The actual result was something a good deal more complex.

In the administration of the poverty program, the coordination and participation objectives immediately collided head on. Coordination ostensibly had a relatively narrow, technical meaning: a closer fit between the needs of the poor and the solutions offered by local agencies; a clear, rational, easily understood delivery structure; and more communication among agencies working with the same clients on different problems. Participation, on the other hand, had a potentially more controversial meaning: political authority for people who had no claim to influence other than their poverty, patronage for groups not traditionally considered part of the political mainstream, and conflict over who would control significant amounts of federal largesse. Not surprisingly, as the war on poverty heated up, the more politically volatile issue of participation drove out the more technical issue of coordination. Administrators found it "most difficult to administer a service delivery system while simultaneously engaging groups in political protest" (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977: 268). Within a year or two after the commencement of the war on poverty, "'Community Action' no longer referred to coordination of . . . local welfare agencies . . . but signified, instead, the mobilization of community residents on behalf of their own interests" (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977: 255).

This change brought the federal government into a largely adversarial posture toward local government and local political organizations, pushing them toward the recognition of previously excluded constituencies. This process was acted out with great variation from one setting to another, demonstrating overall "the extremely grudging way the American regime makes policy concessions to the . . . interests of the disadvantaged" (Greenstone and Peterson, 1973: 293). The "distinctive mission" of federal pressure for participation "became the formation of new political linkages between black Americans and the political order," which "helped stabilize the American regime by reducing racial protest and tension" and "provided immediate government patronage that would only have become available much more grudgingly in older agencies" (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977: 274, 269, 270).

The federal role in broad-scale categorical programs followed a similar path. At their passage, new federal policies like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 stressed both improvement in the general quality of services and compensa-

tory treatment for disadvantaged children. But the history of federal-state-local relations in the implementation of these policies was characterized by the "displacement of broad assistance objectives by narrower compliance objectives and an increasing tendency to define the 'strength' of the federal role in terms of its ability to induce certain specific responses at the local level, rather than its ability to improve state and local competence, adaptability, and responsiveness" (Elmore and McLaughlin, 1982: 165). The federal role became increasingly adversarial, as opposed to collaborative, and focused increasingly on narrower measures of impact.

Contrary to widely held beliefs, however, growth in federal expenditures and federal influence was not accompanied by proportional growth in the size of the federal government. Over a twenty-year period in which governmental expenditures were increasing sixfold (twofold in constant dollars), from the 1950s through the 1970s, federal employment increased only 20 percent (Helco, 1978: 89, 91). Federal employment as a proportion of total governmental employment actually fell by more than 40 percent during this period, while state and local employment increased by 50 percent and 18 percent, respectively (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981: 65). The seeming contradiction between growth in expenditure and influence, on the one hand, and decline in relative size, on the other, is explained by the use of intergovernmental regulation, or heavy reliance on "government by remote control" (Helco, 1978: 92). During the period of maximum growth in federal expenditures and decline in relative size, federal regulations increased sixfold, or nearly three times the rate of expenditures (Helco, 1978: 91).

> *"Rather than building . . . its own administrative facilities. . . , the federal government has preferred to act through intermediary organizations—state government, city halls, third-party payers, consultants, and many others. . . . Rather than having to work at building and policing its own delivery mechanisms, the Washington bureaucracy [uses] regulations [to tell] other public and private bureaucracies what should be done. . . , allowing federal policymakers to distribute not only funds but also much of the blame when things go wrong" [Helco, 1978: 92-93; see also Salamon, 1981].*

Common sense would dictate that, like any highly leveraged transaction, the substitution of rules and third-party administration for direct control would eventually fall in upon itself. In fact, this is precisely what has happened. Criticism of federal intervention has grown from a modest grumble, in the early 1970s into a full-scale reaction against the public sector in the 1980s. This reaction takes several forms.

One is to turn even the modest successes of early interventions into presumptive failures. Retrospective critiques of Great Society ventures stress their lack of effectiveness, as measured by educational achievement, employment, and income (Levin, 1977). But the criticism has also been extended to areas that were previously thought to be successes. To a large degree, the "stress on political stabilization" that characterized the war on poverty "readily accounts for [its] failure . . . to provide any major solution for widespread economic poverty." Stabilization worked by coopting black leadership: "The key to political stability was to attach politically vigorous black leaders to the existing system, and it was from this group that [the poverty program] recruited many of its administrators (who thereby became its biggest individual economic beneficiaries). . . , an accommodation which preserved the underlying stability of social and economic as well as political relations" (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977: 276). Indeed, stabilization seems to have gone a long way. Between 1960 and 1976, black public sector employment increased by 55 percent, as compared with 26 percent for whites, while private sector employment increased 45 percent for blacks

and 74 percent for whites (Brown and Erie, 1981: 305). The benefits of public sector employment, however, appear not to have spilled over to the very poor. Welfare dependency increased. The proportion of income for poor black families accounted for by transfer payments rose from 34 percent in 1969 to 62 percent in 1976 (Brown and Erie, 1981: 310). These trends have led some critics to conclude that "the principle economic legacy of the Great Society for the black community has been the creation of a large-scale social welfare economy of publicly-funded middle-income service providers and low-income service and cash-transfer recipients, . . . a form of welfare colonialism where blacks [are] called upon to administer their own state of dependence" (Brown and Erie, 1981: 301, 321).

The modest successes of stabilization, it seems, have been turned into liabilities. The conventional wisdom has become that fighting poverty through public sector organizations is like feeding the sparrows by feeding the horses; it benefits mainly middle-class welfare professionals. There are several reasons to doubt this conventional wisdom, not the least of which is its tendency to confuse interesting short-term shifts with permanent changes in the structure of society. One wonders, for example, whether a similar analysis of public employment at the turn of the century would have produced equally pessimistic conclusions about Irish police, Italian firefighters and garbagemen, and Jewish schoolteachers. The more basic point, though, is that public organizations, having failed to eradicate poverty and having "only" succeeded at the more modest tasks of assimilation and stabilization, are under the most direct and concentrated sort of attack. The terms of the attack are that "most federal programs do not work and consist principally of throwing money at problems"; that policies predicated on changing "deeply rooted aspects of human behavior" or "skills, attitudes, consumption habits, and production patterns" are largely doomed to failure; and that "government has been successful [only] at delivering food and money" (Wildavsky, 1979: 47-48; Schultze, 1977: 12).

The result of this attack has been a nearly 180-degree turn in the theory of action underlying social intervention. The new theory assumes that in most instances, "collective coercion" of the kind used by the federal government during the 1960s and early 1970s is largely fruitless and should be "reserved for times when it promises large benefits." Social intervention "assumes a 'rebuttable presumption' that the desirable mode of carrying out economic and social activities is through a network of private and voluntary arrangements. . . . A theory of social intervention is thus concerned with defining the conditions under which that presumption is indeed rebuttable" (Schultze, 1977: 6, 13). Whereas the old theory was to mobilize knowledge, financial incentives, and regulatory requirements in the service of remedial and redistributive ends, the new theory is to reduce government coercion to the necessary minimum and to mobolize private interests using indirect means in the service of direct redistribution. This shift has set off what might be called the search for frictionless solutions to social problems. Vouchers and market competition can be substituted for grants-in-aid and regulations as means of improving the quality of public services; direct income transfers can be substituted for rehabilitation, education, and training as ways of improving the well-being of individuals; and wage subsidies and tax credits can be used to create employment instead of publicly funded training and jobs.

Underlying the search for frictionless solutions is a profound pessimism about past uses of government coercion, a deep distrust of public organizations, and a strong belief in the utility of economic theory as a guide for public policy. Arguments for intervention that were previously based on disadvantage, inequity, and social pathology—sociological and political theories—must now be converted into the parsimo-

nious language of market failure, negative externalities, and public goods—economic theory. Not surprisingly, the result is fewer compelling arguments for intervention and less governmental authority to intervene. "If political scientists can be accused of seeing the hand of formal government everywhere, and the need for it almost everywhere, economists can be accused of arguing away the need for government almost anywhere, and advocating the almost universal superiority of the hidden hands of consumer sovereignty and competition among suppliers" (Nelson, 1977: 47).

The big losers in this doctrinal shift are neither policymakers nor academics, both of whom adjust adroitly to shifts in the political wind; the big losers are the public and quasi-private organizations spawned by the earlier theory of intervention, the people in them, and their clients. Economic theory comes with a ready-made diagnosis for the pathologies of public bureaucracy that translates into a single prescription: less. Organizations are "means of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations [where] the price system fails," which casts them in the role of cleaning up after market imperfections (Arrow, 1974: 33). Because the outputs of public organizations are difficult to measure, and the survival of these organizations does not depend on market demand, public bureaucrats are inclined to substitute their own private preferences for those of the public in the conduct of their duties. In the absence of adequate proxies for market demand, public agencies tend to measure their success in terms of budget increases, making bureaucrats chronic budget-maximizers. Because public organizations tend to form mutually beneficial alliances with their constituencies, they generate demands for public intervention in excess of what they can produce efficiently, which leads to redundancy, infeasible objectives, and preferential treatment for powerful constituents. Finally, reliance on public organizations inevitably means placing "authority in the hands of some to be exercised over others," which by its nature produces "opportunities for inequity and abuse" (Wolf, 1979: 113, 117, 124, 128; also Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Stigler, 1971; and Tullock, 1965). The remedies for these pathologies are stern: less reliance on public organizations when market alternatives are available, better proxies for market performance with tight monitoring and control, more competition among public and private providers, and greater reliance on frictionless solutions when intervention is unavoidable.

Putting aside momentarily the empirical validity of these diagnoses, their political import is plain. Government in general, and public organizations in particular, are increasingly identified as problems and impediments rather than solutions. The authority of government is under attack. Authority means both the power to command and the knowledge and skill to decide wisely; on both counts, government is in trouble. The period of maximum governmental growth has come to be associated with institutionalized dependency, overregulation, bad theory, and self-serving inefficiency. "In eras when authority or at least specific authorities have been questioned, there is more tendency to examine the roots of and the need for authority," and it becomes conceivable to think of a society in which governmental authority is confined strictly to those tasks that cannot be managed by "private" and "voluntary" means (Arrow, 1974: 65). Just as the dominant conception of the relationship between knowledge and policy has shifted from a model based on central control to one based on a diffuse exchanges of ideas, so too has the dominant conception of governmental authority shifted from a model that locates solutions at the center to one that locates solutions in the private and voluntary acts of individuals. The consequences of this shift could be far-reaching. "Greater skepticism about government in general" can lead, without much difficulty, to "misplaced skepticism about govern-

ment as a redistributor of income and wealth or as a provider of traditional public services or as overseer of the nation's defense" (Bardach, 1978: 372).

But just as the interactionist view of knowledge and policy falls short of being an alternative to the decision-driven model, so too does the search for frictionless solutions fail to provide an adequate alternative to the view that locates solutions at the center. First, while the search for frictionless solutions provides a number of arguments for reducing and controlling public sector growth, it does not suggest, in anything other than a simplistic way, how policymakers are supposed to handle the complex public-private delivery systems that have grown up around social policy objectives. In some sectors, like child care, employment training, long-term care (nursing homes), mental health, and rehabilitation, the major deliverers are, in fact, private organizations that draw their revenue from a combination of public sources, private sources, and user fees. These organizations do not behave consistently with the economists' stereotype of either the small private firm or the large public monopoly. In the nursing home industry, for example, regulatory practices that are based on either stereotype tend to produce outcomes at variance both with what policymakers intended and with what economists predicted (Willamain, 1979: 458-459). In the child care sector, as in many others, the key question is not whether to rely on private or public deliverers, but "how the public interest is to be defined" toward any deliverer, and "how evaluation is to be brought to bear . . . in a way that influences the provision" of the service (Nelson and Krashinsky, 1973: 59; also Nelson, 1977: 83-103). For a substantial range of social policy objectives, in other words, it is a serious misstatement to say that the problem is uncontrolled public sector growth and unresponsive public organizations.

A more accurate statement of the problem involves the marginal and largely unpredictable effect of public policy on private deliverers, who behave neither as competitive firms nor as public monopolies. This problem of "third-party government" raises "serious questions of accountability," because these organizations "are only tangentially accountable to the elected officials who enact and oversee" policy, which makes them "especially touchy about the exercise of [governmental] oversight, creating pressures to restrict accountability to narrow, technical questions of fiscal control and administrative procedure" that sidestep "more value-laden issues of program results" (Salamon, 1981: 261). The search for frictionless solutions only confuses the already difficult problem of defining the public stake in private provision.

Second, in those sectors like public education, corrections, and income security, where the delivery system looks more like the economists' stereotype of the public monopoly, the search for frictionless solutions raises more questions than it provides answers. Suppose, in sectors like education, that we were consciously to engage in policies designed to stimulate public-private competition. Since the public stake remains, even after private providers enter, we are simply substituting problems of third-party government for problems of public monopoly. Furthermore, there is no assurance that public-private competition increases either responsiveness or the quality of services. Frequently, the first people to leave public organizations, both as clients and employees, are those who would be most effective in arresting decline if they had stayed (Hirschman, 1970). In sectors like corrections and income security, where the likelihood of substituting private provision for public is more constrained, reliance on frictionless solutions in other sectors may produce unintended secondary effects. Does the public sector simply become the custodian of those services and clients that no one else will take? What sort of people will build careers in the public sector under a regime that regards public sector organizations as residual enterprises? What quality of management would we expect from people who had built

careers in such enterprises? The alleged benefits from a rebuttable presumption in favor of private and voluntary solutions to social problems are balanced by a troublesome tendency for frictionless solutions to breed the very pathologies of public bureaucracy that they are designed to correct.

Finally, frictionless solutions generate their own problems of management and institutional design that, in turn, require more government intervention. Underlying the search for frictionless solutions is a naive belief that shifting the mode of delivery from public monopolies to private competition will somehow decrease the need for government administration, and, hence, the complexity of regulatory requirements. In fact, the evidence from sectors like environmental policy, where frictionless solutions have been tried, suggests otherwise. Each change in policy sets in motion a set of demands for exceptions, clarifications, and elaborations of the basic ground rules. Each of these demands is, in and of itself, reasonable, but their cumulative effect is to increase the complexity of the ground rules. Changing the *mode* of intervention, in other words, does not change people's propensity to bargain over the *terms* of the intervention. "People pursue their self-interest not only within given rules but also by investing resources to change the rules to their benefit" (Majone, 1976: 590). In this respect, the differences between private and public deliverers are inconsequential. Changing the mode of intervention may change the direct beneficiaries of public policy—by, for example, admitting more private providers to a delivery system—but over the longterm it cannot be expected to decrease the complexity of administration. Complexity is a function of the propensity to bargain over the terms of the intervention, not the mode of intervention. Social delivery systems under any mode of intervention will be complex. Frictionless solutions simply substitute one type of complexity for another.

In the final analysis, there is no avoiding the fact that government intervention entails the "prediction of how alternative organizational structures will behave over time" (Nelson, 1977: 40). The rhetoric of frictionless solutions can be used to reduce government expenditure, to undermine the authority of public organizations, and to redistribute government largesse to third-party providers, but it does not solve the problem of how to organize the implementation of social policies. Even the advocates of frictionless solutions argue that "in all cases the comparison should be between an imperfect market and an imperfect regulatory scheme, not some ideal abstraction" (Schultze, 1977: 38). Yet the comparison itself distracts from the central problem of authority in social intervention, which is to assure that a given array of organizations—public and private—represent remedial and redistributive public objectives in its operations. An array of organizations is "limited in the range of contingencies it can effectively handle," and when these limits undermine remedial and redistributive objectives, the job of public policymakers is to find the combination of public controls and private incentives that bring organizations into line; frequently this requires "some significant kind of reorganization" (Nelson, 1977: 145). The issue is not how to substitute one type of organization for another, or one type of intervention for another, but rather how the array of public and private organizations around remedial and redistributive objectives works, and how altering the controls and incentives that operate on those organizations influences their performance.

THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE

In each of these three strategic problems, something like a loss of innocence has occurred. Assumptions that previously shaped social policy have been displaced, not

so much by competing theories of intervention as by radical doubt about the government's ability to intervene effectively at all. The old theory of action based on unlimited resources, direct connections between knowledge and policy, and heavy reliance on collective coercion, has been replaced by a new theory based on zero-sum loss allocation, diffuse and undirected connections between knowledge and policy, and a heavier reliance on private and voluntary choices. The old theory has played itself out in contradictions, thwarted expectations, and unanticipated consequences. But the new theory does not prescribe solutions to these problems; instead, it prescribes a sort of willful agnosticism about solutions in general. The "solution" to the allocation problem is to accept the inertial drift of social expenditures away from remedial, redistributive objectives as an inevitable byproduct of pluralist politics. The "solution" to the knowledge problem is lowered expectations for the role of systematic inquiry in social problem-solving and a greater appreciation for the random play of ideas around problems. The "solution" to the authority problem is less government, and greater reliance on frictionless solutions when government intervention cannot be avoided. In all instances, the "solutions" consist of acquiescence to the problems, not alternative courses of action. Taken together, these solutions do not add up to a new theory of action; they are simply a set of justifications for inaction.

The old theory was based on demonstrably questionable assumptions about the availability of resources to finance social interventions, the ability of systematic inquiry to inform policy decisions, and the ability of government to teach by coercion. Reaffirming the old theory will not make these assumptions any more defensible. In this sense, the loss of innocence is irremediable. There will be no return to the old theory.

Yet the failures of the old theory contain the seeds of an alternative. Fiscal limits have only made more apparent what was true from the beginning: Remedial/redistributive policies are financed from foregone consumption and investment; hence, there are severe political and economic limits on society's willingness to invest in them. During periods of growth, these limits are expressed as target inefficiency, since wide distribution of benefits is a precondition for the targeting of any benefits at all. In periods of retrenchment, limits are expressed as disproportionate reductions in highly targeted policies; reductions are felt first and hardest in those policies that are both remedial and redistributive. The main lesson for future social policy is simply that remedial/redistributive objectives are always marginal, regardless of how central they are made to appear in political rhetoric.

Some interesting consequences follow from this lesson. First, the alleged superiority of tax-and-transfer policies over services is probably illusory. The two different kinds of policies simply involve two different kinds of inefficiency, the one target inefficiency, the other organizational inefficiency. Second, policy cannot, by itself, be expected to have much effect on remedial/redistributive outcomes. Policymakers are, in the long run, very accurate aggregators of social preferences; they will tend to express society's limited preference for remedial/redistributive policies. Third, insofar as policy affects remedial/redistributive outcomes, it does so as much by affecting society's preference for those outcomes as by causing specific changes in the distribution of services and income. The main effect of remedial/redistributive policies is probably not captured in the outcomes associated with specific policies, but in the longer-run influences that such policies have on society's preferences for such outcomes. The main effect of the war on poverty, in other words, may simply have been to acclimate society to allocating a slightly higher proportion of its foregone consumption and investment to remedial/redistributive ends.

The discovery of the limits of systematic inquiry in social problem-solving has only underscored what most social scientists knew intuitively to begin with: Policies and theories are tenuous abstractions; they can come unraveled in a variety of ways, and when the unraveling begins, more theory and more policy don't necessarily help. What the decision-driven model did was to confuse momentarily the ability to measure aggregate consequences of policies with the ability to solve social problems. This proved to be a serious strategic error, because our ability to measure consequences has far outrun our ability to solve problems. In fact, social problem-solving is a compound of various kinds of knowledge, including not just science but also ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft. What the interactionist view tries to communicate (not very successfully) is that the *relationship* among these different types of knowledge determines how well we solve problems, not just our ability to construct theories and measure consequences. What the interactionist view does not do is explain how to make the social division of labor in the production and utilization of knowledge work more effectively in solving social problems. Interaction doesn't serve any particular purpose, except possibly the purposes of those who are most skillful at using it, unless it is somehow made to. But interaction can be made to serve certain purposes if the right people are aware of its importance, in the same way that markets can be made to serve public ends through skillful intervention.

The loss of governmental authority has driven home another relatively simple lesson: Every decision to intervene entails a calculated risk that those things the government controls—money and rules—will exercise sufficient influence to overpower those things over which the government exercises little or no control, such as individual preferences and private choices. In a good many instances, the federal government, in its collective wisdom, has overestimated its influence. The result of this strategic miscalculation is not only failed policy but also an erosion of the government's authority to make new policy. The problem with the search for frictionless solutions is that in its zeal to repair past strategic miscalculations, it denies the relative value of organized problem-solving as compared with the play of unorganized individual choice, and it seriously underestimates the magnitude, complexity, and utility of organized problem-solving that already exists. The idea that social problems can be solved by a heavier reliance on private and voluntary choices begs the essential question of what to do when those choices result in the formation of organizations, or when choices are only effective when they are made in the context of organizations. Organizations of various types are integral to any model of social problem-solving, and they cannot be circumvented or avoided by the theoretical sleight-of-hand entailed in economic theory.

TIPPING SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING ON ITS HEAD: BACKWARD MAPPING

Social intervention is caught in a pathological impasse. Society continues to generate problems that provide attractive invitations for government intervention. The supply of problems outruns the supply of theories and policies designed to solve them. Society's willingness to invest in genuinely remedial and redistributive policies is tightly constrained. Hence, social intervention is always vulnerable to attack, on the one hand, because theories and policies always promise more than they can deliver, and on the other, because society's willingness to invest in remedial/redistributive policies is never quite what is needed to produce the results that the policymakers and social scientists promise.

The way out of this impasse lies, I think, in redefining the relationship between knowledge, policy, and organization. The essential fallacy of the old theory of action was the assumption that the problem-solving process began with the application of the scientific knowledge to policy decisions and ended with the implementation of those decisions through beneficent coercion applied to organizations and individuals. In light of our experience with the old theory of action, we might very well conceive of social problem-solving as running in exactly the opposite direction. Social problems are first understood at the level of ordinary knowledge, in the direct experience of individuals. Some of these individuals have an interest in finding problems—doctors, teachers, social workers, judges, and the like—while others have an interest in avoiding problems—administrators, policymakers, or anyone who stands to lose from having a problem singled out for attention. Some fraction of the problems that surface through ordinary knowledge attract organized problem-solving activity, either through established public organizations (schools, employment offices, public hospitals) or through makeshift private organizations (community groups, voluntary agencies, private firms). Some fraction of the problems that surface through ordinary knowledge are, for one reason or another, simply left to be solved by individuals. Of those problems that attract organized problem-solving, most become routinized in various ways, and hence become the object of skill and craft. That is, individuals begin to specialize in certain kinds of problem-solving (counseling alcoholics, teaching reading to slow learners, finding jobs for the difficult-to-employ) and develop heuristic guides that can be communicated to other people.

The constellation of ordinary knowledge, skill, craft, individuals, and organizations that grows up around social problems is more or less random and haphazard. There is no clean division of labor that assigns problems to organizations at the level of ordinary knowledge; insofar as we *perceive* such a division of labor, it is the result of imposing order after the fact through the use of theory or policy. Of the subset of problems sorted out for organized attention, some smaller subset becomes a subject for policymaking. The reasons are manifold: Organizations or professions seek a monopoly on certain problems, organizations seek public financing for certain types of problem-solving, policymakers or administrators perceive political gain in supporting certain kinds of problem-solving, and so on. Once problems are raised to a level of attention that stimulates policymaking, we begin to perceive a need to know about the aggregate incidence of problems and the systematic effects of certain attempts to solve them. At this level, we are prone to make a critical conceptual error by associating policy with the "solution" to a problem and aggregate evidence on the incidence of a problem with the "success" or "failure" of a policy. In fact, the policy is not, in itself, a solution; it only stimulates problem-solving behavior at the level of ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft. Aggregate evidence does not so much measure the success or failure of a policy as it provides a crude measure of what happens when ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft are influenced in some way by money and rules. Finally, at the level of policymaking we make important decisions about the level of resources to allocate to different functions of government and, implicitly, how much money to spend on different kinds of organized problem-solving.

Tipping the process of social problem-solving on its head in this way leads to several conclusions. First, it suggests that insofar as we "know" what to do about certain kinds of problems, we know it first at the level of ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft; only much later, and much more abstractly, do we know it in the form of social science. Social science can be used in a variety of ways to shape and direct ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft. But insofar as we "know" how to solve problems, we

know it most directly at the level of direct experience, not at the level of aggregate effects. Employment, education, health care, rehabilitation, and corrections are, insofar as they solve social problems, knowledge-intensive enterprises. In many instances, the methods of science are used to shape the way these enterprises work. But unless there is some deliberate connection made between science and direct experience at the level of those who practice in these enterprises, there is no reason to expect that more science will result in different aggregate effects. Applying scientific knowledge to policy decisions cannot be expected to produce effects by itself; it only produces effects by influencing ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft. The influence, perhaps more importantly, runs in the other direction too. We only know the utility of social science that do not require any such grounding. But if we hold to the notion that some portion of social science is done in the service of policymaking, then that portion succeeds to the degree that it connects with direct experience.
some portion of social science is done in the service of policymaking, then that portion succeeds to the degree that it connects with direct experience.

Second, tipping social problem-solving on its head suggests that policy works, if at all, by setting a "broad structure of action"—funding formulas, assignment of responsibilities, rules, and operating routines—within which a more complex and diverse "fine structure of action"—individual skill and judgement, interpersonal communication, and commitment—occurs (Rein and White, 1977b: 225). Policy and social science, working through the broad structure of action, can "lead individuals . . . to hold the same conception of the problem at hand" and, hence, to make their discretionary choices reflect broader purposes (Rein and White, 1977b: 265). But the relationships between broad and fine structures of action are not always predictable. Changing funding formulas, rules, and routines sets off a variety of responses at the level of individual judgment and interpersonal communication that cannot always be reliably anticipated. Hence, the critical juncture in social problem-solving is at the boundary between broad and fine structures of action, and that boundary is in the transactions between administrators and practitioners of various kinds within the variety of organizations arrayed around a problem. It is in these transactions that policy either is or is not made intelligible at the level of ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft. Hence, the success of policies in "solving" social problems is determined less by the content of the policies themselves than by the capacity of the organizations that implement them. Capacity can be operationally defined as the ability of higher- and mid-level administrators to direct ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft at a common conception of the problem. This capacity will be widely variable among the organizations arrayed around the problem, so the expectation that policy will produce stunning aggregate effects is unrealistic. It is more reasonable to expect what, in fact, has probably occurred since 1965—a gradual adjustment of the fine structure of action in myriad diverse organizations to a slightly heavier emphasis on remedial/redistributive objectives.

Finally, tipping social problem-solving on its head suggests that broad allocation decisions between consumption, investment, and public expenditures, as well as between various types of social objectives, have consequences that are seldom clearly understood by policymakers. The economists' view of these allocation decisions focuses policymakers' attention on dollar costs, breadth of coverage, and benefit levels all of which are readily manipulated by changing laws and rules. But the more important consequences of allocation decisions, from the point of view of social problem-solving, are their effects on organizational capacity. The array of public, private, and hybrid organizations around a given social problem constitutes the "capital stock" of ordinary

knowledge, skill, and craft that can be brought to bear on that problem. Allocation decisions, apart from their direct budgetary impact, are decisions affecting the maintenance and rate of replacement for that capital stock. In other words, it is possible to "underinvest" in the organizational capacity for social problem-solving in much the same way that it is possible to underinvest in an industrial plant. If allocation decisions are examined solely for their budgetary impact, without attending to their consequences for capital stock, the result will be (in fact, has been) a chronic failure to connect policy with organization. The only way to understand the consequences of allocation decisions for capital stock is to know the capital stock—that is, to examine the array of organizations working on social problems that have a policy content. The only way to know the capital stock is to begin with the individuals who engage most directly in social problem-solving and "map backward" through the organizations in which they work to the policy decisions that affect those organizations (Elmore, 1980).

The way out of the pathological impasse in which social policy currently finds itself is to anchor allocation decisions in estimates of their impact on organizational capacity, to anchor knowledge about the effects of social policy in the practices of those who engage directly in social problem-solving, and to anchor the authority of government organizations on the ordinary knowledge, skill, and craft of the people who work in them. The debilitating effects of zero-sum loss allocation, interactionist views of knowledge and policy, and the search for frictionless solutions are symptomatic of a loss of direction. Regaining that sense of direction, however, does not entail recreating the mistakes of the old theory of action, but looking for solutions in places where they are most likely to be found—in the knowledge and actions of those people who work on social problems.

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11

Organizing for Social Justice

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Poverty, inadequate nutrition and health care, and deteriorating neighborhoods and cities, with inadequate housing and environmental quality, are the conditions of life for many people in the 1980s. Such conditions are often hidden by the dazzling affluence and material abundance of more visible and powerful groups in the United States. The myths of unlimited opportunity and individual equality mask the injustices experienced especially by people of color, women, the young, and the old. The 1980s already have the seen the spread and intensification of varied forms of exploitation and discrimination. The mood of this reality for many people is captured by songwriter and singer, Fred Small (1981).

> *The world has gone crazy, the country's a mess*
> *You open your eyes and you just get depressed*
> *If you take what they give you, they'll keep all the rest.*

Adequate responses to these conditions at this point in history call for new theory and practice of change to achieve social justice objectives. In our view "organizing," and in particular, "new wave organizing," is the root strategy for doing this. Organizing is intentional group action against maldistribution of rights, resources, and privileges, and the creation of new institutional structures and belief systems. New wave organizing represents the strategies and tactics developed by people who are organizing for the 1980s and beyond. The refinement of the theory and practice of new wave organizing can help advance the struggle for justice.

Elites, local community groups, and scholars have developed other strategies that have been used in response to unjust conditions.[1] For the most part, they minimally involve collective action by the victims of injustice. They typically focus on policy reforms, social services, or advocacy for the individual victim, generally performed by someone else. These strategies leave intact the patterns of social power that allocate resources and opportunities. Without changing these patterns little will be done to alter the dynamics producing widespread suffering and deprivation.

The ways in which struggles for social justice currently are being planned and carried out in the United States is the central focus of this chapter. We first address alternative meanings of social justice within the context of organizing, and the recent history of different definitions. In the second section we deal with key themes of social

Excerpts from F. Small (1981) "Stand Up" © 1981 by Pine Barrens Music, from the album *Love's Gonna Carry Us* (Acquifer Records, Somerville, MA), reprinted by permission.

justice organizing in the 1980s, which we refer to as new wave organizing. These developments appear to include theory and practice that have a keener understanding of social systems than in the past, and more potential for achieving change. In the final section we identify specific tactical problems encountered by new wave organizing, as well as a sample of innovative practices developed to deal with them.

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN RELATION TO ORGANIZING

The concept of social justice is controversial and open to multiple definitions and interpretations. In our view, it cannot be a static concept, describing a given end-state of human affairs; rather, social justice is part of a continuing process, and ongoing struggle among various social groups. Fundamentally, social justice involves particular structural arrangements in the social order that can be described on interrelated levels.

At the *societal* level, it involves equal access to basic resources, and equal access to the levers of power guiding the allocation of resources. This presumes participatory structures in both economic and political institutions and policies. At the *organizational* level, it involves arrangements of work, play, and daily life that serve the needs of different groups of people, those with power and affluence, and those without. Moreover, it requires organizational goals, membership patterns, and social structures—particularly regarding decision making and rewards—that are responsive to groups from different social-economic strata, racial and sexual statuses, and so on. At the *personal* level, social justice involves consciousness of one's group and personal interests, and the freedom to act on them. This includes understanding the ways in which one's personal and group interests relate to the common good of an organization, society, or global system, and continuing individual action to affect the world in line with social justice objectives. Social justice at this level also includes a moral and active commitment to realizing one's humanity in relationship to self and others.

Connections between the societal, organizational, and individual levels do not occur in the abstract; they occur as a result of actions various groups take to articulate their needs and achieve their goals. As people participate in the macroeconomic and political order, as they participate in formal organizations throughout the society, and as they join with other individuals in pursuit of cherished ends, they mobilize information and influence to achieve social justice ends.

Considering social justice within such a framework reveals several issues. First, it is less a definition than a perspective or orientation. Second, it combines individual and collective conditions, eschewing a false dichotomy between these different levels of analysis and action. Third, it seeks an integration of material and cultural conditions, seeking new patterns of resource distribution and power as well as rules, norms, and consciousness. Fourth, the perspective is rooted in the reality of oppression. Some people do rule, and do use common laws and policies to serve the interests of their groups while denying and failing to satisfy the interests of others. Social systems do misallocate social goods and resources.

Although we have used terms like equality of resources and access to power, we recognize that these concepts are themselves controversial. Tumin (1976) argues that a false either-or dichotomy has been created in the debates among equality theorists, equity theorists, and efficiency theorists of social justice, and that some balancing between concerns about equity and equality probably is needed. In our view, asserting the correct balance among these principles is part of the cultural dialogue that is part of the struggle for social justice. Definitions cannot be separated from specific

times and places, and developing a specific definition of what is socially just is the ideological part of any struggle.

For us, equality does not necessarily mean "the same," and we acknowledge the necessity to modify absolute equality by the reality of different personal and social needs, and perhaps even by rewards for meritorious action and efficient social organization. However, efforts to define social justice without primary concern for equality have led to highly stratified systems in the name of efficiency. Too great a concern for efficiency generally results in stable power patterns that support structures of inequality, exploitation, and injustice.

People do not often submit willingly to exploitation and injustice. Their needs for self-respect, material sustenance, and influence over the conditions of their lives result in a variety of active responses to their situation. Organizing is one such response. Si Kahn, a prominent organizer, describes it this way:

> *Organizing is for people with problems... and is a way for people to work together to solve their problems... The power of a lot of people working together is enough to make changes where one person can do little* [*1982: 55*].

Brager and Specht, academically based theorists, describe further how organizing develops and uses power:

> *Organization, in the classic sense, is a mechanism for achieving economy of energy in... action, creating solidarity among people with shared goals, coordination of complex tasks and focusing numerical strength* [*1973: 142*].

Social justice organizing is intentional action for change targeted on the redistribution of power and related changes in values, beliefs, and resources. This intentional action for change is rooted in the organization of a collectivity suffering from adverse living conditions and exploitation. A collectivity is an aggregate of individuals experiencing common structural conditions, and therefore shared experiences resulting in shared values, ideas, and symbols. When this aggregate is organized, it becomes an acting group.

Despite these attempts to state an orientation, understanding this strategy of change requires attention to the real-life experiences of people living, working, and struggling together for change in a given historical epoch. The changing meanings of social justice organizing are themselves produced by specific social conditions, even as these meanings are used as the rallying points for new understandings of social justice organizing.

This chapter does not represent the first attempt to discuss questions of social justice organizing; it is not even the first time such an effort has been undertaken by activist scholars. Why consider this topic again? Why risk redundancy and repetition? Two reasons stand out. First, changing social realities in the 1980s, both in America and throughout the world, engender new struggles, and with them new intellectual paradigms for understanding and participating in these struggles. New social realities make some old conceptual frameworks and strategies obsolete, both in ideological and programmatic terms. Second, prior scholarly work in community and social change is inadequate to understand and to point out the direction for new efforts and struggles. It is rooted itself in a prior reality. Moreover, much scholarship is heavily influenced by the interests of ruling groups and the institutional structures and priorities of social science. This relationship greatly limits the capacity of existing scholar-

ship to understand the past, to interpret the present, and to prescribe or suggest creative future actions.

Social justice organizing in the 1980s is developing in new directions, so much so that in describing and analyzing these developments we use the term new wave organizing. In terms of theory and practice, three key differences between the new wave organizing of the 1980s and prior efforts at social justice organizing include serious attention to macrostructural analyses, more concern with cultural context and dynamics, and concurrent work in diverse and plural sites. These new directions in social justice organizing are a product of new social realities as well as of realizations of the limitations of past theory and practice. They are far from fully developed principles, however, and our discussion indicates the progress we see being made on these issues.

IMPORTANT EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW WAVE ORGANIZING

In this section we examine efforts by scholars and practitioners to develop new theory and practice for social justice organizing in the 1980s. It is clear that development and change in these ideas and practices is occurring, but in no way fully completed. Some of these developments have significant potential to increase our understanding and ability to carry out effective social justice organizing. As noted, three themes seem particularly important. First, organizers and scholars studying organizing are beginning to give serious attention to more *macrostructural analyses* of the society and social justice issues. Included in such attention to larger patterns of the domestic polity and economy is a sharper focus on international relationships and global systems.

Second, new wave social justice organizing and scholarship take more seriously the *cultural context and dynamics* of organizing. Day-to-day activities and living patterns of oppressed people, and of people organizing for a change, are recognized more often as critical expressions of individual and group identity. They are treated both as a human resource for organizing and as the source of key resistances to organizing. One especially important aspect of this emphasis on cultural analysis and activity is the focus on personal change as a part of social justice organizing.

Finally, social justice organizing is occurring and being recognized in increasingly *diverse and plural sites*, and the relationship between these different efforts is seen to be important. Obviously, this theme is related to the development of macroanalyses that pinpoint prior failures to build coalitions large enough to sustain change. Thus, concerns about commonalities and differences between sites are becoming more prominent, and more effort is going into communicating and learning across sites.

Macrostructural Analysis

New Realities and New Emphases

Over the past several decades there have been dramatic changes in the structures of U.S. organizations. The increased size and power of major corporations and governments reflect and promote significant alterations in our domestic political economy, many of which have serious implications for social justice concerns. Merger movements have increased the concentration of corporate wealth and power, with a

concommitant centralization of power throughout the economy. New agencies, regulations, and services have brought increased levels of governmental influence on many aspects of life. The increasing problems of welfare-state capitalism are reflected not only in the failure of middle-size firms, but in current stagflation and high levels of unemployment throughout the economy.

Increasingly, the people of the United States recognize shortages of essential resources and social inequities resulting from (mis)allocation of these resources. Moreover, they experience a growing dependence on organizations over which they have little influence (Blumberg, 1980). Continuing population growth places additional constraints on land use and on the productive capacity of these public and private organizations.

These basic changes in societal structures, and a growing awareness of these patterns, have led new wave organizing to give serious attention to understanding and altering large-scale social structures. This emphasis includes attention to translations between macro and micro issues, and between objective and subjective dimensions of reality. Rose, a new wave organizer and scholar, advocates such a focus in the following terms:

> *Larger scale contextual and personal problems posed by continuous social injustice must be the point of analytic departure for redefining both theory and practice issues in community organization [1981: 152].*

Larger-scale social structures have immense effects on people's day-to-day lives and basic life styles, identities, and images of desirable and possible futures. While the nature of these effects are not fully understood, new wave organizing seeks to identify, analyze, and respond to these objective but often hidden dimensions of social life. It is increasingly recognized by organizers and scholars that failure to deal with the larger political and economic context can be disastrous. For instance, in the 1940s Selznick (1966) analyzed the way macroeconomic and political forces coopted organizing efforts within an established regional economy. More recently, studies have examined the absorption of the 1960s' youth and minority movements into the Great Society, the War Against Poverty, and other elite-controlled programs and organizations (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Kenniston, 1968; Wolfe, 1970).

New wave organizing understands and emphasizes that the poverty program did not eliminate the condition of poverty, the school desegregation program did not achieve high quality education, and the full employment law, minimum wage bill, labor-relations act, and occupational health agenda never adequately protected workers against managerial and capital dominance of the workplace. Not only have these reforms failed, but now even these symbols of reform have fallen into disrepute. The cost of this double defeat is the substantial destruction of societal programs and attendant ideas and values.

Macroanalysis cannot be limited to domestic issues and interests alone; clearly, there are global implications and progenitors of domestic oppression, and strategies for challenging it. For instance, many Americans are grappling with the end of the fantasy that America could dominate the world's economic and political system. Dependence upon an uncertain base of international resources, for example, strategic minerals and oil, creates anxiety at home. A large part of the wealth of the developed or industrialized countries is now seen as resting on the colonial and neocolonial exploitation of the Third World. Debate continues within new wave organizing on the nature of global interdependency and exploitation, but the preponderance of opinion concludes:

> *As America becomes a poorer country (as opposed to a period where it could afford to pay both "guns and butter") the arms race on the same postwar sale can be pursued only by making deep inroads into already languishing public services and social programs, and into private living standards as well* [*Blumberg, 1980: xii*].

Marshaling vast military resources to defend our national interest is increasingly being seen as serving the interests of privileged classes at home and abroad (Melman, 1976). Especially in times of economic hardship, special dilemmas exist for those who make a living from production, administration, or direct execution of military and defense activities. New wave organizing is giving greater attention to peace conversion of war-linked production facilities as a long-term solution, while calling for reduced military expenditures and improved social services as short-term improvements.

Critique of Past Theory and Practice

At the same time a macroanalytic focus is stressed, social science scholarship is criticized for inadequately attending to macrosocial structures and their concentrated control and impact on people with little political and economic power. This scholarship has been dominated by consensus perspectives that assume agreement across groups on shared basic values, legitimacy and responsiveness of authorities and official institutions, and goodwill throughout the social system. Applied to inequality, consensus models generally discuss stratification and inequality, but seldom oppression and injustice. Poorly functioning individuals and social processes, rather than interests or actions of ruling groups, are the primary focus of amelioration and planning for change.[2] Such consensus assumptions limit the possible definitions of social justice, inevitably supporting the primacy of merit/efficiency concerns, and submerging equality of power and resources to these priorities. But more than basic assumptions are involved. The increasing dependence of social science scholarship on funding and legitimacy from large organizations, themselves connected to increasing centralization of power, is seen as a major barrier to a sustained, critical scientific analysis of macrostructures.

American social science has also deemphasized consciousness-raising and mobilization in the process of emphasizing sociotechnical reform and improvement. Much attention has been paid to planned change, linking, program planning, and collaborative decision making (Rothman, 1974a; Rothman et al., 1976; Bennis et al., 1976). When considering the activities of protest groups, scholarship seldom has assumed that the interests around which people organize have structural foundations; rather it has assumed that disaffected people felt subjective concern and organized on immediate or visible interests. Thus, issue consciousness rather than class consciousness is considered the major mobilizing force.[3] This approach to issues and consciousness also is reflected in a scientific and popular ideology focused on crises. For example, discussions of organizing often seek to respond to the "new" poverty, crime and the crisis of corrections, urban crises, inflation and unemployment, population explosions, welfare crises, municipal bankruptcy, the crisis in black and white, the crisis of the black family, the crisis in the Middle East, the environmental crisis, the oil and energy crisis, and so on.[4]

The definition of a problem as a crisis suggests it is a temporary or extraordinary event or situation (or time period), perhaps dimly connected to basic structural and ongoing features in the economy and polity. One result is that the symptoms of a crisis, and not the underlying structural conditions giving rise to injustice, are the focus

of analysis and action. Another result is that those people with the crisis are focused on, rather than the people or institutions or interests that create or maintain the situation. Constant identification of a crisis also begins to anesthetize the body politic into a crisis mentality, a sort of hunkering down to wait it out until the temporary event is over. Thus, an exceptionalist approach toward understanding and dealing with segmentalized problems is fostered, preventing an active relationship with history and with the larger situation (Frisch, 1981).

Guided by such theory, the past practice of organizing has given greater attention to the immediate societal problem being addressed than to sustained work to empower the constituency being organized. Past practice has not given adequate attention to the resources needed for sustained organizing that addresses basic objective conditions affecting the victims of injustice. Little attention and effort of organizing went beyond the collectivity immediately and visibly effected by the crisis. Therefore, connections were minimal between different constituencies affected by social justice organizing.

Progress Toward Effective Macrostructural Analysis

The difficulties of achieving a macrostructural emphasis can be illustrated by examining Boyte's (1977, 1980) analysis of organizing during the 1970s. Boyte appropriately criticizes groups in certain movements (e.g., civil rights and feminist movements) for not paying attention to structural or macro issues, and for being overoccupied with internal organizational or personal matters. At the same time, he criticizes the mainstream left for being too "rational, abstract, simplistic, formalistic" and even to having been an "accomplice to government intervention . . . in a way that ignores the intervention's impact on living communities and ways of life" (Boyte, 1980: 25). Thus, he both calls for a more macro analysis and criticizes those who have provided it for their inattention to important micro phenomena. Boyte advocates small, democratically governed social units operating within a localist context as the key building blocks of change. Moreover, he emphasizes broad participation in decisions that affect everyday life to counteract the state and corporate offensive of concentrating power in distal and elite hands. In some ways Boyte's enthusiasm for carrying out organizing according to the Alinsky model retreats from his own concern for a macrostructural perspective (Lustig, 1981). Even Alinksy (1971) has drawn attention to the danger of isolated organizing campaigns, and other analysts have criticized such organizing for its vulnerability to localized and parochial interests and its lack of focus on broader social justice issues (Ellison, 1981; Ackerman, 1977; Fish, 1973). While the task of integration may be difficult, new wave efforts must overcome the potential conflict between localist and macro perspectives on organizing.

Wright's (1978) work is an example of macrostructural analysis of the type needed in social justice organizing, although it remains to be operationalized or applied effectively to particular organizing situations.[5] Wright shows how contradictions and interdependences within the political and economic spheres may foster conscientization and mobilization among oppressed groups. Thus, his analysis indicates the ways connections between fundamental and immediate interests of dependent classes can become clearer and can provide a basis for organizing. He also indicates potential coalitions between constituencies organizing around concerns in widely different sectors of society, and how such coalitions could develop strategies for achieving social justice objectives. Such macrostructural analyses draw organizers' attention to historical changes and their important implications for organizing.

Some examples of social justice organizing do pay attention to macro analyses of the domestic and international scenes. For instance, the Exploratory Project on Economic Alternatives has developed specific analyses of the U.S. economy addressed to organizers concerned with inequity and exploitation (Alperovitz, 1974). The Movement for a New Society has devoted extensive resources to a comprehensive structural analysis of the U.S. society to inform their nonviolent, direct action organizing (Gowan et al., 1976). These efforts address social justice issues within the United States as well as in Third World countries like Pakistan and Namibia (Taylor, 1977). Most importantly, this group has developed educational tools to assist other organizing groups doing structural analyses (Philadelphia Macro-Analysis Collective, 1975).

Several groups organizing on macro issues have developed new techniques for gathering and organizing critical information. One example of the new wave of participatory or tactical research efforts is the recently completed land ownership studies in Appalachia (Edgerton, 1981; Horton, 1981). A somewhat different research focus includes systematic investigation of the financial and legal situation of giant corporations. Such research at the community level involves the full array of local problems being addressed by community organizers (Schroeder, 1977). One example focuses on coal/energy corporation domination in selected Illinois counties (Smith et al., 1978). Other impetus for these new research methods comes from organizing efforts in Third World situations. Borda (1979) emphasizes the integration and testing of such methods in relation to a multifaceted societal movement for justice in Colombia, and Freire reports the development and application of these methods in processes of adult education in postrevolutionary Tanzania (Freire, 1974) and Guinea Bissau (Freire, 1978). In all of these new wave research efforts, concrete action programs, including social justice organizing, have developed and implemented the research implications. Thus, new links between macrostructural analysis and action are being forged.

Having advocated the importance of macrostructural analysis, it is important to indicate the limits and unresolved questions in this approach. While there are several initial analyses of macrostructural forces, there is not yet an effective strategy for organizing in ways that can have impact on them. Piven and Cloward (1971, 1979), for instance, explain failures of poor people's movements not only in actions of the state and economic powers, but in the organizations of poor people themselves. They discuss how misunderstood macro forces can transform vigorous movements into quests for minor reform. Oligarchies arise within most movements, and they seek to gain or maintain power by winning concessions from dominant groups. In order to sustain such efforts, they must be able to deliver their own membership in compliance with negotiated settlements. Thus such oligarchies often operate in subtle alliance with dominant groups who grant enough concessions to make leaders appear effective. This is only one of the practical problems that must be solved if concrete organizing efforts are to take advantage of new and more coherent analyses of macrostructural forces.

Cultural Analysis and Programs

New Realities and New Emphasis

Many developments in U.S. society are contributing to an increased awareness of the importance of values and interpersonal as well as community commitments that affirm and support individuals and families. The increasing divorce rate and high level of geographic mobility affect more and more relationships and individual ex-

pectations and hopes. Plant closings, redlining, highway construction, gentrification, strip development, blockbusting, resource development, and waste disposal disrupt more and more communities and individual lives. Large chain businesses and increasingly centralized media contribute to a homogenization of values and symbols, with an accompanying loss of local distinctiveness and subcultural identity.

Increasingly, people question the desirability of these changes and seek means of stabilizing relationships and celebrating values and life styles that affirm their historical roots. More people of every age and class seek lives that are less alienating. Part of this reaction focuses on decentralization and localism; other parts focus on activities and symbols that affirm exploited groups—for example, pride in women, blacks, hispanics, white ethnics, gays, and so on.

Responding to these changes, the second key theme of new wave organizing is a realistic and genuine emphasis on understanding local cultures and subcultures, and altering people's day-to-day ideas and activities to draw more strengths from these cultures. A focus on cultural issues, as reflected in people's consciousness about their situation, is especially important in the face of potential abstractions generated by new macro analyses.

A viable conception of cultural action has to embrace both consciousness and self-determination, both at the level of group and personal identity. Without such cultural integrity and identity, a people is vulnerable to passivity and destruction. In Mattelart's terms:

> *I understand ideology and culture as power practice, and in this sense, "cultural imperialism" can be considered a model of organization of power. This power seeks a homogenization, a demobilization and disorganization, a consensus. A people deprived of its culture, its customs, its own style of life is just as defenseless as if it had been robbed of its raw materials* [*1980: 69*].

A similar understanding of the role of culture and language is reflected in Baldwin's (1980) statement about the "language of Black America." Language and literacy are cultural and political-economic instruments. At the personal level they are keys to personal identity and means to control access to economic mobility and other resources. At the collective level they articulate a version of social reality, and in so doing connect some people and divorce others from the broader culture (Fanon, 1965; Freire, 1972).

New wave organizing increasingly recognizes that culture is a major definer of people's understandings of themselves and their hopes and visions for the future. Failure to deal with culture is seen to have serious consequences for the victims of injustice. Cultural domination is seen as a key element of oppression; cultural deprivation is recognized as a diagnosis that delegitimizes subcultures departing from or resisting imposition of the majority culture. Advocacy of a false diversity such as the melting pot is seen as a mask whereby Anglo-Saxon culture is raised to the status of most desirable. Programs of schooling, social services, and religion founded on these and other manifestations of cultural oppression are criticized as efforts to pacify and render powerless groups experiencing injustice (Baldwin, 1980; Kenniston, 1968; Mattelart, 1980).

Critique of Past Theory and Practice

Social science scholarship often has contributed to cultural domination and to a lack of understanding of culture as a vital source of empowerment. For instance, a

social science emphasizing positivism and empiricism grounded in distal manipulation of numbers and data sets often is removed from the reality of everyday experience. Most particularly, it is removed from the people and not part of the realities of the poor, the black and the Hispanic, and so on. Since most social science is done in academic institutions that claim value neutrality and detachment, it is buffered from criticism and action challenging its version of reality.

A more active social science would involve itself in cultural analysis with the social conditions and peoples it studies, potentially changing contemporary realities rather than merely observing or interpreting them. The separation of theory from practice in Western and U.S. social science, and the consequent disparagement of practice, has led to study and writing about scientifically measurable problems. Moreover, these problems are defined by a scientific elite, rather than by those suffering from them and trying to fight against them. Since funds to support scientific work generally come from governmental agencies, corporations, or foundations, research problems often are identified and formulated in accord with the perspectives of the managers of political, economic, and cultural systems. Obviously, their perspectives are characterized by social control concerns that are different from the concerns of social system members developing power to satisfy unmet needs (Gamson, 1968; Schnaiberg, 1980).

Thus, it should come as no surprise that most scholarly research relevant to social inequality and injustice has studied the mind sets of oppressed peoples rather than their actions for social change and social justice.[6] The organizing strategies accompanying these analyses have emphasized effective interpersonal relationships between oppressed groups and elites so as to enhance communication and problem solving between and across societal groups. The ideological foundations of such concepts include a value consensus among everyone except deviant groups and individuals. As such, help, and the application of scientific knowledge, is provided to management and other elite agents, not to lower power groups. Such scholarly work has contributed to the failure of organizing to root itself in the collectivities being organized. It also resulted in a failure of organizing to be accountable to these collectivities and to use the perspectives and skills of leaders and members.

Progress Toward Effective Cultural Analysis

A more critical understanding of culture has been facilitated by renewed interest in the early writings of Marx and other scientific socialists (Fromm, 1961). For Trotsky, culture constituted "the main instrument of class oppression. But it also, and only it, can become the instrument of socialist emancipation"; the cultural revolution "is a question of changing the conditions of life, the methods of work and the everyday habits of a great nation, of a whole family of nations" (Trotsky, 1973). The search for the democratic and socialist elements of culture existing among oppressed people is one of the foremost tasks of a new analysis, according to Lenin (1964). More new wave organizers and historians have been guided by this conceptual framework, and have attributed to common people an active role in society's development. Brecher's (1978) "Hidden history of the workplace" treats workers as actors in their own history, and Edward's (1979) more in-depth work shows how the structure and norms of work organizations emerged from the active struggle between workers and owners/managers, not from managers' acts alone.

The relevance of this tradition of cultural analysis and action for practical organizing is quite clear in Freire's (1973) work. He stresses the role of cultural empowerment in people taking (or taking back) control over their lives from oppressors. By learning

more about their own lives, people achieve conscientization, and establish conceptual understanding and control over their daily circumstances. Freire's strategy implies a dialectical process in which people learn to detect economic and political contradictions, and then to act together to transform and eventually destroy alienating conditions that constitute the culture of silence or powerlessness.[7]

Mattelart's (1980) work on mass communications as a form of cultural imperialism and control indicates the importance of new wave organizing efforts that put energy into the creation of alternative media. Gans (1979), Gamson (1975), and others have attempted to concretize the mechanics of information transmission and its effect on consumers. This emphasis on the way the media affect the class-based consciousness of individual receivers or consumers is the basic framework for alternative media focused on social justice issues. Examples of such alternative media projects that work with organizing efforts include the biweekly newspaper *In These Times*, the Pacific Radio News Service, and scattered local newsletters and radio stations across the nation.

Religious beliefs and institutions are also part of the web of culture-creating and culture-maintaining institutions. As such, the development of a Christian liberation theology is another example of a cultural reformulation relevant for social justice concerns and actions (Gutierrez, 1973; Camara, 1971; Cardenal, 1976). Rediscovery or reformulation of the values and identity of the early Christians indicates their roots in poverty and severe political oppression. Their resistance to and challenge of established power structures centered on the use of nonviolent love of the enemy as a powerful witness to dialogue and conversion. In contemporary struggles against injustice, liberation theologians have had to deal with the structural and ideological power of established Christian churches as well as surrounding political institutions. Different regional versions of this theology and closely related practice are developing in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, as well as in some developed countries, including the United States. Similar developments with a secular base stress the centrality of basic human values and thinking and practice that strive for close correspondence with these values (Boggs et al., 1978; Satin, 1978). Education and consciousness raising are the key means practiced through a variety of forms ranging from tightly defined cadres to loosely organized networks.

The full meaning of some of these results of cultural analyses and action is being realized in the values and actions of people actively engaged in social justice organizing. Several observers have noted, for example, the ways in which active organizers experience an altered consciousness, dramatic new dimensions of interpersonal relations (Valles, 1979; Lefebvre, 1958-1961; Heirich, 1971), and new spirit and commitment (Thompson, 1981). In fact, many new wave organizing efforts have given increased conscious attention to the creation of personal and individual change among organizers.

Since the 1960s, there have been tendencies within organizing groups and constituencies to achieve the changes that were fought for in external communities, bureaucratic organizations, and society. This has resulted in attempts to increase internal democracy and reduce elitism, sexism, racism, classism, and ageism within organizations and movements for social justice.[8] Often past organizing efforts have not confronted racism, sexism, and classism as they were a part of the day-to-day life of the organizing effort. Often the activities and commitments of organizing were developed and operated as competitors to people's cherished values of family, friendship, and ethnic identity.[9] In some new wave organizing efforts, male commitment to the women's movement has involved attention to male violence against women in fantasy and

everyday reality—in the kitchen and bedroom, and in the allocation of household tasks and child rearing arrangements. As feminism gains strength, the congruence of feminist political ideals and nonchauvinist day-to-day personal behaviors grows in importance. Male culture increasingly is being criticized for not giving adequate attention to feelings, cooperation, nurturance, and nonviolence. Male leadership increasingly is being criticized if there is not a large proportion of women in leadership roles and if the style and direction of leadership is not congruent with feminist concerns.

The realization of democracy within social justice organizations is a critical component of the connection between the personal and the political, the micro and the macro (Bryan, 1977; Vocations for Social Change, 1976). Organization is the key mechanism necessary to achieve increased justice, and democractic participation in decision making is a basic building block for the societal transformation sought by organizing (Bernstein, 1980). As citizen trust in authorities continues to erode, and as people increase their expectations for meaningful participation in all the decisions affecting them, there is pressure to achieve such participation, particularly in movements for social change. At the same time the lack of a democratic organizational culture, overstated concerns for efficiency, and inadequate behavioral skills will continue to plague social justice organizations.

If active involvement in the struggle for social transformation is to involve personal transformation as well, various practical activities must be planned and implemented to help individuals overcome their own internalized oppression. The Movement for a New Society devotes great attention and resources to integrating individual change and the struggle for social justice (Bedard, 1977; Coover et al., 1977). Several alternative psychological therapies have recognized the far-reaching personal implications of social justice goals and values, and have tried to link personal growth and loving relationships to challenging social oppression. Individual change activities, such as Re-Evaluation Counseling and Radical Psychiatry, have separated themselves from traditional therapies (Wyckoff, 1980; Jackins, 1981; Steiner et al., 1975; Apell, 1971), which they see as condoning oppressive and exploitative relationships, failing to fully empower individuals, and continuing the separation of personal change from actions and achievements of increased justice. Involvement in these alternative therapies includes involvement in social action for increased justice.

Multiple Sites, Sectors, and Constituencies

New Realities and New Emphasis

The 1960s and 1970s created broader awareness of inequity and injustice in the U.S. society. The civil rights and black power movements, federal government declarations of war on poverty, the women's movement, and the rise of the Gray Panthers brought these issues to public consciousness. No longer are inequity and injustice seen as isolated, idiosyncratic realities, but rather as pervasive characteristics of this social system. Action for change on behalf of these groups has increasingly confronted the limits of the power of a single mobilized collectivity, and often has required national and multiple constituency organizing. These realities have increased communication and sometimes coordination among multiple organizing sites, sectors, and constituencies.

Critique of Past Theory and Practice

Historically, poor people, minorities, women, middle-class constituencies, environmentalists, migrant workers, and students have been politically and structurally (and often geographically) separated from each other. They often have viewed each other as competitors for limited—and increasingly diminishing—public and private resources. Furthermore, professionally trained organizers, masters in the specialized diagnosis of the problems of each specific group or constituency, reaffirmed this isolation. Sometimes this form of organizing solved overt symptoms and problems of particular groups; often it failed to alter the structural and cultural patterns at the roots of the problems (Kenniston, 1968; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Zald, 1977; Wolfe, 1970).

Groups with power use these ascribed and symbolic divisions to divide and conquer oppressed groups, so as to enhance their own power and rewards. Given the stratification of U.S. society, and attendant isolation along class, race, gender, age, and sexual preference lines, new wave organizing for social justice cannot afford to be separated by these structures.

Historically, most social justice organizing has been conceived and carried out in the public sectors of urban communities. Civil rights, welfare rights, criminals' rights, and community control of schools have constituted the major foci of organizing efforts. The major scholarly works on this topic have heavily emphasized these sites (Brager and Specht, 1973; Cox et al., 1979). The heavy focus on public sector social service systems, defined in terms of their micro-level immediacy, neglects the private sector and its control of the environmental and production base on which the political-economic system operates. The perceived isolation of these arenas from one another, and from the private sector of industrial control and production, helps keep these efforts from dealing with mainstream power in the society. Moreover, isolated social movements fail to inform/develop a model of how a class-based movement might develop, or how coalitions among oppressed constituencies might be generated.

The setting in which goods are produced—the private industrial sector—is often left out of analyses pertaining to social justice organizing. For some scholars the productive function is deliberately kept separate from the distributive function. For others, the industrial arena is ceded to labor unions, and it is for them to create an agenda for analysis and action. Although unions have organized a relatively small percentage of the labor force, they carried the struggle for workplace rights and employment, and have been active on many other social justice issues. However, struggles with management and groups of owners have focused most heavily on bread and butter issues of immediate concern to members and their leaders. The separation of trade unions from other segments of the working class, and the legitimation of collective bargaining, have contributed to the difficulties of developing a labor party or other syndicalist or socialist organizations. These developments have helped create a gap between union leadership and the rank and file. In a more critical vein, Carnoy and Shearer (1980) document ways in which the labor movement's leadership has also failed to extend worker's rights and democratic participation within unions.

Progress Toward Recognition of Multiple Sites, Sectors, and Constituencies

Braverman (1974) and Edwards (1979) have analyzed macrostructural changes in the economy, in the organization of the workplace and in the social psychology of

work itself. Braverman focuses on the degradation of work and Edwards documents the transformation of workers' alienation in the course of changes in forms of organizational control. Each pattern has its contradictions that must be understood to effectively develop viable strategies for change. Work, inadequate work, alienating work, and lack of work remain central issues for members of this society (Alperovitz and Faux, 1982). Similarly the organization of social relationships within the productive sector remains a central element of the political-economic structure of the society. The concentration of elite power in this arena, coupled with the lack of individual consciousness and influence over this area of day-to-day life, make it an important but difficult arena for organizing.

Concrete examples of organizing for social justice in the production sector and in the workplace have included the development of:

- alternative businesses and worker-owned companies (Workers' Collectives and Cooperatives; Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Bernstein, 1980; Benello and Roussolpolos, 1971)
- labor union democratization (e.g., Steelworkers' and United Mineworkers' campaigns)
- union drives to organize hitherto unorganized women and minorities (e.g., J. P. Stevens campaign, "9 to 5," Coalition of Labor Union Women)
- health and safety in the workplace (Committees for Occupational Health and Safety, Brown Lung Associations)
- workplace democratization (Quality of Work Life Committees; Zwerdling, 1978)
- response to plant closings (Ohio Public Interest Campaign)

Despite the centrality of production organizations as sites for social justice organizing, other geographic and constituency-based sites are important as well. Rural organizing has received increased attention as people respond to large corporate and government actions that disturb traditional rural land uses and social patterns of rural populations (Wellstone, 1978; Swaczy, n.d.). This organizing site is also receiving attention because of the increased rate of migration from urban to rural settings, the attempt to utilize the lands of Native Americans and others who control critical and underdeveloped natural resources such as coal, oil shale, timber, and uranium.

Within the public sector, schools, hospitals, and local governmental services (e.g., garbage, transportation) have received the most attention.[10] With the exception of Bowles and Gintis's (1981) analyses of macro-level issues in education, however, there have been few successful efforts to tie these organizing efforts to a broader conceptual framework or a broader movment for social change.

While every site and setting has its own particularities and specificities, some basic operating guidelines seem applicable across settings, and may even serve as basic principles for Moberg's (1979) alternative society. Bernstein (1980) provides six components that he deems minimally necessary for workplace democracy, but which are general prerequisites for organizing for social justice anywhere:

- participation in decision making,
- economic return to the participants based on the surplus they produce,
- sharing management-level information with employees,
- guaranteed individual rights,
- an independent appeals system, and
- a complex participatory/democratic consciousness.

Although this discussion has emphasized site-centered organizing, the development of broad movements requires constituency-centered and issue-centered organizing as well. Examples of *issue-centered* organizing include efforts to identify problems that affect people in many sites or constituencies at once. One example is the efforts of the Womens' League for Peace and Freedom in tying concerns for peace and the nuclear freeze to a central focus on social justice. Much environmental organizing is issue-defined as well, but it seldom deals with social justice issues. Notable exceptions include the efforts of Environmentalists for Full Employment and the Urban Environmental Conference.

Examples of organizing for social justice on the basis of *constituencies* include work with senior citizens through statewide organizations of seniors. ACORN, a multi-issue organization operating in 18 states, has self-consciously chosen issues (like generic drugs) that are particularly salient to senior citizens. At the national level, the Gray Panthers are a visible and successful example of senior organizing. Another example of constituency-centered organizing around social justice issues is exemplified by welfare rights organizing, with which the late George Wiley was so strongly identified (Kotz and Kotz, 1977).[11]

An important aspect of new wave organizing's emphasis on multiple constituencies and sites is the necessity for substantial communication across localized or individual efforts. Moreover, if various efforts to organize can be connected with one another, that

> *makes it more plausible to think of various alternatives linking together and supporting each other in an "alternative society." If these alternatives are in turn connected with a mass political movement, then they can strengthen the "siege" of capitalistic hegemony* [Moberg, 1979: 309].

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE ORGANIZING

New wave organizing, like earlier organizing, faces enduring day-to-day problems. Some of the key practice problems faced by all organizing for social justice are:

(1) What *issues or programs* should be the focus of organizing for social justice?
(2) What are the processes of member *empowerment*, and how can they help groups cope with reaction and repression?
(3) How can *research and education* be carried out to guide the organizing effort?
(4) How should relationships between a specific organizing effort and *other movements* for change be conceived and realized?
(5) What *resources* are available and/or preferred in organizing?

Growing out of the three themes already described, new wave organizing is developing distinctive responses to these day-to-day problems. To fully appreciate the emerging organizing of the 1980s, it is necessary to understand these responses and their relationships to the emphasis on macrostructural analysis, cultural analysis, and the focus on multiple sites and constituencies. The themes of macrostructural and cultural analysis are strongly evident in the selection of issues, the development of processes of member empowerment, and the use of research and education. The theme of multiple sites and constituencies is most evident in the ways of relating one organizing effort to another and in the development and use of resources in organizing.

Framing Issues or Selecting Programs

Injustice and oppression mean that large numbers of people are without a significant share of societal resources. Moreover, large numbers of people remain relatively unaware of these conditions, and others believe they are alone and powerless. We call this general lack of awareness or ignorance cultural oppression. Thus, they are without knowledge or hope, and without goals or plans for change. One concrete example of such cultural oppression is the separation between people's objective and subjective interests. Objective interests generally refer to those issues that affect people, regardless of awareness of their presence and impact. Subjective interests refer to issues and problems people perceive and feel affect them. Differentiating between these two sets of interests is essential for social justice organizing, although it often has been done in a way that suggests the analyst or organizer knows better which interests are real and which ones are only illusory or the products of false consciousness.

Although recognition of these diverse bases of interest is important, it is crucial to organize around the objective interests that affect people, especially when people are subjectively aware of their impact. When people are unaware of what affects them, or wrongly aware that they are affected by interests that really do not affect them, educational programs are called for.[12]

How do organizers educate themselves and others about interests affecting the particular group that is organizing? How are decisions made on what is a hot or high priority issue? How can hope be generated? New wave organizing requires organizers (often lead organizers and representatives of the collectivity trying to organize) to work together on development and sharing information. As Kahn states, "Using their personal knowledge of the area, as well as statistical information, the organizer and the people he is working with should compile an objective profile of the problems of the area" (Kahn, 1971: 57-58). Freire (1972, 1973) calls for a process of dialogue in which the ideals of the group are articulated and contrasted with their perceptions and feelings about current reality. The organizer is a catalyst and mirror, always accountable to the emerging process, but most of all to the people who are organizing and to their reality. This process of dialogue includes observation, exchanges of questions and answers, reading of documents and summaries, and interpretations of viable issues and priorities.[13]

One example of an attempt to bridge objective interests and subjective awareness of these interests comes from ACORN's analysis of recent federal fiscal policies. In their written material, ACORN sought to counter government pronouncements about cutbacks with the following:

> *We've heard a lot about the cutbacks. We were told everyone would have to sacrifice, but the fact is low and moderate income people will be the hardest hit because the major cuts are in social welfare programs. . . . Likewise, we were told the tax bill would be "across the board," but the truth is large corporations and the rich will benefit most by Reagan's tax-cut package (United States of ACORN, 1981: 3).*

The publication and discussion of critical materials in alternative media helps narrow the cultural gap between a group's objective and subjective interests; it helps people become more aware (subjectively) of what really impacts on them (objectively). It also helps generate and articulate issues and an agenda or program for change.

Empowerment

In most societies, people are educated in families and cultural institutions in ways that encourage adoption of conforming ideas and behaviors. As a result of being denied meaningful opportunities for action, and being unable to control their own life situations, many people lack a sense of personal and social potency. Empowerment involves discovering the ability to act effectively in order to overcome oppressive structures and processes.

Empowerment requires simultaneous attention to the collectivity, the organization, and the individuals who are organizing. For instance, collectivities—such as those based on race, sex, income, occupation, and age—shape and constrain individuals' options and their sense of reality. When unorganized such objective collectivities constitute separated people who happen to be in the same social situation. When organized, people in these collectivities identify with one another and the issues that affect them; they then can act as a group or class. Organizations promote cultural identification and the mobilization of resources in order to pursue and achieve shared goals. Since empowerment requires overcoming prior experiences of separation and alienation, it can only be expressed through communion with others, in organizations or communities of people feeling and acting together.

Traditional approaches to community reform often have ignored the role of collectivities, and have concentrated on individual appeals and the development of formal organizations (Rothman, 1974). The emphasis on individual appeals neglects prior histories of collective or group disempowerment. The emphasis on formal organizations often leads to a concern for their maintenance, per se, and thus subordinates social justice objectives to reformist actions within organizations (Piven and Cloward, 1979). People acting together, in groups and change efforts they control, are the means new wave organizers use to solve the problem of empowerment.

An often feared, but overlooked issue related to empowerment is how people who are organizing should deal with coercion and violence. Historically, relations between those with power and those without power always have been coercive and oppressive. They usually involve some form of cultural or psychological violence, such as ignorance, denial of rights, alienation, intimidation, or loss of self. They also may involve physical violence, such as imprisonment, starvation, or strikebreaking. Of course, elites typically deny or distort the extent or impact of these events, blame them on the victims themselves, and otherwise respond with cultural or psychological manipulation (perhaps even more violence). Empowerment stands in direct confrontation to these forms of ongoing violence.

Most people, even those operating from a perspective of empowerment, would prefer nonviolence as a central characteristic of their tactics (Sharp, 1974). Nonviolence is built on the philosophical foundation that violence is immoral, and that the real strength of an organization lies in resources within the potential control of the constituency being organized. Nonviolence is also a penetrating, practical means of identifying the culture of oppression and violence as exerted by those in power, and it can expand individuals' repertoires of proud and self-enhancing resistance and action (Lakey, 1973). Nonviolence, however, is not always effective in resisting structural violence; nor is it always effective in empowering individuals and their organizations. Since the resources for violence are heavily concentrated in the hands of oppressors, violence by those engaged in social justice organizing cannot be ruled out as a means of resisting continuing violence from the powerful (Gamson, 1975). It is typically a last-ditch tactic: Partly because of the overwhelming resources owned and

controlled by the ruling groups—particularly in terms of legitimized structural violence (e.g., police, military)—and partly because of moral revulsion against the way violence corrupts the ideals of those who employ it.

Once we assume or admit the existence of oppression and of oppressive groups, we must assume further that the attempt to organize for social justice will run afoul of these groups. They will not like the effort to unseat them, to disempower them, to challenge their interests, and to reallocate resources. New wave organizing efforts are beginning to anticipate, analyze, and counter elites' attempts to repress and react against such changes and change programs.

Disempowerment Efforts

Newly empowered groups organizing for social justice are often threatened with disempowerment by existing elites. Such efforts may take the form of withholding material resources (money and personal power) that could otherwise be used for social justice efforts, such as in attempts to halt Legal Aid to the poor, and to defund portions of the War on Poverty. Elites also may control and manipulate the cultural symbols of social justice and change: Under the banner of individualism and equality of opportunity, the loyalties of many people committed to reform of social inequality and injustice may be diverted; under the banners of various liberal reforms, private and public organizations have occupied the energy and assimilated the commitments of many people who could otherwise engage in more dramatic action.

A third disempowerment tactic is control of information and intelligence systems that keep large numbers of people ignorant and uninformed about the state of social injustice, and of the options for change. Thus, for years whites did not know the objective conditions and interests of blacks in America; many relatively affluent people still do not understand the extent and generational reproduction of poverty; and most U. S. citizens do not appear to know the extent of worldwide starvation. Such pluralistic ignorance is no accident; when education on such matters is a state function, such miseducation must also serve state interests.

A fourth disempowerment tactic is for managers to ignore, or to delay recognition of, empowerment efforts by oppressed people (O'Day, 1974; Leeds, 1969). The failure to provide media space, unwillingness to schedule meetings, and announcements of competing commitments and priorities can all amount to denial of recognition of a group and its program or agendas. The establishment of endless diagnostic meetings or problem-solving sessions, channeling grievances into convoluted mediation hearings, litigation or reconciliation, and the creation of special commissions and boards all represent examples of actions consistent with this tactic.

If these front line and inexpensive tactics are not effective, ruling groups may take more direct action. They may incorporate the challenge by including or adopting the challenging groups, either through cooptation or appointment of their leaders, or through recognition and adoption of the agenda of reform. The challenging group can remain separate and be funded to conduct its work; or it can be included in portions of the ruling group coalition and token efforts made at reform. If the inclusive strategem does not work at this stage, an oppressive form of recognition can involve efforts to publicly delegitimate the challenging group and its agenda. Name-calling and labeling is one tactic; another is to challenge the agenda itself as unfair, unmerited, or otherwise inappropriate. Other more expensive forms of attack can include outright sabotage, such as spying on a group or otherwise compromising its leaders through sexual embroilment, bribery, or blackmail. Or, it may involve the use

of private force or mobilization of the apparatus of the state to incarcerate, break up, or assassinate challenging groups' leaders (Hayden, 1970; Walker, 1971). In some instances the state or private groups with power may covertly support counter-organizing efforts, such as the Moral Majority or even the Ku Klux Klan. If reactionary groups capture the initiative, liberals may be able to create a compromise that is far to the right of the social justice agenda.

To deal with such repression, new wave organizing is developing empowerment tactics that monitor the actions of those in power. Moreover, a cultural agenda is being developed to maintain control of social justice symbols that can not be alienated by rhetoric. Media information and intelligence systems are being generated that are sophisticated enough to avoid undermining by the propaganda industry of the mass-media, controlled by the elites. In addition to countering particular forms of repression, such tactics could increase awareness of repression and its sources, and thus contribute to the process of empowerment.

Research and Education

A most important part of any new wave organizing effort, and of any group working toward social justice objectives, is the development of sound information and knowledge. This requires establishment of a system of intelligence-gathering, and the generation of skill and information amongst its own ranks as well as for the general public. However, traditional research and knowledge development are controlled by political and cultural elites and performed by professionally trained scientists (Rothman, 1980).[14] Many see knowledge created and generated by specialists as a critical part of change efforts. Others, however, see it as mostly useful to elites seeking to achieve minor reforms, while planning and controlling the change process. Much of the ideology and practice of "scientifically planned change" (Bennis et al., 1976) can be seen in this light (Piven and Cloward, 1971; Kenniston, 1968; Crowfoot and Chesler, 1974).

New wave organizing for social justice, while requiring knowledge creation (research) and knowledge sharing (education), recognizes the traditional educational and research patterns as part of a system of cultural oppression. Thus, new tactics of conducting research and education are being developed, tactics that are consistent with other aspects of organizing for social justice. Most importantly, control of these processes is located in the hands of people attempting to do organizing (Freire, 1973), and research and education are combined as activities mutually fertilizing each other.

Research for social justice objectives differs from traditional academic and positivist research because it is verified in practice or action for change, not in a set of artificial or methodological conventions. Relevance to new action, and usefulness in guiding action, are the tests; the specificity of knowledge to particular situations renders typical scholarly concerns with generalizable and abstract knowledge less than useful. Especially important is research that locates the structural and historic settings of issues, that assesses the needs and resources of oppressed people as they consider how to organize, and that identifies the vulnerabilities of ruling groups and institutions as they become the targets of attack and change. Thus, research relevant for new wave organizing assumes that powerful parties seek to hide information, unintentionally obfuscate reality, and sometimes intentionally lie (Douglas, 1976). This requires that research relevant for organizing efforts dig out information vigorously (Woodward and Bernstein, 1976). Organizers who have dealt with the creation of

tactical or action research of this sort include Kahn (1971, 1982), Greever (1972), Burges (n.d.), and Schroeder (1977). Kahn, for one, notes, that it is

> *important to involve leaders and members of the organization in research. This is often the easiest way of finding out information. Sometimes it seems that we've put so much emphasis on detailed research of printed information that we forget how much people learn about the opposition that they come in contact with every day (1982: 181-185).*

The same author warns about the control of research in people's organizations:

> *If we don't set our priorities before we begin doing the research, then the research begins to control the decision making rather than helping it. The danger in this kind of situation is that then the people who are doing the research are in a position to influence decision making far more than those who are directly affected by the issue (Kahn, 1982: 185).*

Freire (1974) has attended to some of these dynamics in the research process, but also to the roles of educators in the process of change. He contrasts extension agents or others concerned with managing and controlling education and change with those concerned with education that liberates people from the oppressive conditions of their life. In his view, real education, not just education for conformity to elite rules, is an organizing process; in the process of organizing, people learn the critical issues in their life and social situation.

In discussing research and education processes, we are also addressing the relationship between organizer and people organizing. Since education is often a leadership activity, educational processes consistent with shared leadership formats are critical in new wave organizing. In any organizing effort, people with different skills are involved; perhaps, some have more skills than others. Rather than seek professionalization and standardization of this process, with attendant formal roles and teaching responsibilities, a democratic organizing relationship seeks to design a process of shared knowledge among various people. Oppressed groups are not "to be organized," they are "to organize." A professional organizer or leader does not "do to them," he or she "does with them." People learn from others, but not by placing themselves in a lower status, passive, or dependent position. This is the position of being oppressed, and it has no place in a new wave movement for social justice. In this regard, many professionally trained organizers find themselves lacking critical skills of democratic participation as they try to organize others in pursuit of social justice objectives.

Linkages with Other Organizations Working for Social Justice

Organizations and people acting for social justice are beginning to connect with others working on the same or similar agendas. However, attempts to link to other organizing efforts raise several constraints and questions: What form should these relationships take? To what extent are they with like-minded people or groups, or with groups with which there are major differences? To what extent are linkages possible with representatives of powerful groups?

In a complex society many groups suffer from oppression and try to organize in order to alter their own and others' situations. Although they may have common threads of oppression, they may also have substantial differences across race and sex

and age and class lines. One type of linkage is the issue-centered coalition, whereby separate organizations join together to increase the leverage of any one group in relation to an issue of mutual importance (Chesler, 1981; Institute for Social Justice, 1977, 1979; Kahn, 1971, 1982). Recent examples include coalitions resisting the Reagan-led cutting of social services, environmental regulations, and worker health and safety protection. A second form of linkage between different organizing efforts involves sharing training and support services, such as fundraising, organizational management, constituency organizing, communications and media, and research. Support organizations like the Northern Rockies Action Group (Helena, Montana) and the Highlander Center (New Market, Tennessee) are examples of such resource centers serving multiple organizing efforts. A third type of linkage involves ongoing coalitions for joint planning as well as joint action. An example of such a coalition has recently been formed in Montana (The Montana Alliance for Progressive Policies) and involves progressive labor unions and agricultural organizations, along with senior citizens, low income groups, elements of the religious community, and environmental organizations.

In any of these efforts it is necessary to consider and protect the distinctiveness and autonomy of each group, while at the same time developing cooperative organizing efforts. Autonomy is important: In it lies the potentiality for each member to create his or her own identity as a part of a particular group with special needs and perspectives. Likewise, commonality and cooperation is important: In addition to its tactical advantage in terms of resources, it starts to develop awareness of common oppression across broad classes of people, making identification of enemies easier as well.

As oppressed groups explore their common experiences and goals, and perhaps develop common programs and tactics, it is also important to consider locating allies or coalition partners inside ruling groups. This is a dangerous tactic, but one that cannot be ignored. If people with power do share the agenda of a group organizing for social justice objectives, they can be very powerful allies: They have vital information on ruling group operations, and they have power, or access to others with power: A major concern here is with relationships to elected and appointed public officials. Influencing who occupies these roles, and what the occupants do with regard to disparate societal interests, is an important concern in social justice organizing. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s this area has been receiving increasing attention. This is partly due to the strength of social justice organizing itself, and to the need to influence government on the host of critical matters of concern to the victims of injustice. The Conference on Alternatives in State and Local Politics is an example of a group that has established dialogues with public officials on a national level. Their annual meeting and publications have become key points of reference for officials actively committed to social justice and willing to be publicly identified with this goal.

Electoral politics is another means whereby organizing groups have become involved with societal elites. More and more political action committees are being formed for this purpose. They grow from an increasing frustration in getting needed legislation, along with the broad based constituency of people willing to work for justice. For example, the Montana Committee for an Effective Legislature has identified candidates, taught political campaign skills and developed clear strategies for maintaining legislators' accountability to the people, values, and goals that led to their election. In a somewhat different vein, the National Association of Social Workers and the National Education Association monitor the actions of politicians on matters of interest to them and their constituencies. While their values may not be quite the same, the National Committee for Effective Citizens in Education does the same.

On occasion, oppressed groups have become directly involved in electoral politics, either by temporarily aligning with a major party, or by creating their own party, (Booth, 1981). Either way, involvement in electoral politics has the negative potential of drawing energy away from organizing efforts and concentrating it on far-removed symbolic targets. However, direct involvement in powerful public politics also can be an important means of public education and for training leaders, as well as in increasing pressure on public officials.

Other tactics that are used to relate with powerful groups include advisory committees, mediation/negotiation, public hearings, and elaborate citizen participation processes. These tactics are frequently touted by power holders and established institutions as very desirable—to avoid direct action and vigorous and clarifying conflict. While relating to elites through such tactics cannot be ignored, it may become a minefield for wasting energy, splitting a collectivity, and diverting leadership (Crowfoot, 1980). New wave organizing is beginning to explore the opportunities and dangers presented by such mainstream political tactics.

Resources Available to Organizing Groups

The basic characteristic of a societal order lacking social justice is the maldistribution of control over and access to important resources. Any attempt to shift control and to reallocate societal resources requires new resources as well. Key resources useful to organizing for social justice include money, organizing structures, members, and leadership.

All discussions about funding raise questions about the amount needed, and about the ways of acquiring it. Clearly, no organization ought to spend any more time or energy (which are equally important resources) on the money question than is absolutely necessary. But it would be fatuous to deny its importance. A basic goal should be to get enough funding for self-sufficiency without having to make money-raising the most important day-to-day operation. A related objective is to seek money from varied sources, so that the organization is not dependent upon any one of them, and hence, not easily subject to their control. It is almost contradictory to think about social justice organizing seeking funds from people and groups who have extra funds available—a feature readily associated with the oppressors, or the enemies of social justice. However, while it may be acceptable to take money from such sources when it is free of controls or constraints; to place oneself under these groups' monetary control is quite a dangerous matter.

Figure 11.1 shows the funding mix of Massachusetts Fair Share, a multi-issue, statewide organization with individual chapters employing full-time professional staff. The example shows a diversified set of funding sources. It also provides an impression of the size of a budget needed for a well-established statewide organization.

New wave organizing efforts make fund-raising an integral part of their approach to empowerment and to program development and issue formation. For instance, if self-help and the volunteer efforts of oppressed people represent the organization's key resources, funds for a professional staff may be unnecessary. On the other hand, if a division of labor and energy, caused by the size and/or character of the constituency, or the amount and diversity of issues, requires full- or part-time staff, then funds will be needed to attract and sustain them. More and more new wave organizations committed to social justice are emphasizing grassroots funding sources (Flanagan, 1977). These sources lead to fund-raising efforts that are directly tied to member



SOURCE: Sweeney and Seltzer, 1981: 7.

FIGURE 11.1 Massachusetts Fair Share Annual Budget, Total = $1,595,000

recruitment and empowerment thrusts of organizing. For the collectivity that is organizing, contacts with financial sources serve two purposes—fund-raising and information gathering. Institutional sources (foundations, government grants) require specialized expertise and processes of fundraising that are not conducive to either member recruitment or empowerment of members. Sometimes they are the only option in the early stages of an organizing effort, but as a long-term pattern of funding, they are fraught with liabilities for the organization.

A second important resource is the organizational form supporting individual efforts. In every change effort, decisions must be made about what kind and how formal an organization people desire. In general, social justice organizing in reorganization of multiple sites and constituencies must be open to a variety of democratically governed forms. Thus, in some situations, collectives are being used (Vocations for Social Change, 1976); in other cases, member elected boards with hierarchical day-to-day authority structures are used (Bryan, 1977); and in still other instances, cadre organizations relying on the wisdom and discipline of party structures are pursued (Gorz, 1972).

Each of these organizational forms has a rich history in social justice organizing—including failures. Decisions on the most appropriate format vary with local conditions, of course, but they generally must meet three basic criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and empowerment. The organizational form selected should help organizing be effective in reaching the shared goals of the active members; victories are essential. The organizational form also ought to be efficient in terms of its usage of scarce resources, like time, energy, and even money. In this respect, some notable compromises may have to be made between the goals of grassroots democracy and the time and energy the achievement of such goals require. The third criterion an organizational form should meet is a contribution to the empowerment of those who organize. Empowerment within the organizing effort, as well as in the society at large, must go hand in hand. For any and all of these conditions to be met requires effective and regular meetings, with occasional evaluations, continuous feedback, and openness to try new internal arrangements.

The key resource of personnel and skills with which an organization carries out its social justice mission lies in members and leaders. In some ways, people are ill-prepared for active roles in social justice organizing: There is little adequate preparation anywhere in our society for such roles, especially not for people who are materially and culturally oppressed. On the other hand, the effort to train or facilitate the development of people for these roles is quite critical: It helps establish a wider resource base and actualizes concerns about individual and collective empowerment.

In new wave organizing membership recruitment focuses on the principle that: "People are recruited not simply to boost the membership figures of the organization, or to raise money. They are recruited because the organization gives them power, while without it they would be powerless" (Ballenger, 1981: 5). Thus recruiting is approached as both education and action; offering the recruit active involvement and information that increases his or her understanding of how cooperative activity helps members of a collectivity overcome conditions of injustice. This requires the organization to carry out recruiting in ways that are accountable and responsive to the people being recruited, as well as to prior members of the organization. Ballenger has provided one list and the means of evaluating recruitment approaches as illustrated in Figure 11.2.

Leadership development is another form of member development: It also must be undertaken in ways that are consistent with overall concerns about empowerment of all members of the organizing effort. Given the power of the culture in which we are embedded, without special efforts, leadership in social justice organizations would be similar to leadership in most other organizations. Thus, in new wave organizing racism, sexism, class-bias, and ageism are combatted in leadership development and selection. Moreover, leadership is exercised in ways that do not create or increase distance between leaders and other members (thus avoiding elitism or oligarchism). In order to accomplish such objectives, great sensitivity must be displayed to the culture and historical conditions of the people organizing. A recent exchange on this topic highlighted the different needs of a highly educated middle-class constituency relative to the needs of a working-class group (Kokopeli and Lakey, 1978; Becker, 1978).

New wave leadership development requires an explicit plan that sets aside time and resources for this purpose. An institution committed to this agenda is the National Leadership School of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now. This school runs workshops that include presentation and discussion of the organization's principles: "self-sufficiency, organizing the unorganized, majority constituency, coordinated autonomy, direct action, partnership between staff and leadership, and

	Cost	Need for Volunteers	Level of Expertise Required	Risk	Planning Required	Time Needed to Implement	Potential to Produce Active Membership	Potential Effectiveness	Need for Full-Time Staff to	Ability to Tailor Audience
ORGANIZING	H	L	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
DIRECT MAIL	H	L	H	H	M	M	L	H	L	M
VOLUNTEER CANVASS	L	H	H	M	M	M	M	H	M	H
EVENTS	M-L	H	M	L	M	M	M	M	L	H
PHONATHONS	L	H	M	L	M	M	M	M	L	H
ADVERTISING	H	L	H	H	L	M	L	M	L	L
OPPORTUNITY RECRUITING	L	L	L	L	L	L	M	L	L	H
PUBLICITY	L	L	M	L	M	L	L	L	L	L

SOURCE: B. Ballenger, *Membership Recruiting Manual*, a publication of the Northern Rockies Action Group, 9 Placer Street, Helena, MT 59601. © 1981 by NRAG. Reprinted by permission.
H = high; M = medium; L = low.

FIGURE 11.2 Choosing a Recruiting Strategy: Assessing Organizational Costs and Benefits of Each Technique

democracy" (United States of ACORN, 1981: 4). The school curriculum focuses on building strong local groups, and includes concrete situations that had to be analyzed so tactics could be developed. One such situation included the following example:

> *Leaders had to figure the best strategy for building and ACORN group in a neighborhood where there is already a block club composed of middle income people who are not very active except for a few strong leaders* [*United States of ACORN, 1981: 4*].

This first national leadership school included "very frank and in-depth discussions on sensitive subjects, like how to integrate your personal life with ACORN work" (United States of ACORN, 1981: 5). In distinction, traditional approaches to community intervention posit the separation of social reform activities from the central activities of day-to-day life. These central living activities come to be seen as constraints on people's change activities. In new wave organizing the realities of achieving justice requires social justice organizing to be seen as central to day-to-day life (Flacks, 1974). Thus, organizing becomes an integral part of people's work, family, leisure and religious activities, and vice versa. Empowerment requires creative synthesis and integration of one's entire life: then the various roles and identities one plays can feed and enrich each other, rather than internally competing with and fragmenting with other.

CONCLUSION: WHAT WAVES WILL NEW WAVE ORGANIZING MAKE?

In this chapter we have sketched the development of a new approach to an old problem. The core problem is social injustice, and the derived problem is intentional action or organizing to realize social justice objectives. Traditional approaches to this problem have been so modified by recent theoretical and practical advances that a new approach, new wave organizing, has arisen.

New wave organizing differs from its predecessors (1) in its stress upon a macro-analysis of the sources of social injustice, and therefore, a targeting on large-scale political, economic, and cultural institutions as the arenas of change; (2) in its stress on the power of cultural factors to dominate peoples' minds, and therefore, the need to include cultural transformation, at the individual and institutional level, as part of the organizing process; and (3) in its stress on the interaction among various social settings and careers in societal stabilization and change, and therefore, the need to link, coordinate, and/or form coalitions among and across many different oppressed groups and situations in which people live and work and play.

Concern for the realization of socially just procedures now, within movements of people organizing for social justice, has required new wave efforts to adopt internal strategems and organizing tactics that move immediately to more democratic and humane forms. Internal empowerment of people organizing is critical, as is the transformation of the racist, sexist, and individualist consciousness of people involved. In this way, through new forms of internal education and leadership development, the forms of the old culture can be countered within the process of organizing. Organizing, then, is not just a means to an end; it is a way of life, a continuing struggle for empowerment and humanization of actors.

No matter how attractive these ideas sound (and they do sound attractive to us), will they work? What guarantee, what guess, what hope is there that such tactics and concepts have any greater chance of truly achieving social justice objectives than past

concepts and practices? Surely there is no certain answer to this question, at least no empirically verifiable or believable answer at this point in time. People and groups developing new wave organizing are too new, and their organizing efforts or experiments too young, to have stood the test of time and travail. But in theory, and in beginning practice, they do appear more coherent and correct than prior efforts. They also appear to stand a better chance of resisting the cooptation, seduction, outright sabotage and exploitation of organizing ideas that befell prior efforts.

At the same time such new wave ideas and practices are developing, however, the organization and power of forces resistant to social justice objectives have increased. Increasing sophistication, concentrated power, and the development of a new mythology makes the forces for stabilization strong indeed. In the words of songwriter and singer Fred Small (1981):

Oh, the problems are so hard and talk is so cheap
Counting the crises is like counting sheep
You can count on the experts and go back to sleep
Or stand up and tell 'em you're here.

Standup, standup, and tell 'em you're here
Shout it out loud for the whole world to hear
They're long overdue for kick in the rear
Standup and tell 'em you're here.

NOTES

1. Remedies for injustice may be pursued through individual or collective attempts at social mobility, or through legislative or judicial appeals that seek official redress from unjust social policies and ruling groups. In addition, some seek to create retreats and alternative relationships that model new and more just social forms. Finally, others try to organize people and power to challenge current rules and rulers.

2. Analyses of this literature in terms of its dominant perspective have been undertaken by several scholars, including Horton (1966), Warren and Hyman (1966), Crowfoot and Chesler (1974), Chesler et al. (1978), Paulston (1976), and Buttell and Flinn (1975).

3. The behaviorist emphasis has also resulted in little attention being given to history; this has made it difficult to learn from the early roots and expressions of U.S. intergroup conflict and change. In contrast, Piven and Cloward (1971, 1979) have rendered an enormous service in updating social welfare developments, Bowles and Gintis (1976) have done the same for the educational system, and Edwards's (1979) review provides this perspective on labor struggles in a privately controlled workplace.

4. Some examples of popular scholarly work in this vein include Silberman (1974) and O'Connor (1973).

5. Wright's work is an example of numerous developments in critical theory; see also Bernstein (1976), Forester (1980, 1982).

6. See, for example, discussions of the culture of poverty in O. Lewis (1966), M. Lewis (1981), and Glazer and Moynihan (1970).

7. Fanon (1965) and Memmi (1967), starting from the condition of colonization and oppression, generalize this conceptual framework to minorities and the poor. Decolonialization thus becomes a broad strategy connecting subjective and objective dimensions of oppression, subjugation, and powerlessness, and actively transforming them by asserting control over societal and individual conditions.

8. Spurred by the civil rights and feminist movements, organizers and scholars commenting on this phenomenon include Ross (1977), Gornick (1971), and Eisenstein (1978).

9. Within organizing efforts the awareness often focuses on the phenomenon of burnout experienced by staff and leaders (Bryan, 1980). Overcommitment, lack of support, and exhaustion negatively affect friendships, marriages, and parenting relations.

10. Although we have criticized prior scholarship for an overemphasis on public sector organizing sites and efforts, to ignore these efforts completely would be as great an error.

11. What is unique about these constituency-based efforts, and therefore what makes them so relevant for our concerns, is their focus on broad issues of concern to constituency (not narrow self-interest), and their conscious linkage to other constituencies and organizing efforts.

12. Balbus (1971) and Mills (1959) stress the distinction between objective and subjective interests, and the need to root organizing in objective and macrostructural issues.

13. The problem of distance and perhaps even alienation between organizer and people organizing is a long-standing one in the literature of social change (Lenin 1943; Gorz 1973; Kautsky 1964). In some treatments, it has been seen as an issue of control and domination by a liberated elite or an advance guard. The search for democratic and dialogic resolutions of this problem is a core feature of new wave organizing.

14. See our earlier discussion of the roles of social science in generating a theory and practice of organizing.

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12

The Mass Media and Social Change

George Comstock

The successful employment of the mass media as an instrument for social change is dependent on three not always cooperative factors. They are the values that dictate the conduct of the mass media, the prowess of the media, and the techniques by which that prowess can be exerted. The several hours the average adult devotes to the media each day testify to the substantial place they occupy in the daily lives of most Americans. Both casual observation and rigorous empirical investigation concur that the media may substantially influence their audiences. The acknowledged fact that under some conditions and in some circumstances attitudes and behavior are to some degree at the command of the media is not equivalent, however, to the easy or effective enlistment of the media in behalf of any given kind of change.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

So that these factors may be more sensitively perceived, the media must be placed in historical perspective. Two circumstances in particular demand attention. These are the mass media as a social innovation and their progressive penetration of social life.

The mass media are misunderstood when they are thought of principally as technologies for the dissemination of information. It is more useful to think of them not as techniques appended to society, but as social innovation representing something distinctive.

When Gutenberg published his 42-line Bible in 1456, he introduced the first in a series of technological developments that would progressively increase the efficiency by which one source could communicate with a large number of persons. Certainly, the broad functions that sociologists ascribe to the mass media (Lasswell, 1971; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1971; Mendelsohn, 1966; Wright, 1975) are enterprises basic to the society that antedate these media. These functions include the surveillance of the environment through news-gathering, interpretation and prescription, the transfer of culture, the reinforcement of norms and widely shared values, the conferral of status on those given favorable attention (or, as many would argue, any kind of attention at all), and diversion and entertainment. However, the mass media represent more than new means of performing old functions, and it is for this reason that the birth of the mass media is more tellingly placed in the seventeenth century, when the first newspapers appeared.

The characteristics conventionally ascribed to the mass media which are said to distinguish them from other modes of communication include the large size, diversity,

and anonymity of the audience, the rapidity with which messages are transmitted, the transitory exposure to their content, the public availability of the message, and the degree to which the communicator is an organization. Nevertheless, these characteristics are the appearance and not the essence of what is unique to the mass media. That essence is their social role: the calculated manufacture of messages and symbols for transmission to an audience as large at the time of transmission as the communicator can achieve within the limits of purpose, genre, and medium.

Social innovation is the end to which technological means have led. Thus, the innovation represented by the media resides in three places: (a) the task that they have assumed, which is to devise something to which a large number of persons will wish to attend; (b) the criterion to which they have submitted, which is to garner the largest possible audience within the inevitable boundaries of the specific means of dissemination; and (c) the historic inevitability to which they have been subject, the stepwise regularity by which the size of the audience has grown larger as the media have evolved—an aspect that represents the deployment of each new technology in behalf of the task and criterion synonymous with the mass media.

The second historical circumstance is that third feature that defines the mass media as social innovation—the regular enlargement of its place in people's lives. In its impact, television exemplifies what has continually been occurring with each step in the evolution of the media. First, television increased the amount of time that the average adult devotes to the mass media each day. This unobtrusive fact is made apparent by comparisons of the way thousands of persons in twelve countries in Eastern and Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, spent their time in the mid-1960s, when it was still possible in many countries to examine roughly comparable groups of television set owners and nonowners (Robinson, 1972; Robinson and Converse, 1972; Robinson et al., 1972; Szalai, 1972). The increased attention amounted to about an hour a day per person (Comstock et al., 1978). Since not all of the increase in television use in the United States since then has subtracted from time spent with other media, total time spent with the mass media in the United States today is greater than at any time in the past. Second, television represents the conjunction of ready and easy access to and the communicatory efficacy of audiovisual stimuli. Literacy and often price of purchase are required by newspapers, magazines, and books. An admission fee, a theater, and transportation are required for movie-going. Language is required for radio, a mastery less demanding in the case of television because of its visual aspect—as anyone who has followed the plot of an in-flight movie without sound can attest.

Each of these barriers is partially or fully overcome by television. Additionally, television has furthered the conquest of audience attention by pioneering the study of audience receptivity through the use of random sampling, automatic recording of program selection, and computer analysis, so that feedback by which less popular offerings can be discarded occurs literally overnight. The properties common to the mass media are enlarged and more extreme in the case of television (that is, the size and complexity of the organization that is the communicator; the rapidity, transcience, and public nature of the communication; size and heterogeneity of the audience). However, while television arguably represents a larger step in the penetration of social life by the mass media, it also exemplifies a process under way for three centuries.

THREE FACTORS

When the mass media are seen in historical perspective, it should be no surprise that they are widely looked upon as powerful means by which public and private

behavior can be altered. And they are. They are certainly adept at doing so in their own behalf, as an assembly of an audience in excess of 100 million for the Super Bowl—in effect, a holiday created by television—demonstrates. In community intervention, these sought-for changes involve a variety of presumably desirable outcomes. Those that ostensibly render community and individual life less pleasant and more hazardous decrease; their obverse increases. Targets of such intervention have included smoking, cholesterol intake, vitamin use, consumer behavior, dental practices, energy consumption, menu planning, population control, preventive medicine, forest fire control, government bond purchase, crime prevention, obesity, shoplifting, driving habits, voting, church attendance, child and wife abuse, pet and animal care, gun control, and racial, ethnic, and sex discrimination. Unhappily, from the perspective of their advocates, the media are limited as means for their implementation.

Values

One of the factors that limits the capability of the mass media to bring about planned social change is the values in accord with which they operate in the United States. These divide crudely into those governing their goals and intentions and those specifying their ethics and emphases. These in turn derive from the economic and legal foundations of the media in America.

In the United States, the media are not an arm of officialdom at either the national, state, or local level. In fact, the posture of the media toward government is often described, and accepted by both sides, as adversarial. The exceptions are the publications produced by the U S. Government Printing Office, the various films and television programs financed by federal funds under the rubric of education and public betterment, and public television. However, even these activities can hardly be said to present a consistent voice of official purpose, as access to them is fragmented and power over them divided. The *Congressional Record*, and the hearings of congressional bodies and federal commissions, make available to the public varied and discordant views on any given topic. Public television programming is insulated from the federal government by the statutory if not fiscal independence of the Corporation for Public Television, the entity responsible for national public television policy, while its control is diluted by the Public Broadcasting System, the network of stations that has a large say in what is eventually broadcast. In any event, these exceptions constitute only a minuscule proportion of the media reaching the public.

This independence of the media from governmental control was established as the preeminent principle of media operation by the First Amendment. Even broadcasting, subject to federal regulation for the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" by the Communications Act of 1934, has been held to few standards for program content beyond balanced news coverage of major issues, equal access for contending political candidates outside of news coverage, and some demonstration of readiness to assess and serve public needs. What has been significant over the past half century of broadcasting has been the degree to which, within the context of regulation, independence of communications content has prevailed.

The economic corollary of the First Amendment is that the media depend on market success for their viability, paying their way by producing profits for their private owners through product sales (newspapers, magazines, cable television subscriptions, and the like) or sales of audience access to advertisers through use of space and time. This places audience acceptance at the forefront of their goals, with their intent

to obtain as large an audience as possible, since this maximizes revenues from both product sales and advertising rates, which rise and fall with audience size. This means that it is the media's goal to please, interest, excite, amuse, entertain, and inform the public on their own terms. Otherwise the media face failure on their own terms.

The mass media in the United States have also assumed the role of providing information through the news that is objective, fair, nonpartisan, and includes differing and often contradictory views and opinions. Schramm (1957) labeled this ethic the "social responsibility theory" of the press and characterized it as an unwritten contract with the public in which freedom from government interference in the long run rests on public respect engendered by coverage unbiased by allegiance with any vested interest. From this perspective, the media have no masters but themselves and cannot surrender any of that independence to anyone without risking it in its entirety. This broad and vague outlook, so central to the news media, has also become central to the entertainment business. The consequence is that under the First Amendment and in accepting the view that they have an obligation to fairness, diversity, and balance in both news and entertainment, the media have come to evade and resist their enlistment in behalf of any cause.

These broad parameters determine the mass media's performance as agents of planned social change. Their ethics and economic goals both disfavor propagandizing—news filled with controversy and contending views or in which the conflict and the high human drama of the story take precedence over delivery of a clear and potentially banal message. When views differ, as they do on many of the ends and almost invariably over their means, the media will carry messages that counter as well as support any outcome. Thus, the promise implied by their historical growth of employing the media as agents of social change is a chimera.

Prowess

The mass media have long suffered and drawn sustenance from the popular belief that their influence is powerful. As targets of criticism that they interpret as calumny, the media consequently add awe to the attention they receive, thereby converting debit to credit and presumably increasing their power. But matters are not so simple. That advertisers are implicitly in accord with such a belief offers passing comfort to the student of public opinion, who will find several decades of empirical inquiry in which many a disseminated message has had little effect on subsequent public behavior (Hovland, 1954; Katz, 1971; Klapper, 1960; Weiss, 1969, 1971). Although many of the studies concern political campaigns, the same conclusion is drawn when other kinds of information campaigns are examined; as Katz (1971) wrote, "it is a fact that mass media campaigns—not just political campaigns—convert very few people."

Several broad conclusions emerge:

(1) Exposure to messages in the mass media generally is followed by behavior consistent with what would have been expected in the absence of media exposure based on the attributes of the audience member.
(2) These attributes include age, sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (which subsumes education, income, and occupation), region and place of residence, political affiliation, prior history of behavior, group norms, and interests and motives.
(3) Behavior of both those exposed and not exposed to messages in the mass media often appears to be no different.

(4) Decisions on which mass media messages bear often are reached before the media messages are received and are not changed substantially thereafter.

These conclusion modulated the anxieties over the power of the media that were nurtured by World War II and the preceding decade, principally through such apparent exemplars of media influence as Franklin D. Roosevelt's "fireside chats" and the propaganda apparatus of Nazi Germany. The underlying dynamics posited a counter-philosophy to media influence:

(1) selective exposure, by which persons minimize exposure to information either counter to their opinions or behavior, or irrelevant to what they perceive as their interests and motives, thereby reducing the number of persons a campaign can reach;
(2) selective perception, by which persons comprehend and interpret messages that they receive in accord with their opinions, behavior, interests, and motives, thereby reducing the proportion of those reached by a campaign who will receive the intended message;
(3) rationalization, by which information received and understood that is counter to behavior and attitudes is rendered ineffective by the assembly of seemingly plausible arguments justifying the status quo, thereby reducing the persuasiveness of the message to those who receive it;
(4) avoidance, by which a substantial portion of the public to which a given message might apply evade this and other instances of media content that would heighten the salience of, reinforce, or aid in the comprehension and interpretation of the message in question, thereby reducing the likelihood both of reception and of any reinforcement or interest in the message, should it be received; and
(5) counter-inculcation and inoculation, by which messages received subsequent to or prior to the current message reduce its effectiveness, thereby diminishing the credibility of a received message.

From this perspective, it should be no surprise that real-life information campaigns rarely duplicate the relative ease with which attitudes and sometimes intentions with regard to future behavior can be altered within the confines of a laboratory experiment, where exposure to the persuasive message is more or less guaranteed, contrary or distracting experiences and communications are not encountered, and the passage of time between exposure to the persuasive message and the assessment of impact is measured in minutes. Control over information and its impact was increasingly attributed more to the audience than to the media. Information campaigns in general appeared to wither before the resistant filtering by the public, as did the presidential campaign examined long ago by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944: 76):

As interest increases and the voter [or, in our case, audience member] begins to become aware of what it is all about, his predispositions come into play. Out of the . . . available propaganda, he begins to select. He is more likely to tune in some programs than others . . . to understand one point in a speech than another. His selective attention thus reinforces the predispositions with which he comes to the campaign. At this stage, the initiative is almost wholly with the prospective voter [or audience member] rather than with the propagandists.

No phrase more succinctly describes the predicament of those who would employ the mass media for some prescribed end than Bauer's (1971) "obstinate audience."

The lesson is that the mass media do not consistently reach audiences that are

undifferentiated in regard to the topic at hand. In fact, the most exemplary of "mass" media, network television, during prime time assembles coalitions analogous in their internal diversity to the vast numbers supporting the major political parties at every election. Each audience segment has its own interests, motives, susceptibilities, defenses, and demographic characteristics.

Whatever the medium, how the audience is divided depends on the order and insight imposed by the observer, as Frank and Greenberg (1980) emphasize in their splitting of the television audience into fourteen segments based on the empirical measurement of individual interests. The purpose remains the same, however—to reconstitute the mass audience into components for which more effective purposeful communications can be designed. Here we find the practitioner of community intervention aligned with the advertiser in that they have the same goal, compliance.

Techniques

The third factor that limits the efficacy of the mass media as instruments of social change is the imperfection of the techniques that can be employed. Although much can be said about what should occur as a consequence of audience attention to a message in the media, the fact of the matter is that, in appreciation of the ambiguity of their eventual impact, the communicator intending to effect change cannot help but choose his or her means with ambivalence.

Often, there exists the danger of a "boomerang" (that is, an effect contrary to that sought). A crime prevention commercial that pictures a criminal act may serve as a model for the commission of a crime; the "bad example" of a nutrition commercial may stimulate a desire for the allegedly unhealthy food or drink; and an anti-drug abuse message may increase curiosity over the attractions of the dread substance.

There is also the paradox of mass appeal and individual ineffectiveness. In order to take advantage of the relatively heterogeneous audiences that the mass media reach, messages must have wide appeal and broad applicability, but these same attributes sharply restrict their pertinence to any of the many subgroups within those audiences.

Additionally, there is the advertising phenomenon of "wear-out" (that is, the decline in message effectiveness with repeated exposure). It is an axiom that repetition helps rather than hinders teaching and persuading, particularly when repetition is contrasted with a single exposure to a message. Consequently, the flooding of the media with a message should be powerfully effective should exposure frequently coincide with the readiness of audience members to conform. Repetition also increases the likelihood that everyone who conceivably could be reached will be reached. Nevertheless, the technique of repetition, as with most techniques of mass communication, is two-edged. In most campaigns, there will come a time when continuing dissemination yields little in the way of either the numbers reached or the influence exerted on those reached.

Comprehension can be problematic. "The simpler the message, the greater the comprehension," would appear to be a sound slogan, but it falters in two circumstances: (a) Some messages, such as those for emergency first aid, may require some complexity to be effective, and (b) the simple, succinct message may in fact baffle some who encounter it. "Deposit Trash Here," a message of no small social import in many urban areas, is clear enough. "Get High on Yourself!" requires some decoding.

Even when the message reaches and is understood by the person to whom it is

directed, there may be neither attitude nor behavior change, or the former without the latter. As McGuire (1969: 277) warned:

> *A tremendous amount of applied research has been carried out to test the effectiveness of the mass media by those who work in the marketing, advertising, and political-behavior areas. . . . The outcome has been quite embarrassing for proponents of the mass media, since there is little evidence of attitude change, much less change in gross behavior such as buying or voting.*

The reasons for this apparent impotence return attention to the puzzle of media prowess. A new message may be so slight, irrelevant to, or redundant of the experiences that precede it that it has no impact. The opportunity to conform literally may not occur within the span of the message's influence, and shifts in attitude that do occur may register as changes in intensity rather than behavior. Thus, there is the phenomenon observed in the 1960 and 1976 televised debates between presidential aspirants (Kraus, 1962, 1979)—when public exposure is enormous and immediate effects on opinion and attitude readily measurable, but influence on behavior negligible—for the choice that each voter made on election day could be traced only rarely to what had been seen or heard in the debates.

The consequences that should be portrayed for noncompliance further complicate communication tactics. There is no question that compliance *can* be furthered by threat of unpleasant or even dire outcomes for those who would behave otherwise (Leventhal, 1970). There is similarly no question that compliance *may* be deterred by threats that incite denial, rationalization, or suppression of the message (Janis, 1967). Much turns on whether the threat is perceived as pertinent, rather than simply disturbing, and whether the corrective is perceived as sufficient unto the risk. When the perception of pertinence and sufficiency is in doubt, a low-fear appeal is judicious. When likely, fear can be used as a leverage. Judging which of these circumstances holds is the barrier to effective use of threatening consequences.

Messages are also readily forgotten. For example, interviewers who reached about 650 Miami area viewers of the Super Bowl in 1975 during the three hours following the game found that only 7 percent could volunteer Goodyear as an advertiser, although the company had presented five commercials. Three sponsors were not remembered by anyone, and with one exception, the others were recalled by about two percent (Editor and Publisher, 1975). That exception was a 25 percent recall for Chrysler's rebate announcement, which apparently benefited from extensive news coverage during the preceding week.

What this illustrates is the disseminatory gain that can be derived when the topic of an information campaign is also a prominent subject in the news. Unfortunately for those who would employ the mass media to achieve specific goals, it is seldom possible to bring about favorable and prominent news coverage. Rarely will such coverage be continuous enough to have impact, and it is typically a matter of chance when campaign goals and the news coincide.

This raises a final limitation of the efficacy of the techniques that can be employed—uncontrolled placement. Information campaigns generally do not enjoy the privilege of advertisers who can specify the time or placement of their messages. Information campaigns usually must rely on the media's voluntary cooperation. The timing and placement of public service announcements, advertisements, news releases, interviews, and news coverage are at the discretion of the media. This means that to a great extent the audience is not chosen, but found; that the circumstances of

exposure are not planned, but happenstance; and that the campaign often is rendered artless involuntarily.

ESSENTIAL FEATURES

Three attributes fairly describe information campaigns. First, the strategic placement of messages is usually improbable, if not impossible. Thus, their tactical design is often impracticable. Second, the corollary is that audiences are reached indiscriminately at worst and haphazardly at best, and very often the audience is "the public" no matter how inappropriate or needless such a broad compass. Third, the messages of an information campaign hardly ever monopolize a topic and are often contradicted or amended by messages disseminated in advertising and entertainment with quite different intentions.

DIFFERENCES AMONG THE MEDIA

Differences among the media remain important because choice of medium may be one of the few options available in an information campaign. These differences, which divide into audience characteristics and impact, furthermore suggest what might and might not be expected from one or another of the mass media (Bogart, 1981; Bower, 1973; Clarke and Fredin, 1978; Comstock et al., 1978; Graber, 1980; Greenberg and Dervin, 1970; Levy, 1978; Patterson, 1980; Weaver and Buddenbaum, 1979).

So, too, the pattern by which the messages of the media unfold has both its obvious and nonobvious aspects. Socioeconomic status, age, gender, race, and the present status of the rivalry between television and newspapers as news sources all affect the relationship of medium and audience.

Socioeconomic status is inversely related to television viewing and positively related to reading newspapers and magazines, with education the most powerful predictive variable encompassed by socioeconomic status. Television viewing is the sole form of media consumption that increases after people enter their fifties. Since television viewing is strongly related to presence in the household and the proximity to a set, women on the average spend more time viewing television than do men, and they of course constitute the principal audience for daytime quiz and game shows and soap operas.

Blacks as a demographic category include a greater proportion of persons of lower socioeconomic status than the white majority. The expected stronger orientation toward television occurs for blacks as a group, but to a degree that exceeds what can readily be explained by socioeconomic differences. Not only do blacks on the average spend more time viewing television than would be predicted from socioeconomic status alone, but the inverse relationship between viewing and education that is so marked among whites is sharply attenuated among blacks. Blacks also display a greater preference for television as a news source, a preference that is also associated with lower socioeconomic status regardless of race but which, again, exceeds what would be expected on the basis of socioeconomic differences alone.

When the focus is on the media as news sources, a paradox appears. In opinion poll after opinion poll, the public has displayed increasing favorability toward televi-

sion. Today, "television" is named by more people than any other medium as their principal source of news, the most comprehensive of sources, the most rapid disseminator of news, the fairest of the news media, and the most likely to be right should its reports diverge from those of other media. Twenty years ago, newspapers or radio were first or about even with television.

The obvious conclusion that television is the nation's principal news source nevertheless must be resisted. While that may be true enough when television coverage becomes synonymous with the event, as in the case of moon shots or assassination attempts on national and world leaders, it does not fit well with the facts. The daily newspaper circulation of approximately 100 million is about double the combined average audience for the three evening network newscasts. About half the adult public will not see an evening network newscast over any given two-week period, while markedly more will give some attention to a newspaper.

During presidential elections, newspapers appear to be used more frequently than television as the source of news. People are better able to recall the topics, thrust, and details of stories in newspapers than those on television newscasts. Nor are newspapers and television equal in the degree to which their use is associated with choosing among candidates, knowledge about campaign issues, and actually voting. In each case, the empirical evidence indicates more distinct or consistent associations with newspaper reading than with television news viewing.

Television obviously has a definite advantage when the person, scene, events, or procedures are best witnessed as they take place. When compliance depends on trust in an expert, for example, television coverage may significantly enhance impact *if* the person identified as such satisfies the criteria for expertise applied by the public. Much the same may be said for the vicarious compliance that television can provide, as in documentation of the actual steps by which disaster relief, an inoculation, or alcoholism treatment may be obtained. *If* such a portrayal reduces ignorance, confusion, fear of unknown impositions, and estimates of failure, it may have significant impact.

Certainly, the same effects may be achieved by newspaper accounts, and often are. The point is that television does have an advantage when conveying a person or situation in lifelike similitude. However, neither this nor the public's exalted impression of its reliance on television suggests that as a news medium television should be assigned any superiority to newspapers in community influence.

It is entertainment that is responsible for television's reputation as a cynosure, and the preeminence that people attribute to television as a news source may in part reflect a confusing of the attention given television entertainment with that given television news. At least 90 percent of the more than four hours the average American over the age of 2 spends each day in the fall and winter viewing television is spent viewing entertainment (drama, sports, soap operas, quiz and game shows, and talk shows). When entertainment is the vehicle, television can have enormous reach. Television entertainment can convey information pertinent to social change directly, when the message is part of the theme, plot, or presentation, or indirectly, through public service announcements accompanying entertainment.

Because of television, children have come to constitute a feasible target for public information campaigns. More than half of all children 2 to 11 years of age view television between 8:30 and 11:30 a.m. on Saturday mornings, and from a third to more than half view daily between 4:00 and 10:00 p.m. Many messages, such as those exhorting good nutrition, safety, or care with matches, apply to them and will be understood by all but the youngest. Children regularly view television long before they read any part of the newspaper. They arguably constitute a valuable target be-

cause they are forming attitudes, opinions, and beliefs that will be applied in adolescence and adulthood. Although results may not be immediate, there can be some hope for long-range influence. Thus, children have been added by television to the public reachable through the mass media.

The media are neither equal nor entirely what they seem in their audiences. Certain groups are particularly heavy viewers of television—blacks, those of lower socioeconomic status, women, and the elderly. Those of higher socioeconomic status are particularly likely to read newspapers. As news media, newspapers are seen more frequently than television news and apparently are more likely to affect knowledge and behavior. Television entertainment has only minor analogues in newspaper content, accounts for most of the time people spend viewing television, can convey information that might affect behavior, and has made children a feasible and valuable target for such information.

TWO MODELS

Two models provide guidance for employing the mass media as effectively as possible as agents of social change. They are social learning theory (Bandura, 1969, 1973, 1978) and the health belief model (Becker et al., 1977, 1978; Becker and Maiman, 1975; Suchman, 1967).

Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory posits that observation of the behavior of others may affect subsequent behavior of the observer. This quite sensible proposal supplements the equally sensible proposition that personal experience, in the sense of events that have consequences for oneself, influences future behavior.

The necessary observation of others may be composed of actual events unfolding within the viewer's presence or behavior portrayed on television and film. Dozens of laboratory experiments have demonstrated that both kinds of observation function similarly in their capacity to affect subsequent behavior, although by no means should those conveyed by television and film be judged as invariably equal in impact to direct experience, even when the two sources approximate each other in what is observed. The very encapsulation of experience by these media almost certainly will deaden or intensify the impression made on an observer.

The observation of a real-life event or its portrayal in the media almost always will vary on the dimensions that govern the impact of observed behavior. The processes for each are identical, the effect unlikely so. Obviously, the application of social learning theory to the media is most direct in the case of television and film. Depictions in other media by word, sound, and picture also present examples of behavior and undoubtedly conform roughly to the same principles, although presumably rendered less influential by the absence of the cinematic element.

There are three processes by which behavior may be influenced by the media. They are acquisition, performance, and maintenance of the behavior in question. Acquisition refers to the apparent guileless ease with which observed behavior is incorporated within the repertoire of possible responses an individual might invoke. Seeing someone do something increases the capability of the observer to do likewise. Performance refers to the display of acquired behavior. Here, the contribution of the

media beyond acquisition may be negligible as personal factors, situational factors, and prior experience now take command. The frequent ineffectuality of public information campaigns in fact may be taken as testimony to the role of acquisition as necessary but not sufficient for the display of behavior. Maintenance refers to the conditions that may be construed as responsible for maintaining regular and consistent patterns of behavior. When we encounter a pattern of behavior and the array of performance factors whose regularity is responsible, we are, from the perspective of social learning theory, at the final stage of a series of processes whose regressive pursuit would conclude with an individual observing or otherwise encountering a relatively novel way of behaving.

Intrinsic to the involvement of the media in the processes of performance and maintenance are the features of the television and film portrayals. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that the factors found to increase the likelihood that a viewer will accept the guidance implicitly offered by exposure to a portrayal include the depiction of reward or lack of punishment for the behavior in question, presentation of that behavior as justified by circumstances, depiction of the perpetrator as similar to the viewer, depiction of those toward whom the behavior is directed as similar to persons likely to be in a comparable position in the viewer's environment, characterization or labeling of the portrayal as representing real life, and the absence of criticism of the behavior in question (Comstock, 1977).

These factors apparently heighten the social valuation attributed to a particular course of action for the viewer, and express variations on three basic dimensions that can be offered as prescriptions to anyone who would employ the media to intervene in everyday behavior:

(1) Present the behavior as effective in achieving a desirable outcome.
(2) Present the behavior as pertinent to real-life circumstances.
(3) Present the behavior as enjoying the approval and support of the community.

Efficacy, pertinence, approval; these are the three spheres of belief offered by social learning theory as a means by which the media conceivably might alter behavior.

Much of the experimentation supportive of social learning theory has been concerned with the influence of violent portrayals on subsequent aggressiveness, and many of the experiments have employed very young children as subjects and their imitation of simple physical acts as measures of influence. However, the theory is broadly encompassing. Violence, physical acts of aggression, and young children are simply effective means by which to verify it. It is also supported by experiments involving portrayals of constructive types of behavior and young adults as well as older children as subjects (Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1962, 1973; Comstock et al., 1978; Rushton, 1980). Especially convincing in behalf of its broad applicability is the extent to which its principles have been demonstrated as effective in the reduction of phobic reactions (Bandura, 1969; Bandura et al., 1967). In these instances, individuals have become less fearful as a result of exposure to film and television portrayals and other vicarious experience in which a feared object is progressively approached without a negative outcome.

From a social learning theory perspective, the mass media surely contribute to acquisition, but this is of no significance in the absence of performance. Given the considerable constancy and redundancy in mass media content reaching the individual and the degree to which these are heightened by the individual's efforts to avoid unpleasant, irrelevant, or uninteresting information, a good case can be made for the media figuring prominently in maintenance.

That the media most often reinforce prevailing attitudes and behavior is essentially the view advocated by Klapper (1960) in his influential survey of two decades ago, *The Effects of Mass Communication.* However, the media largely do so by default, and the occasional success of an information campaign can be taken as the measure of the degree to which the earlier configuration of information offered by the media had a part in maintaining previous patterns of thought and behavior. Performance, the first step toward a change in behavior pattern and the measure of the success of the information campaign, is most certainly strongly influenced by factors other than the media and cannot be considered entirely beyond their influence. The prescriptions of social learning theory can be written in good conscience, but they are no certain remedy.

Health Belief Model

The health belief model shares with social learning theory an emphasis on expectations. However, in the health belief model the expected outcome of behavior occupies a more prominent and concrete role. This model posits that in matters of personal welfare, behavior is a function of beliefs about risk avoidance: Manipulate the latter, and the former will change.

Social learning theory and the health belief model are identical in their assumption that behavior is governed to some degree by judgments about its likely consequences. Social learning theory submerges such judgments within the broad interpretation of the way people properly will behave made by an individual. Propriety and "social fit" join payoff as factors. The health belief model confines itself to judgments about the alleviation of risk and thus construes behavior as having a decidedly rational component.

In the health belief model, which is relevant to any kind of behavior in which risk can be affected by precautionary measures, people are implicitly conceived of as continually making decisions affecting their well-being. Information is assigned two roles: the capacity to place a risk topic on the individual's agenda for action and the power to enhance the likelihood that the individual will undertake the prescribed preventive, restorative, or remedial action. There are also two principal means by which these goals are to be achieved: the legitimization of risk, by which the belief is established that a risk exists for the individual, and the specification of avoidance, by which steps to reduce or eliminate the risk are outlined. Sometimes, belief in legitimate risk may be assumed to exist. An example is the health risk of cigarette smoking, to which 90 percent of American adults suscribe (The Gallup Report, 1981). Even in such cases, as the focus narrows, the need for legitimatization may increase. For example, only about half of American adults believe that smoking might cause birth defects. In other cases, such as unusual health risks to travelers to popular vacation areas, ignorance must be presumed.

The media assume an important role in the health belief model because they are likely sources of the kind of information with which it is concerned. Three targets of the information that can be conveyed by the media are *threat,* constituted by likelihood of occurrence and potential for harm; *efficacy,* the benefits of the prescribed behavior; and *costs,* the financial, physical, psychological, or social deficits that might be perceived as precluding the behavior in question. Unlike social learning theory, the health belief model focuses on information intended as such, but like social learning theory, it does not encourage optimism over the impact of the media. There are

numerous other sources of information competing with the media for ascendency—although the family, friends, and neighbors are unlikely to think of themselves as so engaged. Thus the prescriptions of the health belief model for intervening in everyday behavior by means of the mass media are:

(1) Nurture the motive to avoid harm or improve well-being.
(2) Heighten the incentive or value of a particular level of freedom from risk.
(3) Instill the belief that a particular act or pattern of behavior will preclude or ameliorate risk.

Other factors obviously enter into whether a particular individual will embark on a new course of behavior beyond newly received information. As with social learning theory, prior experience with the kind of behavior in question will have created a favorable or unfavorable predisposition. Demographic variables also may reflect decisive differences in the likelihood of compliance among segments of the public. For example, fear of becomng a victim of crime is much greater on the part of women, the elderly, and those living in high-crime areas (Doob and MacDonald, 1979), and the health belief model would lead one to expect that at least in this respect they would be especially likely to engage in recommended crime prevention behavior. Perceived efficacy of such behavior and the readiness or ability to assume the various costs involved also would vary for these same groups, but sometimes in a direction counter to adopting the recommended behavior.

Therefore a variety of factors implicitly of consequence in employing the media to change behavior from the social learning theory perspective become of explicit concern in the health belief model. The two formulations do not compete but rather complement each other. Jointly, they encompass entertainment and news, social as well as psychological factors, intentional efforts to achieve well-being as well as responses based on impressions obtained haphazardly, and information intended to alter behavior as well as media content disseminated with no such intent.

ILLUSTRATIVE CAMPAIGNS

Three public information campaigns give ample opportunity to explore some of the positive outcomes that legitimately can be hoped for and some of the difficulties that may be encountered. They are the continuing campaign of the U.S. government and other organizations against cigarette smoking, the national "Take a Bite Out of Crime" advertising campaign, and the Stanford three-community heart disease prevention experiment.

Antismoking Campaign

The antismoking campaign appears to represent colossal failure cloaking incipient success. McAlister (1981) undoubtedly is correct in maintaining that there is scant evidence linking exposure to information about the health risks involved in smoking to changes in smoking or attitudes about smoking by individuals, and that there is little reason to argue with Fishbein's (1977) conclusion that many people remain ignorant of the relationships between individual diseases and smoking. Nevertheless, there have been some noteworthy shifts in public opinion and behavior which support the view that the campaign as a whole has had an impact, with the media consid-

ered as a component joined by the schools, health authorities, and physicians and nurses (The Gallup Report, 1981; U.S. Surgeon General, 1981).

Since the 1940s and 1950s, the percentage of Americans 18 years of age and older who identify themselves as smokers to the Gallup poll has declined from the low- to mid-40s to 35 percent, while the percentage who believe that cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer has doubled from 41 percent in 1954 to 83 percent (Table 12.1). Ninety percent believe that smoking is harmful to health in some way; 81 percent believe that it is a cause of throat cancer; 74 percent that it is a cause of heart disease; and 53 percent that it is a cause of birth defects. Forty-three percent believe there should be "a complete ban" on all cigarette advertising in addition to the present proscription from television. U.S. government data place the percentage of adult smokers in 1979 at 32 percent, the lowest value recorded in forty-five years. Per capita cigarette consumption, which reached a peak of 4336 in 1963, has declined since 1975 to 3900 in 1979. Over the past decade, both the percentage of adult males and the percentage of adult females who smoke have declined.

This state of affairs has been achieved despite countercurrents. Physicians apparently have not been vigorous in counseling against smoking. In 1975, 65 percent of male and 61 percent of female smokers reported that they could not recall *ever* having received advice from *any* doctor about quitting, reducing, or continuing smoking (National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health, 1976). Furthermore, females increasingly approximate males in the proportion who smoke and the average age at which regular smoking begins. They once fell far short of males on these measures. Among persons 17 to 19 years of age, the percentage of women who smoke now exceeds that for men. Thus the broad wave of social change, of which greater equality between the sexes is a prominent feature, has obscured the effectiveness of the antismoking campaign. Finally, there is the enormous amount of advertising in newspapers, in magazines, on billboards, and at point of sale designed to stimulate rather than diminish cigarette smoking.

What is exemplified is not an anomaly but the almost inevitable, although here extreme, inconsistencies that occur as the media adhere to the values that govern their behavior: the economic reality of deriving support from advertising and the social obligation to carry news bearing on the public good in this instance. Habits by definition are difficult to change, and those involving food, tobacco, drugs, and alco-

TABLE 12.1 Smoking Behavior and Attitudes Among American Adults

	Percentage of Population Who					
		Believe that smoking causes:				
Year	*Smoke*	*lung cancer*	*heart disease*	*throat cancer*	*birth defects*	*Believe cigarette ads should be banned*
1981[a]	35	83	74	81	53	43
Men	38	82	75	79	47	37
Women	33	84	73	82	59	50
1977	38	81	68	79	41	36
1971	43	71				
1957	42	50				
1954	45	41				
1949	44					
1944	41					

[a]Probability sample of about 1500 adults interviewed in June 1981. Adapted from Gallup (1981).

hol particularly so. Thus, it is in fact the "failure" of the public information campaign against smoking that invites skepticism, not its efficacy.

"Take a Bite Out of Crime" Campaign

The "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign is modeled after "Smokey the Bear," arguably the longest-running, the most familiar, and, with respect to its central figure, the most affectionately regarded public interest advertising effort in American history (McNamara et al., 1981). In this new campaign, the central character is "Detective Dog," a canine in a wraparound trenchcoat (one wag suggested he should be named "Flasher") who offers advice—via television and radio spots, newspaper and magazine ads, and posters and brochures—on everyday crime prevention. "Take a Bite Out of Crime!" is Detective Dog's recurrent admonition.

The campaign, prepared by the Advertising Council in cooperation with federal agencies, began in the fall of 1979, when the advertising was made available to the media and interested organizations. The material was slick and well prepared. The varied messages were innocuous and practical: to lock the door, check the windows, and leave a light on when leaving your house or apartment for any length of time; to avoid dark or deserted streets when walking and desolate parking lots when driving; to keep an eye on the neighbors' place when they are away; and so on. Nevertheless, the media use such unpaid-for public service advertisements on their own volition and public exposure is problematic.

The campaign has been evaluated by an artful two-mode design. Mendelsohn et al. (1981) and O'Keefe and Mendelsohn (1983) employed national probability samples to assess public exposure and self-reports of effects a few months (1980) and two years (1981) after the campaign's initiation, and a three-community panel of several hundred interviewed before, a few months, and finally two years after the initiation of the campaign in order to quasi-experimentally compare those exposed and not exposed as to changes in attitudes and behavior.

The resulting data (Tables 12.2 and 12.3) compliment the campaign. By the end of two years, more than half of the public had encountered Detective Dog, a substantial increase over the figure after the first months of the campaign. Majorities of those in the national sample who recalled Detective Dog understood the message, believed it effective, thought they had gained information, considered the message worth passing on, and believed their attitudes had changed; minorities reported they had changed or would in the future change their behavior. The three-community quasi-experiment indicated changes in both attitudes and behavior attributable to exposure to the campaign.

By far the most effective medium for achieving exposure was television. Given the skepticism that any public information campaign justifiably invites in regard to changing thought or behavior, the evidence of impact in these respects is impressive. Given the reliance on voluntary dissemination by the media, so too is the degree of exposure within such a short period. The strong role of television certainly reflects a substantial degree of cooperation from the medium, conceivably greater than from newspapers and radio, and the memorability of these particular public service announcements, but it also testifies to the size of the television audience. Very likely, it also reflects the challenge to selective exposure posed by commercials (it is difficult to evade one rather than another commercial) and the near-irrelevance in this instance of selective perception (since the messages did not threaten self-esteem, habits giving pleasure, or deeply held beliefs).

TABLE 12.2 "Take a Bite Out of Crime" Evaluation: National Sample

	Percentage Who Encountered Detective Dog	
	1980 (N = 1502)	*1981 (N = 1188)*
Total	30	52
Age	46.1	72.4
18-24	30.6	66.7
25-34	28.5	44.5
35-54	21.1	37.4
55-64	19.9	33.3
65+		
Sex	26.9	
Female	26.9	49.1
Male	32.7	54.7
Education		
0-11 schools	30.1	46.8
H.S. diploma	30.8	52.8
Some college	31.6	56.2
College degree	24.1	50.5
Of those reporting having encountered Detective Dog	*Source of Encounter*	
(N = 447)	(N = 447)	(N = 618)
Television	66	78
Radio	7	6
Magazine	7	5
Billboard/Poster	10	14
Newspaper	6	8
Bus/Subway placard	2	4
	Self-Report of Effect	
Verbalized message	70	88
Perceived ad as effective	64	71
Saw message worth passing on	53	63
Reporting intention to change behavior	17	24
Information gain	28	68
new		22
remainder		46
Attitude change	43	59
Behavior change	15	22

SOURCE: Adapted from Mendelsohn et al. (1981) and O'Keefe and Mendelsohn (1983).

Heart Disease Prevention Experiment

The Stanford heart disease prevention experiment involved three roughly comparable northern California towns of 12,000 to 15,000 in population (Farquhar et al., 1977). One community received no special attention. Two communities were subjected to intensive mass media campaigns promoting practices preventive of cardiovascular disease. These identical campaigns, except for a three-month hiatus during the measurement of effects, extended over twenty-one months and consisted of 50

TABLE 12.3 Net Percentage Changes in Key Preventive Activities by Exposed and Unexposed Groups During Initial Months of Campaign

Activity	*Percentage "Always" or "Yes" Initially (N = 426)*	*Percentage[a] Net Change Exposed Group (N = 204)*	*Percentage[a] Net Change Unexposed Group (N = 222)*
Outdoor lights	41	+ 29	+ 9
Timer lights	30	+ 18	− 13
Neighbor watch	62	+ 26	+ 11
Neighborhood observing	82	+ 4	− 1
Police reporting	33	+ 5	− 5
Organization joining	13	+ 10	+ 1
Own dog for security	42	+ 19	+ 11
Correlation of Attitude Changes and Campaign Exposure[b] (N = 426)			
Perceived knowledge	+ .08*		
Perceived responsibility	− .02		
Perceived effectiveness	+ .07*		
Perceived concern	+ .01		
Perceived confidence	+ .12*		

SOURCE: Adapted from Mendelsohn et al. (1981) and O'Keefe and Mendelsohn (1983).

*($p < .05$).

a. Figures represent net percentages of respondents in each group changing in the frequency with which they carried out each activity.

b. Correlation of attitude changes and campaign exposure over 2 years with following variables controlled: initial score on variable, demographic factors, and three measures of direct and vicarious crime experience (victimization experience, media crime attention, and other crime prevention information exposure).

television spots, three hours of television programming, over 100 radio spots, several hours of radio programming, weekly newspaper columns, newspaper advertisements and stories, billboards, posters, and print materials distributed by mail. In one of these communities, a sample of persons identified as at high risk with respect to heart disease were provided with an intensive ten-week instruction program during the first year and a less intensive summer counseling program in the second year. In all three towns, measures of knowledge of risk, such risk-relevant practices as smoking, saturated fat intake, and physical status, were obtained from samples of several hundred three months before the beginning of the mass media campaign, at the end of the first year, and again at the end of the second year. The mass media campaign and the face-to-face instruction and counseling were specifically designed to heighten awareness of risk, identify risk-preventive practices, and increase the practice of such prevention.

By the end of the first year, the estimated risk of heart disease had been reduced for both communities receiving the mass media campaigns, although the reduction was notably greater for the community containing the subgroup of high-risk patients receiving the instruction program (Table 12.4). During the second year, these reduced levels of risk were maintained in the community containing the group receiving instruction and counseling and declined further in the community receiving only the mass media campaign, so that after two years the communities were almost identical in the reduced heart disease risk of the samples examined.

TABLE 12.4 Stanford Three-Community Coronary Prevention Experiment

Treatment	*Percentage Change in Overall Risk (Rounded to .5)*			
	Total Samples		*High-Risk Samples*	
	End 1st Year	*End 2nd Year*	*End 1st Year*	*End 2nd Year*
Town I: None	+7.5	+6.5	+4.5	−2.0
	(N = 384)		(N = 95)	
Town II: Mass Media Campaign	−4.5	−18.5	−10.5	−24.0
	(N = 397)		(N = 94)	
Town III: Mass Media Campaign + Instruction and Counseling				
Mass Media Only	−4.0	−18.0	−8.0	−24.5
	(N = 346**)		(N = 40)	
Mass Media + Instruction and Counseling	−13.0	−19.0	−29.0	−30.5
	(N = 423)		(N = 77)	

SOURCE: Adapted from Farquhar et al. (1977).

*Mass Media Only excludes two-thirds of high risk sample (N = 77) receiving instruction/counseling. Mass Media + Instruction/Counseling total sample includes the Mass Media Only group (N = 346) and the portion of the high risk sample (N = 77) receiving instruction/counseling.

**Analysis employed weighted N = 423 to compensate for the exclusion of 77 high risk persons receiving instruction/counseling from whom baseline measures had been obtained.

The more rapid decline in risk among those receiving instruction and counseling in addition to the mass media campaign and the greater degree of reduction among high-risk persons who received such added attention testify to the importance of face-to-face proselytization and guidance. For example, face-to-face treatment appeared to be crucial among high-risk persons for the reduction of relative weight and number of cigarettes smoked daily. Extrapolation from this instance to uses of the mass media in other contexts must take into account the extraordinary intensity of the mass media campaign. It should also be recognized that the campaign was not confined to a single risk-bearing behavior, such as smoking or cholesterol intake, but instead embraced a broad range of behavior directed toward the avoidance of personal disaster. Nevertheless, the data unambiguously support the efficacy of intervention in everyday behavior by the mass media.

CONCLUSION

Although the mass media have become increasingly pervasive in American life, they cannot be employed as instruments of social change with any certainty of success because of their characteristics, the values to which they are subservient, and the limits imposed on the techniques on which they rely by the characteristics, interests, and predispositions of the audiences that attend to them. Two complementary formulations supported by substantial empirical evidence, social learning theory and the health belief model, provide guidelines for maximizing the likelihood that public information campaigns will have some influence. Knowledge of the distinctions among the media in terms of whom they reach and the content in which they special-

ize may be helpful, but often information is carried voluntarily, as in the case of news or public service announcements, or as a by-product, as in the case of incidental lessons conveyed by entertainment and the social lives of celebrities, so the strategy is as much hope as plan. Despite the various difficulties involved, however, there is good reason to believe that the mass media can be employed to some positive effect, for the promises of social learning theory and the health belief model are confirmed by experience with campaigns directed toward such varied practices as smoking, crime prevention, and the avoidance of coronaries.

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13

Theory in Use Among Change Agents

Gerald Zaltman

Successful community intervention requires an effective dissemination of knowledge among all stakeholders in the community intervention process. Accordingly, one way to treat the topic of knowledge dissemination would be to discuss the efficacy of different communication channels for transferring knowledge from one change agent to another, from change agents to clients, or, more ambitiously, to examine the entire communication structure existing among diverse stakeholders. Although such an approach has merit and is consistent with extant treatments of the topic, it also poses a problem. This problem will be discussed below. Following that discussion some definitional issues will be addressed. The chapter will then proceed to a treatment of knowledge dissemination guidelines that may be useful in the training of change agents.

It is conceptually convenient to separate the activities of knowledge creation or production, knowledge dissemination, and knowledge application or use. This distinction is evident not only in research and its attendant published literatures but even in the social organization of participants in the knowledge and social change professions. Separating knowledge creation, dissemination, and application has several advantages (not to be developed here), and much fruitful work has been facilitated by making these distinctions. However, this separation confronts a difficulty: Phenomena that are conceptually distinct may coexist and, moreover, comingle in such a fashion that might require alternative constructs. A kind of linear description of creation → dissemination → application may be less accurate (even if more convenient) than a construal of these activities as interactive. The alternative constructs would reflect the interaction effects. Thus knowledge may be created in the process of dissemination and application just as application may occur in the dissemination and creation processes. This poses the further catch that an understanding of knowledge dissemination in social change requires an understanding of creation and application phenomena. I shall return to this dilemma shortly. First, however, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of specific terms as they are used in this chapter.

The term "knowledge" refers to a meaning or mapping of reality that is accepted as valid and reliable according to some set of truth tests. Knowledge is differentiated here from data and information. Data might include a set of statistics about the inci-

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dence of cigarette smoking among members of a particular population. Information refers to the meaning of those statistics, for example, that the incidence is increasing. If that information (meaning) is believed, it is knowledge. Knowledge is very much a social and psychological construction of reality. An "innovation" is information perceived as new. The innovation may have a clear physical manifestation, such as a new drug. It may have a somewhat less focused but still specific content, such as a new system for delivering mental health services. The innovation may have an even less focused manifestation, such as a new theory of counseling. A new interpretation or meaning attached to either familiar data or new data would be an innovation. That innovation, if sufficiently convincing, would constitute an item of knowledge.

The term "dissemination" is the process of communicating data, information, or knowledge. The simple publication of census tract data is a dissemination activity. Dissemination would also include the reporting of a social forecast using census data or an explanation of why certain patterns observed in those data have emerged. Dissemination activities would also include design considerations for communicating the forecast or explanation in a convincing or believable way.

When discussing the dissemination of knowledge, I shall mean the communication of reality maps or meanings that are believed by a change agent who intends that some audience also believes these meanings. A community health worker who believes pregnant women should not consume alcohol or smoke and attempts to convince such women not to do so is disseminating knowledge. Whether other change agents, pregnant women, and other stakeholders believe this information is another matter. Of course, the dissemination strategies employed by the community health worker may determine whether various parties also come to accept or believe the information. Thus the process of communicating information in such a way that it is accepted is an essential part of the dissemination process.

Dissemination strategies influence not only the likelihood of exposure to information but also whether or not that information becomes part of someone else's reality map. Accordingly, persons committed to the dissemination of knowledge must understand their own and their intended audience's frames of reference and reality tests. That is, they must understand whether there is a good fit or whether there is a significant discrepancy between their own set of assumptions, expectations, and decision rules and those of their clients. Additionally, the tests clients employ to evaluate the truthfulness and usefulness of information must be further understood. Frames of reference may act upon received information in creative ways. For example, information that the change agent may feel is inconsistent with current client practices may be perceived by clients as reinforcing those practices. This process of biased assimilation is a knowledge creation or production process that the change agent may unwittingly encourage in the dissemination of knowledge. This brings us back to the issue of the comingling of knowledge dissemination, creation, and application phenomena.

Knowledge dissemination is less distinct from other aspects of the social change process, that is, the creation of innovations and their acceptance, than most models of social change suggest. Therefore, what may be useful for the reader is a treatment of dissemination issues within a framework that avoids the conventional linear description of social change. In fact, there is substantial short-circuiting among different activities in the social change *planning* process, as suggested in Figure 13.1.

This chapter is less concerned with the overall planning process and more concerned with dissemination. The approach to be followed stresses a number of dissemination guidelines within a convenient framework that permits greater sensitivity to knowledge creation and especially knowledge acceptance issues.



SOURCE: Rich and Zaltman (1978: 45).

FIGURE 13.1 Basic Activities in Planned Social Change

MAJOR SOCIAL CHANGE PRINCIPLES: THEORY IN USE AMONG CHANGE AGENTS

There are several major social change principles that appear to be internalized by successful change planners. Many of these are obvious. They are also surprisingly easy to forget in the planning process. They are apparently more obvious when using hindsight than when using foresight. A clear message emerging from a wide set of case studies on planned social change is that crises foster forgetfulness. The principles presented in this section are those that change planners should most carefully keep in mind during a crisis.

The principles to be introduced below are derived from a broad array of sources and experiences. However, more than anything else they reflect the principles or theories that appear to be used by successful change agents. Moreover, these principles are evident in the practices of successful change agents working in a diverse array of settings. Hence there is a type of convergent validity concerning their usefulness. In order to increase their usefulness the principles are interrelated to reflect a system of ideas. These connected or interrelated ideas represent the *theories or knowledge structures* in use among effective change agents.

The discussion to follow will begin with a specific principle. The core concepts

involved in each principle will be identified, as will the underlying propositions from which the principle appears to be derived. Relationships among propositions will be suggested. These related propositions are especially useful in the training of change agents.

A convenient framework that will be used here to organize these principles has been suggested by Howard Davis (Davis, 1973; Davis and Salasin, 1975). This framework, described by the acronym A VICTORY, is described below:

A = *Ability*, the resources and capabilities of the individual or organization to implement and subsequently evaluate the innovation; sanctions of decision makers to adopt the innovation.
V = *Values*, the degree of accord with the individual's or organization's philosophy and operating style.
I = *Idea*, the adequacy of knowledge about the innovative procedure and the proposed action steps.
C = *Circumstances*, features of the individual's or organization's environment relevant to successful adoption or adaptation of the innovation.
T = *Timing*, readiness to consider the innovation; the particular combination of events at a given time that might affect the likelihood of implementation.
O = *Obligation*, the felt need to change from existing modi operandi—or at least to try the proposed change.
R = *Resistances*, inhibiting factors—the organizational or individual disinclination to change, for whatever reasons.
Y = *Yield*, the benefits or payoff from the innovation as perceived by potential adopters and by those who would be involved with implementation at the operating level.

Ability

Change Principle 1

Change planners should provide clients with the ability to convert favorable attitudes regarding an innovation into actual behavior if this ability does not already exist. Clients cannot be expected to adopt an innovation if they do not have the knowledge or skills or fiscal resources to implement the logical behavioral consequences of an attitude. For example, a sharp debate exists among various nutrition experts, food industry groups, and the Federal Trade Commission concerning nutrient labeling on food containers and in food advertising. All groups agree that favorable attitudes exist among consumers toward improving their nutrition. Nutritionists and industry groups argue that consumers do not have the knowledge to translate nutrient information into appropriate meal planning behaviors and would react negatively to this information. The FTC claims that the ability will be acquired gradually if it does not already exist, and that rather than causing consumers to ignore the nutrient information, provision of such data will encourage consumers to seek the necessary additional knowledge to use the provided information. Either position may be correct or incorrect, but both clearly address the issue of client ability.

Two concepts are important in Change Principle 1: the diagnosis of client abilities and client ability building. A proposition behind this principle could be:

The greater the diagnosed inability of clients to accept an innovation, the more the change planner should focus on building those abilities.

This is Proposition 1 in Figure 13.2.



FIGURE 13.2 Ability

Change Principle 2

Change planners should distinguish between client inabilities that can be altered and those that are relatively fixed and to which they must adapt. For example, if clients lack knowledge concerning the effective utilization of an innovation, the change planner may attempt to manipulate directly the knowledge level of clients through various kinds of instructional efforts. If the evaluation of an OD program suggests the use of survey feedback, then selected members of the organization could be released from their duties to receive training in survey feedback techniques. If, on the other hand, clients seriously lack the necessary financial resources to adopt an innovation, the change planner should probably accept this client inability as fixed and adapt the financial requirements of the innovation to this constraint. In another context, persons unable to pay for medical services in monetary terms are being allowed to "pay" through the provision of services such as babysitting in the clinic's nursery or in the homes of other persons needing medical assistance but who are unable to travel to the clinic or hospital with their children. In this case, altering the innovation (by changing payment procedures) relaxed a previously unalterable constraint on client ability to adopt the innovation (that is, client ability to pay for use of the innovation).

At least two concepts seem central to Change Principle 2. These are the alterability of client inabilities and the adaptability of the innovation. The underlying proposition for Change Principle 2 appears to be:

> The more unalterable a client inability is, the more change planners should focus on innovation-related alterations and less on client-related alterations.

This is Proposition 2.

Values

Change Principle 3

Change planners should not assume that what is perceived to be scientifically rational to them will also be viewed as rational by clients. This is called the rationalistic bias (Zaltman and Duncan, 1977). Change planners and clients often do not share



FIGURE 13.3 Values

common values and hence have different perceptions about the rationality of accepting an innovation. In the area of humoral medicine, there are many examples of change planners and clients having two completely contradictory belief systems. For example, a medical officer may prescribe a medically appropriate treatment for an illness. If the clients' perception of the temperature quality of the treatment is not opposite their perception of the temperature quality of the illness, the prescribed treatment will be rejected.

Two basic concepts involved in this principle are disparities between the value systems of change planners and clients, and change planners' assumptions about client rationality. These concepts suggest Proposition 3 in Figure 13.3:

> The greater the disparity between change planners and client value systems, the more salient the issue of a rationalistic bias should be.

(Again, rationalistic bias refers to the change planners' assumptions that what is rational to them must also be rational to potential clients.)

Change Principle 4

Change planners should exercise considerable effort to enhance the compatibility of the innovation with existing values, beliefs, and attitudes among clients. This change principle follows from Change Principle 3. In the case of humoral medicine, this has involved the administration of a placebo that the client perceives as a rational treatment along with the treatment prescribed by medical personnel. In the case of the resistance to an external evaluator, the change planner may be able to demonstrate to a client organization that the use of a more expert and objective external evaluator may prevent a likely negative evaluation of a program by community leaders.

Change Principle 4 implies research by change planners and the use of research to enhance innovation-client compatibility. Proposition 4 appears to underlie this change principle:

> The greater the degree of knowledge acquired about the client's value system, the greater the ability of change planners to develop an innovation compatible with that value system.

The concepts in Proposition 4 are related to those in Proposition 3. For example,



FIGURE 13.4 Information

> The greater the level of knowledge acquisition effort expended, the more likely change planners are to learn about discrepancies between their value systems and those of their clients.

This is labeled Proposition A. Proposition 3 suggests this should enhance concern with avoiding a rationalistic bias. Proposition B is also suggested:

> The more concerned change planners are to avoid a rationalistic bias, the greater their ability to (and probability of) develop(ing) an innovation compatible with their clients' value systems.

Information

Change Principle 5

Change planners should clearly establish for their clients the connection between the advocated innovation and a felt need or concern experienced by potential clients. This may require providing considerable information to clients. For example, very substantial and creative efforts have been required in family-planning programs to establish among selected populations in Malaysia and Nepal the idea that smaller families made possible through contraception enhance adult financial security more than do larger families. Change Principle 5 appears to be derived from the following relationship, expressed as Proposition 5 in Figure 13.4:

> The more information is provided about the direct relevance of an innovation to a client need, the earlier the innovation will be adopted.

Change Principle 6

Change planners should be very careful to provide information that facilitates the understanding of how the innovation works.

> The more change planners facilitate understanding about the functioning of an innovation, the more readily it will be adopted.

This is Proposition 6.

Change Principle 7

Change planners should emphasize instructions about the implementation of an innovation. Clients are unlikely to adopt an innovation despite favorable attitudes toward it if they feel they lack information about putting it into use effectively. While an agency may agree that formative and/or summative evaluation is desirable, uncertainty about using evaluation techniques may prevent the use of any systematic evaluation efforts. This extends to the situation where implementing the results of a recently concluded project with a school district, considerable resistance to having a summative evaluation component was encountered, because the results were not expected to be put into use effectively. The school superintendent believed that his staff was not in a position to translate those research results into action and hence should not be required to expend the effort to provide the necessary data. He was assuming (incorrectly) that the change planners would not be concerned with assisting in this task after the formal termination of the pilot program.

Change Principle 7 appears to have as its basis Proposition 7:

> The more understanding provided about an innovation's implementation, the more readily an innovation will be adopted.

Propositions 5, 6, and 7 have a client behavior, early adoption, as a dependent variable. However, three change-planner-related concepts in these propositions are interrelated and are of more central concern here. Once clients perceive the relevance of an innovation to a felt need, the greater their motivation to learn about how it works and how they may use it effectively. This suggests Propositions C and D. Proposition C is:

> The more information provided about the relevance of an innovation to a client need, the more likely change planners are to be requested to provide information about the functioning of an innovation.

Proposition D is:

> The more information provided about the functioning of an innovation, the more likely change planners are to be asked to go further to facilitate understanding about the implementation of an innovation.

The demand for information about implementation is likely to be greater as clients gain more understanding about the functioning of an innovation they perceive as relevant to a felt need. Thus, Proposition E states that (given Proposition C):

> The more change planners facilitate understanding about the functioning of an innovation, the more likely it is that clients will ask planners to help them (clients) understand how to use or implement the innovation.

In short, once a community mental health center director realizes that a particular organizational development technique may have significant unanticipated consequences, he or she will be more open to considering a type of evaluation research especially appropriate for assessing such consequences. This type of research will be perceived as potentially relevant. This potential relevance will be clarified when the change planner provides an understanding of how the research works in principle. If satisfied by this, the director will be concerned with having the change planner indicate how it could be put to work in his or her center.

Circumstances

Change Principle 8

Change planners should avoid focusing only on the individual clients and forgetting that client behavior is greatly affected by other people and organizations and the larger culture. Clients make decisions and use innovations in social settings, and those decisions and use behaviors are strongly influenced by the surrounding social settings.

Acquiring knowledge about the social settings or circumstances in which decisions are made and innovations are used enables change planners to design innovations compatible with those circumstances. It also enables change planners to develop more client-compatible programs introducing the innovation. Research about who rural-dwelling mothers of very small infants used as social referents when making decisions to breast-feed their children greatly facilitated the design of radio announcements, posters, and billboards in a government-sponsored nutrition education program in three Central American nations. A major concern in these three programs was to have mothers breast-feed their children for at least six months after birth. Considerable time was also spent in this program mapping communication structures and traffic patterns in various representative communities to determine optimal points for locating posters and billboards.

Change Principle 8 seems to be derived from Proposition 8:

> The more change planners acquire (and use) knowledge about their clients' social circumstances, the more compatible the innovation can be made to be with those circumstances.



FIGURE 13.5 Circumstances

Timing

Change Principle 9

Change planners should think in terms of optimum rather than minimum time for securing the adoption of an innovation. Time, in this principle, refers to the speed (fast or slow) of the adoption and diffusion processes. Even when rapid adoption is possible, it may be fruitful to delay actual adoption. For example, if client expectations about an innovation are unrealistically high and adoption is immediate, early disappointment is likely, which may trigger early discontinuance and/or unfavorable word-of-mouth communication. There is a very long history of unintended puffery by commercial and noncommercial research and development agencies producing teaching innovations. An example is a complex social science curriculum for 10 to 12-year-olds. This curriculum has elicited considerable excitement among teachers in workshop settings. Teachers adopting the innovation found the practicalities of in-class use quite different from the workshop settings and largely discontinued its use. In this example, change planners would want to adjust client expectations downward to some realistic level prior to actual adoption.

Other examples, which indicate that the minimum possible time for adoption is not always the best time, share in common dysfunctional postadoption consequences that should be "addressed" in advance of actual client adoption. Usually this means the change planner should delay client adoption until these issues are addressed.

The idea upon which Change Principle 9 appears to be based is Proposition 9:



FIGURE 13.6 Timing

> The greater the range or intensity of potential postadoption client problems (related to the innovation) perceived by change planners, the more sensitive change planners should be to the timing (delay) of client adoption.

This assumes that a delay permits change planners to take actions that will lessen the severity of postadoption problems. If a delay does not permit remedial action by change planners, then conceivably the optimum adoption time would be the minimum possible time before clients discover the problems.

Change Principal 10

Change planners should be sensitive to ongoing events that may adversely (or propitiously) affect the decision to adopt an innovation, or may adversely (or propitiously) affect the use of an innovation after adoption. This principle is most commonly articulated with regard to events over which the change planner has little, if any, control. If an ongoing event has a positive impact, then change planners might find it wise to time the introduction of an innovation or the encouragement of its adoption with that event. Conversely, an adverse event may cause change planners to delay the introduction of an innovation or delay any final decision making by the client.

Change Principle 10 appears to be partially founded in Proposition 10:

> The more impact an ongoing and essentially uncontrollable event is perceived to have on the adoption decision, the more salient the timing of client innovation adoption.

Change Principle 10 also appears to be based in part on Proposition 11:

> The more impact an ongoing and essentially uncontrollable event is perceived to have on the client's attitude, the more salient the timing of the introduction of an innovation.

Change Principle 11

Change planners should be sensitive to possible future events that may impact favorably or unfavorably attitudes toward the innovation and the adoption of an innovation. If an unanticipated future event is perceived by change planners to have a favorable impact on attitudes toward an innovation, change planners may wish to delay introducing the innovation until the event occurs or is more imminent. If the event would have a negative impact, introduction of the innovation well before the event would seem appropriate. Similarly, change planners may wish to delay active decision making by clients until an expected favorable event occurs. Again, if the event is expected to have a negative impact on that decision, decisions prior to that event should be encouraged.

The decision by an international humanitarian aid agency to actively encourage the use of a semicommercial distribution system for condoms using military logistical support and retired military personnel as vendors in rural areas was delayed several months until senior military personnel were promoted into (and out of) important positions. The decision by the international agency to pursue such a distribution system in El Salvador was made without prior assessment of the existing support of the critical military personnel. This agency did have sufficient leverage within the government of El Salvador to bring pressure on the military formally to support the distribution system. However, very little effort would have been required by unfavorably disposed military personnel completely to thwart the program through informal means.

Change Principle 11 appears to be based on two propositions. The first proposition is Proposition 12:

> The greater the perceived degree of impact (favorable or unfavorable) of an anticipated and uncontrollable future event on clients' attitudes toward an innovation, the more salient the issue of the timing of the introduction of that innovation.

Next, we have Proposition 13:

> The greater the perceived degree of impact (favorable or unfavorable) of an anticipated and uncontrollable future event on clients' decision making, the more salient the issue of the timing of when clients actually make that decision.

Change Principle 12

Change planners should consider how past events, such as past efforts to satisfy the relevant need, may influence client response to an innovation. This principle appears to be derived from Proposition 14:

> The greater the perceived degree of impact (favorable or unfavorable) related past events have had on clients, the more salient the issue of timing in the introduction of an innovation.

Obligation

Change Principle 13

Change planners should determine that potential clients are experiencing a significant discrepancy between their present well-being in the area of the innovation and what they feel their well-being should be. The greater this discrepancy, the greater the felt need to change. The discrepancy between a present and a desired state is sometimes referred to as a performance gap. This latter label is preferred over felt need.

Whether or not a significant performance gap (or felt need) is experienced influences clients' motivations to consider an innovation. This in turn should influence the change planners' decision whether or not to introduce the innovation to those clients. *If* change planners are committed to introducing the innovation and a performance gap is not experienced, it is important for change planners to know whether to enhance the experience of a performance gap by (1) attempting to lower clients' satisfactions with their present state or (2) increasing their sense of what their state of well-being should or could be.

The first innovation to be introduced might be a discrepancy evaluation program. Discrepancy evaluation might well be considered as a predecessor innovation for other innovations. One such "following" innovation might be an ongoing evaluation research program. However, change planners must be able to demonstrate that the results of the evaluation research process—which are the most significant innovations for the client—can close a performance gap. Client utilization of the specific results of evaluation research is yet another innovation adoption problem. This brief discussion suggests that change planners should think in terms of bundles or clusters of innovations, perhaps presented in sequence, as an appropriate response to client performance gaps. How much of the bundle of innovations is necessary depends on how acutely the client is experiencing a performance gap.



FIGURE 13.7 Obligation

Whether or not clients are perceived by change planners to be experiencing a performance gap influences such strategic decisions as whether or how an innovation should be introduced. Change planners' perceptions of their clients' performance gaps influence weightings given to various strategy selection criteria concerning the introduction of the innovation. The issue of strategy selection criteria is discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. However, it appears that change planners will be more proactive (more outreach-oriented, more persuasive, and so on) in their strategies the less they perceive clients to be aware of experiencing a performance gap.

The use of incentives to foster innovation adoption is an example of a proactive strategy in response to an absence of client recognition of performance gaps. Incentives are defined here as monetary or nonmonetary inducements to adopt an innovation, but which are not intrinsically related to the innovation. The use of lottery tickets for increasing attendance at nutrition education classes or the giving of cash payment for undergoing a vasectomy are examples. The use of incentives is growing rapidly planned social change. In a special way, they, too, are technological shortcuts to change. The advocacy of passive restraints, such as air bags in automobiles (which require no active behavior on the part of the drivers), are examples of proactive change planner strategy in response to an apparently insufficiently felt need for safety protection among many drivers.

The basic proposition upon which Change Principle 13 appears to be based is:

> The smaller the client-experienced performance gap determined by change planners, the more salient proactive change strategies will be to change planners.

This is Proposition 15 in Figure 13.7. Again, this appears most prevalent when change planners themselves feel a need or obligation to introduce an innovation Thus, Proposition 16 must be added:

> The lower the change planners' need or obligation to introduce an innovation, the less salient proactive change strategies will be.

Simply put, Proposition 15 and 16 say that the less people want to change, the more change planners will want to convince them that they should change (#15) unless

change planners do not themselves have a strong need for people to adopt the innovation (#16).

Change Principle 14

Change planners should exercise great care in identifying and assessing the performance gap clients experience. This principle warns against identifying the wrong performance gap. It also suggests that the magnitude of the performance gap be carefully assessed and compared with other needs clients may have. These warnings or suggestions, if heeded, can help avoid the error of responding to the wrong performance gap. A performance gap could be "wrong" in several senses: It is not the one that underlies a problem; it is not of a serious absolute magnitude; or there are other more serious performance gaps that the change planner should address first. For example, senior health planners in a wide variety of health settings and countries are determining that, say in the areas of alcoholism and drug abuse, the critical performance gap is not excessive consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and so forth, but rather inappropriate lifestyle behaviors that happen to be conducive to excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Very different types of change programs are indicated, depending whether the problem is defined at the "excessive consumption" or at the "lifestyle" level.

Selecting the most appropriate performance gap to address requires the careful acquisition of knowledge about clients. Careful data collection *and evaluation* or interpretation are especially important when the client's problem involves circumstances that suggest a performance gap is unclear. Thus, Change Principle 14 appears to be derived from Proposition 17:

> The greater the level of knowledge acquisition about client circumstances, the more precise the definition of client performance gaps.

A greater precision of performance gap definition implies a lower likelihood of responding to the wrong need or performance gap. The proposition assumes that the acquired knowledge about client circumstances relating to performance gaps will be carefully evaluated.

Resistance

Change Principle 15

The change planner should use the display of client resistance as an opportunity to acquire additional knowledge about the client. Being attentive to the presence of resistance and the way resistance manifests itself may yield many new insights into client circumstances that might not be obtained otherwise. These insights may be helpful in responding to present resistance or to future resistance concerning future innovations. For example, several studies have been conducted evaluating the management of national family planning programs in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Persons involved in implementing the recommendations of these evaluation studies have often encountered considerable resistance even when there was little resistance to the evaluation process itself.

Principle 15 appears to be derived from Proposition 18a:



FIGURE 13.8 Resistance

The greater the study of actual resistance, the greater the acquisition of knowledge abut client social circumstances.

Also,

the greater the study of actual resistance, the greater the acquisition of knowledge about clients' personal value systems.

This is identified as Proposition 18b.

Change Principle 16

"The change planner should distinguish between sources of resistance that can be overcome in the short run and those that can be overcome only in the long run perhaps not at all" (Zaltman et al., 1977: 313). (This principle is related to Change Principle 2 concerning the alterability of client abilities.) Some sources of resistance such as those rooted in very basic belief and value systems or in strongly functioning norms, cannot be altered directly by changing the client in some way. Other sources of resistance, such as inappropriately perceived threats, may be altered directly providing the client with more accurate information indicating that the innovation will not have the worrisome effect. Those sources of resistance that cannot be altered readily by changing the client may require altering change planner behaviors. For example, many consumer activists are concerned with the elderly consumers as victims of deception and criminal fraud. Programs designed to help elderly consumers who feel victimized to complain effectively have not been particularly successful with the groups most in need of assistance in the complaint process. These programs have focused on providing information about how to lodge an effective complaint. This information does overcome some causes of resistance. However, recent research indicates that the elderly consumer most in need of help is one who, due to physical inabilities, is unable to write a letter of complaint, get to a mailbox, or travel to a store to complain. Such barriers to changing clients are best overcome by an active outreach program of personal contact with clients, rather than through the dissemination

of booklets (Zaltman et al., 1980). Thus, consumer activist groups are beginning to reorient their activities to conform to these client barriers.

Two basic concepts appear to be involved in Principle 16. One is the alterability of a cause of resistance. The second is the alterability of the change program. Proposition 19 appears to be the foundation for this principle:

> The more unalterable a cause of resistance is through manipulation of client circumstances, the more consideration change planners should give to manipulation of their programs to be more consonant with circumstances causing client resistance.

An objection to this proposition on nontechnical grounds may lie in an implication that change planners should try to alter clients or their circumstances before altering their own change program. This is not intended as a suggestion, although it is a frequent practice.

Change Principle 17

Change planners should consider the expression of resistance to be an accurate indication of the absence of a perceived performance gap or need. Change planners should be as willing to terminate an innovation on the basis of real or anticipated resistance as they are to launch or continue an innovation on the basis of real or anticipated favorable responses to the innovation. Resistance may be healthy. It is not necessarily something to be overcome or adapted to. This principle is based on Proposition 20:

> The greater the level of resistance (real or anticipated), the greater should be the change planner's willingness to terminate the innovation.

This proposition is clearly prescriptive and not descriptive except in the extreme. Change planners do terminate programs when faced with substantial resistance. However, this is most often done only after efforts to lower resistance have been unsuccessful, rather than on the basis of resistance being interpreted as an indication of the absence of a desire or need for the innovation.

Yield

Change Principle 18

Change planners should be very clear in identifying for clients the intended benefits of an innovation. For example, if evaluation research is the innovation being advocated for an organization, a clear statement should be made about what *type* of evaluation research is proposed and what type of insights it is likely and also unlikely to yield. This lowers the likelihood of client uncertainty and ambiguity and subsequent disappointment. However, intended benefits are not necessarily those that clients want or associate with a given innovation. Change planners may introduce an innovation for one reason, while clients adopt it for a different reason. This does not mean clients should not adopt an innovation for reasons other than those advocated by change planners. Rather, it means clients should have a clear understanding of what the change planners' perceptions of benefits are. This may prevent unrealistic



FIGURE 13.9 Yield

expectations from developing, or inappropriate use of the innovation. Change Principle 18 appears to be derived from Proposition 21 in Diagram 8:

> The greater the discrepancy between client and change planner perceptions of an innovation's benefits, the more active change planners should be in identifying the benefits intended.

Change Principle 19

No innovation should be selected by change planners without prior evaluation of its benefits, nor should the innovation be introduced and sustained without a prior plan for evaluating its benefits and costs. Benefits and costs are considered here in their nonfinancial as well as financial aspects.

Evaluation research seems especially appropriate when the benefits and costs are not clear-cut and not likely to all be in the expected and intended directions. Thus, Change Principle 19 appears to be based in part on the notion of uncertainty about benefits and costs. The less control change planners have over the nature of the benefits and costs, the more essential it is to have an evaluation plan. (This does not mean that it is unimportant to have an evaluation plan if benefits and costs are clear-cut or are controllable.) Proposition 22 appears to be one foundation for Change Principle 19:

> The more uncertain change planners are about the nature of an innovation's benefits and costs, the more important it is that their evaluation plan allow for second-order consequences.

Second-order consequences are those benefits and costs that go beyond those intended by change planners.

Additional Propositions

The broad set of factors used to group the principles discussed thus far are interelated. For example, the type of information change planners provide, as well as the way information is structured and the strategy selected for its dissemination, is influenced by assessments made about client (and change planner) abilities, circumstances, and obligations. It is not difficult to imagine how each factor could be affected by every



FIGURE 13.10 Relationships Among Propositions 1 Through 22

other factor. In this section, some of the more prominent interrelationships will be addressed. These interrelationships are derived from the concepts in the propositions already presented.

Figure 13.10 shows the various connections among concepts identified in Propositions 1 through 22. Figure 13.11 shows other relationships among concepts in those same propositions. These might be called emergent propositions. These new relationships emerge when considering possible but not previously specified propositions based on the concepts in Figure 13.10. They are, however, more than logical possibilities. Each proposition specified in Figure 13.11 has at least limited empirical support in either a published case study or in the behavior of exemplar change agents observed by this author. Thus Figure 13.10 presents a partial network of ideas representing a composite theory or knowledge structure used by successful change agents. Figure 13.11 simply identifies additional relationships in this network that are supported on logical and empirical grounds. These new relationships are discussed briefly in this section and given alphabetical designations.

It is not feasible within the scope of this chapter to present evidential support for these propositions. Nor is it feasible within this chapter to reexamine the proposition in Figure 13.10 in light of those emerging in Figure 13.11.

Ability—Values—Circumstances

Client ability building may involve changing client value systems and social circumstances. These changes may bring about greater compatibility between the client and the innovation. Thus, Proposition F is suggested in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 13.11:

> The more client ability building undertaken, the greater the (eventual) innovation-client compatibility.

This involves consideration of abilities, circumstances, and values. The reader is reminded of Proposition 2, indicating that ability building is dependent on the alterability of client inabilities. Just how alterable values and social circumstances are depends on their centrality and the importance of the innovation to be acquired (see Propositions 4—values—and 8—circumstances). Proposition G in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 13.11 is also suggested:

> The more alterable innovations are, the more easily innovation-client compatibility can be achieved.

Obligation—Information

One reason change planners want to be very concerned with the precise definition of client performance gaps is to be better able to articulate the relevance of an innovation as a way of narrowing that gap. This brings us to Proposition H in the center-left of Figure 13.11:

> The more precise the definition of performance gaps, the better able change planners are to provide information about the relevance of an innovation.

Change planners will simply have a better idea of what to say which will demon-

Yield—Timing

A concept identified among the timing factors concerned the severity of postadoption problems experienced by clients (see Proposition 9). These problems may be viewed as second-order consequences. Whether or not they are anticipated, they are presumably not intended. Although postadoption problems are not intended, they still are part of the yield of an innovation, and thus part of the bundle of benefits and costs that should be evaluated. This would seem especially important if the problems are severe. This suggests Proposition S (top-center in Figure 13.11):

> The greater the perceived severity of postadoption problems experienced by clients, the greater should be the extent of provision for the evaluation of second-order consequences.

Resistance—Yield

> The more activity change planners expend in communicating to clients the benefits clients are intended to experience, the lower the level of resistance which should be encountered.

This is Proposition T in the bottom-center of Figure 13.11. This proposition assumes that resistance may be based in a particular case on lack of adequate information about the innovation (see Propositions C and E and the discussion on information and yield).

Obligation—Yield

Resistance is likely to be less if change planners are especially precise in their definition of client performance gaps. However, the linkage between obligation and resistance appears to be mediated through a yield factor. Specifically, Proposition U is suggested:

> The more precise change planners are in defining client performance gaps, the lower the discrepancy between client and change planner perceptions of benefits.

This would become manifest, for example, in the development of an innovation more compatible with the client. (See also Propositions 4—concerning values—and 8—concerning circumstances.) When the benefits clients perceive match those change planners perceive and when the benefits at issue are developed by change planners in response to a precise definition of a performance gap, then the likelihood of experiencing resistance is low. This is Proposition V in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 13.11:

> The smaller the discrepancy between change planners' and clients' perceptions of benefits, the lower the level of resistance experienced by change planners.

Obligation—Values

Proposition 17 identified a link between knowledge about social circumstances and the precision of defining performance gaps. There should be a similar linkage between knowledge about client personal values.

> The higher the level of knowledge acquired regarding clients' personal value systems, the more precise the definition of client performance gaps.

This is Proposition W in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 13.11. Through testing we might well discover that Propositions 4, 8, and U could be dropped and, in effect, replaced by a proposition (not shown here) connecting the precision of performance gap definition directly with innovation-client compatibility. A proposition (not shown here) would then probably be in order connecting innovation-client compatibility with planner-client discrepancies in perceived benefits. Of course, these two possible propositions may still be appropriate without Propositions 4, 8, and U becoming insignificant.

Resistance—Ability

Propositions 2b and 19 may be considered redundant, depending on the examples used. An inability could be expected to be a potential cause of resistance. An alteration in the innovation would be an example of an alteration in the change planner's program. However,

> the greater the level of study of actual client resistance, the greater the diagnosed client inabilities.

This is Proposition X in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 13.11. This proposition is phrased in the direction of frequent change planner behavior: Experience resistance and then determine what inability is causing it. A more prescriptive proposition would suggest that the more advance diagnosis of client inabilities is possible, the more client ability building activity should occur (Proposition 1), and thus,

> the more client ability building, the lower the level of resistance experienced.

This is Proposition Y in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 13.11.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began with a caution: Knowledge creation, dissemination, and application criteria, which are conceptually distinct, coexist and comingle. The resultant interactions are at least as critical to understand as the conceptually distinct phenomena. Probably the interaction effects are more important and are the major determinants of whether subsets of knowledge—innovations—become diffused within a community. Research in the field of planned social change has barely begun to address interaction effects among knowledge or innovation creation, dissemination, and application phenomena. Change agent training has completely ignored these effects.

After noting the comingling, interactive nature of creation, dissemination, and application, a framework was introduced that does not assume linearity. The framework consists of a set of factors that operate more or less simultaneously. A set of propositions involving each factor was introduced. Thus propositions relating to such factors as ability, resistance, timing, and so forth were introduced. Of course, concepts in, say, ability-related propositions are related to concepts in, say, timing-related propositions. In fact some concepts in each factor's proposition set are related to one

or more concepts in one or more other factor proposition sets. A necessarily brief discussion (illustrated by Figure 13.11) of this concluded the chapter.

The particular propositions presented in this chapter are to be viewed as rules of thumb that change agents or interventionists should use with considerable poetic license. Stated somewhat differently, they are central tendencies for effective change agents, not absolute rules. Many factors beyond the considerations contained in the propositions influence the degree of success obtained in any community intervention. For example, the propositions do not address issues of personal style and social skills that change agents exhibit. Individual differences among change agents may suggest correspondingly different strategies and tactics; what works for one change agent may not work for a change agent having different interpersonal skills.

A most constructive exercise is for the reader to map his or her own network of key ideas or concepts relevant to community intervention. This involves surfacing assumptions and making explicit one's own working hypotheses. This facilitates the process of critically examining current practice and the alteration of current thinking (Zaltman et al., 1982: 17-23, 113-138).

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IV

EDUCATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

Part IV consists of seven chapters describing a wide array of educational, psychological, and social programs and policies in the educational arena (House and Mathison, Chapter 14), for special needs children and adults (Lilly, Chapter 15), for troubled youth (Klein, Chapter 16), in the criminal justice arena (Roesch and Corrado, Chapter 17), in the mental health arena (Price and Smith, Chapter 18), for older adults (Benjamin and Estes, Chapter 19) and for families (Zimmerman, Chapter 20). While there are other areas of educational, psychological and social intervention, these seven chapters represent a broad sampling of the areas of major importance and activity during the past several decades.

Common to all chapters in Part IV is an implicit (or more often, explicit) discussion of the world in which intervention (policy formation, program/project implementation, and evaluation) takes place. This world is characterized as one of interdependent political, economic, social, psychological and cultural values, forces and pressures. No simple postulates of linear causality are offered to explain social intervention and change. Each area of intervention has numerous stakeholders and vested interest groups. (A general framework depicting many of these forces, interests, and systems is presented in the Introduction.)

We build on this framework by turning to a discussion of similarities and differences in these chapters with regard to several common themes. These themes include: the premise of individualism, the quality of knowledge, and strategies, stakeholders, and efficacy.

PREMISE OF INDIVIDUALISM

Not surprisingly, the interventions discussed in these chapters are based, for the most part, on the premise of individualism (see Introduction, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion). Policies and programs are based, in practice, on the assumption that the "problem" lies within the individual, not the social structure. This is

particularly clear with regard to special needs children and adults, "troubled" youth, alleged adult criminals, the elderly, and the mentally ill. In fact, problem identification and definition imply little more than the premise of individual deficiency and, consequently, individual remediation in the articulation of intervention plans. Even assessments of the impact of various policies on the family, rest on a premise of individualism. To the extent that individualism continues to underlie the articulation of social intervention plans, the range and nature of alternative solutions, and morphogenetic ones in particular, will continue to be constrained and hindered.

QUALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

According to traditional scientific criteria, the overall quality of the data reviewed across these chapters is at best weak. In fact, it is the rare report of an investigation that attempts to employ, let alone meets, either the traditional or innovative methods of design and measurement explicated in Part II of this volume. Indeed, more and higher quality research needs to be conducted to better inform us with regard to the efficacy and utility of various types of social interventions. It should also be noted that even the most promising research designs and techniques fail to match the complexity inherent in any arena of social intervention. Thus it is imperative that we continue the search for new ecologically based research methods that more closely approximate the realities inherent in the world of social intervention. By the same token, other new and more broadly conceived methods of knowledge creation (see Chapter 8), with their own internal sets of evidentiary rules, need to be developed and utilized in the ongoing appraisal process.

STRATEGIES, STAKEHOLDERS, AND EFFICACY

Education

House and Mathison describe several dominant strategies employed in the arena of educational intervention. The first is primarily technological in orientation and based on a research, development, and diffusion model. Here the emphasis is on both the development of innovative materials, like "new math" textbooks and their dissemination. This is a top-down strategy that assumes that the recipients of the intervention are passive. It pays little attention to the specific needs of either the delivery or recipient systems. Where these innovations *do not require* changes in teaching modes or role relationships (e.g., between teacher and students), they are more likely to be effective (i.e., where efficacy is defined in terms of the successful delivery of the materials) than those that do require such changes because the needs of members of recipient and delivery systems are not as critical for the simple adoption of new materials. (It should be noted, however, that such simple adoption does not imply attainment of the ultimately desired outcomes). However, when new teaching styles are the object of adoption, the failure to incorporate systematically local needs and an adequate cultural understanding of the recipient and delivery subsystems results in minimal, if any, impact.

This model responds to central goals or national needs (e.g., catching up or keeping ahead of the Soviets in our educational methods in the area of mathematics, science, and technology) not local needs. Researchers are given a central role in this

process on the grounds of social relevance and the opportunity for continued academic success. For the private sector (e.g., publishing companies) the promise of economic profit looms large. Deliverers and recipients are brought into the process only at the tail end of the process and are afforded little genuine opportunity for influence or "ownership." In other words, little attention is paid to Elmore's backward-mapping strategy under which delivery system personnel help define the goals and articulate the appropriate strategies and implementation methods. The ultimate beneficiaries (or victims) are not afforded any role, either. A uniform solution is thrust on a diverse array of particularistic circumstances and problems.

Policymaking is the second major strategy discussed by House and Mathison. This too is a top-down strategy, but one that is primarily restricted to the public sector (where policy is generated by the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government). Education policy is most often made at the federal level, and occasionally at the state level (e.g., with regard to minimal competency testing). Rules and guidelines are promulgated from above with the objective of school compliance. Compliance occurs more often when there are also financial incentives.

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided increased funds for children in poor schools and resulted in strong redistributive effects by decreasing the teacher/pupil ratio and, presumably, the quality of education tendered these children. On the other hand, categorical programs, such as innovative projects, bilingual education, and Right-to-Read, lead to mixed results with success or failure apparently related to how local school districts implement federal guidelines. When federal policies are implemented in a heavy-handed fashion and local circumstances ignored, the impact is disappointing. Yet when implementation of the innovation is negotiated between the delivery system (e.g., teachers, principals) and the donor and administrative exosystems, success is more probable. Local circumstances are attended to in what McLaughlin (1976) referred to as a process of *mutual adaptation.* "It involved modification of both the project design and changes in the local institutional setting and personnel during the course of implementation."

The last major strategy discussed by House and Mathison is site-specific development. These strategies are locally initiated and far more attentive to culturally embedded meanings. To date, however, they have received little systematic attention, other than occasional anecdotal reports. In terms of the framework provided in the Introduction, interventions of this nature are generated from transactions between the locally based recipient and existing or emergent delivery systems.

For optimal efficacy, House and Mathison imply that strategies need to embody a political and cultural understanding in conjunction with technological developments.

Special Needs Children and Adults

Reforms dealing with special needs children and adults have progressed from a preoccupation with segregation objectives based on what individuals cannot do toward the goal of integration, according to Lilly. Nevertheless, programs continue to be based on the assumption that handicaps are significant and enduring individual characteristics. Some values shift, but others remain stable.

The National Association of Retarded Citizens (NARC), a parents advocacy organization, was instrumental in several important ways in stimulating improved educational opportunities for special needs children. Initially, its members formed and operated school programs for their children. They were also instrumental in advocating

the development of public school programs based on the principles of integration, normative treatment, and placement in the least restrictive setting. This led to two landmark judicial decisions asserting that all children of school age have a right to a free, appropriate public school education, regardless of severity of handicap. Eventually, this series of events culminated in the Education for all Handicapped Children's Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142). Of course, many other forces and actors, ranging from the sociopolitical *zeitgeist* to advocacy organizations like the Children's Defense Fund facilitated this legislation. Yet many such educational programs are still isolated and provide only limited curricula of questionable quality. While progress in this arena is undeniable, the goals have not, to date, been attained, except in a limited number of settings. However, integrated schooling has been accomplished in a sufficient number of settings to show that it is a workable solution. But as Weatherly and Lipsky (1977) have demonstrated, unless the culture, mindscape, and needs, of the street-level bureaucrats (i.e., delivery system personnel such as teachers and social workers) are attended to, in terms of both policy formulation and actual program implementation, the desired outcomes are not likely to be accomplished.

The work of the NARC provides an excellent example of what Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet refer to as new wave organizing. The NARC is both issue and constituency centered. It not only raised consciousness and mobilized action at the grass-roots level; it also helped to increase awareness and stimulate policymaking in several components of the donor system. However, it seems that the legislation has not given due consideration to the delivery system. This is critical for continued progress in this area.

Lilly depicts a similar portrait of both shifting and stable values in his discussion of adult living arrangements for individuals with severe handicaps. He demonstrates the potency of the media as an impetus for reform in discussing the impact of Burton Blatt's photographic exposé of institutional life, *Christmas in Purgatory* (Blatt and Kaplan, 1966). Again, this was one of many convergent forces, but was quite significant in its own right. A number of important pieces of litigation followed that were critical of residential institutions and asserted the rights of handicapped individuals to partake in normal community life. More recently, this has lead to deinstitutionalization efforts and broadened participation in "normal" living and employment arrangements. Again, while success has been demonstrated as possible in these areas, it is far from being the mode. Here, increased attention to the culture, values, and needs of the delivery system personnel, and to the communities and work arrangements into which these individuals are incorporated, is required.

Juvenile Justice

We now turn to the juvenile justice arena. Klein describes the historically changing conceptualizations that characterize this area. There has recently been accommodation between conservative and liberal perspectives in that each has received some credence. Liberal concerns for the protection and treatment of juveniles have increasingly been applied to both minor and status offenders, while the conservative concerns (e.g., the "just deserts" model) has been applied to delinquent offenders. This accommodation was evident in the 1974 federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, and more recently in both the 1977 California and 1978 Washington state legislative initiatives.

A number of policies and programs have been initiated for both minor and status offenders, although most often they have been constrained by a strong, societally

determined individual bias, reflected in the conventional wisdom of professionals, and not sufficiently attentive to the social context of the youth. These programs and policies include deinstitutionalization, diversion, early sanctions, and community treatment. Most often these programs and policies have been inadequately tested, in part, because full and meaningful implementation rarely occurs. Nevertheless, in summarizing the literature Klein finds relatively little about which to be optimistic. He points out that scientific data have had insignificant impact on the formulation of policy in this area as a consequence of the interests and priorities of several major sets of stakeholders, including social service delivery system personnel and justice system constituencies (e.g., police, judges, probation officers).

Klein provides us with a closer look at a handful of programs and policies that were distinct successes or failures. An example of success at the state level is provided by Massachusetts. Deinstitutionalization was put into effect statewide on the basis of an administrative order. This policy was quite successful in that it did not lead to an increase in delinquent behavior or arrest rates. The communities that were most successful in reintegrating the deinstitutionalized youth into their communities seemed to have developed the widest array of treatment approaches, though some communities were even successful without any treatment alternatives. Vermont initiated a similarly successful venture, and California has progressed toward a similar goal for status offenders employing a legislative strategy. While a decriminalization statute for status offenders in Virginia led to their decreased numbers in the juvenile justice system, paradoxically the rate of delinquent offenders climbed (Mulvey and Hicks, 1982). It appeared that many of those previously labeled as status offenders were relabeled, thus subverting the statute's intent. The culture, needs, and values of the local "gatekeepers" (juvenile justice personnel) were attended to in neither the formulation nor implementation of the statute. Mutual adaptation never had an opportunity to occur.

In the private sector, the Boys' Club of America issued a position paper that highlighted:

> *(1) the commitment to seek out youths traditionally harder to serve and likely to drop out of standard youth activity programs, (2) the necessity of influencing the community conditions seen as fostering delinquency, and (3) recognition of the dangers of negative labeling via early identification. It remains for the individual Boys' Clubs to respond to the position paper within their own neighborhoods [Klein, Chapter 16, this volume].*

This plan or policy statement led to the implementation of a wide array of different and reportedly successful neighborhood responses across the country.

Klein also describes a successful community-based effort in Philadelphia to control gang activities. Local residents, many of whom were former gang members, organized the Crisis Intervention Network to control gang activities, emphasizing violence reduction through surveillance. This differs dramatically from previous gang intervention programs in which the emphasis was on gang transformation, general prevention, and rehabilitation.

Criminal Justice

Roesch and Corrado appraise several strategies of reforming the criminal justice system. Two of the most common reforms, both of which emanate from "model"

projects, are pretrial diversion and bail reform. Both programs are implemented by local courts.

Pretrial diversion programs divert primarily first-time offenders prior to the filing of charges. These individuals may, in fact, be innocent. Serious offenders are usually excluded from such programs. Control over the lives of those referred is thus increased, in many cases without justification. The net of the criminal justice system is widened. These "offenders" only constitute 1 to 2 percent of the criminal court load. Furthermore, they are not truly diverted, but instead sent, most often, to counseling or employment programs. The success of these programs is not encouraging. Roesch and Corrado offer a number of recommendations critical to improving the utility and efficacy of pretrial diversion programs.

Bail reform programs allow defendants to be released on their own recognizance (ROR) when they do not have sufficient funds to post bond. These programs are based on a point system that depends on the defendant's prior criminal record and his or her employment and residential stability within the community. Alleged offenders of any severity are excluded from eligibility. Consequently, relatively few individuals are granted ROR who could not be released in any case. Nevertheless, the existence of an ROR program seems to increase the number of defendants released and decrease the burden on the courts. These programs generally seem to be successful when extra funds are provided for the programs. Again, extensive recommendations are offered for the improvement of bail reform programs.

Dispute resolution programs are another recent reform. Here the two parties are brought together outside of the court, frequently with the aid of a third-party, nonprofessional mediator. Many of these cases seem to be resolved more rapidly, with lower costs, and with less tension and hostility than if they were to enter the court system formally. These programs appear to hold considerable promise despite the wide variation in the specific nature of the projects across communities.

Most recently, restitution and community service programs have been developed in a variety of communities. While little, if any, systematic research has been conducted, these programs appear promising.

In contrast to criminal justice system reforms focusing on individuals, Roesch and Corrado review several exciting and promising environmental change programs and suggestions. These include the prevention of violence through increased lighting and the availability of public transportation in places in which crime occurs more frequently. (For a more extensive consideration of environmental programs and policies see Chapter 24.)

The Roesch and Corrado chapter highlights the importance of the program implementation context for efficacy. Furthermore, most programs consistently fail to provide recipients with a voice in program formulation or implementation.

The Mental Health System

Price and Smith describe the mental health system as a "turbulent policy arena where interest groups with conflicting interests engage in competition, collaboration, and negotiation for scarce resources while attempting to minimize their own liabilities and costs." However, clients are not organized to compete effectively in this turbulent arena, though obviously they have the most to gain or lose. Their inability to compete can only exacerbate their major liability—dependency.

In this arena litigation and legislation have played an important role, as in the area of special education, in guaranteeing the right to treatment, and in making it more difficult to obtain civil commitments. Such legislation was made possible, in part, as a result of advances in therapeutic technology, President Kennedy's "bold new approach," and the civil rights movement.

The creation of mental health services was viewed as the province of state and local governments, but over the last several decades it has become a national purpose with the resulting transfer of a major portion of the responsibility to the federal government. Relatively distinct federal mental health policies have been constructed separately for the psychologically disabled and outpatient clientele.

Several policies have had a profound impact on the psychologically disabled. The structure of Medicare payments created a "revolving door" policy, because if a patient is discharged for sixty days, he or she may return for an additional period of reimbursed hospitalization. The resulting treatment modalities clearly fail to match patient needs. Similarly, the structure of Medicaid payments helped move many elderly mental patients into less expensive nursing homes. And the Supplemental Security Income Program further facilitated the move of patients from state hospitals to single-room occupancy hotels and board-and-care homes in which owners had no responsibility to provide service. These financial reimbursement programs helped create an illusion of "deinstitutionalization." Funding determined the nature of treatment, and unfortunately, it was inappropriate or nonexistent treatment. Thus, "a policy of neglect and exploitation rather than community care evolved."

For outpatient clientele, sociopolitical forces similar to those affecting the changing patterns of care for the psychologically disabled were at work. These culminated in the Community Mental Health Centers Act. Financially, the act bypassed state mental health departments and dealt directly with local communities. Private and public health insurance programs have mushroomed and so has the use of outpatient care. But these insurance programs have been based on a medical model of care defining "illnesses" and caregivers, for the most part, in traditional ways. The result is a restriction of consumer choice that further enhances the client's dependency. Choice is critical for consumer control.

The development of options available to consumers is also described by Price and Smith. One of these is the growth of self-help groups. These provide a grassroots or constituency-based strategy for change. Some self-help groups view themselves as an adjunct, while others view themselves as a genuine and more meaningful alternative to traditional services.

It was noted above that federal policies had bypassed the states and gone directly to local communities. Under the Reagan administration, control, but with fewer dollars, is being returned to the states. The turbulence of the mental health policy arena is likely to increase.

Elderly

Federal legislation has endeavored to improve the quality of the life of the elderly in four major domains—income support, housing, health care, and social services—according to Benjamin and Estes.

Income maintenance objectives are routed through Social Security benefits and the Supplemental Security Income Program tied to public assistance. There are also

private pensions. While these programs have enhanced the stability of "welfare" benefits to the elderly, they have not substantially altered the elderlys' relative status in this society. This is particularly true for the poor.

Over the years a variety of housing acts have been put into law. The Housing Act of 1959 provides direct loans to nonprofit sponsors to develop housing. Unfortunately, it has been surrounded by protracted debate and struggle since the early 1970s, and funds only began to flow again in 1976. Thus its impact has been very modest.

The major objective of Medicare and Medicaid programs is the health care of the elderly. The impact of these financial reimbursement programs on the elderly is similar to their impact (discussed previously) on the psychologically disabled: Acute care has most often been provided inappropriately to meet chronic conditions, and at the same time, the provider industry has flourished.

The Older Americans Act and several of its provisions are aimed at the provision of social services for the elderly. Appropriations have been modest, discretion of state and area agencies large, and the impact across communities variable and limited. Solutions were aimed at social isolation and recreational services. Subsequent amendments to the act addressed institutional problems like planning, coordination, pooling of resources, and advocacy. Unfortunately, these indirect services, which address institutional deficiencies, appear to be qualified and eventually undermined by individual deficiency assumptions and service strategies.

Finally, Benjamin and Estes discuss nonservice approaches. These have been stimulated by several arguments, including the argument that "adequate solutions to local problems are best framed at the local level." Nonservice approaches utilize older governmental mechanisms like policies of the donor and regulations of the administrative exosystems to stimulate local initiatives from a range of sources. These include collaborating with the private sector to encourage individual firms to pursue community objectives, like food cooperatives, tenant inspection of housing, and advocacy for special need populations.

Family

According to Zimmerman we have never had an official family policy in this country. Nevertheless, many policies affect families indirectly, and for better or worse. The results of several divergent interventions and their impact on the family are reviewed in Chapter 20.

The negative income tax experiments (see Garfinkel and Haveman for a fuller discussion of the effects of income transfer policies) have affected families in several respects. Work effort of family members was reduced, but increased time was spent on child-rearing activities and the pursuit of educational opportunities. Marital dissolution rates increased compared to control families supported below the poverty level, but dissolution rates decreased substantially in those supported at 140 percent of the poverty level. Thus the impact of income maintenance programs on families may actually be beneficial in the long run and also informative with regard to the structuring of future income maintenance policies.

With regard to the deinstitutionalization of a mentally ill or retarded individual, the results, in general, appear to increase family burden and a number of other negative outcomes. However, this is not consistently the case; the outcomes are sometimes dependent on the nature of the times and the availability of other family supports.

In assessing the impact of divorce and abortion policies, Zimmerman concludes

that they have not had detrimental effects on the family. Evaluation of the impact of governmental policies on families requires increased attention as a salient evaluation criteria.

LESSONS LEARNED

By now it is apparent that a wide array of social intervention strategies have been employed both within and across content domains. Legislation, administrative orders, technological dissemination, private organizational policies, local projects, media, self-help, and advocacy are among the strategies utilized. Similarly, the loci of intervention and salient stakeholders are quite diverse.

Several salient points for enhancing an intervention strategy's success can be gained from this discussion. First, *an intervention must be congruent with, or at least not antithetical to, major stakeholders' interests.* Thus, for example, policy implementation must be congruent with the reality and vested interests of delivery system personnel or street-level bureaucrats. When a policy or program ignores or denies major stakeholders' interests or reality, co-optation is a likely outcome, as previously noted in the case of some bilingual education programs and statutes decriminalizing status offenses. On the other hand, when a group is prevented from influencing or undermining a policy, congruence between the policy and these stakeholders' interests can become irrelevant. The latter situation was illustrated by the drastic administrative order in Massachusetts to close all residential facilities for delinquent youth. Delivery system personnel were blocked from influencing the decision, and the policy was implemented successfully.

Second, *an intervention's success is enhanced when policy makes needed resources available.* This is particularly true when salient parties require an incentive to cooperate or comply. These resources may take the form of technical assistance, finances, or social and psychological support. As noted when considering legal strategies, the economic benefit to business interests facilitated their compliance with civil rights legislation; their ability to rationalize their compliance was critical too. However, economic incentives can lead to unintended effects. This is particularly problematic in a capitalistic-oriented society such as ours. This was amply demonstrated in several deinstitutionalizing groups—the developmentally disabled, the mentally ill and the elderly—where proprietor profits overshadowed the need for appropriately developed and matched services.

Third, *interventions seem to be more successful when they permit a process of mutual adaptation to occur at the interface of critical social systems,* and in particular, between the administrative and delivery systems or delivery and recipient systems. This mutual adaptation enables the intervention to attend to local cultural values, needs, and mindscapes. It also enhances the sense of ownership, decision making, and empowerment of the involved stakeholders. This allows for particularistic solutions, though it also implies that only the broadest aspects of an intervention principle may be generalizable.

This brings us to the general strategy of social intervention discussed in the introduction to Part III, that is, the reciprocal commerce between broad and fine structures of social action. The National Association for Retarded Children (NARC) is an outstanding case in point. These parents developed and ran classes for their own children, and lobbied for legislation to protect their children's rights and to provide services, with the nature of the services in no small way determined from their own base

of knowledge and concerns. NARC was very attuned to the needs and concerns of both parents and children and exercised powerful influences on the determination of both broad and fine structures of social action.

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14

Educational Intervention

Ernest R. House
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Intervention is defined in one dictionary as "interference that may affect the interests of others." This definition correctly captures the political nature of social intervention. Intervention is an intrinsically political act in that people's interests are affected for better or for worse, unless the intervention is itself insignificant. Social intervention is not a purely technical act, like heart surgery or the application of fertilizer. In fact, these acts are political, too, except that it is normally presumed that these acts are performed in the interest of the clients. Social intervention more clearly involves conflicting interests and hence is properly seen as political. Social interventions are not merely techniques, though there is an inclination to treat them as such.

A second overlooked feature of social interventions is that they are messy enterprises. That is, they grow out of particular historical circumstances and take their shape from specific social forces. There is a tendency in social science, as indeed in any science, to idealize the phenomena under study in order to make sense of them. As Chomsky (1977) notes, rational idealization is a necessity in scientific explanation. In a field such as social intervention, however, overzealous idealization can sometimes confuse more than enlighten. For example, one may talk about the development of new curricula, such as the "new math," as an educational intervention without being fully aware of the differences among new curricula. In other words, there is a danger of overlooking important and often determinant particular factors in making haste to generalize about interventions and intervention strategies.

Consequently, in this chapter we call some things "interventions" that others might not call interventions—for example, we call Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 an intervention. Title I is a complex program that grew out of a specific social context and particular compromises. It has effects, many of which were unanticipated, and has different effects in different settings. It is not conceptually clean, like a heart bypass operation, but is instead messy, like a social movement. Its boundaries are unclear. What we call educational interventions in this chapter are large and untidy events rather than precise encapsulations.

Later in the chapter we shall characterize these interventions in more abstract and idealized form, but these characterizations based on the research literature should be understood as researchers' idealizations of these untidy events. We shall characterize the researchers' idealizations themselves and contend that these idealizations are very limited in number and substance. So, from the social context emerge complex, disordered events we call interventions; researchers idealize these events in limited

particular ways; and we base our understanding upon the researchers' idealizations, or else ignore these idealizations and resort to common sense, or some combination of the two.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Before the mid-1950s there was little effort at the national level to intervene in the operations of local schools. Local schools determined their own curricula, relying heavily on commercial textbooks for the content of instruction and on local school boards for legitimacy and guidance. There was, however, much criticism. Most of the criticism was directed at colleges of education for the way they trained teachers, and most of it came from liberal arts professors.

In the early 1950s, Max Beberman, a mathematician at the University of Illinois, set up a committee of professors of mathematics and engineering with the intention of influencing the mathematics taught in the high schools. Beberman's group developed math materials that included modern concepts such as set theory. The Carnegie Corporation provided the funding and the "new math" was born. In 1956 the National Science Foundation began funding Zachiarias's Physical Science Study Committee (PSSC) to develop physics materials for high schools. Thus began the development of "new curricula" in a number of subjects.

It was not accidental that these earliest attempts at postwar curriculum reform were in the fields of mathematics and the sciences. Science and technology were perceived as highly prestigious and an unqualified good. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, and the federal government sponsored curriculum reform on a large scale (Atkin and House, 1981). National defense depended on quality science education, it was argued, and this emphasis on science and technology had to start in the public schools.

In 1958 Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, which provided support for math, science, and foreign language instruction in the public schools. Most of this reform effort was initiated without a clear picture of how the schools actually worked. It was believed that teachers and administrators were very pliable and impressionable. It was assumed that if the new programs were developed by the proper authorities, they would find their way into the schools. After all, teachers used commercial materials without much modification or complaint. Teachers were paid to attend summer workshops to learn the new concepts and materials. No one raised questions about the new federal role or the intrusion on local autonomy. The national defense was a national concern, and the schools were an instrument for achieving the national purpose.

By 1960, two federal agencies, the National Science Foundation and the Office of Education, were committed to curriculum change in the public schools. There was a high degree of consensus about national goals and about the ability of the federal government to modify social institutions. About this time, however, national priorities began to shift. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, while still concerned about national defense, noted signs of social ills. Poverty and racism were brought to public attention.

In the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, President Johnson effected passage of massive federal aid to the public schools. The issue of aid to parochial schools had delayed passage of such legislation for decades. As a result of political compromises, the funding was categorical, that is, targeted to specific purposes. The largest section, Title I of ESEA, was targeted for "compensatory education," for

improving schooling among the poor. Other sections of the legislation addressed other specific problems. Federal help for science, math, and other new curricula continued. The nation was committed to both quality and equality in education.

By the late 1960s, however, the Vietnam war was siphoning off large portions of the federal revenues. Education received no significant new funding from the federal government. During President Nixon's first term, the results of the new social programs, including education, began to be questioned. The Nixon administration was attuned to a reduced role for the federal government in alleviating social ills. Social friction had increased rather than decreased, and the strong social consensus of the postwar era waned. More and more, the national consensus dissolved, and special interest groups became more prominent. Each group advanced its own cause and promoted legislation or court action favorable to its own interests. Many of these groups were the perennially disadvantaged, such as Blacks, the handicapped, and women. Teachers, too, became militantly unionized and advanced their own interests. Teachers carrying strike placards, a rare sight only fifteen years earlier, became common.

By 1981, American society appeared very fragmented indeed. Middle-class people resented aid to the disadvantaged and rebelled against having their children bused to further racial desegregation. Public disenchantment with education was high. Many middle-class parents put their children into private schools. Most states and many cities instituted minimum-competency testing, a form of testing in which students were held back in school if they did not perform according to established standards. School budgets were besieged by inflationary costs and voter resistance to increased taxes. Religious fundamentalists were demanding the removal of certain materials from the classroom.

In Washington, President Reagan attempted to dismantle the entire structure of social programs established in previous decades, particularly the role of the federal government in social intervention. The newly established Department of Education was abolished, and most education programs were severely curtailed in funding. Federal guidelines and regulations were withdrawn in many areas. In the previous two decades the federal government had established itself as the dominant force in educational intervention; it remained to be seen whether this would be true in the post-Reagan era.

INTERVENTIONS

Walker (1979) has identified three types of curriculum development activities that might describe educational intervention activities in general. These are generic development, policymaking, and site-specific development. During the last fifteen years most intervention activities have been the result of either generic development or policymaking.

Generic Development

Because of the influence of science and technology during this period, it was natural for reformers to adopt a strategy modeled on applied research and development in engineering and agriculture. The initial strategy adopted by curriculum reformers such as Beberman and Zachiarias was to develop new materials and distribute them to schools. It was soon realized that teachers could not handle these new materials

without special training. Teachers were brought to college campuses during the summer and given intensive training by the developers. This was the prototypical strategy of the 1950s and early 1960s.

Generic development is characterized by the design and production of curriculum plans and materials that are considered to be applicable to a great number of settings (Walker, 1979). Development includes testing and marketing of pilot versions of the curriculum. At first this tactic was reasonably successful. Teachers of math and science numbered in only the tens of thousands. However, when attempts were made to change the entire school system, consisting of more than two million elementary and secondary teachers, it became apparent that not every teacher could be trained in model curricula on campus, even if such curricula existed.

Perhaps the most successful National Science Foundation curriculum development effort was the Biological Science Curriculum Study (BSCS). Prior to federal involvement, one single commercial textbook accounted for about half the market in tenth-grade biology. The BSCS materials altered that basic pattern somewhat (Wirt and Quick, 1977). The BSCS materials were quite different in content and method from the existing textbooks. Within seven years of the introduction of the BSCS curriculum, these materials held about 30 percent of the textbook market. More significantly, regular commercial textbooks were altered to include topics introduced in the BSCS materials. On the other hand, teaching methods were not changed much by the BSCS materials, even though the inductive teaching method was a major concern in all BSCS materials and workshops. Other curriculum projects were less successful than BSCS in effecting change, but change in textbook content was apparent in most subject areas.

Biologists were highly approving of the BSCS materials, but test score results were more equivocal. In comparing new curricula to traditional curricula on the basis of test score outcomes, Walker and Schaffarzick (1974) found that traditional curricula did better on traditional tests, but new curricula did better on tests specially constructed to measure the outcomes they sought. In other words, test outcomes depended very much on the match between the content of the tests and the content of the curriculum. Standardized achievement tests could not be used as the simple criterion measure of which curriculum was best.

In an NSF-supported study in the late 1970s, Stake and Easley (1978) discovered that the textbook was still the key to information in the science classroom and that teaching styles were unaffected by all the federal curriculum efforts in the science area. The standard mode of teaching was to assign sections of the textbooks, recite in class, test, and discuss in class. Not a single NSF-supported project promoted this traditional mode of teaching. Apparently, the lasting effects of these curriculum development projects were in the revision of materials and texts used in the classroom. (One of President Reagan's first moves in the area of education was to reduce the educational budget of the National Science Foundation from $110 million to $10 million.)

Another generic development program was the Follow Through Project, the largest educational experiment ever conducted in the United States. The Office of Education funded more than 20 different approaches to educating poor children from kindergarten through third grade at a cost of $500 million over a 10-year period. The evaluation compared the various approaches on the basis of standardized test results (Stebbins et al., 1977). Presumably the government would endorse and disseminate the one best approach. The evaluators concluded that "basic skills" approaches were best, and this finding was seized upon by the mass media, thus fueling the "back-to-

basics" movement, which had not existed prior to the Follow Through experiment. The labeling of some approaches as "basic skills" connected the evaluation results to something the mass media could use.

In fact, gains in the standardized tests were modest, even for the strongest programs and without consideration for the match between the content of the tests and the content of the early childhood curricula. The evaluation conclusions were denounced as mistaken and misleading (House et al., 1978). In fact, test gains varied substantially from one community to another. The same approach did well in one setting and poorly in another. Local circumstances were important.

In the mid-1960s, in an effort to institutionalize such educational innovation, the Office of Education created and funded thirty or so regional educational laboratories and research and development centers. These labs and centers were to develop and disseminate educational materials, in much the same manner as the NSF generic development pattern. The basic strategy of the labs and centers became known as the research, development, diffusion model of change (Clark and Guba, 1965). In a fashion similar to the development of new manufacturing and agricultural products, the labs and centers were to conduct research, invent new products, develop and test these products, and eventually distribute them to schools, where they would be adopted by teachers in classrooms.

The labs and centers produced voluminous materials for which there was no market. Some of these materials were of high quality, some were not, but in either case they were not seen as relevant by teachers and administrators in local schools. The development of the materials was guided by federal officials who insisted that the materials fulfill important societal needs as seen from a federal perspective. Dissemination and adoption of the materials depended on what the teachers and administrators wanted and could use. The government wanted something new, but educators wanted something useful that fit into everyday routines.

In their attempt to disseminate materials, the labs and centers also ran afoul of commercial publishing interests. Publishers were successful in preventing large sums of money from being spent for dissemination (Robinson, 1979). Without a network of book salespeople to haunt the corridors of school buildings, the labs and centers had no effective dissemination organization. Those materials most successfully disseminated were those promoted by commercial publishers. Since publishers wanted products that would sell, highly innovative materials were not likely to be commercially marketed. The exception to this was the adaptation of new ideas to textbook form, such as in the case of the BSCS materials. Cost of the materials was a significant factor in successful dissemination.

Most educational intervention strategies were spawned by this research, development, and diffusion model (RD&D) of change. Havelock (1971) identified five features that characterize this model:

(1) There is a rational sequence of activities moving from research to development, and once the product is packaged it is disseminated.
(2) The model requires massive planning in order to coordinate and control these various activities.
(3) A division of labor is required to perform the necessary functions.
(4) The model assumes that the consumer is passive and will adopt a product that is presented in the right way at the right time.
(5) The payoffs of efficiency and quality are used to justify the high initial development costs.

The RD&D approach posits a linear view of educational change. Solutions that can be used in most, if not all, contexts will be determined by the application of technology. Empirically this model has not resulted in expected changes in education. A major problem with the RD&D approach is that the practitioner is treated as passive (House, 1974). It is assumed that research will provide knowledge, which will lead to the development of solutions to specific educational problems. These solutions will presumably then be presented to and adopted by a totally nonreactive practitioner. By assuming that the consumer is passive, the model strips the practitioner of any initiatory power that he or she might have. This top-down approach also disregards situational constraints that are an important part of the practitioners' world. When a change or innovation is offered as an unalterable product, the practitioner is often left with only one option. The product is sometimes rejected because there is no room for adaptation to the constraints and needs of the local context.

The RD&D is characterized by the expectation of a smooth transition from step to step in research, development, and diffusion. Such a view ignores the division of labor and lack of central control of the components of the model. The motivations for doing research and developing education products are based on different values and rewards. Researchers want to publish articles, while developers want to turn out products and are little concerned with research or dissemination. These differing values and rewards may even result in researchers and developers working at cross-purposes. The RD&D model might be appropriate if it were applied to an integrated social system; this is not, however, the situation in education. Control of the educational system is apportioned among many state and local entities.

Rationality is emphasized in the RD&D approach, but the model is rational mostly to those who control and benefit from it. Use of the model justifies central control of power, resources, and expertise in addressing central national goals, such as national defense. Educational interventions resulting from the use of this model are usually responses to central goals rather than local needs or goals.

Emphasis is on interventions that address major problems and can be applied under many different conditions and to many different contexts. The RD & D approach therefore deemphasizes the needs of local users and consumers and is justified by a need to respond to national requirements. With these problems inherent in the model, it is not surprising that educational practice has been thus far little affected by products developed from this approach.

Policymaking

The second general type of intervention identified by Walker (1979) is policymaking. This consists of establishing rules and guidelines with which the schools must comply, either because the requirement is a legally binding one or because the government provides money in return for compliance. Any branch of government—legislative, executive, or judicial—may impose such guidelines. In the past few decades the courts have been particularly active in such matters as desegregation and equal rights enforcement. Here again the federal government has been instrumental in initiating change, although state governments have also been active in instituting new policies, such as minimum-competency testing, that force changes in school practice.

Much of the federal education legislation passed during the Johnson years consisted of categorical funding with guidelines attached. For example, the largest federal program, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, provided funds for

children in poor schools (about $2.5 billion annually, pre-Reagan). For the most part this program was successful in achieving the aims of Congress (NIE, 1977; House, 1979; Husen, 1979). One of the aims of Congress was to send funds to districts and schools with poor children. The execution of this aim was not as straightforward as it appears, given the intricacies of federal, state, and local controls.

An extensive investigation revealed that Title I did indeed have strongly redistributive economic effects. Inner-city schools received twice as much per pupil as schools in the suburbs. The Title I program provided about 5.5 times as much aid to districts with the highest poverty rates as to those with the lowest. The redistributive ratio for other federal priority programs was about 3.5 to 1 (NIE, 1973). To receive this aid schools had to comply with two sets of requirements. Funds allocation requirements consisted of seven regulations, such as those for targeting of schools and eligibility of students. These regulations appeared to be necessary because of strong pressures in the states and local districts to use funds as general aid rather than to help the poor. The other set of requirements consisted of program development regulations, mandating such things as needs assessments, specification of objectives, and parent involvement. One might meet the letter of the law in all these respects and still not have a quality program. Indeed, even though the legislation provided for parent advisory councils for programs, these councils were almost entirely dominated by principals.

What was done with the Title I money? Most of it was spent providing extra teaching personnel in the form of more teachers or teacher aides. Hence, the teacher/pupil ratio was significantly lowered. Current evidence suggests that this is as good a way of improving instruction as any (Glass and Smith, 1979). Investigators have also found sizable increases on standardized test scores as a result of these programs, but the evidence is equivocal because of the methodology employed (Cooley and Leinhardt, 1980). All in all, Title I of ESEA, while certainly not eliminating poverty, was quite successful in what it set out to do.

Other categorical programs included Title III (innovative projects) of ESEA, Title VII (bilingual education) of ESEA, and Right-to-Read. These programs provided funds for school districts for three to five years in the expectation that the programs would be continued with local support. The success of these programs was more equivocal than that of Title I. The Rand Corporation conducted a study of the effects of these programs and found that no class of educational interventions consistently led to improved student achievement. Even successful projects had difficulty sustaining themselves for more than a year, and individual projects were not easily disseminated or replicated by other school districts. Availability of federal funds led to adoption of new programs, but did not ensure their successful implementation. The investigators concluded that the "net return" to federal investment was "the adoption of many innovations, the successful implementation of few, and the long run continuation of still fewer" (Berman and McLauglin, 1978: 6).

The difference between success and failure depended on how the school districts implemented their projects, and not on federal guidelines. Local concerns overshadowed federal strategies. The role of the school principal was critical. For the project to succeed, the school principal had not only to approve the project but also to actively promote it in the school. Success was enhanced by participation of the principal, participation of the teachers in decision making, and training of the teachers in specific aspects of the project. Only when there was a negotiated innovation in which both the federal and local interests were represented did the project result in outcomes acceptable to both sides. The Rand studies referred to this negotiation as "mutual adaptation" of the federal program to the local situation.

It is clear from this review that most interventions in the schools have emanated from the federal level. Some significant interventions have come from the state level, however. State legislators have passed numerous requirements that nutrition or driver's education or the state constitution be taught in the local schools. Taken collectively, these requirements have had a significant, albeit piecemeal, effect on the school curriculum.

Perhaps the most forceful intervention has been the imposition of statewide minimum competency testing programs. The earliest such testing program was developed in Michigan in the early 1970s and was known as the Michigan Accountability System. All fourth and seventh graders in the state were required to take state-mandated tests in reading and math. The number of students who correctly answered 70 percent of the test items was made public. Some funding for the schools, as much as $200 per pupil, was made dependent on the test scores; hence successful schools would be rewarded and unsuccessful schools would be punished. At least that was the intent of the Accountability System, which was heavily promoted by the Michigan Department of Education. In fact, a furor arose over the construction and administration of the tests. The tests were assailed for their inadequacy (House et al., 1974; Kearny et al., 1974), and the teachers' unions and other educational organizations took a strong stand against the accountability program. Amidst public furor and debate, much of it acrimonious, the testing program was modified.

In the late 1970s the minimum competency testing movement took another direction in Florida. State-devised tests were administered to seniors in high school, and those who did not attain a certain score were not allowed to graduate. Failures varied greatly by race. These tests and their administration and use were severely criticized by educators and testing experts (Tyler et al., 1978). By 1980 most states and many cities had minimum competency testing programs in place in which promotion or graduation depended on students' attainment of certain scores on the tests. These testing programs had strong effects on local school curricula. For example, in 1981 New York City administered minimum-competency tests in fourth and seventh grades and failed 25,000 students, or 25 percent of the students in those grades. About 11,000 students attended special summer classes, where some managed to obtain passing scores on the readministered tests. The other 14,000 were forced to remain in the same grade the next year and to enter special classes consisting of no more than 20 students. These classes were geared to the information on the tests and generally, where such tests existed, a significant portion of instructional time was devoted to teaching the type of information required by the tests.

Whether such testing and alteration of curricula were good educational interventions was hotly debated. In the summer of 1981 the issue had become so politically embattled that the National Institute of Education sponsored public hearings on the issue. These hearings were televised by some public television stations (Madaus, 1981; Popham, 1981; Thurston and House, 1981). Minimum competency testing promised to be one of the most powerful and strongly contested educational interventions. It is significant that this intervention was administered at the state level of government, although it did have substantial federal support and sponsorship.

Site-Specific Development

Locally initiated intervention efforts have received no attention in this review, other than the New York City minimum competency testing program. The reasons for

this are twofold. First, the overwhelming number of interventions for the past two decades have been federally inspired and federally supported, even those implemented at the state and local levels. This may or may not change with the Reagan administration—it is too soon to tell. Our guess is that the federal government will continue to be a major factor in educational intervention. The activism of the federal government in educational matters is the major intervention event of the past two decades, and, once established, central authorities are extremely difficult to dislodge. For example, the centralizing of the U.S. economy during World War II is a trend that has never been reversed in spite of much rhetoric to the contrary.

The second reason that local intervention efforts have not received much attention is that they are seldom documented. Studies are almost always funded by federal authorities, and these are studies of federal efforts. We know, for example, that religious fundamentalists have had a measurable impact on the school curriculum in recent years, but documentation is unsystematic and anecdotal where it exists at all. Hence locally initiated intervention activities usually remain invisible, like the underground economy. It is almost certainly the case that local intervention efforts are underestimated here and elsewhere.

THE CHANGE LITERATURE

There have been hundreds, perhaps thousands, of studies conducted on the process of institutional change in education. These studies are extremely variable in quality and do not provide a coherent picture of how change occurs or even what variables are relevant. The research literature seems to emanate from three distinct perspectives. These perspectives combine facts, values, and presuppositions into complex screens through which intervention activities are viewed.

Whichever screen one adopts leads one to focus on certain features of intervention activities, to advocate certain policies rather than others, and to conduct certain types of research and evaluation studies. Through a particular screen one sees certain events, but one may see different ones through a different screen. Theoretically, there are no limits to the number of perspectives that may exist, but, in fact, three perspectives—the technological, the political, and the cultural—account for the vast majority of studies of educational interventions that have been conducted (House, 1981).

Each of the three perspectives on interventions has a different underlying image upon which it draws to interpret events in the intervention process. Underlying the technological perspective is the image of production. Concepts such as input-output, flow diagrams, and specification of tasks are commonly employed. Intervention is conceived as a relatively mechanistic process. Social relationships are based on technological necessity. The concern is economic and the primary value that of efficiency.

Underlying the political perspective is the image of negotiation. Concepts such as power, authority, and competing interests are employed. Social relationships are conceived as voluntary and as resting on contractual arrangements. Individual and group interests are conceived as often in conflict. Distribution of resources in a legitimate and acceptable manner is important. The concern is political, and a primary value is the legitimacy of the authority system.

Underlying the cultural perspective is the image of community. People are bound to one another through shared meanings resting on shared values. Social relationships are traditional. Integrity of the culture is a primary value. Within a given culture, conformity to the culture's values may be important. Across cultures, tolerance of

other cultures' values is critical if cultural integrity is to be maintained. From the multicultural perspective, autonomy of separate cultures is paramount. Although relationships within a culture may be binding and obligatory, relationships across cultures are relativistic.

For the past decade or so, studies on interventions have been dominated by these three major perspectives. The perspectives have been the framework through which researchers, developers, and officials have understood the process of educational interventions. Early in the sixties, intervention efforts proceeded from professional and scholarly authority. Reforms were headed by university scholars, who found their authority base in their discipline and who developed new training materials in an intuitive manner bred of familiarity with their subject. The model was that of university teaching. Teachers were simply to be updated in content and method. During this time, there was a considerable degree of consensus about the purpose of the schools and the authority of scholars.

By the mid-sixties this view of curriculum and innovation based on scholastic authority gave way to a more technological view of intervention. The scholastic approach had proceeded intuitively based on tacit knowledge. The technological perspective replaced the tacit basis of intervention with a more systematized and rationalized approach. The intervention process was conceived as separated into functions based on rational analysis and empirical research. Whereas the scholastic intervention process had proceeded by tacit knowledge, technologizing intervention based it on explicit knowledge. What characterizes the technological perspective is its way of formulating and addressing problems. Teaching and innovation are (or should be) technologies. Solutions are techniques that are replicable and transferrable to other situations. Technological thinking—selecting the most efficient means to a given end—is the mode of rationality. It is not likely in such a technological society as ours that the technological perspective will disappear.

The political perspective views educational intervention as a matter of conflicts and compromises among factional groups. These groups may include teachers, administrators, parents, developers, governments, and individuals. From the political perspective each of these groups has its own goals and interests, which often conflict with the purposes of the others. Cooperation on an intervention is viewed as problematic rather than automatic. Cooperation must result from negotiation and compromise.

The third perspective is the cultural perspective. It is not a new orientation. It is at least as old as Jules Henry's (1963: 283) analysis of the classroom ("School is an institution for drilling children in cultural orientations") and probably much older. Yet it has been undergoing a revitalization and increasing its popularity greatly among researchers as an explanation of change (Hill and Burnett, 1978; Lortie, 1975; Sarason, 1971; Smith and Geoffrey, 1968; Smith and Keith, 1978; Wolcott, 1973, 1977).

The intervention process from the cultural perspective is conceived as the interaction of distinct and separate cultures. Conflicts and misunderstandings are interpreted as conflicts in values. Teacher culture is often seen as distinct from other cultures, such as those of researchers, parents, technocrats and developers, who try to change it. Many of these studies show the subtle ways in which change efforts are absorbed without significant change occurring. Most studies are directed at the different "meanings" produced by the change efforts rather than at the change itself. The cultural perspective is less fully developed in relation to educational interventions than either the technological or political perspective. This perspective is not likely to supplant the technological and political perspectives, but societal developments make the cultural view more relevant as an explanation. It now competes with the other two perspectives as an explanation for events.

How do these three perspectives—the technological, the political, and the cultural—compare with one another? The technological perspective has focused on the intervention itself, on its characteristics and component parts, on how to produce and introduce it. The intervention technique and its effects are the focal points. The political perspective has focused on the intervention-in-context, on the relationships between sponsors and recipients, on rewards and costs and their distribution. Power and authority relationships are the focal points. The cultural perspective has focused on the context, on how work is structured and life is lived, on how the intervention is interpreted and relationships disturbed. Meanings and values are the focal points.

Changes in research methodology have accompanied these shifts in perspectives. From the technological perspective, research is usually conducted with psychometric instruments such as achievement tests, attitude scales, or scaled questionnaires. From the political perspective, research is conducted with semistructured questionnaires and interviews, a survey methodology. From the cultural perspective, research is conducted with anthropological methods of investigation such as observation, participant observation, and case study. However, the shift in perspectives precedes the shift in methodology. One uses a different methodology in order to ask different questions, and then the different answers confirm the methodology and perspective. In other words, each perspective is confirmed by its own methodology.

The same event will be seen differently from these three perspectives. For example, from the technological perspective, *Man: A Course of Study* (MACOS), a social studies curriculum developed by Jerome Bruner and others at Educational Development Corporation (one of the regional labs), has been studied as to the degree of faithful implementation. Teachers have been tested for their knowledge of MACOS content, and students have teen tested for conformity to MACOS principles (Cole, 1971). From the political perspective, MACOS has been studied as to how local personnel adapt the materials to their own uses and how local factions promote and inhibit their use (Hill, 1978). From the cultural perspective, MACOS has been studied as encounters among the social science culture that produced the materials, the disseminating group culture, and the recipient group culture. The first culture is embodied in the materials themselves, the second in the workshop settings and procedures for dissemination, and the third in the institutions and values of the traditional curriculum. The interaction of the three cultures is treated as an acculturation process in which the three cultures develop a common tradition (Rudduck, 1977).

These three perspectives also differ significantly in the degree to which there is social consensus on interests and values. The earliest version of the technological perspective assumed that there was considerable consensus in both interests and values. It assumed that everyone shared a common interest in advancing interventions and that everyone operated from a common frame of values. It reflected a society believing unabashedly in technological progress. The only problem was to find how best to achieve it.

The political perspective implies that all is not harmonious. There may be problems, conflicts of interests. Not everyone wants the same thing, or else everyone wants a greater portion of a scarce resource. Conflict is not only possible but probable. Opposing factions will have to bargain and compromise, resort to political devices. Still, the political perspective assumes that there is enough value consensus to allow for the successful negotiation of a compromise. The participants, however much their interests conflict, share an authority structure, a set of values.

The cultural perspective assumes a more fragmented society, more value consensus within groups and less consensus among social groups, so that separate groups must be regarded as subcultures. The groups may be professional, ethnic, or re-

FIGURE 14.1 Summary of Three Perspectives on Educational Intervention

	Technological	*Political*	*Cultural*
Fundamental principles and assumptions	Systematic, rational processes Explicit knowledge and techniques are applicable (e.g., RDD model) Passive consumer Cooperation is automatic Efficiency and accountability are issues Common interests and values are assumed	Factional groups engage in conflict and compromise Influence is exerted by persuasion, inducements, coercion Power struggles dominate Cooperation is problematic Legitimacy is issue There are conflicts over interests	Participants are seen as cultures and subcultures Intervention requires the interaction of separate cultures Effects of intervention are diffuse and intangible Cooperation is enigmatic Changes have different "meanings" Autonomy is issue There may be conflicts over values and interests
Focal points	The intervention itself The technique and its effects	Intervention-in-context Power and authority relationships	Context Meanings and values
Values	Common value framework Goal is predetermined Find the one best way to accomplish the goal	Values are shared by all Consensus is possible after conflict, negotiation of interests	Values are shared within small groups Values are different between groups and may be in conflict
Ethics	Ethics are authoritative Intervention is in the common interest Technological change should be pursued aggressively	Ethics are contractual Intervention is not necessarily in the best interests of individuals and groups Compromise differences	Ethics are relativistic Intervention may have unanticipated consequences Do not impose on other groups
Image	Production Product oriented	Negotiation Conflict oriented	Community Meaning oriented

gional. Separate parts of the system are seen as more different than alike. The belief system of each one is a significantly different entity. The separate groups do not share a value system or a common way of resolving conflicts, nor can they be certain of what the other groups' values are. On the other hand, the cultural perspective views each particular group as having a unitary culture and value system internally.

The three perspectives also differ significantly in their ethics. From the technological perspective, it is all right to pursue interventions aggressively since the idea of technical progress is shared by all, since the intervention proceeds from a common value framework, and since the intervention is in the common interest. In fact, the primary ethical problem is to discover the best means to the common end. The innovation, program, or policy that most efficiently leads to the common goal or maximizes the common end is the best one. There is a common, unquestioned base of authority, and the ethics are authoritative (and often hierarchically institutionalized in government agencies).

From the political perspective, securing the cooperation of others is problematic. The intervention cannot be assumed to be in their interests. For example, the intervention may require a substantial increase in the teacher's workload yet the teacher may not benefit from it. One way of proceeding is to get the other parties to agree, to

come to understandings with them, and to secure their assent before intervening. The ethics are contractual.

From the cultural perspective, even common agreement is problematic since two different cultures may not understand each other, and there may be no mutually accepted procedure for reaching agreement or common values on which to do so. The possibilities for misunderstanding and miscalculation are enormous. One must be greatly concerned about the possibility of the unanticipated effects of an intervention in an unknown culture. Action becomes difficult. One way of proceeding is to try cautiously to establish common ground between the two cultures. It is not clear what is right and wrong, good and bad. The ethics are relativistic. Figure 14.1 summarizes the three perspectives.

The emerging political and cultural perspectives will not fully supplant the dominant technological perspective. The disappearance of the technological perspective would presage a change in the very nature and identity of Western civilization. While significant societal change is occurring, and accounts in a real sense for the increasing salience of other perspectives, we do not expect such change to be so profound or so rapid as to extinguish the technological mentality. What we do expect is for the technological perspective to be blended with other perspectives. The urge to introduce technical innovations into the school will continue, but will take more cognizance of political and cultural realities it has often studiously neglected. More radical innovators will attempt purer political or culturally derived policies, but these attempts will be fewer and perceived as unusual. Mixed strategies of intervention will predominate.

CONCLUSIONS

If the picture we have presented here of the last two decades of educational intervention is a confusing one, then we have accurately portrayed the situation as it has existed. There has been a tremendous burst of activity, much of it ill coordinated and ill conceived, and the results of these efforts have been highly variable. Research has been of little help in clarifying this scene; rather, research itself seems to be somewhat chaotic and predicated on different conceptual frameworks. In the last analysis, the research itself is part of the social turmoil rather than a serene reflection upon it.

If one could achieve some distance from these engrossing events—not an easy thing to do—one might venture a few overarching conclusions. First, the most significant outcome of this period is the direct intervention of the federal government into local educational matters. The federal government has intervened in education to a degree unprecedented in recent American history. It seems unlikely that the federal presence itself will disappear, whatever the Reagan administration does.

During World War II, government procurement and control of the economy were centralized in Washington. Firms doing business successfully set up offices in the Capitol. Enormous fortunes and financial alliances were built based on these arrangements. The modern corporation was significantly shaped by these events. The small businessman was relegated to subcontracts and local markets. This pattern of government procurement transformed the entire economy.

Although federal intervention in education is not as dramatic, it too has transformed the educational establishment in a way that is likely to endure. New coalitions and interest groups shape federal policy. School districts, state governments, and teachers' unions look to Washington for funds. Minority groups, women, and the less privileged look to Washington for redress. These pressures for action seem likely to survive the Reagan administration, in spite of its strenuous attempts to disengage

these coalitions. The very presence of the federal government in education, whatever its policies, is the most significant determinant of future events.

A second conclusion is that many of the federal government's policies, strategies, and tactics of intervention have been heavy-handed and counterproductive. This accounts for some of the backlash against federal involvement. Much government strategy has been informed by a simplistic top-down conception of change that denies local circumstances. Federal officials often seem ill informed about how change is likely to occur in institutions such as schools. The necessity of political compromise and negotiation with other levels of government and other factions frequently seems to elude federal planners, who are unable to anticipate how educators will respond to policies and tactics.

Partly as a result of clumsy strategies, federal intervention efforts have met with mixed results. Some strategies, such as introducing new innovations via a research, development, and diffusion model of change, have not been very successful. On the other hand, some interventions, such as Title I of ESEA, have resulted in significant changes. Successful strategies have been informed by an acute awareness of local school circumstances. There is a negotiated compromise in which local schools receive benefits in return for their cooperation with federal agencies. The categorical aid programs are of this type.

On the other hand, the mandated interventions, such as busing for racial desegregation and minimum competency testing, have had mixed results. There have been clear benefits from busing, but also very marked social costs. Mandatory busing has in some places resulted in white flight and a strong negative reaction against schools and all social programs. There is sometimes a failure on the part of social planners to perceive the limits of government power.

The role of research in all this is not what one with a traditional view of research would expect. One would expect that social research would clarify goals and determine the best means to achieve those goals. Instead, social research seems to be far more ideological and value laden than this notion would support. For example, a close examination of Coleman's school survey, which led to the desegregation by busing strategy, reveals that it was premised upon certain beliefs then current and that those value premises corresponded closely to those held by the federal officials for whom the survey was conducted (Ennis, 1975). In general, social research has influenced broad social assumptions and beliefs in an indirect fashion. There is no extensive, consistent, systematic theory as to how change occurs. Rather, the status of research on educational intervention processes is represented by the three perspectives we have proposed—the technological, the political, and the cultural. Which variables seem relevant and which strategies seem worth pursuing depend on which perspective one adopts. The existence of rather different perspectives makes a comprehensive intervention theory difficult.

Over the past few decades, the trend has been away from a technological perspective and more toward the political and cultural. Political and cultural considerations seem to better account for why intervention activities do not succeed. Similarly, the research on the success of educational programs for training low-income populations lends itself to a number of different interpretations, depending on one's world views. One arrives at rather different conclusions depending on whether one adopts a genetic, professional, reform, welfare capitalism, or socialist perspective (Levin, 1978). It probably is the case that deeper insights into educational intervention will emerge only with more sophisticated notions of what social theory and social research are.

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15

Interventions with Special Needs Children and Adults

M. Stephen Lilly

John is a 14-year-old black male who lives in East St. Louis, is in the eighth grade in the East St. Louis public school system, reads at the fourth-grade level, knows rudimentary math facts, has a part-time job stocking shelves in a grocery store, and is "turned off" by school. Sarah is a 9-year-old girl without functional sight or hearing who lives in rural Minnesota, spending weekends at home on the farm and living with a foster family in the city during the week so that she can attend a special education class for multiply handicapped children. Jeffrey is a 12-year-old boy of above-average intelligence who has cerebral palsy, which results in problems of locomotion and speech, and which sometimes masks his intelligence. Eddie is the 4-year-old son of migrant workers who, when his parents are working in given areas of certain states, attends preschool programs for "high-risk" children. Rebecca is a 25-year-old resident of a state institution for the mentally retarded who is being prepared for release into a more normal, community-based residential and work setting.

The difficulty in arranging and presenting this chapter is that it is about all of these people, and more. It is about a system that has grown in people and complexity over time, and that has undergone systematic and identifiable shifts in values and orientation over the past two hundred years. For our purposes in this chapter, we will call this system "special education," though this term is often used inappropriately and tends to build barriers in an educational system that already resembles a maze built with walls of brick. Special education is seen as dealing with students who are "handicapped" and therefore not capable or worthy of a "regular" educational experience. Even when special educators advocate the "normalization" or "mainstreaming" of individuals who are labeled handicapped, it is usually based on an implicit assumption that general education must change, (that is, become more like "special education") in order to serve students with special needs.

In this chapter, I hope to identify and explicate some *basic values* that underlie the provision of special education services to persons labeled handicapped, and to analyze both *stable values* and *shifts in values* that have occurred. What will emerge is a picture of an evolving, sometimes apparently rapidly changing field with a constant, basic conservatism rooted in a set of stable beliefs and assumptions about both the client population and the regular education system in the public schools. These seeming paradoxes can best be analyzed by examining the history of special education, focusing on value orientations at various points in history and leading up to the

1980s. Prior to launching into such a history, however, it is appropriate to define and delimit the client group that is the topic of this chapter.

The reader may have noticed that in the preceding paragraphs, I have referred to "students who are called handicapped" rather than "handicapped students." This conscious choice of terminology is indicative of real and substantive disagreement among special educators concerning the nature of the population to be served and the definition of handicapping conditions. This disagreement will form the basis for discussion later in the chapter and need not be delineated in detail here. It is sufficient at this point to say that there are two basic types of students who are identified and served in special education. One group has distinct and often obvious disabilities, such as visual impairment, hearing impairment, physical impairment, severe emotional disturbances, and moderate-to-severe mental retardation. While problems of definition in these groups must not be minimized, the existence of disability is not generally at issue. The second group of students who are called handicapped and provided special education services are less "obviously" disabled and are identified primarily on the basis of poor school performance, either academic, behavioral, or both. These students are generally called mildly (educable) mentally retarded (EMR), mildly emotionally disturbed or behavior-disordered (BD), or learning disabled (LD). In a subsequent section of this chapter, considerable attention will be given to the analysis of current issues in these areas of special education, and to the possible overinclusion of students in these categories of services.

The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to the two areas of special education that have generated the most discussion, action, and controversy in the last decade: (1) the "mildly handicapped" population, referred to above as EMR, BD, and LD; and (2) the population of clients who are described as severely emotionally disturbed, moderately and severely retarded, or multiply handicapped. The primary focus will be on interventions with school-age populations, with additional attention to preschool services for both sets of clients, and adult services for the moderately and severely handicapped. This delimitation is done with the intention of presenting the most current debates and issues surrounding intervention programs for special needs children and adults.

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION THROUGH THE 1960S

When our forefathers proclaimed freedom and opportunity for all while dumping tea in the Boston Harbor, their definition of "all" was somewhat limited. It did not include women, blacks (and others who were held as slaves), children, or the handicapped. Education in the early years of the republic was intended for the elite, and the education system was designed to serve the children of the upper class. Needless to say, the handicapped were not a primary concern of the schools during this era.

In the early 1800s, the work of Guggenbuhl (Kaufman and Mona, 1978) and Itard (Hewett, 1977) with moderately and severely mentally retarded individuals in Europe represents the first major and sustained intervention efforts with other than hearing- and visually impaired populations. This early work was focused on *curing* mental retardation through systematic sensory training, thus permitting large numbers of mentally retarded individuals to return to the community and lead normal lives (Wolfensberger, 1969). This education was delivered in residential centers, which provided an opportunity for intensive services and massed resources. The goal

of these early interventions was optimistic, and while the services were delivered isolated settings, the underlying value was normalization through cure.

This version of services for the moderately and severely mentally retarded was brought to the United States by Seguin in the mid-1800s, and residential schools were established in major metropolitan areas, with treatment and cure as the major focus. Thus, large numbers of mentally retarded individuals were gathered in a small number of residential schools to be prepared for eventual return to their communities.

By the late 1800s and early 1900s, the hope of curing mental retardation had faded, and the residential schools had become custodial institutions. As more institutions were built, they tended to be located in "out-of-the-way" rural areas, as opposed to urban centers. In addition to the obvious failure of sensory training to eradicate mental retardation, Kaufman and Mona (1978) cite four major reasons for the evolution from residential treatment centers to custodial care institutions:

(1) a growing concern for the placement of residents after leaving the institution;
(2) a significant growth in the number of persons admitted to institutions;
(3) the development and popularization of a hereditary view of intelligence; and
(4) the publication of studies on families such as the Jukes (Dugdale, 1877) and the Kallikaks (Goddard, 1912), leading to a view of the feebleminded as a menace to society.

Thus we see a pattern in the early development of special education in this country which is to be repeated through the twentieth century: the development of services and interventions that are well intentioned and optimistic in their goals but that contain the seeds of isolation and social injustice, which eventually sprout and take root.

The concept of intelligence as inherited and unchangeable stifled the growth public school services for moderately and severely retarded individuals until the 1950s, with most public schools requiring that children be toilet-trained, ambulatory, and have minimal language skills before they could attend school. Children who did not meet these criteria were barred from school; some merely stayed home, while others attended privately funded schools, many of which were operated in garage and church basements, sponsored by parent groups and local chapters of the National Association of Retarded Citizens. Lilly (1979: 8) has summarized the situation as follows:

> *These schools were often established in church basements or converted garages, and were staffed by teachers and aides who more often than not worked for wages which made the job more volunteer than occupational. The primary focus of most of these schools was on teaching self-help and socialization skills, and academic subjects were generally not covered since it was commonly assumed that these children would not be able to learn functional academic skills. It was not until the late 1950's that public school services for moderately retarded children became a subject of discussion and debate (Goldberg and Cruickshank, 1958), and it was well into the 1970's before most local school systems began to consider serving severely and profoundly retarded individuals.*

In these school programs of the 1950s and 1960s, acceptance of the hereditary of intelligence was evident, and the curriculum was based largely on a concept of what mentally retarded individuals could *not* do (Wilcox, 1979). Academics were generally not taught, many programs laid heavy emphasis on "arts and crafts" and other nonfunctional activities, and virtually all "graduates" of such programs proceeded into either long-term residential, custodial care or subsidized sheltered em-

ployment in the community while living at home. In short, the basic "values" underlying these programs were related to the presumed inherent limitations of handicapped individuals and the need for lifelong basic support and protection from risk. The values were based on benevolence to the point of condescension and the creation of inappropriate limitations.

Recall that we are talking here of persons labeled "trainable mentally retarded," and of programs offered largely in private schools. Society's commitment to this population during the period under discussion was limited in large part to the provision of sheltered employment and residential care during the adult years. For more severely handicapped individuals, custodial care in institutions was the only available alternative to home care. These situations have changed considerably in the 1980s, and some recent developments will be covered in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Let us now turn our attention to the historical development of educational interventions for "mildly handicapped" individuals, those clients typically labeled educable mentally retarded, behavior-disordered, or learning disabled. The reader will recall that through the late nineteenth century, the notion of "mild handicaps" had not yet developed in our society. This situation changed in 1910 when the American Association on Mental Deficiency expanded its classification system for mental retardation, adding the classification of "moron" to the previously existing terms "idiot" and "imbecile" (Hewett, 1977). The term "moron" is roughly equivalent to the modern term "educable mental retardation" and represents the first introduction of a mild handicapping condition largely educational in nature. Lilly (1979) has cited three societal factors that were instrumental in establishing the category of moron and in the development of school intervention programs for this group of students: child labor laws, compulsory schooling, and the development of tests purporting to measure intelligence. In the words of Lilly (forthcoming):

> *Young children were increasingly expected to go to school, could not be sent to the factory to help support the family, and encountered a school curriculum and staff which was oriented to serving children of the elite, not children of the working class. It is not surprising that this confluence of factors resulted in considerable school failure, and the emergence of the intelligence testing movement provided a vehicle for pinpointing the reason for this failure in the child. Thus, a complex set of social factors was often simplified into a decision, usually based on a single test score, that the child was not adjusting well to school because he was, in fact, a "moron."*

The important points to note about early development of educational interventions for "mildly retarded" individuals are that:

(1) while complex societal factors led to the original identification of the population of students in need of special services, the assumption was made that the problem was "in the child," and a child-based categorization and service system was developed;
(2) diagnostic procedures were utilized and institutionalized which offered little option but to pinpoint the source of the problem as in the child, thus reinforcing the notion of handicap as a person-based phenomenon; and
(3) interventions were largely separate from regular education, were designed based on the presumed deficits of the client, and resulted in a more or less permanent separation of the student from the regular classroom environment.

Kaufman and Mona (1978: 99) have summarized the early development of educational services for students labeled "morons" as follows:

By 1922, 23,000 retarded pupils were enrolled either in special day schools or classes. The special class was to be the standard environment for educating mildly handicapped children for decades to come. The educational environment for mildly to moderately handicapped children became a labeled and segregated classroom in either a special building or a regular school. Typically, the class consisted of a small group of children with a similar degree of cognitive impairment who were taught by a specially trained teacher, using methods and materials different from those used in regular classes. Segregation became an end in itself; return to the regular classroom was not a goal of the special class. The goal of education for even the mildly handicapped had shifted from the early goal of normalcy to life styles (some more sheltered and protective than others) commensurate with abilities.

Consistent with the initiation and expansion of services for students labeled mildly retarded, the 1920s and 1930s spawned the growth and development of school intervention programs for students with so-called "mild emotional disturbance" or "behavior disorders." These programs, largely consisting of self-contained special classes in public schools, primarily served students who "were judged to be too disruptive for the regular classroom setting, but who did not score low enough on intelligence tests to be called mentally retarded" (Lilly, 1979: 6). The students thus served were mostly boys, and largely from families of low socioeconomic status. As with the development of services for "mild MR" students, the primary forces behind this educational movement were increased homogeneity in regular classrooms and the provision of specialized interventions geared to the needs of groups of "handicapped" students with similar characteristics.

School intervention programs for students labeled EMR and BD grew steadily, but not spectacularly, through the 1950s. The late 1950s and early 1960s, however, saw an explosion in the number of self-contained special class programs in the area of EMR. Special federal teacher preparation and research efforts were begun in this area, and special education became a visible entity at the local, state, and federal levels. Hewett (1977) credits this growth in MR services and activities to the leadership of John F. Kennedy, first as a U.S. Senator and then as President, and this was certainly a factor. However, it is naive to view this as the only determinant of growth in special-class services for students labeled EMR. Lilly (1982) points out that EMR special classes have always been populated by a disproportionate number of poor and minority students, and that it is not surprising that the number of such classes grew after the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* of Topeka. Within a few years of this landmark decision, significant changes in the racial and socioeconomic composition of the schools started to appear, and a situation analogous to that already described for American schools in the early 1900s emerged. Classrooms became more heterogeneous, and one reaction of many school systems was to seek homeostasis by removing students from the classroom who "did not belong there." Special classes for students labeled EMR and BD were one mechanism for such removal, and a recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1981) documents that racial disproportions still exist in EMR programs nationwide. This phenomenon will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter, and is presented here as an indication of the multiplicity and complexity of the values that have contributed to the growth of special education as a system of social intervention.

As EMR services grew in scale and magnitude through the 1950s and early 1960s, so did professional skepticism concerning the predominant models for student identification and service delivery. While these controversies form the substance of a subsequent section, they are important to mention here in the context of the generation of yet

another category of students to be served in special education. It has already been mentioned that large numbers of students identified as EMR were poor and minority members, and that the predominant service delivery structure was the self-contained special class. It was also the case that many students were identified as EMR on the basis of a single score derived from an individual test of intelligence, usually the Stanford-Binet or the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children. Thus, children performed poorly in school, were given tests on which they did not score well (at least partially due to cultural factors), were determined to be mentally retarded based on the outcomes of the test, and were placed in special instructional programs that were separate from and that used curricula distinct from those used in the regular classroom.

While this system of special education served many needs in the schools of the 1950s and 1960s, it also left many needs unmet. One such unmet need focused on a group of children who "(a) did not score low enough on tests of intelligence to be called mentally retarded, (b) did not exhibit behavioral aberrance necessary to be called emotionally disturbed, but (c) were in need of special education services due to poor performance in their schoolwork. In effect, while professional educators and parents could agree they needed special help, these children 'fell between the cracks' of the then existing categories of exceptionality" (Lilly, 1979: 12). Furthermore, many of these children were from white, middle- or upper-income homes and their parents would not accept either a label of mental retardation or the limited curriculum that formed the basis of most EMR programs. From this concern developed the field of learning disabilities, which has since become the largest single area of special education in terms of number of students served (General Accounting Office, 1981).

When the field of learning disabilities emerged, there was considerable debate among special educators as to the nature of the phenomenon under discussion. Was LD a heretofore undetected (or unrecognized) condition of *children,* which could be identified reliably and which resulted in reasonably predictable difficulties in school performance? Or, on the other hand, was LD an administrative classification of educational services to be provided for a broad array of students who demonstrated a need for special help? In essence, this choice of concepts underlying the phenomenon of LD centered on the continued acceptance or rejection of a basic premise that permeated all special education services, one that can be stated as follows: Special education is for *handicapped children,* and in order for a child to be eligible for special education intervention, the root of the instructional difficulty must lie *in the child.* In the end, this conception of special education and the children it serves was incorporated in the field of learning disabilities. As a result, LD was defined as a condition of children and added to the already existing array of categories of children eligible for special education services. This is an important event in the history of special education, since it represents an opportunity to break with a traditional assumption of the special education system, an assumption that had been (and continues to be) a source of considerable controversy in the field. Furthermore, since the first definition of LD was proposed in the 1960s, there has been a succession of attempts to define this elusive concept, without considerable success, and it has grown to be the largest single area of special education without a hint of professional consensus on the definition of the concept itself.

The brief history of special education presented thus far, which only takes us through the 1960s, provides a picture of a social intervention system built on the following assumptions:

(1) The standard school program is not appropriate for significant numbers of students, for whom different expectations and/or curriculum experiences must be developed.

(2) For students receiving special education intervention, the primary problem resides "within the child" and can be discovered through child-centered diagnostic activities.
(3) Discovery of the nature of the problem "within the child" is central to the identification of effective intervention strategies (that is, different interventions are appropriate for different types of handicapping conditions).
(4) Special education is beneficial for children, offering services and resulting in outcomes that cannot be realized through the regular education system.
(5) The appropriate locus for special education intervention is in settings that are separate from regular classrooms and normal community environments.
(6) The responsibility of the public schools to provide special education intervention is subject to limitations based on the public's definition of education and the limitations that potential students bring to the learning environment.

Thus, early special education can be seen as a relatively closed system, offering a proscribed array of services to individuals deemed to be limited in their capacity to respond, but not so limited as to make the entire endeavor pointless.

The 1970s and early 1980s have seen dramatic shifts in the values and assumptions underlying the delivery of special education services, drastically affecting some of the assumptions listed above, while leaving others intact. In subsequent sections of this chapter, I will analyze current service systems for the handicapped in four areas, identifying in each case the value shifts that have occurred and the current philosophical basis for services. The four areas to be explored are: (1) school services for moderately, severely, and multiply handicapped individuals;[1] (2) adult living arrangements for severely handicapped individuals; (3) vocational arrangements for severely handicapped individuals; and (4) school services for students labeled mildly handicapped (EMR, BD, and LD). It is felt that by examining these areas, shifts in societal and organizational values concerning intervention programs for individuals with special needs can be identified. Prior to looking at each of these areas individually, a general analysis of shifts in values during the 1970s will be provided, and the predominant view of this value shift among special educators, as embodied in the "continuum of services" model, will be discussed.

THE 1970s: SHIFTING VALUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION

It is both popular and accurate to portray education in general, and special education in particular, as being in a constant state of flux. To pick any single era of the history of education and designate it as a period of "dramatic" or "critical" change brings on suspicions of hyperbole. Even so, it is appropriate to state that the 1970s constituted a period of major and critical changes in the field of special education. Reynolds and Birch (1982) have identified eight forces that are part of the major developments in special education and related intervention programs in the last decade:

(1) judicial decrees in areas such as right to education, least restrictive environment, and parents' rights;
(2) legal restrictions on school exclusion, expulsion, and suspension;
(3) the return of large numbers of individuals from residential institutions to community life;
(4) the initiation of school programs for students formerly thought to be ineducable;
(5) mainstreaming and the erosion of boundaries between regular and special education;
(6) the emergence of consultation and indirect service roles in special education delivery models in the public schools;

(7) the establishment of requirements for notifying and involving parents in special education classification and intervention decisions; and
(8) objections to testing and classification systems, as well as segregated special class placements, by parents and advocates for minority children.

In addition to those listed by Reynolds and Birch, the following issues can be cited as significant in the development of special education over the last decade:

(9) growing concern over the effect of special education labels on the lives of children and adults, and the integrity of the labeling system itself;
(10) the emergence of the area of learning disabilities as both the least well defined and the most prolific area of special education;
(11) continuing controversy over the use and misuse of tests for diagnosis and classification purposes in education;
(12) the development and acceptance of principles of normalization as a basis for planning and delivering services to handicapped individuals; and
(13) a reanalysis of appropriate vocational expectations and opportunities for moderately, severely, and multiply handicapped adults, with a shift in emphasis from sheltered to competitive employment.

Thus, the past decade has seen a swing back from the tendency of the past seventy years to separate handicapped individuals and provide segregated services based largely on assumptions of what individuals *cannot* do. The principle of normalization espoused by Wolfensberger (1972), and increasingly accepted among special education professionals and advocates, calls for interventions to be as integrated and as normative as possible in terms of both service goals and methods of service delivery. In terms of services for moderately, severely, and multiply handicapped individuals, Snell and Renzaglia (1980) identify three major trends:

(1) deinstitutionalization, with development of support systems for as normal a lifestyle as possible in the community (Heal et al., 1978);
(2) public school education in integrated school settings (Brown et al., 1977); and
(3) functional, chronological-age-appropriate curriculum emphasis within school programs (Brown et al., 1979).

With regard to services for students labeled mildly handicapped, the following trends can be detected:

(1) increased sensitivity to issues of labeling and classification, with fewer students labeled educable mentally retarded and more labeled learning disabled (General Accounting Office, 1981; Tucker, 1980);
(2) increased emphasis on early intervention for children who are at risk of having later school problems;
(3) provision of direct services in resource settings that involve minimum removal of students from the regular classroom environment (Sindelar and Deno, 1978);
(4) development of consultation as an area of special education services, with an emphasis on direct solution of academic and behavioral problems in the regular classroom utilizing procedures that can be implemented by classroom teachers (Deno and Mirkin, 1977; Egner and Lates, 1975; Lilly, 1971);
(5) a stress on direct skill development and remediation of presenting problems, as opposed to identification of presumed underlying ability deficits and intervention based on training these ability areas (Heward and Orlansky, 1980); and
(6) a focus on assessment and intervention strategies that derive from a concern with the functional performance demands of the regular classroom and the standard school

curriculum, as opposed to the development of separate special education curricula and expectations (Blankenship and Lilly, 1981).

Perhaps the most important and central value underlying recent developments in special education is the return to normalcy as an appropriate standard for building special education programs. This does not imply a naive assumption that all handicapped individuals can be cured through powerful intervention programs, an assumption which our analysis of nineteenth-century special education would indicate can be more harmful than helpful. It does indicate, however, that all special education intervention should be as *normative* as possible, and minimally disruptive to an individual's participation in the normal activities of school and life in general. Since the early 1970s, the most popular expression of this principle has been the "continuum of service" or "cascade" model for special education (Deno, 1970). The cascade model conceptualized educational services in a pyramid, with the most "normal," or regular, classroom setting at the base of the pyramid, and the most "restrictive" service, full-time residential school, at the point. The width of the pyramid at any given point represented the number of handicapped children who could be expected to be served in each type of setting, with the largest number expected to be in regular classrooms and the fewest in residential school services. The points on the continuum have varied from time to time, but typically include the settings specified in Figure 15.1.

Reynolds and Birch (1982: 38-40) have pointed out the following favorable features of the continuum of services model for special education:

(1) It proposed that support be given in regular classes as one means of meeting the special needs of children who are maintained there.
(2) It proposed that children *not* be classified and given special placements on a permanent basis but, rather, that they be moved to special stations only for as long as necessary and that they be returned to regular classes as soon as feasible. Thus, no indelible labels were attached to students. The total number of children served over time greatly exceeded the numbers served at any given time.
(3) It proposed that the boundary lines between special education and regular education be renegotiated and opened so that students could pass back and forth easily, as dictated by their educational needs.
(4) It proposed that regular and special education staff members become more interactive and collaborative in their daily work, such as sharing responsibilities for students, rather than remain isolated in their separate centers and classrooms.
(5) It proposed that extraordinary justification be required to remove a student from the regular school environment, especially when removal was from both home and school environments to a residential center.

While the continuum of services model seemed to have many advantages over the largely separate model for special education that preceded it, and while it is still widely cited as the preferred model for organizing service delivery, many would argue that it has serious flaws. To begin with, many of the "promises" of the continuum of services cited above by Reynolds and Birch are only promises, and have never become reality. Classification systems are still in widespread use in special education, and the majority of special education services in the United States are provided on a traditional categorical model. Due in large part to the use of diagnostic systems based on traditional categories, the easy movement between regular and special education, presumed to be part of the continuum of services, has never materialized. It is still a complex and cumbersome process to be declared eligible for even the simplest of



SOURCE. Adapted from M. C. Reynolds and J. W. Birch, *Teaching Exceptional Children in All America's Schools.* © 1982 by the Council for Exceptional Children, Reston, VA. Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 15.1 Special Education Continuum of Services

special education services, and once in special education, the chances are slight that one will escape the label or service during one's school career. In a very real sense, special education is still based on the concept of handicaps as significant and enduring personal characteristics.

Finally, in relation to the advantages listed above, extraordinary justification is more often needed to help a child in a regular classroom or less restrictive setting, as opposed to providing more segregated services. While it is assumed in the continuum of services model that the process begins with the identification of individual student needs, and that service delivery patterns are then arranged to meet those needs, in point of fact the exact opposite is more often true: Student needs are assessed in relation to the already existing array of services available in a given school district or service agency. For example, while publicly espousing the use of a "continuum of services" model, many school districts offer only special school placement for students labeled moderately and severely handicapped. In a study of two special education administrative entities in Illinois (Moore et al., 1981: 15-18), it was found that "assessment and placement (like referral) were decisively influenced by the number of slots available in particular programs at particular schools. In some schools, for instance, a child with reading problems could receive supplementary help in remedial

reading, Title I, or learning disability resource rooms. In others, the only option, given available services and barriers created by test score requirements, was placement in a self-contained class for the mentally retarded." Further, Moore et al. point out that "school district budget and staff allocations for individual schools are not decisions based primarily on an analysis of student need. Nonetheless, once these allocations are made, teachers frequently limit referrals and placement recommendations so they will not exceed available slots." In short, the continuum of services is honored more in theory than in practice, and is not functionally available to large numbers of students identified for and placed in special education.

One final problem that must be mentioned with regard to the continuum of services model has been presented by Galloway (1981: 32-33), who points out that once the concept of a continuum is established and accepted, it follows that "for every point on the continuum, there must be a group of people who—because of their shared characteristics—'fit' that facility or program type . . . (and) one's prognosis for full participation as valued members of the community will be determined by his or her present location along the service continuum." Thus, while it can be reasonably argued that *no one* need be educated in a separate school and denied daily contact with the full range of his or her age peers, the concept of a continuum of services would seem to imply that *someone* needs such isolated education. Likewise, self-contained special classes seem to be institutionalized in the continuum of services model, and since they are a part of the model, we should expect to find school children who need them. In Galloway's words, rather than seeing special education as a continuum of *alternatives*, we should view it as "a continuum of *compromises* on the best that is possible. We will more likely then judge our service accomplishments with a proper degree of humility and act with a greater urgency to work toward reducing the existing degrees of compromise."

This extended discussion of the continuum of services model is meant to illustrate two points:

(1) Special education as a social intervention system is bound by its own assumptions and values, and while progress has been made over the past decade in changing some of these values and developing new methods of service delivery, certain enduring concepts place boundaries on the extent of change which is possible; and
(2) As with any other area of social intervention, rhetoric must be separated from reality, and both *principles* and *practices* must be examined, along with the inevitable gulf between the two.

With these cautions in mind, let us examine the current principles and practices in four areas of intervention with children and adults who have been labeled handicapped, the four areas which in the view of this author have undergone the most dramatic value shifts over the past two decades. As specified earlier, these are:

(1) school services for severely handicapped individuals;
(2) adult living arrangements for severely handicapped individuals;
(3) vocational arrangements for severely handicapped individuals; and
(4) school services for students labeled mildly handicapped.

SCHOOL SERVICES FOR SEVERELY HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

You will recall that when we left the history of education programs for moderately and severely handicapped individuals, in the 1950s and early 1960s, school pro-

grams for the "trainable mentally retarded (TMR)" were being provided primarily by parent groups, and more severely handicapped students were typically receiving no formal education. In fact, while most public school programs in the 1950s excluded children with IQs below 50, even many private programs for the "trainable mentally retarded" would not accept children with IQs below 30 (President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976).

During the latter part of the 1960s and into the 1970s, this situation changed dramatically. Increasing numbers of school districts began to provide school programs for students labeled TMR, and the National Association for Retarded Citizens, a parents' organization that had formed and operated many school programs, began to take on an advocacy role in fostering development of public school programs. With regard to the availability of public school services, the most dramatic developments have occurred during the 1970s, with litigation and legislation establishing that *all* children of school age have a legal right to a free, appropriate public education, regardless of severity of handicap. Two landmark court cases, *Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens* v. *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (1971) and *Mills* v. *Board of Education of the District of Columbia* (1972), were instrumental in securing this right, which was solidified in the mandatory education provisions of PL 94-142, the Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975. As a result of these actions and those of many state legislatures as well, it is unusual to find school districts in 1982 that do not provide educational programs for all school-age children living in their attendance areas.

As school programs began to emerge for severely handicapped students, it is not surprising that they were, by and large, patterned after the TMR programs that already existed. Thus, they have often been located in isolated settings, with curricula that are limited to the sets of skills which it was presumed could be learned by students with significant mental impairment. According to Wilcox (1979: 135), "current practice is still characterized by segregated services."

Apart from prevailing practice, what are the principles espoused in providing educational programs for severely handicapped students? An examination of the rapidly expanding literature in this area reveals the following:

(1) Educational intervention should begin as early as possible following the identification of severe or multiple handicaps (Hayden and Dmitriev, 1975; Hayden and McGinness, 1977; Bricker et al., 1979). Snell and Renzaglia (1980: 53) have summarized the importance of early intervention in their statement that it makes "a measurable difference in the attainment of basic developmental milestones in mobility, self care, social, cognitive, and language skills," and "is more cost effective than later intervention."

(2) Educational programs should be provided in the "least restrictive environment," meaning settings that are age-appropriate and in which both nonhandicapped and handicapped students attend school (Sontag, 1976; Wilcox, 1979). Wilcox has identified the following criteria by which to evaluate the extent to which placement settings for severely handicapped students are more or less restrictive:
(a) the presence of nonhandicapped students in the same educational facility;
(b) the presence of handicapped (age) peers;
(c) interaction with nonhandicapped students in school environments;
(d) the ratio of handicapped to nonhandicapped;
(e) the quality of access to educational facilities;
(f) the quality of educational services; and
(g) the normal organization of the school day.

While segregated day schools constitute a popular model for educating severely handicapped students, they cannot be justified on either educational or philosophical grounds, and they run counter to the preponderance of professional literature in the field.

(3) Development of curriculum for severely handicapped students should be based on analysis of adult living environments, rather than the study of normal growth and development (Snell and Renzaglia, 1980; York and Williams, 1977). In this manner, instruction is apt to be more functional and practical, and to lead to more independent living options for graduates of school programs. Snell and Renzaglia (1980) term this a "top-down" approach; it avoids the possible problems associated with students proceeding too slowly in a dvelopmental curriculum to reach functional skill levels within the term of the school program.

The latter two principles are sources of considerable discussion and controversy among special educators. Some would argue, for example, that severely handicapped students integrated into regular school environments will be teased and mistreated by their nonhandicapped peers, or that a full array of supportive services can be arranged only when a large number of severely handicapped students are clustered in a single setting. Others would contend that only a developmental approach to curriculum development can assure systematic and stable skill acquisition. The principles enumerated above have been applied and demonstrated, however, and are not mere theoretical ideas. The "top-down" curriculum development approach has been operationalized in the Madison, Wisconsin, public schools, as well as in other places, and has been utilized in delivering effective school programs.

Integrated school programs for severely handicapped students have been in existence for many years, and have operated successfully. While there have been no systematic research studies comparing the learning performance of severely handicapped students in integrated and segregated settings, such is not necessary to argue for the inclusion of each student in the regular school setting. Rather, the "doctrine of least restrictive placement" (LRP) is the generally accepted standard for the placement of students in special education programs. The principles of LRP are: "(1) students should be placed in special education services based on their unique educational needs, (2) a broad array of possible special education services should be available to any given student, and (3) placement of students in a special education arrangement should assure that the children are removed from the educational mainstream *only as necessary to meet their education needs*. . . . The LRP philosophy holds that any movement to a 'more restrictive,' i.e., more isolated setting must be justified on the basis of the individual child's educational needs" (Lilly, 1979: 48). Thus, the burden of proof for educational benefit to the child lies with those who seek to remove students to segregated settings; nowhere in the special education research literature can be found a hint that moderately, severely, or profoundly handicapped students learn more in special schools.

Considerable support exists in the special education literature for regular school placement for moderately and severely handicapped students in the form of analyses of pros and cons of various placement options (Brown et al., 1976; Brown et al., 1977; Wehman and Hill, 1980). The President's Committee on Mental Retardation (1978: 73) reported on programs in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, concluding that "the regular public building is the proper setting for school-age, mentally retarded students—except for those students whose medical problems rule out such a possibility." Taylor (1982: 30) visited eleven integrated school programs for severely handicapped students in

communities throughout the United States, and reported on the integration strategies in use in these sites. Based on his observation, Taylor concludes:

> *The programs described in this article shatter the myth that some children are too disabled to be educated alongside their fellow students. Specialized services can be provided in regular schools, even in the most rural areas. Regular students can learn to accept and value their disabled peers. Parental resistance to integration can be overcome. Regular teachers and administrators can learn to accommodate students with severe disabilities into their programs. Integration can work. Integration is working.*

In the last twenty years, we have gone from virtually no school programs for severely handicapped students to "full services," if one is willing to accept the mere existence of school programs as sufficient. The next step is the development of *quality* services of which we can be uniformly proud. The parameters of quality educational programs for the severely handicapped, as represented in the current literature, have been broadly sketched in the preceding paragraphs. Translation of these values into common educational practice will be a slow and deliberate process.

ADULT LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SEVERELY HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

One of the more visible and accepted shifts in public policy regarding the handicapped has been in the area of adult living arrangements for moderately and severely handicapped individuals. Whereas residential institutions started in the nineteenth century as small, educationally oriented facilities, they quickly evolved into a primary focus on custodial care. Furthermore, the first two-thirds of this century saw a steady growth in the population of these institutions, to the point that in 1969, there were 190,000 institution residents nationwide, a rate of one person per thousand population (President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976).

With this steady growth in institutional population came a tendency toward increased efficiency of service and a consequent depersonalization of institutional care. Many institutions were overcrowded, most were understaffed, and living conditions were less than bearable. These conditions existed for years and were assumed by many professionals to be an inevitable result of poor staffing, lack of funds, and the general difficulties inherent in dealing with large populations of mentally retarded individuals. Few professionals and virtually no members of the lay public ever saw the back wards of institutions, and it was easy not to worry about the nature of life there.

In 1965, however, a series of events were begun that would change this situation and produce both public outcry and official action against the quality of life in residential institutions. In December of that year, Burton Blatt, a nationally known and respected special educator, visited four "typical" institutions for the mentally retarded and took a friend, Fred Kaplan, who was a freelance photographer. Using a camera concealed on his belt, Kaplan took photographs of life on the back wards of these institutions, and a photographic essay entitled *Christmas in Purgatory* (Blatt and Kaplan, 1966) was published. This book was greeted with shock and dismay, and while some professionals deplored the conditions pictured in the book, others questioned the professionalism of Blatt in presenting only one side of the situation. Without question, however, the book served as a major impetus for an era of institutional reform.

The fact that Blatt and Kaplan presented, in *Christmas in Purgatory*, a portrait of a fifth residential institution which was clean, orderly, and comparatively personal in its approach to care led some to define the problem as the nature of existing institutional conditions. Thus, the first efforts were in the direction of institutional reform—attempts to increase the quality of life in institutions. A major tool in this quest for improvements was use of the courts and litigation, and the 1970s saw a series of court judgments against residential institutions. Willer et al. (1980: 9) point out five basic tenets of these court decisions:

(1) "all retarded persons have basic rights that must be recognized";
(2) institutions should serve a limited population and have a goal of returning residents to community life;
(3) residents should be treated individually in terms of their needs;
(4) restraints and other negative treatments should be controlled; and
(5) "the residential facility must provide a humane physical and psychological environment."

These rights are still being pursued for individuals who continue to reside in institutional settings.

Even more significant than attempts to improve institutional life has been a more basic shift in values, stressing the right of handicapped individuals to partake of normal community life. Blatt (1981), in a follow-up to *Christmas in Purgatory*, concludes that institutions will always produce dependence and incompetence in residents, and calls for the closure of institutions and the relocation of residents. "Deinstitutionalization" has been a major societal goal for the past fifteen years, which have seen an approximate 30 percent decrease in the number of mentally retarded individuals in public institutions (Martin et al., forthcoming). This same period has produced a substantial increase in the number of community residential facilities, including homes, foster homes, group homes, intermediate care facilities, and convalescent homes (Heal et al., 1980).

While the *value* of normalized living arrangements is well accepted, the translation of that value into practice is not always smooth. Thurman and Fiorelli (1979) warn against the mere physical integration of retarded adults into the community without attention to the need for *social* integration, and Galloway (1981: 32) makes the following point concerning the practice of deinstitutionalization in many communities:

> *If by "institutionalization" we mean forced residence in very large, self-contained facilities—"forced" either by court action or scarcity of choices to the contrary—then it is true that many people across the nation have been "deinstitutionalized" over the last decade, or so. However, many of these "deinstitutionalized people" now live in small regional institutions, nursing homes, and no-exit group homes. If, on the other hand, we understand institutionalization to mean any human service model that tends to isolate, confine, and congregate people who are de-valued by the community-at-large, then we must confront the reality that the last decade has witnessed a great deal of* trans-institutionalization, *not* de-institutionalization.

Only recently has the process of *community integration* been given as much attention as the goal of deinstitutionalization. It has been pointed out, for example, that institution-based programs designed to prepare individuals for community living are not particularly successful, and that community-based training programs that are systematic and sequential are needed (Martin et al., forthcoming; Schalock and

Harper, 1978). Martin et al. have reviewed current research in training in ten areas requisite to successful life in the community (travel, money management, meal preparation, clothing and personal care, telephone skills, housekeeping, self-medication, leisure, social skills, and conversation), and conclude that while more research efforts are needed, "in vivo" training of complex skills with moderately and severely retarded adults can be successful. This is the kind of preparation that will be necessary if the value of normalization is to be realized in the lives of increasing numbers of mentally retarded indidivudals.

In summary, the past fifteen years have brought a major shift in both our goals for severely handicapped adults and their actual placement in adult living arrangements. What must follow is a system of ongoing educational intervention to bring more individuals within reach of the goals.

VOCATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SEVERELY HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

Vocational preparation and employment of the moderately and severely retarded are the clearest examples of services and programs based on presumed limitations associated with handicapping conditions. Subsidized employment has long been an accepted "fact of life" for the moderately and severely retarded, most often taking the form of sheltered workshops and work activity centers. As recently as 1975, a book on the trainable mentally retarded had as its only material on employment a chapter entitled "Sheltered Employment for the Mentally Retarded" (Gearhart and Litton, 1975: 120). These authors describe sheltered employment as follows:

> *The principle of sheltered employment is relatively simple; it presumes that "sheltered" or highly controlled working conditions may provide specific benefits to certain employees, or potential employees. For the mentally retarded, as for many other handicapped individuals, sheltered employment may be the only feasible means whereby the individual can become a contributing member of society. . . . Advocates of sheltered employment for the trainable mentally retarded do not maintain that such provision will eventually lead to an independent, self-supporting status for those so assisted. They do maintain that this is perhaps the best way to maximize the potential of the retarded, permitting at least limited contribution to society and providing a wide array of benefits to the individual, his family, and society.*

This view of the handicapped prevailed until the latter part of the 1970s, at which time an increasing number of individuals began to question old assumptions and ask new questions. As more mentally retarded individuals returned to the community, and as the full ramifications of the concept of normalization became clearer, the limitations of sheltered employment became increasingly obvious. These limitations have been summarized by Wehman et al. (1979: 274-275) as follows:

> *First, few sheltered workshops pay the minimum wage, but rather compensate on a piece rate basis. Consequently, many workers earn only $20 to $80 per month, if that. Secondly, sheltered employment is primarily restrictive; that is, it includes only handicapped workers and therefore limited opportunities for intervention with non-handicapped individuals. . . . Furthermore, in sheltered workshops there are rarely the full spectrum of fringe benefits (i.e., Blue Cross) which are available in competitive employment situations. A final limitation of sheltered employment is that it is often a needlessly terminal placement for many individuals. It becomes terminal*

because the skilled employee is a critical part of the production process and invariably is "carrying" several less productive workers. Therefore, the workshop supervisor may be reluctant to move the worker out of the shop and into competitive employment.

While the *value* of competitive employment is firmly established, this is of little use if it cannot be obtained. However, there are numerous examples of school programs and adult rehabilitation projects which are successfully preparing moderately and severely handicapped individuals for competitive employment. Wehman et al. (1979) report on Project Employability in Virginia, which uses an on-the-job training model with gradually decreasing staff supervision of job performance. Eventually, trainees are hired at minimum wage, and follow-up services are provided. Frith and Edwards (1982) describe a *school-based* competitive employment training program, an important extension of predominantly adult services into the public school program.

A major competitive employment training project for moderately and severely retarded adults has been in place in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, since 1978, with a focus on job training in the areas of food service, and janitorial and maid service. In addition to demonstrating successful on-the-job placement, this project has produced research in such areas as increasing compliant work behaviors (Rusch and Menchetti, 1981) and improving conversational skills on the job (Rusch et al., 1980). In a most significant study emanating from this project, Schneider et al. (1981: 28) demonstrated that competitive employment training was cost-beneficial in comparison to sheltered employment programs. In the words of the authors: "At the end of ten years, an individual in non-sheltered employment could be expected to have earned $16,153 more than the cumulative cost of training, placement, and follow-up services. On the other hand, if that same individual had been employed in a typical sheltered setting, the earnings would never exceed the training costs, and the cumulative cost over ten years would be $50,276."

In summary, a major shift in expectations for the employment of severely handicapped individuals is occurring—a shift toward more normative, more rewarding, and more competitive employment. This is, however, a movement in its early stages, and it will be some time before competitive employment is the predominant employment mode for these individuals.

SCHOOL SERVICES FOR STUDENTS LABELED MILDLY HANDICAPPED

The final specific area to be covered with regard to shifting values concerning intervention on behalf of special needs populations has to do with individuals labeled "mildly handicapped." This is far too broad an area to be covered adequately in the limited space available, and therefore only the most salient current issues will be highlighted.

The reader will recall that as of the late 1950s and early 1960s, services for the mildly handicapped were provided under the categories of EMR and BD, were located primarily in special class settings, and bore little relationship to the regular curriculum. In addition, these classes enrolled disproportionate numbers of males and minority students.

In this section, the following predominant shifts in values from the early 1960s to the present will be briefly described:

(1) an increased focus on early identification and intervention;
(2) growing concern for overrepresentation of minority students in special education;

(3) skepticism regarding the value of diagnostic categories and the effects of labeling on children;
(4) acceptance of regular classrooms as the preferred *locus* of instruction and the regular curriculum as the preferred *mode* of instruction; and
(5) concern for the appropriate limits of growth for special education.

Efforts at early intervention for students "at risk" of being labeled handicapped in school began concurrently with experiments in early intervention for the "culturally deprived" in the mid-1960s. Those early programs focused on intellectual stimulation, and a primary measure of success was a change in scores on standardized tests of intelligence. While results were mixed and there were questions concerning the maintenance of gains, at least some researchers concluded that both expansive programs such as Head Start and Follow Through, and smaller, more experimental programs have measurably affected young children's intellectual functioning (Gotts, 1981; Hodges and Cooper, 1981).

More to the point for our purposes, however, has been the dramatic growth in preschool programs for "handicapped" or "high-risk" students. Many states now mandate special education programs for all handicapped children beginning at age three, and a few even have mandates starting at birth. This movement has not been without controversy; Mercer et al. (1979) cite both advantages and disadvantages of early identification:

Advantages

(1) Behavior is more susceptible to change at an early age.
(2) Preventive programs can be established during optimal developmental periods.
(3) Family adjustment and acceptance is made easier.

Disadvantages

(1) Identification instruments are unreliable with certain groups of children.
(2) With certain conditions, inappropriately low expectations may be set due to early diagnosis.
(3) Rapid growth in early years makes it difficult to determine if poor performance on a test is due to maturational factors or is a sign of a true disability.
(4) Children may be labeled who are not in fact disabled, and these labels may have detrimental effects.

In the face of controversies over identification and difficulties in competing with other areas of education (and special education) for limited resources (Gilkerson et al., 1981), preschool special education programs continue to grow. And while short-term measures of outcomes sometimes produced mixed results, a recent report (Research Progress, 1982: 3-4) of the John F. Kennedy Center at Peabody College describes the findings of a consortium on longitudinal studies in preschool education as follows:

> *Children who participated in preschool programs were more successful in high school than those who did not take part. Fewer were placed in special education classes or had to repeat grades. More graduated from high school and were employed or continued their education after graduation. What consortium members consider especially important is that these efforts are lasting ones that still show 10 years or more after the early education interventions. The findings point to some of the long-range economic benefits of early education.*

The second trend to be discussed in special education for students labeled mildly handicapped concerns overrepresentation of minority students. Numerous reports

indicate that this overrepresentation is present in the area of EMR (Franks, 1971; General Accounting Office, 1981; Jones and Wilderson, 1976; Moore et al., 1981), and a recent report indicates that while emergence of the LD classification might be resulting in a reduction in the percentage of minority students in EMR classes, rather than solving the problem, it "masks a significantly greater increase in the percentage of minority group students placed in special education rather than reducing an already inequitable situation" (Tucker, 1980: 95). This concern has led some school districts to launch programs aimed at reassessing and declassifying large numbers of students previously labeled EMR, and providing support services for their return to regular education (Lilly, forthcoming). It is important to note that these are not, strictly speaking, "mainstreaming" programs, since mainstreaming refers to the education of handicapped students in regular classrooms, and these are not handicapped students, but misclassified students.

With regard to the third issue to be mentioned, labeling and classification, this topic has been covered in depth elsewhere (Lilly, 1979; Reynolds and Birch, 1982), and the discussion will not be repeated here. It will suffice to say that the emergence of the field of learning disabilities has contributed substantially to growing questioning of the classification schemes used in special education (Adelman, 1979), and while the field of special education clings to traditional categories in the delivery of services and in personnel preparation, they remain the subject of considerable discussion and controversy in the professional literature. In point of fact, the lack of an adequate definition of the concept of learning disabilities has been a source of substantial embarrassment for many special educators, and the recent development of yet another "authoritative" definition (Hammill et al., 1981) is not apt to settle the issue at all.

The fourth trend to be highlighted is, in many ways, antithetical to the continued reliance on categorical labels in special education, since it relates to acceptance of the regular classroom and regular school curriculum as preferred instructional arrangements. The establishment of LD services in the late 1960s brought to the fore the concept of resource services as an alternative to the special class model for special education intervention. At least in part, this development was brought about by the "inability to clearly articulate the uniqueness of instructional programs available in self-contained classrooms" (Kaufman and Mona, 1978:100). Sindelar and Deno (1978:17) have defined resource programs as "any administrative organization in which children in regular classrooms receive some proportion of their instruction from special education personnel." While the original conception of resource programs called for direct instruction by special educators, growing emphasis is placed on providing support for classroom teachers in solving academic and behavioral problems directly in regular classrooms (Egner and Lates, 1975; Lilly, 1971; Parker, 1975).

Concurrent with this emphasis on the solution of problems in regular classrooms has come an increased focus on the regular curriculum as the preferred mode of instruction and the appropriate locus of assessment activities. *Curriculum-based assessment* involves designing assessment instruments to identify a student's difficulties in handling regular curriculum materials, and *direct instruction* stresses the direct remediation of learning problems as they are manifest in the regular classroom (Blankenship and Lilly, 1981). These concepts form the basic tenets of growing numbers of special education intervention programs for students with mild problems of academic learning and social behavior.

The final issue to be discussed in this section has to do with the growing concern over the inclusiveness of special education programs in the public schools. Over the

past several years, increasing proportions of school budgets have gone to special education programs, and it is not unusual to find school districts in which up to 20 percent of elementary students are enrolled in some form of special education program (Lilly, 1982). Furthermore, the largest group of students in special education are in programs for learning disabilities, an area that is not well defined and yet rapidly expanding. Tucker (1980) reports that in one state, LD rose from being nonexistent to comprising 44 percent of the special education population in a period of seven years (1970-1977). As reported earlier, the General Accounting Office (1981) report established LD as the single largest area of special education.

The combination of growth in LD and concern for the overidentification of minorities in special education, along with recent increased acceptance of regular education curriculum and placement by special educators, is leading to a reexamination of the scope and role of special education for the "mildly handicapped." This analysis will be the topic of considerable debate over the next several years, and may lead to a return of responsibility for certain supportive and remedial services to regular education (Lilly, 1982). The extent to which special educators will be effective participants in this discussion may depend, in large part, on the extent to which they can cast aside the long-standing assumption that the root of instructional problems is in the child.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, special education has been presented as a social intervention system. A historical analysis of the development of special education services was presented and the values that formed the basis for early special education programs were identified. Major developments of the last ten to twenty years were reviewed, with a focus on the shifts in values that either brought about or accompanied these developments.

What emerges from this analysis is a picture of a social intervention system which in many ways bears little resemblance to that which existed twenty years ago. Whereas the early system focused on segregated services, integration is now an overriding value of the service delivery system. Whereas protection and a focus on the limitations and deficits of handicapped individuals have been important organizing principles, recent developments call into question such limiting views of people and stress the importance of challenge and risk in intervention programs. Whereas early programs were built on the "unique needs" of handicapped individuals, recent developments are more apt to capitalize on the similarities between so-called handicapped and nonhandicapped individuals.

While a case could be made that a revolution has occurred in the values and assumptions underlying special education services, such an analysis would be unduly optimistic and overstating the case. Lilly and Smith (1980) argue that special education is a social movement, and that as a successful social movement, it is subject to a conservatism designed to "protect one's gains." Thus, while it becomes increasingly clear that the child-based categorization system used in special education is maladaptive and does not often represent reality very well, we cling to it for fear that without labels, we will lose power and influence. Mann (1979) has commented that "special education appears to be becoming a field that poorly tolerates dissent... (because) special education is a very vulnerable institution within a vulnerable institution."

Nonetheless, the seeds of change and continuing ferment within special education are already sown. Reynolds and Birch (1982: 28) point out that "historical and interna-

tional perspectives suggest that the current mainstreaming trend is not a minor pendulum swing or a temporary enthusiasm. From the beginning, a steady inclusive trend in special education has moved from unconcerned to distal (faraway) to proximal (near) arrangements for handicapped persons." Likewise, our heightened expectations for handicapped individuals are, unlike the dreams for cure in the nineteenth century, based on demonstrated success in real programs in real communities, with real individuals who are living examples of the new possibilities. While it is popular to speak of "pendulums" and "cycles" in education, it is more appropriate to picture long-range developmental trends in intervention programs for special needs children and adults. It would be naive to predict sudden or revolutionary changes in these intervention systems in the near future, because enduring value systems change slowly, and the notion of handicaps as residing in individuals and placing limits on their accomplishments is still a central value and belief for most special educators. However, this view is slowly changing, and future services will increasingly be built on the hope and promise of individuals' abilities, not the limitations of their presumed handicaps.

NOTE

1. For ease of communication, in the remainder of this chapter the term "severely handicapped" will be used to refer to this population of individuals who may exhibit characteristics associated with moderate to profound mental retardation, severe emotional disturbance, or multiple (including physical) handicaps (Snell and Renzaglia, 1980).

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16

Where Juvenile Justice Meets Social Service

Social Intervention with Troubled Youth

Malcolm W. Klein

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In this section I take my text principally from the recent work of LaMar T. Empey (1978) and even more recent conceptual attempts undertaken with some of my research collaborators (Klein, 1979a; Teilmann and Klein, 1979; Little, 1981). The histories of juvenile justice and delinquency as concepts provide a context for understanding our current approaches to social and community intervention. This history also provides an antidote for unintended side effects often accompanying our prescriptions for the delinquency problem.

It was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that Western civilization developed and accepted the concept of childhood as a developmental stage clearly differentiated from adulthood. As this concept took hold, it was accompanied by increased cohesiveness of the nuclear family and separation of roles within the family: children's function became more set apart. Concurrently, and with increasing conviction, in the nineteenth century, the focus on children's formal education became more important. As formal education became entrenched as a social institution, that very institution helped to concretize the notion of childhood as a real phenomenon, something natural rather than something constructed by social processes.

Thus family structure, educational institutions, and childhood became part of a cycle of social construction so interwoven that to separate them conceptually threatens to appear arbitrary. It is possible, nonetheless, to see a major process taking place by which the young first appear as a separable category, then appear consequently as requiring separate attention, and then finally become subjected to formally structured separation. It is within this context that we can better understand the importance of what happened in Illinois in 1899.

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It was then that the first juvenile court was established in recognition (1) that children were different, (2) that children were inferior beings, and (3) that children therefore needed to be protected. The juvenile court, with its growing accoutrement of special services, became our second major institutionalized response to our own invention, childhood. With a special justice system added to the school system, childhood was here to stay; the concept had become the reality, to the point where it is hard for us to remember that childhood, schools, and the juvenile justice system are creatures of the modern world, and are not necessary segments of a social system.

The juvenile court represented a major effort at what is now called juvenile diversion. It was designed, first, to treat youngsters separately from the criminal courts and, second, to offer its own protective mantle in order to foster rehabilitation. In responding to this separatist, protective, and rehabilitative thrust, other segments of the juvenile system also expanded. In corrections, in probation, and in enforcement one saw the development of altered strategies and specialized units designed for juveniles, requiring special knowledge of juvenile status and behavior, and demanding special skills and training. And, of course, one saw the growth of professional associations to support, maintain, and sanctify the existence of the new thrust and its practitioners. We do indeed have a juvenile justice *system*, a structure of considerable substance and power built on a philosophy now under attack.

One other point should be made about our recent history; the very cultural structure that has fostered our protective juvenile justice system has also fostered the development and conceptualization of a treatment philosophy perfectly matched to the system. I speak specifically of the individual treatment philosophy as embedded in the psychodynamic theories of human development and human needs. In a society such as American society the stress on individualism—including individual freedom and individual responsibility—responds well to a psychological rationale that stresses the locus of change as being within the individual. An American justice system that concerns itself so directly with individual responsibility for actions will obviously resonate well with a treatment rationale based on changing *individuals*. Thus the psychologist and the psychologically trained and oriented justice practitioner are joined most naturally. And where might they be better joined than in the arena of juvenile behavior, where the protectionist goals are so well meshed with treatment strategies? Thus it is that, in the juvenile justice system, juvenile justice, mental health, and social service systems have joined in the effort to serve the needs of the young.

Yet within this context other social pressures have been forcing change upon us. The original concern for juvenile *protection*, paramount up to the 1940s, began to give way to a concern about juvenile *delinquency*. Children began to fade; their behavior slowly came to the forefront. More often, one saw the phrase "protection of the child" coupled with "protection of society." Children, especially adolescents, were committing the kinds of acts that frightened or threatened adults. Their behaviors needed something more than protection; they needed treatment. But treatment can only be administered if the child is available. And so the net of juvenile justice system was both spread and strengthened. Custody, formal and informal, was needed to protect us and to treat them.

By the 1960s, with some help from the politicians who found crime and warring upon it a most convenient route to public office, we had decided that many adolescents were dangerous. We connected them with drugs, with preying upon helpless elderly citizens, with political unrest, and even treason. Protection of them and protection of us came into direct conflict. How could we reconcile these?

I want to suggest, at least for the sake of argument, that we have found a most

creative—at least for the moment—a most salubrious resolution to the conflict. Rather than changing our minds about the young, or changing our philosophies or our fears, we have—once again—begun to change our concept of the young. Whereas we have usually placed them into one large, amorphous category, we are now learning to differentiate between two types of troublesome youngsters. One of these needs our protection (and thus maintains our treatment philosophies); the other forces us to protect ourselves—these are the truly bad youths. Evidence for this dichotomous concept is available in very concrete form. Starting in the late sixties or early seventies, and concretized in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the policymakers have organized their thinking around the professionals' distinction between *status* offenders and *deliquent* offenders.[1]

At the risk of oversimplifying the situation, we can fairly say that political liberalism and social welfare protectionism have aligned themselves around the problems of helping status offenders. Similarly, political conservatism has combined with a neoclassical criminology around the demand to provide just deserts for delinquent offenders, or protectionism versus punitiveness. But rather than fostering direct conflict, this opposition has found an acceptable compromise with two interesting facets.

First, as suggested above, the more liberal and more conservative factions have concerned themselves with opposite ends of the seriousness continuum: the liberals with minor and status offenders and the conservatives with serious delinquent offenders. This permits each faction to concentrate on a pertinent aspect of the delinquency problem without necessarily stepping on the toes of the other faction.

Second, each faction has found support in the rising national concern with legalization of juvenile justice practice, but again each has done so through the medium of different emphases (Teilmann and Klein, 1979). For the liberal/protectionist faction, legalization has taken the form of *due process*. In the case of status offenders, those whose act was not technically criminal, due process has meant the protection against criminal sanctions or even separation from the juvenile justice system altogether.

For the conservatives, legalization has meant the provision of fuller criminal court proceedings for delinquent offenders. If a delinquent act is a criminal act, the procedures for delinquent offenders should approach those for criminal offenders. Such procedures may include full adversarial proceedings, the lowering of the age of majority, certification to adult criminal court, and placement in adult correctional facilities.

In summary then, the history of modern juvenile justice is a history of cycles as much as it is a linear progression. We have moved from nonrecognition of special juvenile justice problems to an emphasis on juvenile *protection and care*, then to a concern for juvenile *delinquency*, and now to a concern for juvenile *justice*. In this development we have seen changes in our own *concept* of juveniles and the problems they pose. In many ways this history of juvenile justice is really a history of adult concepts. Since these can change rather readily, we must be wary of the feeling that what we believe at any particular point in time is anything but a transitory state in an emerging pattern.

The most interesting feature of our current state is the compromise stance suggested above. The liberals and the conservatives have found their own slices of the pie. So long as they are convinced that the slices are reasonably separate, the two opposing philosophies can coexist in reasonable harmony, bolstered by their separate legalization emphases on due process and adult process.

And lest the reader suspect that I have built a fantasy structure in all of this, let us review the tidal wave of new juvenile legislation sweeping across the country. Best exemplified by the new 1977 and 1978 laws in California and Washington, these new

bills embody both directions of the juvenile justice progression within the same legislative framework. Using the California case (Van Dusen and Klein, 1981) as an example, there were liberal provisions to deinstitutionalize all status offenders, encourage greater use of informal rather than formal probation, and foster greater use of community treatment options. At the same time decisions on filing of delinquency petitions were shifted to the District Attorney (DA); the DA's presence was mandated in all delinquency hearings, and certifications to adult court were greatly facilitated. Both factions were served; legislative schizophrenia was legitimated; the minor offender was "given" to the community, while the major or repeat offender was "sent" to the justice system.

Determinants of Public Policy

Given the historical progression described above, we might usefully step aside for a disinterested glance and ask a few questions about public policy. For instance, has public policy about community intervention in the juvenile justice area been determined by recourse to scientific data? Most assuredly the answer is "no." Nor can we claim an overabundance of such relevant data, to the point that its being overlooked is felonious behavior. But perhaps it is misdemeanor behavior. There are data—pertinent data—that could be used to inform the direction of public policy. Further, there are social science procedures and technologies now available, as well as currently developing, that could provide policy-relevant data, should policymakers see the need for them. We will return to this point later in the chapter.

If scientifically gathered data have not had much impact on intervention policy, are there other categories of data that *can* be identified as policy determinants? The answer is "yes," and two such categories seem particularly relevant to our concern with the absence of scientific data. First among these is what might be called the conventional wisdom of practitioners.

This conventional wisdom, the aggregated opinions of a profession that achieves some consensus from its members, derives from several sources. It also has several drawbacks that may or may not tend to invalidate it. The sources of the conventional wisdom are at least three. First, they come from the formal training, both in school and in service, whose very purpose is to inculcate new professionals with the wisdom of their predecessors.

Second, they come from common, mutually shared, and mutually reinforced field experiences. These experiences—with clients, with offenders, with victims, with social agencies and systems—can become quite compelling. They become the empirical data for field judgments. As they accumulate, they slowly fall into *categories* of experiential data, and as categories, provide a structure resembling knowledge or wisdom. And finally, as redundant experiences serve to reinforce the correctness of this wisdom, disconfirming experiences are discounted or more easily forgotten, thus reinforcing wisdom via errors of omission.

The third major source of conventional professional wisdom is the suggestion, the guideline, and the reinforcement that comes from supervisory personnel. These people may be presiding judges, field supervisors, division chiefs, watch commanders, senior clerks, case managers, or others whose superordinate position in the professional work setting symbolizes professional wisdom while it legitimates the passing on of such wisdom. This is neither an easy nor an automatic process, but it is, in the long run, an effective one.

The conventional wisdoms of the professions often affect public policy. Professional associations take public stances on issues with which they become concerned. Sometimes they lobby actively for new or corrective legislation (Maxson, 1981). As the assumed embodiment of wisdom, individual professionals are often sought out by policymakers for their views. And because we are a society that attributes expertise and status to the professions, the conventional wisdoms are generally given considerable credence.

But there are problems. First, the professions of concern to us, especially the people-changing professions at the core and the periphery of the social service and mental health fields, have developed a societally sanctioned conceit about their wisdoms that often transcends the available documentation of their validity. The essence of the problem is found in the quote from a delinquency counselor to whom it was suggested that the value of counseling for diversion clients had yet to be demonstrated: "I can't believe that fifteen minutes of counseling with me wouldn't help a child" (McAleenan, 1975). And we have the comment of a juvenile court judge that "the courts are the most stable branch of government and have the greatest capacity to acquire long-term empirical knowledge about problems such as delinquency" (Tamilia, 1976: 9).

Second, conventional wisdom, as with many things conventional, has a time-lag problem. The world changes, and it is unconventional rather than conventional wisdom that is more likely to be in immediate touch with change. Today's conventional wisdom, even if highly appropriate for today, may be misleading for tomorrow.

A third problem, clearly the case in the juvenile justice arena, is that there are many conventional wisdoms, not one. They need not be, and often are not in accord. In the disposition of certain delinquency cases, the court's wisdom suggests treatment under wardship; the probation officials see clearly the advantages of informal (nonwardship) probation; the community advocate, at the forefront of the 1970s change, is clear that diversion to nonjustice, community agency treatment is the way to go; the police understand that anything short of secure placement will only ensure future delinquent predations. Each wisdom, with the sanctification of professional consensus, is thus revealed not as wisdom but as perspective. But the revelation is the observers', not the involved practitioners'. Yet upon such wisdoms is public policy often based or justified.

Finally, as more social science data on delinquency become available, the more it appears likely that a significant portion of our conventional professional wisdoms may be even less than perspectives; they may be *incorrect* perspectives. This applies equally well to the conventional wisdoms of the scholarly professions—sociology, psychology, law, and medicine—which have provided the texts for the transmission of scientific conventional wisdoms.

So far, I have suggested that scientifically derived data have been relatively underutilized in the practice of policymaking. I have indicated that the most likely alternative, the conventional wisdom of the professions, has been more effectively utilized, but at a considerable risk of error. A third, and probably more pervasive determinant of intervention policy, is that conglomerate of values, needs, and special interests that represents the stake in the game of the various social service and justice system constituencies. Included among these constituencies, of course, are those local, state, and federal politicians who find the delinquency field a congenial arena for playing out their political roles.

In a sense, of course, this matter of values, needs, and special interests is nothing more than a recognition of political issues, if we define politics in its broader sense.

Delinquency legislation, regulations, and guidelines often reflect the end-product of individual or group promulgations along with intergroup negotiations. The means by which these processes result in official policy is far too complex to be treated here,[2] but we can cite the California case as an illustration. When Assembly Bill 3121 was passed—rather precipitously and with little advance notice—in the fall of 1976 for enactment on January 1, 1977, its political origins soon became apparent. It included provisions satisfying the interests of liberals and protectionists. It included other provisions satisfying the interests of conservatives and hard liners. But these were the interests of the legislators, and not, as it turned out, of the community and justice practitioners (Teilmann and Klein, 1979).[3]

Rather than expressing their satisfaction with various parts of the bill's twenty or more provisions that *met* their interests, the several professional groups instead rallied against those provisions that seemed to go *counter* to their own interests. This included the police, private agencies, probation, and the courts. The new bill was a *political* compromise and not, as it turned out, a satisfactory compromise between practitioner groups with conflicting values and interests.

If various conventional wisdoms have some impact on policymaking and special constituency values and interests have even more, is there realistically a place for science in all of this? It must be remembered that science, as a conservative and skeptical enterprise, often takes on a debunking role when turned loose in the public arena. Can this be tolerated by those who already have an impact? In the delinquency area, are there enough data of value to make an attempt likely to succeed? It is to these issues that we now turn.

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS AND RELEVANT DATA

In this section three broad categories of assumptions and data are summarized. *Etiology, patterns,* and *intervention* encompass a rather broad spectrum of information available to and pertinent to policymaking where juvenile justice and social service join forces.

Etiology

Fortunately, we have now come to the point that only the uninformed seek single-factor causes of delinquency. If nothing else, social scientists and practitioners alike have demonstrated that neurological deficits, unemployment, poverty, discrimination, family disruption, and moral breakdowns do not by themselves explain the existence of delinquency. The amount of variance in delinquency accounted for by any single factor is quite small. Thus, we know better than to expect much from prevention or control programs based primarily on one individual or social factor. The fact that we continue to mount such single-factor programs reflects less our lack of knowledge than our lack of willingness and skill to use it.

Delinquency is a by-product, a very complex by-product, of some very complex social factors that seem endemic to the very structure of human social existence. It will never disappear or be cured; it will only become more and less prominent in response to social situations. If we keep its character as a social by-product in mind, we will be less prone to seek simplistic causes for its existence. Scientists suggest that for a factor to be thought of as the *cause* of a phenomenon, that factor must be both *necessary* and

sufficient to produce the phenomenon. For example, for poverty to be the cause of delinquency, it must be necessary (no delinquency without poverty) and sufficient (wherever there is poverty, there should be delinquency). No single factor we can mention even *begins* to meet the tests of being necessary and sufficient.

Another point about etiology; we have been unnecessarily distracted by the search for what some call the root causes of delinquency, and insufficiently alert to contemporaneous determinants of delinquency. We suffer from the fallacy of original causes, be these poverty, discrimination, or family problems. Delinquency need not arise because of deficits during the so-called formative years; it can arise because of what is happening in a juvenile's world *now*. And it can be reinforced and called forth again by the reaction it receives *now*. Just as saplings emerge in only general form from seeds and take their structure from the context of soil, climate, and immediate physical constraints, and change their structure as their context varies, so too with delinquent youngsters. The effects of root causes can be overcome by other contexts; delinquents become conformists, conformists become delinquents, and most of us become both.

Finally, let us put aside several of our favorite myths. First, it has *not* been demonstrated that poverty is a major cause of delinquency. At both the aggregate and the individual level, data from self-report studies, cross-national studies, and cross-temporal studies fail to verify a strong relationship between poverty and delinquency. Poverty is certainly not necessary to produce delinquency; it is usually not even sufficient.

Second, family disruptions, however conceptualized and measured, have *not* been demonstrated as strong causes of delinquency. It is time to lay the Gluecks' work aside. Delinquency often arises in the absence of family problems. And while family problems often lead to unhappy situations and behaviors, delinquency may or may not be found among them. There is probably no single-cause notion about delinquency that is so prevalent among our conventional wisdoms as the notion of the connection between disrupted families and delinquency.

Finally, the recent hobby-horse of the 1970s, learning disability, shares the same fate. There has been *no* adequate correlation between learning disabilities and delinquency. Perhaps the conventional wisdom about the connection between disabilities and delinquency has in fact been the cause of the connection.

For any who find it hard to accept the notion that poverty, or family problems, or learning disabilities, or any other favorite cause is poorly related to delinquency, history provides a salve. In centuries just passed a similar disbelief would have attended the statement that delinquency was not biologically determined, or was not the direct result of being raised in a criminal family, or was not the result of sin and moral degeneration. The fault is not in the causal variable chosen; it is in our insistence upon finding a single cause and prior causes for a phenomenon that is really not amenable to that type of thinking. Our mode of conception has been faulty.

Patterns of Delinquency

For the purposes of illustration, I have chosen eight common assumptions about delinquency patterns, and will suggest what is now known about each.

(1) *Assumption: Delinquent careers increase in seriousness.* Data: For the most part, the assumption is unsupportable (McEachern and Bauzer, 1967; Klein, 1971; Thomas, 1976). Youngsters are just as likely to commit serious offenses early in their

careers as late in their careers, or are just as likely to commit minor offenses late their careers as early in their careers. Thus, the implication of the assumption—almost universally held—is *false*, that by intervening early in delinquents' careers they will be prevented from progressing to more serious offenses. They may, in fact, progress into more minor offenses (Heuser, 1979).

(2) *Assumption: Time between subsequent offenses in a delinquent career decreases.* Data: There is good support for this (Robin, 1967; Klein, 1971; Wolfgang al., 1972). For instance, among juvenile gang members an average of 13 months ensues between the first and second arrest, but only 8 months between the second and third, and so on down to less than 4 months after the eighth arrest. Thus early successful intervention *can* be measured in terms of lengthening the time between succeeding episodes.

(3) *Assumption: Delinquency is patterned—different youngsters commit different kinds of acts.* Data: By and large, delinquency is *not* patterned, does not reveal specialists at work. While obvious exceptions exist, most youthful careers in delinquency reveal a "cafeteria style" of behavior (see Klein, 1983, for a review of reports). The implication is that treatment strategies specifically aimed at thieves, drug users, or incorrigibles, or violent offenders may commonly be inappropriate and, to that extent, doomed to failure.

(4) *Assumption: Status offenders are different from delinquent offenders* Again, data accumulated to date do not confirm the assumption (Thomas, 19 jek, 1978; Erickson, 1979; Kobrin and Klein, 1981; Klein, 1982). Both official and self report studies indicate that the "pure" status offender is a relatively rare bird. Programs designed specifically for the status offender, such as the national deinstitutionalizatio program (Kobrin and Klein, 1981) may well be misdirected if they develop treatment strategies for status offenders that do not deal equally with delinquent behaviors.

(5) *Assumption: Juvenile gangs are the source of much or most delinq* Data: Gangs contribute only a small portion of all delinquency, although obv this portion is higher in urban areas (Klein, 1971). The elimination of gang delinquency—an impossible task—would not dramatically affect the level of delinquency in America. Even in gang territories of our major cities, a very substantial portion delinquency is contributed by nongang juveniles. Gang intervention programs h high drama value, and high political salience, but they cannot make significant contributions to general delinquency reduction.

(6) *Assumption: There are major gender differences in delinquency ra* There are indeed major differences. Boys are more heavily involved in de arrests than girls, the ratios being from 3 to 1 up to 7 or 8 to 1 depending o reviewed. There are some indications that the ratios are decreasing in the 1970s the data on this are conflicting (Cernkovich and Giordano, 1980). The assu that there is gender *discrimination* in the juvenile justice system is harder to c Most studies of this issue have been seriously flawed in methodology; the mos work, which attempts to avoid these flaws, fails to find consistent evidence of gend discrimination (Teilmann and Landry, 1981).

(7) *Assumption: Delinquency is a primarily lower-class problem.* Data: Recer studies support this assumption only with respect to *arrest* rates. Self-report studie

reveal a distribution across economic lines of such magnitude that the assumption has been seriously weakened (Tittle et al., 1978; Elliott and Ageton, 1980). Certain kinds of offenses, and serious career patterns, may be less evenly distributed across class lines, but the most legitimate conclusion now is one of broadly distributed delinquent behavior. Thus intervention programs must make a distinction between reducing behavior rates and arrest rates; the two rates call for radically different forms of intervention.

(8) *Assumption: A small proportion of delinquent offenders account for a large proportion of delinquent offenses.* Data: There is very good support for this assumption (Rector, 1979; Wolfgang et al., 1972). Scientific studies and agency reports agree on this point. There are a number of identifiable youngsters who account for a surprisingly large proportion of the arrests in a given jurisdiction. The implication is inescapable that special intervention for these hard-core offenders should be developed and tested.

Summarizing over these eight assumptions, we are led to several conclusions. First, a number of commonly held assumptions do not hold up under the social scientists' test. Second, each set of data, whether it confirms or disconfirms an assumption about delinquency patterns, does lead to implications for social or justice programs. Third, we would be hard put to list those programs that do, in fact, take such data into account in the rationale or the design of the programs. But by contrast, it is easy to cite programs based on unsupported assumptions. The gap between the scientist on the one hand and the practitioner and policymaker on the other remains very great. This brings us directly to our third category of interest.

Intervention

With respect to intervention with delinquents, some components of conventional wisdom are even more firmly entrenched than anything covered above. Scientific skeptics must tread softly on this ground, since it is here especially that their skepticism is often taken to be bias and antagonism. Eight examples will illustrate our current situation.

(1) *Assumption: Incarceration of juvenile offenders actually increases their involvement in delinquent careers.* Data: Because almost no *experimental* studies have been carried out, the assumption is relatively untested. The most careful analyses of comparable groups of incarcerated and nonincarcerated offenders (Empey and Erickson, 1972; Empey and Lubeck, 1971; Murray and Cox, 1979) suggest, however, that both institutionalization and community treatment can suppress delinquent careers. The common liberal contention that no good for the individual offender can come from incarceration is now under attack.

(2) *Assumption: Early intervention will head off later delinquency.* Data: There is virtually no support for this assumption. The most famous early intervention study, the Cambridge-Somerville project, has now been followed up for thirty years with results still favoring the untreated over the treated youngsters (McCord, 1978). The problems here are of two sorts. First, early intervention requires early identification of probable delinquents. Not only have we proven to be poor identifiers; the conception of early identification may itself be faulty because of its assumptions about delin-

quency patterns as noted earlier. Second, adequate treatments for pre-delinquents have not as yet been developed.

(3) *Assumption: Counseling is an effective treatment modality for juvenile offenders.* Data: With frightening consistency, decades of research have failed to confirm the counseling assumption, although many individual case examples of success can be cited (Lipton et al., 1975). The most recent summary of the more careful research (Romig, 1978) was carried out by a corrections official with a commitment to discovering the most effective forms of counseling. It proved to be a discouraging search. Given the level of our national investment in counseling therapies, it is shocking that the available data have had so little impact on the public policy, but it is also a testament to the vitality of our mental health practitioners in the delinquency arena and to their faith in their own conventional wisdom.

(4) *Assumption: Diversion away from the juvenile justice system and into community treatment programs has been successful.* Data: While there are some studies cited on this issue, some of which confirm and some of which deny the effectiveness of diversion, the concept has in fact not yet been tested. A recent exhaustive review (Klein, 1979) suggests that most diversion programs actually do very little diverting. Rather, they tend to select clients who would not otherwise have entered the justice system in any case. Diversion remains a relatively untested concept.

(5) *Assumption: Deinstitutionalization of juvenile offenders is more effective than incarceration.* Data: This too remains a relatively untested assumption. The results of the Massachusetts Experiment (Coates et al., 1978) reveal no major detriment resulting from statewide deinstitutionalization of virtually all offenders. California programs yielded more equivocal findings (Palmer, 1974; Lerman, 1975). The evaluation of the national program to deinstitutionalize status offenders (Kobrin and Klein, 1981) reveals a failure of program implementation of such serious dimensions that an adequate test of impact on recidivism may not be very meaningful.

(6) *Assumption: System processing of juveniles initiates the labeling process, thereby increasing delinquency levels.* Data: Because labeling theory has been so unamenable to proper operational procedures and experimental test, tests of the labeling assumption have yielded equivocal results. The most judicious statement at this point, suggested by diversion projects, is that the effect can be demonstrated but is probably of relatively minor proportions (Elliott, 1978; Elliott et al., 1976; Klein, 1974, 1978). It should be carefully noted for policy purposes, however, that both the Elliott and Klein research groups have found labeling effects most pronounced among young, white, middle-income youngsters with no prior records. These "vulnerables" are, of course, precisely the youngsters we target for early intervention and treatment programs. The danger is that we expose to our labeling processes those very youngsters most likely to be harmed by those processes.

(7) *Assumption: Early sanctions, the proverbial "taste of jail" approach, will alter further delinquency involvement.* Data: There are almost no empirical studies on this point, although the conventional wisdom among enforcement, judicial, and correctional conservatives is buttressed by many personal experiences. The conceptual as well as operational problems relevant to adequate tests of the assumptions are now only beginning to be faced (Klein, 1981). The most relevant work is research relating

to first-time offenders. As noted above, there is at least a suggestion in such work that early sanctions may actually be detrimental (at least in the short run). Basically, however, the early sanctions assumption is an untested one.

(8) *Assumption: Community treatment is cheaper than institutionalization.* Data: Until recently, this seemed to be a largely supportable assumption. Institutional costs are high; community treatment costs are more flexible, and therefore usually lower. But, of course, the comparison is dependent upon the level of service provided. Recent examples from the deinstitutionalization literature make it clear that intensive community treatment can in fact be more expensive than institutionalization (Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1977; Peat, Marwick and Mitchell Co., 1978). The fiscal advantages of community treatment, often cited as a benefit regardless of comparative outcome data, can no longer be assumed; a cost-benefit form of analysis, as difficult as it may be, would seem to be more appropriate.

A fair summary of the foregoing might be that most of our cherished assumptions about intervention are nothing more than that—cherished assumptions. The empirical support for what we do is minimal. Given the investment in personnel, time, and money that goes into our intervention procedures, it might be even fair to suggest that we are doing harm because we are not assiduously seeking alternative avenues that might hold more promise. One such avenue, the cheapest of all, is simply to do much less of what we now do. The assumption that doing less is beneficial seems to be just as tenable, empirically, as the assumptions associated with the level of service we provide currently.

SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

This chapter cannot document the enormous number and variety of delinquency intervention programs that have included the community dimension. What can be done is to comment briefly on a few intervention attempts that illustrate either typical, popular, or intriguing approaches. Significantly, those for which success is most commonly claimed are those stressing implementation; those for which failure has been noted include either implementation failure or outcome failure. Success is *rarely* to be claimed on the basis of favorable outcomes.

Illustrations of Success

Well-implemented programs can vary from the broad, state level to the narrow, neighborhood level. It is useful to survey this entire range.

The Massachusetts Experiment

After several years of frustrating and unsuccessful attempts to liberalize the Massachusetts juvenile correction system, known for its archaic facilities, rigid and punitive practices, and frequent brutalities, an overnight deinstitutionalization was initiated by edict of this system's director. Over a thousand incarcerated juveniles were released into the community in 1972 on very short notice and with practically no preparation in the receiving communities. It was an invitation to disaster, and generally perceived as such. Yet, the unprepared communities throughout the state were

helped to respond and absorb these youngsters. Of the many lessons to be derived from this experience, three seem paramount (see Coates et al., 1978; Miller et al., 1977 for an amplification and analysis of these points).

First, the return of the vast majority of the state's incarcerated juveniles (and the continuation of the nonincarceration policy for their successors) did not lead to any appreciable increase in juvenile crime. Second, those communities which developed the widest assortment of treatment approaches were the most successful at absorbing the convicted juveniles. And third, massive intervention *even without much community preparation* can be entertained; Vermont, on a far smaller scale, was also successful. And as we shall note later, a similar attempt by the legislative route in California was also successful with respect to status offenders, but in that case there were some unintended consequences.

The Boys' Clubs of America

A more diffuse illustration of success is offered by this national character-building organization. In 1973, in response to perceptions of community needs as well as the funding of National Strategy programs (Polk and Kobrin, 1972) the National Boys' Clubs issued a position paper (Boys' Clubs, 1973). Among other points highlighted in this statement were (1) the commitment to seek out youths traditionally harder to serve and likely to drop out of standard youth activity programs, (2) the necessity of influencing the community conditions seen as fostering delinquency, and (3) recognition of the dangers of negative labeling via early identification. It remained for the individual Boys' Clubs to respond to the position paper within their own neighborhoods.

In 1975, just two years later, the national office was able to publish a 160-page book titled *Alternatives to Delinquency*, containing capsule descriptions of 36 tested programs. This was followed four years later by *Delinquency Prevention Program Models* (Boys' Clubs, 1979) in which 18 program models field-tested for application to potential offenders are described. Finally, in 1980 plans were developed to guide inner city clubs into active intervention with the most intractable of targets, members of juvenile gangs.

In the absence of independently derived empirical data, the case for the outcome success of such ventures cannot be made. But so far as *implementation* of community-level intervention is concerned, it seems clear that central leadership can prove pivotal and need not wait upon someone's arbitrary determination that the community is ready.

The Philadelphia Plan

In 1969 the Pennsylvania Crime Commission noted an alarming level of gang homicides in the City of Brotherly Love—30 gang-related homicides in 1968. By 1973, the number of gang-related homicides had risen to 41. In 1974 an operation known as the Crisis Intervention Network (CIN) was established to combat gang violence. It was manned principally, but not exclusively, by former gang members.

CIN was unlike the gang intervention programs of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. These programs, in such cities as New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, focused on individual gangs, attempting to transform them into more socially acceptable youth structures via individual counseling, group activities, and school and job connections. This transformation approach proved to be quite successful in implementation, but paradoxically seemed to have either no effect or an inverse effect on

delinquency reduction (Caplan, 1968; Carney et al., 1969; Klein, 1969; Miller, 1962). These programs tended to make use of community resources as needed, but were not, by and large, well integrated into the community fabric.

By way of contrast, CIN in Philadelphia was initiated by members of the community. As such, representing focal community interests, it eschewed gang transformation in favor of community-based control over gang activities. Concentration was on patrolling the gang areas in radio-equipped, marked cars, responding to gang and nongang rumors and events threatening violence. Councils of parents were organized, special gang member caseloads were established in the probation department, with probation officers and police in close liaison with the CIN workers. Workers were assigned to neighborhood areas, rather than their own groups. Thus, the emphasis had been shifted from gang transformation to gang control, from general prevention to violence reduction, from rehabilitation to surveillance.

With detailed operational manuals, a centralized radio communications system, training programs and the support and involvement of community residents, the Philadelphia Plan, as it has been labeled elsewhere in the nation, achieved a substantial level of implementation in a rather large portion of the city. According to police statistics, gang homicides receded from 41 in 1973 to levels in succeeding years of 32, 14, 6, and—eventually—to only 1. Such a dramatic turnaround has caused jubilation among the program's adherents, and vast skepticism elsewhere; we are not used to such levels of social impact. But even if the reduction figures are inflated, it seems reasonable to assign a substantial portion of progress to CIN, and equally reasonable to speculate that much of the effect may be attributable to the community-based *control* emphasis that evolved in the program.

The Ladino Hills Project

This gang intervention program was implemented in only one neighborhood, a Mexican-American barrio in Los Angeles, to demonstrate a *theoretical* proposition about the relationship between gang cohesiveness and gang delinquency (Klein, 1971: Part III). Falling midway in concept between the earlier transformation approach and the control emphasis of the Philadelphia Plan, the Ladino Hills Project forced its workers to proceed according to a detailed, a priori operational plan based on theory and leaving relatively little room for workers' insights and intuition. It successfully implemented interventions based on gang structure and the use of alternative community job and recreation resources, reducing gang cohesiveness substantially.

The project did not change the level at which gang members were charged with delinquency offenses. On the other hand, it did so reduce cohesiveness that gang membership was reduced dramatically during the 18 months of the project and for another year and more afterward. This, in turn, lead to the same dramatic reduction in gang delinquency in Ladino Hills (a pseudonym). However, because community officials and residents could not be energized to step in as the project staff moved out, Ladino Hills eventually reverted to its prior level of gang size and activity. No lasting effect can be claimed despite the short-term success in implementation.

Illustrations of Failure

Three major reviews of delinquency programs generally yield the most discouraging of conclusions. Wright and Dixon (1977) reviewed published reports of 95 studies judged to be methodologically most sound. They found that almost none yielded

significant effects. Elliott's review of the intervention efforts funded under and presumably responsive to the federal government's national strategy found that the strategy had not been implemented, despite the expenditure of massive funds (Elliott, 1978). Walker et al. (1976) carried out a comprehensive literature review, studied 120 prevention program reports carefully, and undertook intensive, on-site investigations of 31 programs scattered across the country and representing numerous alternative approaches to intervention. The reviewers found successful implementation to be rare. Rather, they concluded, "prevention programs are ill conceived, poorly structured, and suffering from a lack of conceptual, definitional, and operational clarity in virtually all major aspects" (1976: 207).

The OJJDP Prevention Initiative

In the face of this situation, the Justice Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) launched a massive, $20 million program in the late 1970s to develop and support delinquency prevention programs in 11 sections of the nation. Involved were 168 agencies, serving approximately 20,000 youths in 118 target areas in 68 cities (National Council of Crime and Delinquency [NCCD], 1980).

Typically, according to the draft evaluation report by the NCCD researchers, little advantage was taken of accumulated experience. The outcome goals for the federal program did not even specify prevention. The program guidelines required no identification of the theoretical basis of the community programs to be considered for funding under this federal initiative. And the evaluation contract almost totally avoided the research design requirements that might have yielded information on the effectiveness of the overall federal program or of the individual intervention efforts funded by it.

DSO

A second 1970s federal initiative program funded by the OJJDP concerned itself with implementing the deinstitutionalization of status offenders (hence DSO) and providing alternative community activities and procedures to decrease their involvement in the justice system. Evaluated in eight separate sites across the country (Kobrin and Klein, 1981) these programs were indeed implemented in all sites, very actively in some. However, they resembled diversion more than deinstitutionalization efforts, selecting for intervention the types of youngsters unlikely to be incarcerated in any case. Further, despite the proclaimed preference for a wide range of intervention efforts stressing community resources and involvement, the programs were in many cases dominated by agencies of the justice system, and the predominant intervention modality was counseling, not requiring energetic community involvement. The national evaluation concluded that there was a slightly detrimental rather than beneficial effect on delinquency prevention. On the other hand, progress toward decarceration was substantial (though it did not reach required success criteria). The most discouraging aspect of this venture may be that the findings apply so uniformly despite the jurisdictional and geographic variety of the eight projects.

Diversion

A summary of delinquency diversion efforts undertaken throughout the nation suggested that (1) the concept had generally been poorly implemented and (2) the effect on delinquency reduction had been nil or even detrimental (Klein, 1979). In light of the experience of many of the intervention efforts summarized in that sum-

mary report, OJJDP launched another of its multimillion-dollar initiatives. However, in this instance, the researchers had a good deal more to say about program design, site selection, and evaluation capacities.

One result of the research input was that the appropriate types of youngsters were involved in a number of the projects, making a meaningful evaluation possible. Additionally, experimental designs, with random assignment to experimental and control conditions, were achieved in several sites. Thus, the best hope for the effectiveness of a diversion effort to show itself had been achieved. But the effective achievement of the diversion efforts, including a measurable if not outstanding involvement in community treatment, yielded no impact on delinquency levels of the juveniles involved (Dunford et al., 1980).

Mobilization for Youth

MFY was the most extensive and intensive effort at community action to emerge from the War on Crime/War on Poverty efforts of the socially active 1960s. MFY was explicitly based upon sociological theory (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Over $25 million in federal and Ford Foundation funds were poured into a comprehensive attack in New York City's Lower East Side on poverty, unemployment, service delivery systems, and resident involvement in social action (MFY, 1961; Walker et al., 1976). Yet for all the effort and the reliance on conceptual frameworks (opportunity structure theory), little effort went into documenting impact on delinquency rates. What did become clear, however, was that even such massive community intervention efforts as MFY may eventually flounder in the sea of bureaucratic and political rigidities that seem to be a feature of modern urban life.

The Group Guidance Project

The best-intentioned programs may inadvertently defeat their own purposes due to the absence of a conceptual base or examination of program assumptions. The Group Guidance Project was run by the Los Angeles County Probation Department between 1961 and 1965. It was gang intervention of the transformation model, typical of its time and based on the untested assumptions and experiences of 15 years of gang intervention.

As was common to the model, efforts to help gang members in their family, school, recreational and employment arenas were centralized around group work practices. Weekly "club" activities, organized sports, outings, car washes (and charm clinics for the girls) were designed to maximize workers' contact with their gang members and provide the entree for group and individual counseling.

The evaluation (Klein, 1969, 1971) suggested that community intervention of various sorts were not successfully implemented overall, while *group* activities were so assiduously carried out that gang cohesiveness was actually increased, leading in turn to an increase in negative gang activity. Clearly, these were unintentional consequences, but—given the structure and philosophy of a group-oriented gang intervention program—they may have been unavoidable. It was, in fact, the lessons from this effort that led to implementation of the more (temporarily) successful Ladino Hills Project discussed earlier. There are, unfortunately, precious few models explicitly developed from the findings of necessarily less informed prior efforts.

Assembly Bill 3121

This final illustration similarly highlights the issue of unintended consequences. In January 1977 the California juvenile justice system was considerably transformed, as noted earlier in this chapter, by new legislation (AB 3121) providing both for harsher handling of serious offenders and more moderate treatment of minor and status offenders. An assessment of the various components and results of this legislative reform has been provided by Teilmann and Klein (1979, 1981). Our interest here lies in provisions related principally to community involvement and, consequently, to the less serious offenders.

AB3121 encouraged the use of informal probation procedures and of community treatment for minor offenders. This was particularly aimed at status offenders, because AB3121 forbade the use of *any* form of secure detention for these juveniles. But analyses revealed *no* increase in community referrals, and *no* attempt by community agencies to respond to the needs of the undetainable status offenders (Gordon, 1981). Indeed, one analysis revealed that the understanding of the requirements of the legislation was highly varied among justice practitioners (Little, 1981).

Yet other unintended consequences of the nondetention provisions were to be found. For instance, even though the legislation said nothing about arrests for status offenses, the absence of detention power led police to decrease status offense *arrests* by as much as 50 percent. Thus, large numbers of youngsters were immediately returned to communities that had made no provisions to receive them. As in Massachusetts, no detrimental effect has been detected (despite some horror stories projected in advance).

An additional unintended consequence, manifested in several forms, was that status offenders were, in measurable numbers, relabeled into categories that would permit their detention in secure facilities or treatment by alternative agents of social control. Some were charged as dependent and neglected children, making them acceptable clients for county welfare departments. Others were relabeled as delinquents, permitting their detention by police and court officials. Finally, some were found in increasing numbers in the adolescent wards of mental hospitals where voluntary commitment provided (in California) no appeal and involuntary commitment permitted a 72-hour minimum detention (Guttridge, 1981).

In this instance, then, we have an illustration of frustrated justice practitioners and unresponsive community agencies combining, however motivated and constrained, to subvert the intent of legislation designed to increase community involvement and absorption of juvenile offenders. That some of these consequences were predictable priori (Teilmann and Klein, 1979) and others easily reconstructed a posteriori should not decrease our concern with explicating them. Social and community intervention with juveniles in trouble has a future; whether this future is merely a repetition of the past, or manifests conceptual and operational growth depends on the uses we make of what has been, to be honest, an inglorious past. Accordingly, we turn now to a reprise of some of the more prominent characteristics of our past intervention failures.

COMMONALITIES IN INTERVENTION FAILURES

The illustrations of both successes and failures cited above are far from an exhaustive litany of the issues that might be cited (see Klein, 1979, for a more comprehen-

sive and conceptual treatment). To redress the balance of successes to failures—to increase the former at the expense of the latter—we can collapse some of the major juvenile intervention problems into three broad classes: (1) our individualistic bias, (2) our practitioner conceits, and (3) community agency priorities.

The Individualistic Bias

A constant battle between casework, group work, and community organization perspectives takes place both within and between schools of social work in this country (Kasius, 1954; P. Klein, 1968). In the United States, casework has predominated, reflecting a generally individualistic philosophy of human determination and responsibility that articulates well within our national traditions. The psychological perspective permeating social casework is not synonymous with this individualistic bias, but it is certainly a potent reinforcer of it.

Emphasis on individual responsibility for one's actions is a strong theme in our juvenile justice system. Individually based therapeutic approaches to delinquency permeate our practices in social intervention programs. The combination of these emphases in juvenile justice and social service systems has been mutually reinforcing in the face of mounting and, in fact, overwhelming evidence of their relative impotence in reforming or rehabilitating or preventing delinquent careers (Lipton et al., 1975; NCCD, 1980; Romig, 1978).

While one might specify numerous facets of this problem for social intervention, there are perhaps three deserving of special notice. The first is that the overwhelming preference for individual-based interventions commonly results in a very narrow range of intervention modalities. The potentials of community organization approaches, of attempts at institutional change, of advocacy programs, or of broad programs of opportunity enhancement or skills training simply are not well tested. Even family counseling (Schubert et al., 1981), group counseling, and peer counseling usually end up as applying treatments to the individual actor—the actual or potential delinquent (Walker et al., 1976; Kobrin and Klein, 1981). Scratch the surface of an American community intervention effort in delinquency and, far more often than not, what is revealed below the surface is individual treatment. But specifically in the field of delinquency, individual treatment has not proven effective.[4]

A second facet of the individualistic bias problem is the underlying assumption in most therapies applied to juveniles that undesired *behaviors* can be altered by altering the *attitudes* of the juvenile client. Attitudes (broadly conceived, to include values, rationalizations, etc.) are seen as causes, delinquency as effects. Individual treatment (including some of those calling themselves behavior therapies) are aimed at the (assumedly) underlying attitudes, rather than directly at behaviors. But a reading of modern professional literature on what is termed the attitude/behavior discrepancy problem hardly convinces one that attitude change will commonly lead to behavior change, nor even that behavior change commonly requires prior attitudinal change.

What strikes one most about this literature, in fact, is the inconsistency of the findings on attitude/behavior relations, and the extent to which these relations may be determined by the social context in which they are played out. Since delinquency intervenors are so seldom sensitive to these social contexts and so commonly untrained with respect to their significance,[5] it should not be surprising that attempts to alter delinquent behaviors based on assumptions about underlying attitudes seldom achieve demonstrable success.

Finally, with respect to the individualistic bias, is the paradoxical finding that the juvenile targets selected out for treatment in social intervention programs are often *not* those for whom the intervention was designed. Specifically, the tendency has been for program clients to be "creamed," that is, the easier, less needy, less serious offenders end up as program clients. Examples are common and most recently have been demonstrated in rather global fashion with respect to deinstitutionalization (Kobrin and Klein, 1981), diversion (Klein, 1979), and prevention programs (NCCD, 1980). It seems fair to suggest that deinstitutionalization programs tend to engage the milder diversion client, that diversion programs tend to engage prevention clients; that prevention programs are hard put to demonstrate that their clients are, in fact, heading for anything more than normal levels of adolescent misbehavior. Thus, at each level, the program rationale articulates poorly with the client population selected; this is an invitation to ineffectiveness.

The Conceit of the Intervenor

This phrase is perhaps rather strong, but to some extent it is probably valid. What is one to say of a group of professionals who continue to ply their trade in the absence of consistent demonstrations of success? If years of student evaluations tell me that my lectures are disorganized, should I not discard my lecture notes and test out a new version? If radical mastectomies are shown to be no more effective than more simple and less extensive surgery, which is also less disfiguring, do we not urge a reduction in the number of radicals performed? If the new math proves to be associated with poorer grasp of mathematics among the majority of our pupils, do we not turn to revision and in some cases abandonment of the new math?

The answer to each of these questions is "yes," except in the case of the delinquency intervenors. In addition to the question of effectiveness, there are two major problems raised by the failure to alter intervention procedures. The first is called net-widening or, as Roscoe Pound described it in the legal realm, the overreach of the law. There is ample demonstration by now that many youngsters not deserving of social agency attention and treatment are nonetheless receiving it (Blomberg, 1980). The assumption of effectiveness—the conceit of the practitioner, if you will—leads not only to the continuation of current practices but also to their *expansion* to the *potential client*. If treatment offered to regular clients is often inappropriate, it is likely to be even more so for those who are not yet clients.

Gang workers turn their attention to the "peewees," "midgets," the "unborns," to 11-year-old potential gang members, and thus help to perpetuate the very phenomenon they are supposed to reduce. Caseworkers involve younger siblings juvenile offenders as part of whole family counseling, thus drawing them into the whole realm of justice and delinquency argot and thought. School counselors refer pupils with either academic or conduct problems to social agencies whose principa clientele consists of more seriously delinquent or more seriously disturbed youngsters. Thus attempts to prevent may help to create that which is to be prevented.

The second facet of the social practice problem, clearly related to net-widening, that of avoiding one stigma, the image of being a delinquent, by inadvertently exposing the client to another, that of being disturbed. This may be what we do when we divert an actual or potential delinquent client to a community agency whose general ambience is that of a treatment center, a place where maladjusted youths are the clientele.[6] Research on diversion programs has consistently revealed this pattern (El-

liott, 1978; Klein, 1978). Agency treators may be unaware of the dangers; some may be aware of the fact, but not consider it a danger; others may feel that dealing with the stigma is a necessary step in a therapeutic process. But the dangers of alternative stigmatization, if they can be justified at all, surely must require for that justification some strong evidence of therapeutic success, in this case the cessation or decrease in delinquent activity. As noted earlier, the case for this outcome has *not* been demonstrated. The efficacy of community referral and treatment being absent, what then is the reason for the intervention process? The first, as indicated, is the unexamined or accepted assumption—the conceit—that intervention is beneficial. The second takes us to our third and final category of the intervention problem.

Community Agency Priorities

The normal and natural assumption about a social intervention program is that it exists principally for the benefit of the clients. The same would presumably be true of discrete portions of an intervention program, such as those specifically designed for the delinquency problem, in an agency with a broader mandate.

But a more realistic view would be that programs also exist autonomously of clients; that is, there are needs of staff and administration, and often of support groups, which also contribute to agency style, practice, and even existence. It is a commonplace observation that social agencies facing the loss of one category of client will shift focus to accommodate another. The agency that purposefully disbands when its original purpose can no longer sustain it is probably the uncommon case (and, perversely, may be accused of inflexibility in leadership). By the same token, a program or agency with a particular treatment approach, finding its existence endangered, will seek alternative clients more readily than it will alter its approach.

Practitioners, be they lawyers, physicians, psychologists, police officers, or social workers, have sets of skills, perspectives, and beliefs that drew them to their fields and were essential elements in their training. They have confidence in themselves and what they bring to the intervention situation. To suggest to social practitioners, or to the agencies supporting their practices, that their clients do not need their professional services and do not gain from their skills in service delivery is tantamount to challenging both their personal and professional competence. It is little wonder, then, that agencies seem so immune to their ineffectiveness with delinquents and continue to serve this particular clientele. The conventional wisdoms of the practitioner overwhelm the data of social science; thus the agency often becomes a greater priority than its clients.

IMPLICATIONS

The cynic might conclude from the foregoing pages that historical cycles will determine the future of juvenile justice policy, not we; that there are no reliably identifiable causes of delinquency, few meaningful patterns in delinquency, and little evidence for effective treatment of delinquents; that consequently the conjunction of social science and intervention policy has been a useless enterprise. My response would be that it certainly has been frustrating but not useless.

There are some useful implications to consider. First, we must learn to adopt a broader perspective on the nature of juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice. We

must see current operations as phases, and learn the meaning of the development and modification of phases. Second, we must keep in mind, in order to retain flexibility, that delinquency is less a matter of natural order than a way of looking at our subject matter: Our *concepts* are causes and can be treated as such.

Third, if single causes fail us, we can train ourselves to think in multivariate fashions, understanding that change can be engineered even in the absence of neat, clean demonstrations or original, unitary causes. Fourth, if our current treatment modalities are not very fruitful, we must recognize that our continued reliance on them must be serving other needs—ours, not those of the children we treat. If we can recognize the nature of *our* investment in the status quo, perhaps we will be more willing to experiment with alternatives.

Fifth, if delinquency patterning is minimal, then treatments tied to specific forms of behavior may have to be abandoned. That is, diagnosis related to behavioral forms of delinquency is inappropriate. This throws us back upon two alternatives. The first generalized or holistic treatment (treating the whole child) and the second is the justice model (or just deserts) in which emphasis is on sanctions, not results.

The first model, holistic treatment, has proven ineffective in the delinquency arena. Whatever may be its success elsewhere in dealing with neurotic, depressed, and mentally ill patients, that success does not generalize to delinquency. Delinquency does *not* equate with neurosis and it is time we acknowledged this in practice.

The second model, the justice model, has rapidly become the core of a new conventional wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s. The writings of Wilson (1975), Van den Haag (1975), and Martinson (1974) have sounded a responsive chord, especially among policymakers frustrated by our failure to make much progress. The justice model also fits well with the legalization emphasis rapidly emerging in our juvenile courts (as well, for that matter, as in our adult criminal courts).

If specific treatments for specific behaviors do not work, and if holistic approaches do not, we can avoid the whole issue by stressing just deserts, specific sanctions for specific crimes and to hell with ineffective treatments, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Yet the leap toward this new wisdom, especially in the juvenile arena, may also prove be ill-founded. One consequence of the just deserts model and legalization emphasis that minor offenders are shunted off by the justice system and left to the community be absorbed. But it is unclear how fully our communities are committed to or capable of absorbing youngsters who formerly were referred toward the courts.

Additionally, for those offenders whose behaviors call for punitive action under the just deserts model, it is equally unclear whether the juvenile justice system is, can be, properly structured to deliver deterrent sanctions. Indeed, if these sanctions are in anyone's mind supposed to represent known principles of learning from negative sanctions, then there is reason to be quite skeptical. The disjuncture between learning principles and justice system actions is quite wide (Klein, 1981).

A final implication has particular relevance for evaluation research. If the emphasis on intervention *effectiveness* assumes less importance, then emphasis on *efficiency* may assume greater importance. Recidivism is only one of a vast number of evaluation criteria by which to assess our satisfaction with the manner in which the justice and social service systems operate. Broader alternative approaches to evaluation are available (Edwards, 1980; Empey, 1981; Krisberg, 1980; Grizzle and Witte, 1980) that would prove far more satisfying to practitioners in these systems. Policymakers open to the challenge will be embraced by awaiting social scientists.

NOTES

1. Status offenders are those committing acts for which adults could not be punished: runaway, truancy, incorrigibility, and so on. Delinquent offenders are those whose acts are prohibited to adults as well. The early sixties also saw the separation well under way between these two categories and that of the dependent/neglected children.

2. For a description of the process as influenced historically by the "child savers," see Platt (1969).

3. An exception may be the District Attorneys who seemed to achieve many of their aims through the new legislation.

4. This is not the place to delve at length into the reasons for this ineffectiveness in the delinquency arena, especially as contrasted with the demonstrated effectiveness in other areas of socially undesired behaviors. However, the reader should remember that delinquent behavior is often *not* deviant in the statistical sense, that it is usually *not* of a serious nature, and that it often consists as much of its definition as of its content. Thus the application of treatment may be considered fairly inappropriate in many instances in which treatment is supplied.

5. Given the nascent state of our knowledge in these matters, it is not even clear what would constitute the content of appropriate training in social determinants of attitude/behavior discrepancies.

6. One of my favorite demonstrations in a lecture setting is to ask audience members to close their eyes and think back to their lives at age 14 or 15, and to the family and peer relations that were important to them then. "At that time," I ask, "would you rather have been thought of as a delinquent kid, or as a sick kid?" When a show of hands is called for, it is a rare audience in which more than one or two hands in fifty are raised in favor of the "sick" label (and the rare case is usually from an audience of police officers!).

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17

Criminal Justice System Interventions

Ronald Roesch
Raymond Corrado

In keeping with the intent of this book, this chapter will review interventions in the criminal justice system that have as their primary focus changes at the institutional or system level rather than directly at the individual level (see Rappaport, 1977, for a fuller discussion of the relationships among values, goals, and levels of intervention). Two programs, pretrial diversion and bail reform, will be used to evaluate the extent to which system-level changes have or can be successful. As will be shown, diversion has apparently had very little impact on the criminal justice system, while bail reform has been somewhat more successful. Following the discussion of these programs, some other and perhaps more promising interventions in the criminal justice system will be reviewed.

Before turning to this review, it will be helpful to provide a conceptual framework from which the interventions can be examined. Levine and Levine (1970) have observed that the problems social scientists choose to study, as well as the theories that guide their work, are determined by political and social forces. In their book, *A Social History of the Helping Services,* Levine and Levine argued that during periods of conservatism, an individual model of change is adhered to, while in more politically and socially liberal periods, an environmental reform model is typically advocated. There is little doubt that the values of social scientists heavily influence the way in which problems are defined and, subsequently, the particular solutions proposed (Caplan and Nelson, 1973; Seidman, 1978; Watzlawick et al., 1974). With respect to the helping professions, defining the problem as residing within the individual inevitably leads to attempts to change the individual in some manner, while defining the problem as being caused by environmental and institutional forces leads to programs that attempt to change the way in which these external forces affect individuals.

These ideas about problem definition and solution are quite evident in criminal justice reform. The shift in the 1960s to community correction programs paralleled the movement in mental health to treat patients in the community rather than in the mental hospital. In the criminal justice system, however, the effects were less substantial (Scull, 1981). Many mental hospitals now operate at considerably less than capacity, while prisons become increasingly crowded. This is undoubtedly in large part due

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to less community acceptance of offenders as opposed to mental patients, although, in fact, as Rabkin (1979) and others have shown, there is considerable overlap in the two populations. Nevertheless, there is a greater fear of allowing offenders into the community, which has hampered the development of community corrections. Furthermore, there is a growing sense that criminals should simply be punished for their criminal activity by confining them in institutions. Letting offenders enter a diversion program or placing them on probation is viewed as too "soft."

The values affecting criminal justice system reform become clear when the types of programs initiated are considered. Liberal reforms include pretrial diversion programs, establishment of community alternatives to prison, decriminalization of certain offenses, and a greater emphasis on procedural rights of individuals. The overriding value underlying these programs was that the state was too coercive and punitive and did not place enough emphasis on intervention and rehabilitation. Conservative reformers, on the other hand, have been pushing for greater and more certain imposition of state control. Various attempts at bail reform, for example, have been attacked because they may facilitate the release of defendants who may commit more crimes prior to trial. Greater use of preventive detention is urged, as is more certain and equitable punishment (Fogel, 1975; Morris, 1974). As Austin and Krisberg (1981) have discussed, however, the strategies are by no means clear. Deterrent advocates suggest that incapacitation and preventive detention are appropriate, while those following a "just deserts" philosophy suggest that such a model is too costly. Rather, they propose that the system should be modified so that punishment will be fair and abuses by the system minimized (Morris, 1974).

There is a growing disenchantment with the more liberal reforms, especially those that provide a variety of treatment services for individuals. Opponents of these treatment programs have seized upon some recent critiques of treatment, notably the one by Martinson and his colleagues (Lipton et al., 1975). Martinson is widely cited as demonstrating that treatment of offenders has been ineffective, and his conclusions are often summed up with the simple phrase, "nothing works." Martinson's conclusions have been criticized severely (for example, see Palmer, 1975; Ross and Gendreau, 1980), but nevertheless have had a dramatic impact on the attitudes of persons working in the criminal justice field. Others have also raised doubts about community-based programs (Greenberg, 1975, 1977).

An even more damaging criticism is that the community corrections movement has not actually resulted in significant changes, either with individual defendants or offenders or with the manner in which the system deals with these individuals. Scull (1981) has recently argued that community programs are simply extensions of existing corectional programs. Pretrial diversion provides an example. The program itself will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, so suffice it here to state that diversion is an attempt to provide services to defendants prior to trial. Defendants accepted for diversion typically have their trials postponed and, if they successfully complete the program, ultimately have charges against them dismissed. But compare this to probation, in which similar services are often provided, but after trial and conviction. There are even procedures whereby convicted probationers may have their records expunged at a later date so that there are no records of convictions. Functionally, then, there may be little difference between diversion, which has been touted as an alternative to the system, and probation which is an integral part of the system. Many diversion projects are funded and administered by a department directly within the criminal justice system. The difference is not *what* happens to the individual, but *when* it happens. This could be valid, of course, as a secondary or early

intervention strategy. Unfortunately, both diversion and probation programs are all too often poorly conceived and implemented, offering services of little demonstrated value. The concern should be with changing the manner in which the system deals with individuals, and not just delivering the same services in slightly altered forms or at different times. If individuals are not in need of therapy, then it matters little whether the therapy occurs before or after trial.

Reppucci and Clingempeel (1978) have discussed these ideas quite effectively by suggesting that the research and interventions in criminal justice are typically based on two related value assumptions. The first, referred to as the "assumption of offenders' deficit," is that there is something psychologically wrong with persons who commit crimes. The second, the "assumption of discriminating traits," is that criminals differ from the rest of us on a number of traits, especially such traits as impulsivity and aggression. Reppucci and Clingempeel argue that too much research is based on these assumptions, while situational and environmental factors as well as the positive characteristics or strengths of offenders are ignored.

Based on the conceptualization of social change suggested by this review, this chapter will examine several interventions in the criminal justice system to determine the extent to which significant changes have occurred. Specifically, the focus will be on the impact various reforms have had on the criminal justice system.

PRETRIAL DIVERSION

In many ways, pretrial diversion is the prototypic liberal reform characteristic of the 1960s. Diversion programs have proliferated quite rapidly. Austin and Krisberg (1981) report that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has funded over 1200 adult and juvenile diversion projects, at an estimated cost of $112 million. The underlying assumption of diversion is that involvement of defendants with the criminal justice system has inherently negative consequences. Thus, the goal of diversion was to remove pretrial defendants, usually first-time offenders, from the system as early as possible. A second assumption was that these defendants required some services, often in the form of individual counseling. Diversion can be considered a secondary prevention program based on a rehabilitative model that some form of treatment was both appropriate and necessary to success in reducing further criminal activity. This second assumption is critical in an examination of the impact of diversion. If one simply adopted the first assumption, it would be relatively straightforward to simply dismiss charges against certain defendants. It would be assumed that getting caught and arrested for committing a crime would be sufficient to deter the person from further criminal activity. But those who developed diversion programs apparently believed that this would not be a sufficient deterrent. Rather, they argued that the diversion must include a component of treatment, which typically lasted from six to twelve months, depending on the particular program.

Despite the favorable political and social climate for the development of diversion programs, the selection criteria reflected a rather conservative approach. Prosecutors had a tendency to refer cases that they were either unwilling to prosecute or believed would not result in successful prosecution (Rovner-Pieczenik, 1974). Futhermore, there was often an attempt to select relatively safe defendants who were less likely to recidivate and for whom the community at large would not object to diversion. The two most common forms of restriction were limits on the type of charge and the extent of the defendant's prior criminal record. In a review of thirty diversion projects,

Roesch (1979) found that all projects excluded defendants charged with serious felonies and seven projects accepted persons charged with misdemeanors only. While the majority of projects accepted defendants charged with either a misdemeanor or a felony, this appeared to be largely a paper criterion for many of them. An analysis of selected defendants showed that many projects focused heavily on minor misdemeanor charges, with shoplifting being the most frequent charge. Over one-third of the projects excluded defendants with any prior record, while five other projects would accept defendants with a prior misdemeanor conviction. The remaining projects indicated that they would accept defendants with prior felony or misdemeanor charges. In a more recent and comprehensive review, Pryor and Henry (1980) report that nearly 69 percent of all diversion projects excluded defendants charged with any felonies and/or violent felonies.

As will be clear from the review of diversion research later in this chapter, this focus on first offenders charged with relatively minor crimes has placed severe limitations on the possible system-level changes that were expected to occur with the advent of diversion programs. In addition to restrictions on the type of defendant referred for evaluations, there were limits on the number of defendants that could be served at a given time. As a consequence, diverted defendants usually account for only about 1 or 2 percent of a total criminal court case load.

The focus on minor offenders has led to a concern that diversion programs increase the amount of social control over the lives of individuals. Blomberg (1980), Renner (1979), and others (e.g., Morris, 1974) have presented considerable evidence and have voiced concerns about the tendency of diversion programs to widen the net of the criminal justice system's control. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, there is evidence from two major studies of diversion that many diverted defendants would not have been prosecuted anyway. In the absence of a diversion program, the prosecutor would have simply requested a dismissal of charges because there was insufficient evidence or interest in prosecuting the case. Futhermore, there are also some data suggesting that prosecutors tend to deny the referral of otherwise eligible defendants if they believe convictions are likely (Baker and Sadd, 1981).

Another and related criticism of diversion is its potentially coercive nature. Participation is obstensibly voluntary, but defendants are usually given the choice between diversion and prosecution. Given the alternative of a possible conviction, defendants may perceive diversion as the only option. The result is that many defendants are not motivated to participate in the diversion program but view it as a lesser evil. Since they are not there by choice, their cooperation and enthusiasm are minimal.

The critical concerns about net widening and coercion could be addressed, although admittedly with some difficulty, if diversion were shown to be highly effective in reducing recidivism, increasing employment, or otherwise enhancing the lives of participants. This issue will be considered in the next section.

The Effectiveness of Diversion

As with any social intervention, there is considerable interest in knowing whether diversion is an effective program. Unfortunately, despite the rapid and extensive proliferation of diversion programs, there is scant information about their effectiveness. Most studies have simply been descriptive, lacking control or comparison groups and other aspects of methodologically defensible research (Roesch, 1978). Recently,

however, there have been three diversion studies that have provided some data on the effectiveness of diversion.

The Fishman Study

One of the more controversial studies of diversion was conducted by Robert Fishman (1977), who examined eighteen diversion projects in New York City. Fishman concludes that the diversion projects were not effective in reducing recidivism. He argues that his negative conclusion could be generalized to other projects as well, suggesting that "unless there is better comparable data with different results the findings from these eighteen projects are indeed the best estimate of the outcome to be predicted for a universe of projects" (Fishman, 1977: 303). However, Fishman's study has been criticized severely, largely because of the unrepresentativeness of the sample, the lack of an adequate control group, and overgeneralization of the results (Roesch and Corrado, 1979; Zimring, 1974). Two recent studies have used better research designs but, unfortunately for advocates of diversion programs, come to similarly negative conclusions.

The Vera Institute of Justice Study

A recent study completed at the Vera Institute of Justice addressed many of the methodological concerns raised by the Fishman study. Baker and Sadd (1981) were able to employ a control group design in their study of diversion programs operating in the Manhattan and Brooklyn criminal courts. It is worthwhile to consider this study in some detail since it used an adequate research design and it tried to provide answers to a number of important questions.

Baker and Sadd's (1981) study was of the Court Employment Project (CEP), one of the early formal diversion programs. It was operated by the Vera Institute of Justice and began in 1968. The basic model was the provision of vocational and prevocational services such as job and educational referral and placement, individualized needs assessment, and referral to appropriate community resources. CEP's emphasis on employment sets it apart from perhaps the majority of diversion programs, which tend to use a counseling, casework approach. CEP also differed from many programs in that it formally excluded defendants arrested for misdemeanor charges. Thus it focused on more serious criminal cases and directed its efforts at unemployed defendants.

The study was based on a sample of defendants drawn from the Manhattan and Brooklyn criminal courts in 1977. Eligible defendants (that is, those who met the eligibility criteria and agreed to participate, and whose participation was approved by the defense attorney and the CEP staff) were assigned to either the experimental group ($n = 410$) or the control group ($n = 256$). The experimental group was diverted to CEP while the control group was processed normally through the court. The assignment was not precisely a random one, but rather involved the creation of variable-length time periods in which a quota of experimental subjects was selected. The overflow during each time period became control subjects. Since both the time period and the quota varied and were unknown to project personnel, they could not predict to which group an eligible candidate would be assigned. This method represents an innovative and methodologically adequate procedure that circumvents the usual objections to control groups, since the "overflow" control subjects were ones that could not have been handled by the project.

The data collected consisted of three personal interviews, conducted at intake, six months after intake, and twelve months after intake; prior record; the progress and disposition of the current criminal case; and recidivism. The study addressed three major questions: (1) What was the impact of diversion on the disposition of the criminal case? (2) What effect did diversion have on employment and/or education? (3) What effect did diversion have on subsequent criminal activity?

The issue of disposition is important because diversion is presumably viewed as an alternative to prosecution. Diverted defendants should be those who would be prosecuted if the diversion program did not exist. Data from the Baker and Sadd study suggest that this may not be the case. Successful completion of the program resulted in dismissal of any criminal charges. Thus all defendants who completed the program had their charges dismissed. But only 55 percent of the experimental group completed the program. The remaining 45 percent were considered program failures and should have been returned to the court for prosecution. However, 41 percent of the failures also had their charges dismissed. The control group, which was to be processed as usual through the legal system, had a 46 percent dismissal rate. These two findings suggest that, for a high proportion of cases, diversion results in an increase of social control for diverted defendants. Many diverted defendants simply would have had their charges dismissed even if the diversion program did not exist. Furthermore, diversion did not provide an advantage when punishment was considered: 70 percent of the control cases received no sanction (either because of dismissal or by sentence to conditional or unconditional discharge), compared to 80 percent of the experimentals. The authors note that the experimentals were also subject to CEP supervision, while the controls had no comparable sanction.

These findings might be considered acceptable if the services provided by the diversion program led to increased employment and reduced recidivism. Again, the data suggest that this did not occur. There were no significant differences between experimentals and controls with respect to employment or attendance in school. Also, a number of lifestyle measures were obtained, such as use of community resources, improved living conditions, and drug and alcohol use, but again there were no significant differences. Recidivism was measured in several ways (number of rearrests, convictions, severity) and across a number of time periods. Comparisons of the experimental and control groups revealed no significant differences on any of these measures.

Unless these consistently negative results are discounted, they represent quite discouraging prospects for diversion programs. Baker and Sadd attempt to put the findings in perspective in their concluding comments and suggest some causes for optimism. They point out that the lack of impact, especially in terms of disposition, was the result of the legal system's misuse of the program. Prosecutors, for example, "tended to exercise their discretion by diverting to CEP's supervision other defendants—those who would have been difficult or impossible to prosecute, and defendants who would have received insignificant levels of supervision if convicted" (Baker and Sadd, 1981: 27). At the same time, prosecutors "perceived it to be in their interests to use their own resources in cases where conviction is relatively likely and sanctioning the conduct or incapacitating the offender is relatively important." In this regard, it should be noted that 75 percent of diverted defendants were charged with property crimes; for the more serious crimes of robbery and assault, the figures were 7 percent and 9 percent, respectively.

The lack of impact on lifestyle, including employment, is discussed in several ways. The authors point out that the experimental group was a high-risk population: 90 percent were black or Hispanic, most had not completed high school, and only 17

percent were employed at the time of arrest. CEP's focus on securing employment was hindered by several factors, notably the declining job market and increased unemployment in general. Many participants also appeared to be concerned primarily with getting charges dismissed and not with obtaining the services of social agencies, of which they were highly distrustful.

Finally, the lack of impact on recidivism is explained quite simply. The authors acknowledged that because CEP had little impact on disposition or changes in clients' vocational or educational status, there was no reason to expect that the program would have any effect on recidivism patterns.

The authors conclude with three observations that may be useful to other diversion programs. First, they indicate that "simply providing court decision-makers with an alternative for handling cases does not assure that the new option will be used in the way preferred by its advocates. . . . Existing diversion programs cannot assume they are diverting defendants from conviction and harsh sanction" (Baker and Sadd, 1981: 44-45). The implication of this is that diversion programs should not accept cases until a decision for prosecution has been made, as Seidman (1981) did in a highly successful juvenile diversion program. Second, Baker and Sadd (1981: 45) call for "more detailed analyses . . . of what specific types of services are effective, with different types of clients, for the various behavior changes that are desired." It will be recalled that only 55 percent of diverted clients actually completed the program, while the employment and recidivism analyses were conducted using the full sample of experimental subjects. Can selection procedures be improved to identify defendants who are most likely to benefit from the type of services offered by a particular program? Finally, the authors indicate that the Court Employment Project responded to the study's findings by dropping the diversion program and substituting a postconviction program designed to reduce unnecessary incarceration. In addition, CEP offered its program to anyone who wanted to use it, with no guarantee of more favorable court treatment. This positive response of the program to the results of the study should be seen as quite encouraging to those advocates of experimental social innovation in which the problem rather than a particular solution is regarded as the primary concern (for example, see Campbell, 1969).

The San Pablo Adult Diversion Project

The results of the Baker and Sadd study have been replicated in an evaluation of the San Pablo (California) Adult Diversion Project (SPAD). Austin (1980) was also able to establish a randomly assigned control group (one-fourth of diverted cases), which was processed as usual through the legal system. The project was administered by the probation office, with probation officers serving as counselors. Austin cites this as one of the problems with the program because the services provided were much the same as those for probation. The project was primarily counseling oriented and made heavy use of volunteer work by divertees, usually in menial jobs. Little emphasis was placed on educational or employment-related services.

Diverted defendants (n = 149) and controls (n = 59) were compared on several recidivism measures, and a cost/benefit analysis was also conducted. Based on three-year follow-up, no significant differences between the two groups were found in terms of arrest rates, conviction rates, or severity of subsequent offenses. While arrest rates were somewhat high (38 percent for experimentals and 44 percent for controls) most offenses were of a minor nature. This is not surprising since the project was quite restrictive in its selection criteria. The screening committee accepted only

19 percent of all referred cases and tended to take those charged with minor crimes and those with no serious prior records. The complicated cost/benefit analysis showed that control cases were handled at about one-half the cost. There were simply not enough defendants diverted to have any impact on the system's case load; consequently, diversion apparently added to the costs of justice. In terms of degree of social control, divertees did spend less total time compared to controls on probation, but their supervision was considerably greater. Diversion did eliminate the conviction record since 90 percent of divertees had charges dismissed upon successful completion, compared to less than 7 percent of controls.

There was some evidence that prosecutors were using diversion for cases that would get little or no sanction from the courts. As Austin (1980: 129) states, "Knowing that the accused would 'get off' justified diversion for control, surveillance, and supervision."

Austin's predictions about the future of diversion are not positive. He argues that economic cutbacks will have serious consequences for diversion projects, especially if diversion is shown to add to costs rather than reduce them, as promised by many advocates of diversion. But Austin also adds that the failure of diversion may be more a result of the manner in which diversion programs are run rather than problems in the theory underlying diversion. If a diversion program is not properly implemented, even methodologically sophisticated studies will not provide definitive answers. This issue will be discussed at greater length in the next section.

The Future of Diversion

It is evident from this review that diversion has not had the impact on the criminal justice system that its advocates predicted. Several improvements should be attempted to maximize the impact of diversion in the future. First, projects should follow procedures that ensure that diversion occurs only after the filing of charges, so that diversion is a genuine alternative to the criminal justice system. Diversion programs might also develop as alternatives to jail sentences, as in Lamb and Goertzel's (1975) program that diverted jail-sentenced offenders to a halfway house. Second, the scope of diversion should be expanded to include, and perhaps emphasize, defendants charged with more serious crimes. Third, diversion programs should try true diversion, in which defendants are simply diverted out of the system, with no services from a diversion program. Charges would be dismissed immediately and individuals would not be required to participate in any program. Fourth, the type of program offered by a diversion program should have a firm grounding in theory. A program should justify why a selected intervention, such as counseling, should be presumed to have an effect on recidivism, the participant's quality of life, or any other outcome variable. Vera-type programs with an emphasis on employment may be more supportable given the high rates of unemployment among many arrested persons. Finally, more research on the effects of diversion programs is needed. The two projects reviewed previously (Austin, 1980; Baker and Sadd, 1981) are the first useful studies to come out of the diversion movement. They have provided some answers, but much remains unknown. Future research must examine selection procedures and acceptance criteria, program successes and failures, different types of intervention, and true diversion versus diversion with services. Also, all forms of diversion have to be compared to cases processed as usual through the criminal justice system.

It is important to emphasize that the Baker and Sadd (1981) and Austin (1980)

studies provided negative results only in a limited sense. The two studies did demonstrate that diversion in the two jurisdictions did not appear to be effective. It is clear, however, that there were serious limits on the operation of the two projects, as discussed in this review. It may well be that diversion projects operating in different forms—that is, closer to the ideals proposed for diversion projects—would achieve greater success. As Austin (1980: 237) notes in his conclusion:

> *Pre-trial diversion programs should be faulted for what they became and not what they were supposed to do. The problem of diversion lies not in its assumptions about the negative effect criminal justice actions have upon offender attitudes and criminal careers. Hypotheses derived from them remain to be empirically tested. This study and others have shown that current diversion programs bear little correspondence with a theory premised on reducing criminal justice intervention. Instead of diversion, there has been organizational extension and expansion within the pre-trial court processes.*

Austin's views about the net-widening effects of diversion programs reflect a commonly held perception (for example, see Feeley, 1979). To minimize the problems created by diversion programs, it will be necessary to understand the organizational dynamics and politics of criminal justice agencies. Without this understanding, it is unlikely that diversion programs will be implemented appropriately. The actual impact of diversion cannot validly be assessed until this is accomplished.

BAIL REFORM

The issue of pretrial release is often a controversial one, and provides a good example of the conflict between liberal and conservative factions. For the former, pretrial detention should be kept at an absolute minimum. Citing data that show that some 50,000 defendants may be in jail prior to trial on any given day, Goldkamp and Gottfredson (1979: 228) argue that "such massive use of pretrial detention is a matter of considerable controversy, because, to begin with, it appears on its face to be so incongruous with the due process precept that criminally charged defendants are innocent until proven guilty. Because, in essence, detention of the pretrial accused so closely resembles punishment of the pretrial accused, many find it highly objectionable, if not unconstitutional." Others have argued that pretrial defendants commit new crimes while out on bail and, hence, pretrial release should be made more difficult to obtain. This ideology would call for greater use of preventive detention, especially for those defendants considered to be dangerous or possible recidivists.

The shift toward greater use of preventive detention is perhaps best demonstrated in a recent report of the Task Force on Crime of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association (ABA). The report has been submitted to the ABA for approval, and thus is not yet official ABA policy. The report's conclusion about preventive detention was recently summarized in the *Criminal Justice Newsletter* (1982: 2). The conclusion marks a dramatic change in the ABA's current position. As quoted in the newsletter, the report states:

> *Judicial officers should be authorized to detain persons without bail pending a trial where, after a full hearing it appears that (1) the defendants meets criteria which establish his danger to the community, (2) there is substantial probability that the defendant committed the offense with which he is charged.*

If the ABA policy were adopted, a substantial number of defendants would likely be detained unnecessarily. This would be likely to occur because of the difficulty in determining which of these defendants should be detained. The problems associated with predicting dangerousness are well known (see Monahan, 1981, for a review). Consequently, a policy calling for the preventive detention of *any* defendant charged with a violent crime would face the fundamental problem of discriminating between those who will and those who will not pose a danger.

The controversy is, of course, unresolvable, since some defendants do invariably commit crimes while on pretrial release. But the dominant form of pretrial release, posting a cash bail, does not prevent these crimes. Any defendant who can raise the necessary cash can obtain release. Bail can be set at an inordinately large amount to prevent release, but this does not occur on a regular basis. Rather, most bails are set relatively low, with amounts of $5,000 or less being common. The use of pretrial detention as a preventive measure is further weakened by the fact that dangerousness and recidivism are not very predictable, which would result in a large number of false positives (defendants incorrectly predicted to be dangerous) being unnecessarily detained (Monahan, 1981). Many prosecutors and judges rely heavily on the seriousness of the present charge, but this has not been shown to be a good predictor of recidivism or the probability that a defendant will appear in court as schedule (Gottfredson, 1974; Schaffer, 1970).

Bail reformers have focused on the discriminatory nature of release practices, arguing that the reliance on cash bail discriminates against indigent defendants. If a defendant has no funds, then even a $100 bond may be unattainable. As a consequence, many defendants must remain in jail prior to trial, often waiting as long as six months or more for the disposition of their cases. The reformers have criticized a primary assumption of the cash bail system, that the possible forfeiture of the bond will ensure that defendants appear in court as scheduled. Thomas (1976) points out a flaw in this assumption. Most defendants post bail by paying a fee to a bailbondsman. This is typically in the form of a percentage of the total bail, usually 10 to 20 percent. The bailbondsman in turn guarantees the full amount to the court should the defendant not appear. Thomas points out that the percentage paid to the bailbondsman is forfeited regardless of whether or not the defendant appears in court. Thus there is little financial incentive to appear.

The reformers also maintain that other ways exist to ensure that a defendant appears in court. The first significant attempt to change the legal system's approach to pretrial release was initiated by the Vera Institute of Justice. The original idea was to create a bail fund for indigent defendants, but it was soon realized that this would simply allow the court to maintain the status quo—a reliance on cash bail (Thomas, 1976). The creative alternative was to create a program that would increase the use of a noncash release method, referred to as "release on recognizance" (ROR). ROR allows the release of defendants solely on their word that they will appear in court. Reasoning that the strength of a defendant's ties to the community may be a good predictor of court appearance, the Vera staff devised a point system to aid project staff in making ROR recommendations to the court (Ares et al., 1963). The point system is shown in Figure 17.1. Defendants are assigned points for residence, family ties, employment, school, health, and prior record. In a recent revision of the scale, defendants had to earn 6 or more points in order to receive a positive recommendation.

The Vera program was referred to as the Manhattan Bail Project, and it quickly gained acceptance not only in New York City but across the United States. The spread of this program was dramatic. Just a few years after the Manhattan Bail Project

began, nearly 100 projects were developed elsewhere (Thomas, 1976), spurred on as well by the 1964 Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice addressed by then Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The proliferation of ROR projects received substantial impetus from research conducted by Vera staff as well as by others. The research demonstrated that the court appearance rates of ROR defendants were quite good and compared favorably to the rates of defendants released on cash bail (Nietzel and Dade, 1973; Wice, 1973).

There is no doubt that bail reform projects have had a significant impact on the criminal justice system by increasing the use of ROR. In one of the first studies, Ares et al. (1963) withheld ROR recommendations on defendants who had actually achieved sufficient points for positive recommendations, in order to assess the impact of the recommendation. The court used ROR in only 14 percent of these cases, compared to 60 percent of the cases in which the project did give a positive recom-

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Residence

3 Present 1 year OR present and prior 1.5 years.
2 Present 6 months OR present and prior 1 year.
1 Present 4 months OR present and prior 6 months.
1 4 years or more in County.

Family Ties

4 Lives with spouse and children.
3 Lives with parents, spouse; single parent lives with children.
2 Lives with other family relative.
1 Lives with non-family friend OR regular contact with family.

Employment, School, Resources

4 Present job 1 year or more and can go back.
3 Present job 1 year.
2 Present job 4 months OR present and prior 6 months.
1 Current job OR receiving unemployment OR workman's compensation.
4 Presently in school, attending regularly full time.
2 Left school within 6 months and employed.
1 Left school within 3 months and unemployed.

Health

1 Poor health, and regular visits to doctor.
−1 Definite knowledge of alcoholism.

Prior Record

2 No convictions.

_____ Felonies (7 units each)

_____ Misdemeanors (2 units each)

Points	*Units*
0	2
−1	3-6
−2	7-13
−3	14-20
−4	21 and over

TOTAL POINTS _____

If a defendant scores 6 or more, he/she is recommended for ROR

Provided by Vera Institute of Justice

FIGURE 17.1 Revised Manhattan Bail Project Scale

mendation to the court. Nevertheless, the success of ROR projects has been somewhat limited, as will be discussed in the next section, and there is recent concern that the popularity of these programs is on the decline.

A National Bail Study

Thomas (1976) conducted a study of the bail practices in 20 U.S. cities, collecting data on a sample of approximately 200 felony and 200 misdemeanor defendants in each city. The study provides an excellent opportunity to examine the impact of bail reform because it looked at the bail practices for two time periods. The first period, 1962, was the last year prior to the beginning of the bail reform movement, while the second, 1971, reflected a period in which bail reform projects were in widespread operation. The Thomas study was thus designed to provide data on whether the alternative release models had an impact on the number of defendants released prior to trial, and whether the changes, if any, had an effect on pretrial appearance rates.

Thomas (1976) separately examined the patterns for felony and misdemeanor defendants. Since the results were similar, only the results for felony defendants will be considered here. The data showed that there had indeed been significant changes in the number of felony defendants released prior to trial. Only 48 percent were released in 1962, but this figure increased to 67 percent in 1971. Moreover, the changes appear to have been largely the result of increased use of ROR. In 1962, an average of 5 percent of defendants across the 20 cities were released on their own recognizance, while in 1971 the rate had increased to 23 percent. There was considerable variation in the use of ROR. A number of cities had rates that were quite high, such as 47 percent in Des Moines, 56 percent in Washington, D.C., and 45 percent in San Diego. But a majority (12) of the cities had ROR release percentages of less than 20 percent. In 5 of the cities, the reduction of custody rates was due to increased use of cash bail rather than ROR. Overall, in fact, cash bail was the predominant form of release. In 17 of the 20 cities, the release percentages for cash bail were higher than the ROR rates.

While the overall rates for ROR have increased, at least one study questions whether this has actually had an impact on detention rates. Bynum and Massey (1977) had release data from two cities. They found that "the increase in the use of alternative forms of release was accompanied by a decrease in the percentage of defendants posting bail" (Bynum and Massey, 1977: 14). This may not be particularly surprising. Later in this chapter, it will be suggested that the point system that serves as a basis for many project ROR decisions may well be biased against many of the very defendants it tries to reach. Defendants least likely to raise cash bail may also have a difficult time achieving sufficient points for an ROR recommendation. As a consequence, many defendants released by ROR could also pay cash bail if it were set. The result is that the ROR project provides an alternative to bail, and not an alternative to detention.

Thomas also compared how long defendants were held prior to release by ROR or cash bail, and the failure to appear in court rates. In fifteen cities, those released by ROR tended to get out of jail a little faster, as their mean number of detention days was usually a day or two less than bail defendants. This would result in some cost savings to the system. The nonappearance rate rose slightly between 1962 (6 percent) and 1971 (9 percent for felonies, 10 percent for misdemeanors), but the percentages for ROR and cash bail were comparable.

The conclusion one can reach from this finding is that the increased use of ROR has had some impact on the system, but it did not become the primary type of release, as had been hoped by some reformers. However, it is clear from this study that increased use of ROR does not lead to increases in the nonappearance rates. This finding is, as previously discussed, consistent with a number of other studies. The more alarming finding of this study is the high percentage of defendants who were detained, even though the rate had decreased by 1971. Twelve of the cities had detention rates of 30 percent or more in 1971. A number of cities had what can only be considered excessively high rates. For example, 62 percent of pretrial defendants in Boston were never released prior to trail, 64 percent in Kansas City, 49 percent in Oakland, and 45 percent in San Francisco.

Thomas (1976) discusses several problems encountered by ROR projects that have perhaps limited their impact. One problem is economic, a problem all the more salient today. The early ROR projects were funded by private foundations and later ones by federal funds, notably through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The intention of the funders was that once the projects had been demonstrated to be effective, the cities would assume the operation costs. This has occurred in some cities, but in many others the projects were terminated when outside funds dried up. A second problem was created by the very fact that when some cities took over a project they placed it organizationally in probation or other court-administered offices. As Thomas pointed out, this resulted in a shift from the early defendant-oriented philosophy of the externally funded projects to a more conservative and legalistic philosophy. While the early projects were concerned with identifying good risks and presenting only positive recommendations to the court, many of the latter projects began making both positive and negative recommendations. Thomas suggests that the shift has had largely negative consequences for ROR. The probation-run projects, for example, viewed themselves as providing a service to the courts, which meant not challenging the courts by recommending borderline cases. Furthermore, these projects tended to rely on subjective criteria rather than on the point systems. Thomas notes that exclusions due to current charge or prior record became more common.

A third problem raised by Thomas was that of increasing delays in interviewing defendants. While the early projects interviewed defendants within hours of arrest, delays of several days were becoming common for projects in 1970. Thomas cites poor project location and lack of interview rooms as primary reasons for delays. A related problem was increased difficulty in verifying the information obtained from defendants. Many references were not at home or did not have phones, often resulting in delays of several days before a verified recommendation could be made. Field verifications were attempted by some projects, but this proved too costly and time consuming.

A final set of problems has to do with the release criteria used by the different projects. When projects were first initiated, there was a tendency to have a number of exclusionary criteria to maximize acceptance on the part of court system. Type of charge was the most common reason for exclusion. Thomas points out that the intention was to reduce the number of automatic exclusions as the projects became more accepted by the courts. Unfortunately, this did not occur, as many projects used criteria that excluded 50 percent or more of pretrial defendants. Thus many defendants were never interviewed simply because of type of charge or extent of prior record.

The exclusion of certain offenses reflects the court's emphasis on type of charge in determining pretrial release. In a simulated decision-making study, Ebbesen and Konechni (1975) found that judges indicated that they were most influenced by prior

record and community ties. But when they observed some of the same judges in court actually setting bail, they found that the judges' decisions were almost exclusively based on prosecutor's recommendations. This recommendation was found to be based primarily on the severity of the current offense. This finding was replicated in a recent study by Goldkamp and Gottfredson (1979), who found, in a multiple-regression analysis, that the type of charge was the single most important variable in predicting whether ROR was granted, accounting for 29 percent of the variance. Prior record was the next most important variable, accounting for 13 percent of the variance. Demographics, health and other legal variables accounted for very little variance. The authors also point out that despite using 51 variables, which presumably reflected a good range of possible variables influencing a decision, the majority of variance was left unexplained. They suggest that this may be due to inconsistent treatment of defendants and argue for limits on bail discretion.

The emphasis on the part of both the court system and many bail reform projects on the severity of offenses or prior record is not supported by empirical data. A number of studies have shown that most defendants will show up in court, and that severity of offense or prior record do not predict failure (see Gottfredson, 1974; Nietzel and Dade, 1973).

A final problem raised by Thomas is that of release criteria. In a study of 119 bail projects, Pryor and Henry (1980) found that 17 percent used objective criteria only, 39 percent used subjective only, and 38 percent used a combination of objective and subjective criteria. Thomas (1976: 147) notes that projects using the subjective method were more conservative and criticized the notion that subjective methods would be more fair to indigent defendants. He states that "in reality, no defendant without the requisite number of points will be released, and many who have the points will be denied."

It is important to note, as have Thomas and others, that the point system has not been validated completely. While there have been countless studies demonstrating that defendants released on their own recognizance will show up in court, with few exceptions, the reality probably is that most defendants will show up in court regardless of the basis of the release decision. It has by no means been demonstrated that failure to achieve a certain number of points on a Vera scale is predictive of nonappearance. In fact, at least one study has shown that Vera criteria do not predict negative outcomes very well. Gottfredson (1974) conducted a study in which a group of defendants who were not considered eligible for ROR, using the Vera criteria, were released anyway. While the failure to appear rate was higher for the noneligible released group (27 percent versus 15 percent), the data collected as part of the evaluations failed to predict the 73 percent of defendants in the noneligible group who did appear in court, and also could not be used to predict the 15 percent of the eligible and released group who did not appear.

The use of an objective point system may simply be a way of making the recommendation process appear more scientific and safe. This may have been viewed necessary because ROR has typically been viewed as a privilege rather than as a right. A project must defend a recommendation that a person be released on ROR, and if insufficient or unconvincing evidence is advanced, the automatic default is cash bail. The burden of proof essentially rests on the project and/or the defendant to show why cash bail should not be set. This philosophy may be the single most important reason that ROR has not been used as extensively as it might or should be, and why it has not had more of an impact on the court system. To achieve a significant change, the burden should be shifted away from the defendant to the legal system. As

Thomas (1976: 148) has argued, "The presumption should favor nonfinancial release, and the burden should be on the prosecutor to rebut the presumption with specific evidence of unreliability in individual cases."

Future Directions

The increased use of ROR has had a significant impact on the criminal justice system, but it hasn't solved the jail problem. Many defendants continue to remain in jail because they do not meet ROR eligibility criteria and cannot post a cash bail. Continued reform of a number of aspects is clearly necessary. First, as Pryor and Henry (1980) have argued, the type of offense should not be an exclusionary criterion. Second, the point system should be scrutinized closely. Considerable doubt has been raised about its predictive validity, especially for defendants who do not achieve a sufficient number of points. It is probable that a substantial proportion of these defendants would appear in court. Goldkamp and Gottfredson (1979: 247) have suggested the type of study necessary to examine the validity of a point system, but this would require the system "to allow all defendants at their first appearances to be released before trial. By close follow-up of this total sample of defendants to record their failures to appear and their serious criminal activity while on pretrial release, it would not be difficult to learn whether such factors or defendant attributes as criminal charge or past record might be associated with pretrial failure." But, as these authors point out, such a research strategy may never be approved. There are some workable alternatives, however. For example, projects could gradually and systematically extend their decision criteria by including new charges, by reducing the number of points required for a recommendation, or by introducing new criteria. This would require, of course, ongoing research examining the outcomes of these decisions.

Third, as Thomas (1976) and others have argued, ROR should be the release of choice, with bail being set only if evidence is presented that a defendant may not appear in court or has failed to appear in the past.

Finally, the issue of continued financial support of bail reform projects is a critical one. Federal funds are becoming less available, requiring local communities to assume the cost of these projects. Continued research on the cost effectiveness of bail projects may help to sell the projects to city administrators. Ideally, the projects should be administratively outside the control of the courts. As a way to reduce costs, greater reliance should be placed on volunteers to conduct the interviews and verify the information. Through the use of volunteers, ROR projects can operate at a minimal budget. One good source of volunteers is local universities or colleges. For example, when the first author was a graduate student at the University of Illinois, he set up a bail project in Champaign County, Illinois. Students were given course credit through an independent study course and served as interviewers and verifiers. The city donated a small office and a telephone, and the project was supervised by the author and staff from a local community action group. When a project is run in this way, the cost to the city is minimal. Junior League and other community service groups could easily follow such a model.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS

The manner in which the criminal justice system processes cases usually results in the isolation of offenders from victims. The two parties rarely come into direct contact

with each other, and the victim typically gets very little feedback about the progress or disposition of a case. Two major exceptions to this are dispute resolution centers and restitution/community service programs. The latter will be discussed in the following section.

Dispute resolution programs operate on a crisis-intervention-type model in which individuals in conflict are brought together to reach some resolution of the dispute. The resolution program provides an alternative to criminal or civil action. Considerable doubt has been cast on the ability of the courts to resolve disputes. The courts are often inappropriate for dispute resolutions because they rarely attempt to achieve a mutually acceptable solution that leaves both parties with the perception that a fair agreement was reached (see Merry, 1979).

Garafalo and Connelly (1980) discuss five characteristics of dispute resolution programs: (1) They deal with individual-versus-individual disputes such as landlord/tenant, spouse/spouse, neighbor/neighbor, or consumer/merchant. (2) The programs rely on an independent third party who acts as a mediator. The mediator promotes discussion and helps identify areas of agreement and disagreement, with the final settlement being made by the disputants. (3) The programs usually use volunteers as mediators. Often the mediators are nonprofessionals who are representative of the population being served, although some programs have used law students (Fraser and Froelich, 1979). (4) Participation is voluntary and the programs do not have formal sanctioning authority if disputants do not follow the agreement reached as a result of the mediation. (5) The hearings are informal; they do not adhere to established rules of evidence and legal representation is discouraged.

Garafalo and Connelly (1980a, 1980b) completed an extensive review of the literature on dispute resolution programs. There is considerable variation among the programs with respect to the process of handling disputes and the types of cases referred to the programs. Some deal predominantly with assault and harassment cases and neighborhood disputes (animal or noise disturbances). Other programs have a considerable number of landlord/tenant and consumer/merchant disputes. Thus the programs are potentially capable of handling a range of civil and criminal cases.

The programs can be conceptualized as secondary prevention programs in that the intervention usually takes place early in the dispute and attempts to prevent the problem from becoming more serious. A clear advantage of such programs is that they try to reach resolution within a month, compared to the five to six months it takes to process a case through the legal system. As Fraser and Froelich (1979: 245) suggest, the intent is to "intervene rapidly and intensively in a pressing problem using structured, goal-oriented tactics. The goal is to stabilize escalating, vicious cycles and to implement minimal but significant changes that may serve to offset similar problems. Even better, it might initiate a positive ripple effect in the parties' lives."

How effective are these interventions? In their review, Garafalo and Connelly (1980b) summarize data from 13 projects. They found that a high percentage, usually 80 percent or more, of cases resulted in formal agreements, usually in writing. The most frequent types of agreement were disengagement, alteration of behavior, and payment of money or return of property. The majority were satisfied with the outcome and generally had slightly more favorable reactions than control cases processed as usual through the legal system. In terms of long-term effects, however, most studies found small or no differences between mediated and court-processed cases. For example, there were about the same number of new complaints in both groups. The case processing time, as mentioned earlier, showed that the disputes are resolved considerably faster in the resolution programs, usually within one month. There were insufficient studies to make any firm conclusions about relative cost-effectiveness.

In summary, dispute resolution programs represent a promising alternative to the formal legal system. The focus on secondary prevention, using a crisis intervention approach, is a novel one for the legal system but one that makes considerable theoretical sense from a community mental health or community psychology perspective.

RESTITUTION AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

It has often been argued that the victim is a forgotten individual in the criminal justice system. The system's attention is often focused solely on an alleged offender, while the victim is often not even informed of the disposition of the case. Victims can suffer both psychological and pecuniary damages, often with little compensation. Many programs have been developed to aid victims of crimes by providing psychological and advocacy services (Reiff, 1979). It is not the purpose of this chapter to review such programs since they usually do not involve the criminal justice system. However, two related programs have become integral parts of the system: victim restitution and community service.

Restitution is often ordered by the court as a condition of probation. Restitution is made directly to the victim, in the form of payment for stolen or damaged property, reimbursement for medical expenses and/or lost wages, or provision of a service for the victim. The concept has been broadened to provide for compensation to the community at large when individual victim restitution is inappropriate or not possible. This is referred to as community service.

The practice of restitution is based on the notion that the offender should be held responsible for his or her actions by, whenever possible, directly "righting the wrong" committed against the victim. While this appears reasonable, the effectiveness of restitution has not been established largely because little research has been done. However, the limited research to date suggests that a variety of problems exist. Harland (1981) points to low arrest rates, low wages paid to incarcerated offenders, and nonreporting of crimes as factors limiting the success of restitution. Reiff (1979: 138) persuasively makes an argument for a limited view of restitution by discussing the potential impact for victims of violent crimes:

> *Since only an average of about 15 percent of reported violent crimes result in convictions, and assuming that all those convicted are able to earn enough to pay restitution, that would still leave 85 percent of the victims of violent crime unrecompensed. Add to that the fact that 95 percent or more of the offenders would be financially unable to pay restitution, we are left with the harsh reality that under our present system more than 99 percent of the victims of violent crime would be unable to collect restitution.*

Reiff goes on to argue that states should assume more responsibility in providing cash awards to victims of violent crimes. Many states already have such compensation programs in operation (Newton, 1976).

In summary, restitution is clearly a popular practice, at least on the part of the system and the community. Despite his reservations, Harland (1981) concludes that the programs should be allowed to develop, preferably with little restriction placed on eligibility criteria for either the victim or the offender. He adds that it will be critical to conduct more exhaustive research to assess whether the benefits exceed the costs and justify the initial cautious optimism of this innovation.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

The interventions reviewed thus far have all focused on what the criminal justice system can do after individuals come into contact with it. The system can only react after an individual is apprehended or a victim formally seeks help. As a consequence, interventions are limited to those based on secondary or tertiary preventive models. As a long-term strategy this is probably neither effective nor efficient. A potentially better strategy is the introduction of interventions based on a primary prevention model. Such interventions would focus on the prevention of an offense. If successful, there would be no offender and no victim. This section will briefly review the effects of situational and environmental factors on crime, since these two factors are essential to the primary prevention model.

Preventing Violence

The research on the ability of decision makers to predict whether given individuals will be violent in the future consistently shows large error rates (see Monahan, 1981, for a review). Regardless of the basis of the prediction (such as psychological tests, clinical interviews, or prior violent behavior), it is clear that many individuals are erroneously labeled potentially dangerous. Furthermore, from a prevention perspective, reliance on individual predictions is limiting because it will not prevent violence by individuals who have never been in contact with the system.

Concerns about the ability to predict dangerousness have led to suggestions that a better strategy would be to focus on situations and environments that are conductive to violent behavior. One method to accomplish this is to analyze where crimes occur. Once the situational or environmental problems are identified, measures could be taken to either modify the situation or instruct individuals to avoid the situation. For example, the latter is frequently done when parole boards order a parolee who has had difficulties with alcohol to stay away from bars. Monahan (1976b: 28) gives an example of the former:

> *In attempting to prevent the crime of violent rape, for example, a hypothetical ecological analysis of a given community might reveal that a sizeable proportion of past rapes occurred in certain areas of the community with poorly-lit streets, where public transportation was unavailable, and when hitch-hiking. Preventive efforts based on this analysis might then include modifying the environment by providing increased lighting and public transportation, and a publicity campaign to advise women to avoid hitch-hiking situations.*

Other examples of modifying situations will be considered in the next section.

Defensible Space

The idea that a relationship exists between the type of environment and behavior is based on the research of environmental psychologists showing that physical surroundings exert considerable influence on an individual's behavior. Obviously, this applies to all aspects of behavior. With respect to criminal behavior, there are several ways in which environments may be changed to potentially have an effect on crime.

A target of crime, such as a home, can be physically altered to make it more difficult or risky for an offender to carry out a crime. This could be accomplished fairly simply, through the use of alarms and dead bolts, and the marking of personal property.

Newman (1972) conducted a considerable amount of research on the relationship between architecture and crime in two inner-city housing projects. He concludes that the higher rate of crime in one of the projects was due to the proponderance of high-rise buildings with more areas conducive to crime (elevators, stair wells, lobbies that could not be viewed from the street). Furthermore, he suggests that this type of living has psychological consequences as well. For example, he suggests that children who live in high-rise, high-density environments have poorly developed perceptions of individual privacy and little respect for territory and the property of others. Unfortunately, Newman had few data to support these assertions and his conclusions have been criticized (Mawby, 1977). Nevertheless, Newman's work did serve to bring environmental design issues as they affect crime to the attention of urban planners.

Structural changes in a particular environment may well have the effect of reducing crime, at least in that environment. However, programs based on the concepts of defensible space, such as Operation Identification and the use of better locks, alarms, and lighting, may also displace crime to other locations. Reppetto (1976) discusses a number of ways in which this may occur, such as when an offender changes the target, place, or time of the crime. Following a review of the potential effects of the various forms of displacement, Reppetto concludes that displacement is not total because some crimes are opportunistic and offenders typically have limited mobility. Thus defensible space strategies would likely have an effect on the total amount of crime.

Police-Level Interventions

When environments cannot be changed it may still be possible to reduce the opportunity for crime. Interventions with and by police can be used to create changes in the environment. Police generate deterrence by providing a general risk of apprehension and by blocking criminal opportunities because of their presence in the area (Riccio, 1974). Theoretically, if potential offenders perceive that the risk of apprehension is high, they will be less likely to commit an offense. One possible way to increase the perceived risk is to increase the amount of police patrol in a given area.

A major study of a police patrol intervention was conducted in Kansas City (Kelling et al., 1974). Fifteen patrol areas were randomly divided into three groups. In the reactive beats, routine preventive patrol was eliminated and police only entered the area to respond to service calls. One car per area was used in the control beats. In the proactive beats there were two to three times the usual level of patrol.

The results were discouraging to advocates of increased patrol. Victimization surveys, which were used to avoid the problem of nonreported crime, were conducted, but no differences between the types of beats were found for 69 offenses studied. Arrests were not affected, nor was response time. Fear of crime, including the perceived probability that one would become a victim, was not reduced in the proactive beats. Finally, a hypothesized reduction in traffic accidents due to a greater presence of police cars was not supported.

Larson (1975) criticized the study on a number of grounds. He argued that the increase in patrol level was not that great and may not have been noticed by citizens or offenders. Risman (1980), however, conducted a reanalysis of the data and found that the differences among the three groups were quite significant. In terms of visibil-

ity, defined as mileage covered per beat, the proactive beats had substantially more visibility than the other beats. Another criticism was that the increases in patrol should not be random but rather should be concentrated in high-crime areas.

The Kansas City study was replicated in Nashville with some important modifications (Schnelle et al., 1977). Four patrol cars that had no service functions were added to the regularly assigned car in an area. The researchers selected high-crime areas and increased patrol for both days and nights. Monitoring devices were installed to see how much patrol occurred in an area. The results showed no effect on crime during the day, but there was a reduction in crime at night. It appeared that patrols were not able to prevent house burglaries, which often happened during the day, but were able to prevent business robberies at night. The project staff concluded, however, that the cost was prohibitive in terms of the benefits gained (the reduction of some crimes). Thus arguments for the positive effects of increased levels of patrol do not seem warranted by the available data. The two studies cast considerable doubt on whether concentrated patrol would be effective or cost-efficient.

Another major focus of intervention with the police is training in specific skills that will enable officers to perform their job more effectively. One good example is the work by Bard (1969), in which 18 officers (9 white and 9 black) were trained in marital conflict resolution. The training included role playing on how to handle family quarrels, lectures, seminars, and film sessions. Following training the officers were designated the Family Crisis Intervention Unit and during the first year engaged in 945 interventions with 665 families. Bard (1969) reports that during this period no officers were injured, while in a neighboring precinct there were 5 reported cases of injury. Bard concludes that when family disputes are dealt with more effectively, as they presumably would be because of training and ongoing supervision, the relationships between the police and community should be enhanced.

Driscoll et al. (1973) criticized Bard's conclusions, suggesting that he had few data to support them. They specifically focused on the six evaluation hypotheses used by Bard: (1) The number of family disturbance complaints would decrease; (2) the number of repeat interventions for trained officers would decrease (as a function of problem resolution); (3) homicides would be reduced; (4) homicides among family members would decrease; (5) assaults would decrease; and (6) injuries to policemen would be reduced.

Driscoll et al. point out that the results on four of the six hypotheses were opposite to the expected findings. There were *more* disturbance complaints in the demonstration precinct compared to the control precinct; more repeat cases; only slightly more homicides in the control precinct; and an increase in family homicides in the demonstration precinct compared to no change in the control. Driscoll et al. noted several design problems in the Bard study and set out to improve the design in their study in Louisville, Kentucky. They also shifted the theoretical approach to training from one based on sensitivity training to one based on behavior modification techniques. The results support Bard's conclusions about effectiveness and should be considered promising for those who support this type of training and intervention. Trained police were better able to resolve the immediate conflict, compared to untrained police, saw less need for force, and were perceived more positively by citizens.

More recently, Mulvey and Reppucci (1981) conducted a methodologically sophisticated study of the effects of crisis intervention training in a midsized police department. Using a control group design, they examined changes in attitude, knowledge gained from the training, and field performance. The results did not support the effectiveness of the training as both experimentals and controls changed over time.

The authors provide an excellent discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of their study, and suggest that there is a need for replication and research design improvements before conclusions can be drawn about the use of crisis intervention training.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The mixed results of interventions aimed at system-level change within the criminal justice system are evident from this selective review of a number of reforms. While the results have often been discouraging, there is a basis for concluding this chapter on an optimistic note. It seems fair to argue that many of the interventions have not had a fair test. The theories underlying interventions have often been subverted when the interventions have been implemented. There are many reasons for this, and social scientists would perhaps accomplish a good deal more if they paid greater attention to examining and understanding the complex system-level context in which interventions take place. Factors such as individual and organizational self-interests, differing ideological perspectives, and political pressures and constraints can affect the way in which an intervention develops. This can occur even when an intervention has been shown to be effective, as Seidman (1981) found in his research on juvenile diversion. When control of the project was transferred from the researchers to the juvenile justice system, Seidman found that the process was significantly changed. For example, once the system had authority for the program, serious first offenders and repeat offenders were no longer referred to the diversion project.

As a consequence of a variety of internal and external constraints and influences on an intervention, it is clear that a treatment program can vary in fundamental ways from its original conception. As a result, subsequent evaluations do not provide totally valid assessment of the effectiveness of an intervention. Thus it is not sufficient for researchers to simply conduct outcome evaluations that only examine questions of program effectiveness. Future research should pay more attention to the contextual variables and the integrity of interventions and their implementation, so that valid conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of attempts to reform the criminal justice system.

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18

Two Decades of Reform in the Mental Health System (1963-1983)

Richard H. Price
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On February 5, 1963, President Kennedy proposed sweeping reforms in the delivery of mental health services in the United States. He recommended the substitution of community-based care for the custodial institutional care that had been the primary service available at the time. He requested funds from Congress for construction and staffing of a new system of community mental health centers that was expected to provide a broad spectrum of services to consumers in the community. In the last 20 years the face of mental health services in America has indeed been transformed. But what has been the nature of the transformation? While Kennedy and others hoped that mental health services would constitute a social and community intervention of national proportions, many of the outcomes we now observe were unpredicted and the results for the consumers of mental health services were mixed, at best.

Kennedy's attempt to reform the mental health system should be seen in the context of a widespread transformation of the federal role in solving social problems. As Sundquist (1969: 3) suggests, "before 1960, the typical federal assistance program did not involve an expressly stated *national* purpose. It was instituted, rather, as a means of helping state or local government accomplish *their* objectives." Similarly, the problem of treating the mentally ill was seen primarily as a local one. The federal government sought only to aid programs developed by the states rather than to design and implement their own programs. Sundquist suggests that the new federal role came into being only after public attitudes had changed to view particular problems as national problems requiring national solutions. Kennedy's new plan for mental health reflected such a shift in public awareness. At the same time, it set in motion political and economic forces that have greatly affected the organization, availability, and quality of mental health services during the past 20 years. In the next section, we will present a framework that will aid in understanding the interaction of those forces and their impact on the consumer of mental health services.

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A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING INTEREST GROUPS

The Control of Resources and Power in the Mental Health Arena

In examining recent social and community interventions in the field of mental health, commentators have focused on improvements in treatment technology. While it is true that there have been improvements in the technology of mental health treatment—including the development of psychopharmological treatments and various psychotherapeutic techniques—we believe these improvements have had a marginal impact on the quality of care provided to the majority of severely impaired clients when compared with political and economic factors. Researchers and opinion leaders in the mental health field often point with pride to new technologies. But this misses the important fact that decisions about the allocation of resources for mental health care are made in a turbulent policy arena where interest groups with conflicting interests engage in competition, collaboration, and negotiation for scarce resources while attempting to minimize their own liabilities and cost. The outcomes of these strategic maneuverings and transactions are not merely bureaucratic losses and victories where one agency wins or a professional group emerges dominant. We will suggest that while one interest group or coalition may win temporary victories, it is seldom the case that the client also wins. Instead, the client, particularly when he or she is severely disabled and poor, has little bargaining power about the quality of care provided, with predictable results.

In what follows we will articulate a framework of assumptions about the nature of these interactions and their results for both interest groups and for clients in the mental health system. Our assumptions have been heavily influenced by the work of Cook (1977), Emerson (1962, 1972), Hasenfeld (forthcoming), and Wamsley and Zald (1976). Our framework involves propositions about four issues: (1) interest groups, (2) resources, (3) patterns of interaction among interest groups, and (4) the resulting nature of power and dependency.

Interest Groups

We assume that all groups that have a stake in a particular social problem, such as mental health, are "interested." That is, they are positioned in the policy arena in such a way that they may gain or lose from developments and decisions in that arena. Furthermore, they are interdependent so that action by one group necessarily affects the others. In the case of mental health, of course, interest groups include professional associations of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and nurses, among others. Various client advocate groups such as mental health associations and legal advocacy groups, treatment agencies at federal, state, and local levels, legislators at both the federal and state level, the courts, and third-party insurers, both public and private, are also included. These groups are not always homogeneous, nor do they always have well-defined boundaries—indeed, their boundaries can change over time.

While we are particularly concerned about the role of the client in the mental health system, we do not identify the client as an organized "interest group," even though some clients or client advocates may form interest groups. While clients cer-

tainly share common interests, they do not automatically constitute an organized interest group in our sense of the term. We also assume that interest groups have value orientations that vary from group to group. Some interest groups may be concerned about maximizing intangibles, such as justice as they perceive it, while others may be more concerned with maximizing income or controlling decisions about who is entitled to deliver mental health services. Interest groups may act to maximize their own values by attempting to acquire the resources that help them do so. In addition, we assume that each interest group possesses some resources of its own but often requires other different types of resources that are essential to it. In this case, an interest group may be forced to compromise between maximizing its values and survival. Thus, for example, a patient advocacy group may have to apply for funds from a foundation that may expect it to moderate its stance, or a local mental health agency may discover that its primary source of funding requires that it deliver services it sees as less essential in the local community.

Resources

A resource is any valued activity, service, or commodity. We assume that resources can take a wide variety of different forms. They may actually involve funds, but in many other cases a "resource" may consist of legitimacy, a coveted credential, or prestige. We also assume that resources are scarce. Even though they may take on a variety of different forms and be possessed in different patterns by different interest groups, we assume they are limited in quantity.

Finally, we assume that the allocation of resources is contingent on a variety of different allocation rules or entitlements. In the field of mental health, these allocation rules are often tied to the diagnosis of the client, or to specifications about the manner in which the client must be treated. These allocation rules are products of previous negotiations among interest groups with respect to the allocation of resources (White, 1974).

Interaction Among Interest Groups

Various interest groups will interact with one another in order to obtain the resources they need to maximize their own values. Although interest groups may at times compete directly with one another for a desired resource held by a third group, more often they will engage in negotiation, coalition building, collaboration, collusion, and other forms of exchange among themselves to maximize the likelihood of obtaining the desired resources.

Interest groups will frequently engage in negotiation about the rules for client processing and treatment, as Hasenfeld (forthcoming) has observed. This is primarily because in human service organizations, the allocation of resources is often contingent on these rules. It is interesting to observe that most often the client plays no direct role in this negotiation process. Thus, diagnostic systems, what constitutes "appropriate" treatment technologies, and the degree to which the treatment of various disorders is reimbursable are issues negotiated by various interest groups but seldom directly between the client and the service provider. Thus, insurance companies, courts, legislators, treatment agencies, client advocates, and various professional

groups will engage in exchanges of information, funds, legitimacy, and other resources to preserve their own values. These transactions will affect the organization of service delivery, but the consumer usually plays no role in them.

Dependency and Power

We assume, with Emerson (1972), that power and dependency are inversely related in this set of exchanges. By exchange, we mean voluntary transactions involving transfer of resources between two or more actors for mutual benefit (Cook, 1977). Thus, interest groups remain in a stance of resource exchange, where each group has some resources the other groups require. In this exchange, group A has power over group B if group A possesses a resource B requires and B can obtain it from no other source. Thus, even if B requires a particular resource (e.g., funds), it is dependent on A only if A is the only source of funds available to B. Interest groups that are interdependent, in this context, sooner or later will negotiate to form stable coalitions in order to develop a predictable pattern and level of control over resources.

In considering issues of power and dependency it is particularly interesting to observe that the client is also engaging in a set of exchange relations with service providers. But the client's power (or, inversely, the client's dependency) is a function of the availability of alternative sources of care or the ability to do without care. That is, in the exchange relation between client and provider, the client's power or dependency varies directly according to the variety of different choices the client can make among service providers. We will return to this last aspect of our framework at the end of the chapter because we feel it has important implications for the structure of services to be provided in the mental health arena over the next several decades.

GOALS OF THE CHAPTER

With the framework just described in mind, we will now review the events of the last two decades in the field of mental health. We will pay particular attention to political and economic events that transpired over that period, and our discussion will be informed at least in part by the perspective and assumptions just described.

We will review separately two aspects of the mental health service system. First, we will consider the inpatient hospital-based system and then will turn our attention to organization of outpatient services. We believe each of these service systems in the mental health arena justifies separate treatment because, until recently, they have served relatively distinct segments of the population and because their recent histories have been quite different. The outpatient mental health service system has served a population that seeks a number of different forms of professional and informal care on a voluntary basis in response to a variety of situational distresses and interpersonal difficulties. The inpatient hospital in the past has served a population that is more likely to be severely disturbed, have a lower socioeconomic and educational status, and to experience their disturbance and disability as chronic and lifelong. While these service systems and populations were relatively distinct in the past, we will see that the events of the last 20 years have changed their composition in a number of unexpected ways.

INSTITUTIONAL CARE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY DISABLED

By the middle of the nineteenth century, asylums for the mentally ill began to appear all over the United States. Rothman (1971) noted that these new asylums were seen as sanctuaries from the chaos and uncertainty of the social environment that was then believed to be a major cause of psychological problems. The first asylums were relatively orderly and supportive institutions where care for the severely disturbed could be obtained. But in the space of the next 50 years overcrowding had increased rapidly and people who were socially or intellectually disabled for a wide variety of reasons began to be placed in mental hospitals.

Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century, the well-ordered asylum of the Jacksonian era had become an institution where crowding and maltreatment predominated (Price and Lynn, 1981). The rehabilitative programs of the asylums of the 1840s and 1850s had been transformed into large public state and county hospitals with few rehabilitative programs. It is not surprising, then, that at the end of World War II state mental hospitals in the United States began to receive substantial criticism (Deutsch, 1948), and studies by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Health (1961) reinforced public concern about the quality of care in institutions.

By the middle of the twentieth century, yet another dramatic change in the role of institutional care for the psychologically disabled began to emerge. A massive shift of the institutionalized population out of mental hospitals began. In 1955, there were approximately 559,000 institutionalized mental patients in the United States. Only 20 years later, in 1975, 215,000 remained (Shinn and Felton, 1981). This reduction of the institutionalized population by 57 percent reflects major social and community intervention.

Where had all the patients gone? Had the moral crusaders of the 1950s and 1960s helped the mental health professionals and policy makers to see the errors of their ways? Had patients been liberated from the human warehouses in which they had been cast, and were they now safely reintegrated into welcoming communities? Or had the courts, spurred by public interest lawyers, scored a victory for the constitutional rights of mental patients? Or had we seen a victory for medical science and pharmacological treatment? Had new psychoactive drugs liberated patients from their madness? Still another version of this story views it as a victory for federalism and the national community mental health movement. In this version of the story, inadequate state facilities were replaced by federally funded local community mental health centers concerned with comprehensive care for people in need of help.

While each of these versions has a grain of truth in it, we will argue that political and economic changes that occurred at the time played critical roles. These political and economic changes, we believe, not only shaped the nature of the relationship between the psychologically disabled and mental institutions in the United States but continued to exert a major influence on the quality of care received by this population.

In what follows, we will sketch the ideological, legal, technological, political, and economic forces that have shaped this major change in the relationship between the psychologically disabled and institutions. We will then examine the outcomes of these forces as they can be seen today in terms of new, but not necessarily better, institutional arrangements. Following this, we will ask what new alignments of political and economic forces have resulted. Finally, we will ask how these new realignments will affect the quality of care and the quality of life of psychologically disabled and dependent populations in the United States.

Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization

Ideological and Legal Forces

Recently, Scull (1981) ably documented the ideological forces at work during the 1960s and early '70s that fueled much of the professional enthusiasm for removing the psychologically disabled from institutions. Scull observes that psychiatrists such as Szasz (1963, 1970) who were opposed to all forms of involuntary commitment strongly supported the removal of patients from mental hospitals. At the same time, labeling theorists in sociology "eagerly embraced the notion that the fundamental problem was the patient's institutionalization and not his or her illness" (Scull, 1981: 8). Sociologists such as Goffman (1961) described the numbing effects of total institutions, and influential social scientists such as Cumming and Cumming (1957: 55) asserted that "the worst home is better than the best mental hospital." Thus, the ideological stage was set for the movement of patients from institutional care to the community (Price and Denner, 1973). While professionals were influential in pointing to the problems of mental hospitals, reformers were writing exposés of hospital conditions (Deutsch, 1948; O'Gorman, 1956) to heighten public awareness outside professional ranks.

Legal changes based on the changing ideology and public awareness also provided a powerful impetus for the removal of patients from state hospitals. Two major decisions affecting the rights of mental patients deserve special attention: One concerned the right to treatment and another made it much more difficult to obtain civil commitments.

A major change in the application of civil commitment laws was reflected in the 1975 Supreme Court ruling which asserted the constitutional right of the mentally ill against involuntary confinement if they were not considered dangerous and were capable of surviving safely without incarceration (Stone, 1975). In that case, a jury awarded Kenneth Donaldson both compensatory and punitive damages against two hospital physicians who confined him involuntarily without any indication that he was dangerous to himself or others (Donaldson, 1976). The more restricted application of civil commitment laws following the Donaldson decision meant that many patients who would have previously been hospitalized remained in the community.

A second major landmark decision came in the case of *Wyatt v. Stickney* in 1971 (Mechanic, 1980; Stone, 1975). In that case, the Federal District Court in Alabama held that involuntarily committed patients had a constitutional right to receive treatment that would give them a realistic opportunity to improve their mental condition (Stone, 1975). As hopeful as these legal reforms seemed, Mechanic (1980: 202-203) observed that a number of unanticipated problems resulted from the right to treatment decision. He remarked:

> *perhaps the most dangerous of all is that such standards may encourage a practice of indiscriminant dumping of patients in the community without providing an adequate network of community care that facilitates social functioning and alleviates the social costs for families and community members of having highly disabled persons residing in the community.*

Mechanic also observed that there is evidence, following the Wyatt decision, that large numbers of patients were released from Alabama hospitals and that the number of releases was larger than would have been expected on the basis of existing trends in nearby states. It is also interesting to note that the Wyatt case represented a federal

intervention into an arena that had traditionally been the responsibility of the states. Thus, the legal and ideological forces we have described combined to provide both the sentiment among professionals and the public and the legal means for a change in the relationship between institutionalized persons and institutions themselves.

Changes in Treatment Technology

An additional, very different force came into play somewhat earlier. The introduction of psychoactive drugs for the treatment of severe psychological disturbance was an innovation much hailed, especially in the psychiatric community. Berger et al. (1977: 263) describe the revolution created by the introduction of psychoactive drugs in the following way:

> *In order to understand the revolution that occurred in the treatment of the mentally ill after the introduction of pharmacotherapies, it is important to recall what the conditions were like before these therapies were introduced. . . . The patients' living areas were crowded and poorly furnished; schizophrenic patients with paranoid delusions crouched in corners in constant fear; catatonic patients were allowed to maintain the same rigid posture to the point of developing swollen legs and pressure sores; hallucinating patients paced the floor talking to their voices and unaware of what was going on around them. People sat year after year on benches or on the floor doing nothing, while their physical health deteriorated as well. Violent patients attacked staff members and other patients for reasons known only to themselves.*

The introduction of major tranquilizers such as chlorpromazine, which seemed to be able to reduce the most florid and disturbing of psychotic symptoms, stimulated institutional physicians to develop active psychopharmacological treatment programs. Berger and his colleagues observe that without the advent of psychomacological drugs, the number of patients in public mental hospitals by 1973 would have swollen to at least 800,000.

Changes in the Political Climate

While ideological and legal changes and concomitant changes in treatment technology were all important forces in changing the relationship between the psychologically disabled and state institutions, political changes in the Kennedy and Johnson eras with still earlier roots were crucial. Levine (1981) offered an insightful and scholarly account of the political changes in mental health legislation at that time.

State hospitals had been badly neglected through the depression and war years and began to deteriorate even further in the 1950s, making them the target of many reformer exposés. The Governor's Conference of 1949 sponsored a study of mental health programs in the United States. The National Association of Mental Health began to generate political support for massive federal efforts in the mental health sector. Levine (1981) observed that by 1955 a working coalition concerned with reform had developed consisting of professional leadership at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), leaders in psychiatry in universities and medical schools, and lobbying organizations such as the National Association of Mental Health. Because a number of legislators were sympathetic to the cause, NIMH was able to develop congressional support to appeal effectively for funds year after year.

State mental hospitals had become a political liability to the states, and a political

coalition had developed at the federal level between mental health professionals, government officials in NIMH and Congress. Congress in 1955 passed a resolution for a thorough study of the problems of mental illness. The study, conducted by the Joint Commission on Mental Health and Mental Illness (1961), produced a number of influential volumes that, among other things, recommended that the state hospital system be revitalized.

While the Joint Commission report was an important impetus for what was to come later, John F. Kennedy's message to Congress on mental illness and mental retardation in 1963 also called for a "bold new approach" to mental health problems. Kennedy's approach urged the establishment of community-based treatment rather than revitalizing the state mental hospitals. He urged that a new system of comprehensive community mental health centers be used as agencies of community-based care and that custodial care of patients in state hospitals be reduced by 50 percent or more (Kennedy, 1963).

While these political developments made it seem that genuine improvements in the treatment of severely disabled persons would be forthcoming, the political coalitions that brought it about also were sowing the seeds for later problems in the coordination of care among state, local, and federal authorities. For example, Levine (1981: 55) observed that the 1965 Community Mental Health Centers Act

> *allowed NIMH to bypass state mental health authorities and to deal directly with local sponsors of community mental health centers. This provision created local constituencies for NIMH funded service programs and set the stage for conflict between state authorities and local groups.*

Economic Forces

While all of the influences we have described thus far were important in removing patients from state hospitals, perhaps the most important and most potent factors were economic. As Scull (1981: 66) observed, shifting the financial burden for the care of institutionalized patients from the state to federal government was a powerful incentive for removing people from state-supported institutional settings. Levine noted that

> *a potent incentive to states to reduce hospitals censuses were laws providing financial means for states to reduce the burdens on their budgets while shifting the burden to the federal level. The laws providing financial incentives for emptying the state hospitals are critical.*

We will discuss these economic and policy shifts in more detail below because we believe they are implicated in the quality of care that psychologically disabled people are now receiving in the mental health system.

The Shifting Financial Base for Care and Its Consequences for the Psychologically Disabled

The Community Mental Health Centers Act was designed so that once centers had been established with federal funds, they would "graduate" and their funding base would shift from federal to state sources (Foley, 1975). In retrospect, the realism of this assumption can be questioned, particularly in light of the fact that federal

funding frequently bypassed state agencies and directly provided support for community services at the local level. Little meaningful collaborative interaction between state institutions and community mental health centers had been achieved. It is not surprising, then, that the states would be reluctant to assume obligations to finance and coordinate the community care of institutional populations, particularly when they had just begun to develop mechanisms for divesting themselves of a political liability and a fiscal burden by transferring the financing of care for institutionalized persons to the federal government.

Federal Financing and Its Impact

However, perhaps the most influential force transforming the relationship between the psychologically disabled and their institutions was the development of three federal programs designed to finance the care of the elderly and the disabled. They are the Medicare program, the Medicaid program, and the Supplemental Security Income program. Levine (1981) provides a carefully documented and compelling account of the relationship between the provisions of these programs and the form and quality of care disabled populations now receive. Medicare was designed to provide health care for all Americans and to pay hospital and related costs for those over age 65. Kiesler (1982) noted that the Medicare insurance program as it is currently structured actually produces an incentive for physicians and psychiatrists to hospitalize patients rather than treating them on an outpatient basis. Furthermore, the number of hospital days covered by Medicare is limited. However, if a patient is discharged for 60 days, he or she may return for an additional period of federally subsidized hospitalization. This payment structure creates a "revolving door" policy in which patients are shuttled in and out of hospitals in order to maximize reimbursements from the Medicare program (Kiesler, 1982). Furthermore, as Levine observes, the regulations to accredit hospitals so that they may qualify for Medicare reimbursements are designed to support care using an acute, intensive treatment approach of doubtful appropriateness and provides no alternative facilities for chronic mental patient care. Thus, the reimbursement structure of federal hospital insurance has encouraged hospitals to discharge patients based on reimbursement rather than their clinical condition and has structured treatment for acute episodes when care for chronic conditions would often be more appropriate.

The Medicaid program is designed to provide health and rehabilitation services to the poor and the medically disabled and provides services in a general medical hospital for persons between 21 and 65 and psychiatric hospitalization coverage only for those under 21 and over 65. In addition, the Medicaid program, because of the way it was structured, provides strong incentives for the states to move patients out of state mental hospitals. As Levine (1981: 69) observes:

> *Medicaid has helped to empty the state hospitals, especially for the elderly, although they still constitute some 30% of the public mental hospital patients (Task Panel on Costs and Financing, 1978). Medicaid funds were used to move elderly mental patients from state hospitals where the state paid the full cost, to cheaper nursing homes, where costs are shared with the federal government. Between restrictive admissions practices and wholesale discharges to nursing homes, it is now true that more mental patients reside in nursing homes than in public mental hospitals.*

The Supplemental Security Income Program did still more to move people from state hospitals to other types of institutional settings, creating an even greater illusion

of "deinstitutionalization." This program was important primarily because it could support placements in halfway houses and board and care homes for clients who were not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. Levine observed that these funds were often used to support the elderly and the disabled in residences that could not meet federal standards as Medicare-reimbursable facilities. States were motivated to move people to these facilities simply because it was cheaper to let the federal government pay to maintain patients in these settings than it was to hospitalize them in state-supported facilities. As a consequence, single-room occupancy hotels and board and care homes where the owners or proprietors had no responsibility to provide service, but which could be paid through Supplemental Security Income payments, became the new "community-based" homes for the disabled (Scull, 1981). In addition, both the Medicare and Medicaid programs together now constitute the largest mental health program in the country (Kiesler, 1982). These and the SSI program created profit-making industries to care for those who had once been institutionalized in state mental hospitals. However, the care of clients in board and care homes and SRO hotels was essentially unregulated and therefore offered fewer safeguards against abuse and neglect.

Funding Determines Treatment

In sum, these three major federal programs fueled the massive movement of patients from the state hospitals. They shifted the economic burden of care from the states to the federal government by providing federal incentives in the form of the medical insurance and welfare programs just described. In addition, because of the way the provisions of Medicare and Medicaid were structured, they provided incentives for inappropriate care designed for brief, acute inpatient stays when chronic long-term care in less medically intensive settings would have been more appropriate. As Kiesler (1982) observed, the program led hospitals to *treat what was fundable* rather than what was appropriate. The net result of this federal support system was to create essentially unregulated profit-making nursing home and real estate industries to care for the psychologically disabled. And since any money nursing homes could save in the provision of care could be treated as profit, in a number of cases there were genuine incentives for neglect built into the system (Scull, 1981).

Consequences: Realignment of Political and Economic Forces

It should be clear by now that the original goals of the Community Mental Health Centers Act, with the exception of President Kennedy's hope for reducing the population of the state mental hospitals by 50 percent, were unmet. Indeed, the deinstitutionalization movement actually consisted of a shifting of the psychologically disabled population from state mental hospitals to other, less expensive facilities where the care provided was nonexistent (as in the case of many single-room occupancy hotels) or substandard (as in the case of many nursing home facilities) or inappropriate (as was the case for acute care hospitals that intermittently served a population in need of continuous care).

Having said that, let us ask about how the actors in this drama came to be realigned at the end of the 1970s. First, the tension between the state and the federal government concerning the responsibility for caring for disabled populations re-

mains, but the locus of care has shifted, and, as we observed, the state has succeeded in shifting much of the responsibility and expense of institutional care to the federal government.

Both public and private psychiatric hospitals have begun to shift their patterns of care so that they are maximally consistent with the provisions for medical reimbursement. Thus, a revolving door has been established where clients are cared for in hospital settings only as long as reimbursement is possible. They are then discharged into the community until they are again eligible for either public or private third-party reimbursements.

State legislators find themselves responding to multiple pressure groups. Neighborhood associations and community groups are pressing for legislation to bar homes for deinstitutionalized mental patients from being placed in their communities. Professional groups continue to lobby for licensure and insurance regulations from which they will benefit (Danish and Smyer, 1981; Reppucci, 1980). Communities have largely come to reject the idea of community integration of ex-mental patients (Denner and Price, 1973), and the courts, which once were eager to protect the rights of mental patients, are now beginning to recognize the rights of community groups that are objecting to community-based care facilities in their neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the structure of insurance payments has created an industry of nursing homes and board and care facilities and single-room occupancy hotels that are, as Scull (1981) has described them, "structured to reward neglect."

Thus far we have examined the ways in which the allocation of resources through insurance, primarily from the federal government, has shifted the pattern of care and produced realignments among the various interest groups and actors in this drama—but what about the patients themselves? They too are actors, frequently powerless ones, in this contest for resources. Let us now examine two broad issues, the quality of care provided to dependent populations and the protection of their rights.

Consequences: The Dilemmas of Community Care for the Psychologically Disabled

While the poor care and dehumanizing qualities of many state mental hospitals have been amply documented, there remains the question of whether or not nonhospital community-based alternatives have proven more effective or more humane. Dellario and Anthony (1981) have reviewed the literature on client outcome of institutional versus alternative placements and report that no clear-cut conclusions about the long-term superiority of one type of placement over the other can be drawn. They suggest that following the termination of active treatment, any initial differences in the effectiveness of rehabilitation in alternative or inpatient settings soon disappear and that it is perhaps less important where services are delivered than how they are delivered. They also argue that effective rehabilitative programs should focus on issues of client skill gain, the benefits to the client and society, the quality of life of the client, and client satisfaction with services.

The results surveyed by Dellario and Anthony (1981) should not be taken to indicate that alternative care programs in the community are ineffective. Indeed, as long as such programs are carefully conceived and monitored, they tend to yield positive results. Thus, while neither inpatient nor community-based programs produce results that transform the disabilities and life circumstances of severely disturbed individuals permanently, as long as these individuals remain in an alternative commu-

nity-based program significant help and social support can be provided. This suggests that continued support for such programs is critical. Furthermore, a second generation of studies of community care for chronic patients (Pepper and Ryglewicz, 1982) is beginning to examine and appreciate the unique dilemmas of this new type of psychiatric patient and is developing programs that are more responsive to their needs. These new programs represent promising departure, but there are still ethical and practical dilemmas that face practitioners charged with the care of the psychologically disabled. We will explore some of these dilemmas later in our discussion.

What is the current reality of the experience of being a mental patient in a model community-based rehabilitation program? Estroff (1981) has provided a vivid and compelling account of the life of psychiatric patients who have been "deinstitutionalized" and who are living in and participating in a community-based treatment program. In her fascinating account, Estroff points out that some of the key aspects of the community-based rehabilitation program involve dilemmas for patients that are extremely difficult to overcome. In particular, she focuses on three issues: the administration of psychotropic drugs, the role of work in the life of the deinstitutionalized patient, and the role of income maintenance payments.

Medication

Estroff notes that medication plays an important role in controlling the symptoms of patients. But medication also produces side effects, including tardive diskinesia, rigid muscles, and a shuffling gait. These side effects also send the message to others that the person is either taking drugs or is in fact a psychiatric patient. Thus, medications have the paradoxical effect of controlling some of the symptoms of severe psychological disorder while at the same time revealing the person's "identity defect" to others. As Estroff observes,

> *perhaps closer examination of the medications issue will more distinctly underline the paradoxes. For our group, taking meds almost always meant developing visible side effects. The shakes, stiffness, blank expression, gait, leg jiggling, eye rolling and facial grimacing were physical markers to others and were badges of patienthood to themselves [1981: 110].*

Estroff also observes that being told by a physician that you must spend the rest of your life on drugs conveys the message that you are "incurable" and further reinforces the patient's identity as someone who is helpless and crazy. Thus, while psychoactive drugs do control symptoms to some degree, faithfully taking medications both communicates a message to patients that they are helpless and crazy and reinforces visible side effects which communicate that message to the outside world.

Work

The issue of work is also a critical one for community-based programs and has its own paradoxes and dilemmas. The ability to hold down a job is frequently equated with psychological stability and adjustment and is a major source of identity in our culture. However, many deinstitutionalized patients are placed in "sheltered workshop settings" with little explanation for their placement. The message they frequently got, according to Estroff, was that they were not capable of any work except sheltered workshop employment, and this conveyed to them the increased feeling of inadequacy and inability to work.

Though I saw little overt evidence, a subtle discrimination was practiced by the community at large. Volunteer job co-workers either patronized clients, underscoring their deficits and need for special attention, or they avoided honest communication altogether. Some employers simply would not hire clients when they saw the poor work history, or when they saw the person as a poor employment risk. Still others reluctantly offered clients a chance at menial work, firing them if another choice presented itself, or if the client's anxiety or bizarreness became apparent [Estroff, 1981: 147].

Income Maintenance as "Gentle Entrapment"

Finally, the issue of income maintenance for clients in the community presents still other dilemmas and problems. Income maintenance such as Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income allow patients to live outside state hospital settings. However, at the same time, these programs tend to reward the demonstration of personal inadequacy and to require that people act disabled in order to receive the income maintenance funds. Thus, disability is rewarded while, at the same time, being negatively valued by society. Estroff points out that while income maintenance payments allow patients to live outside the hospital and often make them eligible for various health care and psychological treatment services, they also offer major disincentives for work. Ozawa and Lindsey (1977) express similar concern for what they believe to be the "gentle entrapment" of deinstitutionalized clients by economic incentives to remain disabled.

The Protection of Patient Rights

We should recall that some of the initial impetus for deinstitutionalization and for community-based treatment came from legal advocates who were concerned about the patient's right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, and other coersive practices which frequently were associated with involuntary hospitalization. What can we say about the rights of patients after nearly 20 years of attempted mental health reform?

In a recent and penetrating essay, Scull discussed this question in detail. He begins by making a distinction advanced by Monahan (forthcoming) that contrasts "negative rights," which include various guarantees against state interference with individual decision making, and various individual rights against the state's power to coerce people. The right to refuse treatment would be one such example. On the other hand, Monahan (forthcoming) and Scull (1981) describe "positive rights" as those that involve a guarantee to provide resources for people who would benefit from them. Scull assesses the balance of negative and positive rights secured for severely disturbed patients over the last 20 years and comes to the following conclusion:

Though there may be opposition from mental health professionals whose discretionary power and authority is threatened by restrictions on the availability of treatment and/or by the grant of the "right" to refuse treatment, securing negative rights is, on the whole, relatively painless, of utmost importance, it is financially advantageous to state governments. *This is, in part, because neglect is cheaper than care, even the minimal levels of care traditionally provided in our state mental hospitals. . . . Positive rights, by contrast, are by definition costly, involving the transfer of resources to those who are less able or are less fortunate* [*1981: 12-13, emphasis added*].

This observation has been echoed by Rappaport (1981), who observes that providing patients and other dependent populations with rights while ignoring their needs is an emerging trend in our society.

Miller (1982) has drawn similar conclusions about the concept of "least restrictive alternative." This idea, which suggests that patients should have the right to be treated in situations that do the least possible violence to their freedom and privacy, was developed in a series of court cases (Lake v. Cameron, 1966; Lessard v. Schmidt, 1972; Wyatt v. Stickney, 1971). But Miller (1982: 49) argues,

> *Many state governments are choosing to divest themselves of these responsibilities rather than to accept the burdens associated with them; invoking the LRA is a face-saving device to avoid blame for the criticisms from advocates for treatment of the mentally disabled.*

What are we to conclude about the relationship between psychologically disabled and dependent individuals and the institutions that are supposed to serve them, after 20 years of attempted mental health reform? We have seen that political coalitions that emerged to develop President Kennedy's "bold new approach" to mental health reform in combination with a new drug treatment technology and a civil rights movement concerned about the protection of the rights of mental patients generated important forces for change. But these forces were subverted in many ways by changing patterns of economic support for the care of the psychologically disabled. As the states found ways to shift the financial burden for care to the federal government in the form of medical insurance and welfare, a policy of neglect and exploitation rather than community care evolved. Medical, nursing home, and real estate industries flourished, but for the psychologically disabled, neglect appeared to be the price of freedom in the community.

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVISION OF OUTPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE

The organization and availability of outpatient mental health care has also undergone a series of important changes as a result of shifting patterns of resources. After World War II the federal government began to respond to the public and professional groups that had expressed concern about the treatment of the psychologically distressed. Not only had public awareness of the widespread character of emotional disturbance grown (Levine, 1981), but the belief that the federal government should address such problems increased political pressure for federal control. In addition, there was an emerging faith in the federal government's ability to solve problems of equity and access to treatment (Sundquist, 1968).

But what was the nature of the political situation? We will look primarily to Washington to assess the politics of mental health at that time. Those political events have led to our current system of public provision of local outpatient services where federal, state, and local governments contend for control of resources for outpatient care, and where private interests play an increasingly important role in decision making.

Public Health Service Clinics

During the 1950s there was a substantial increase in public concern for children and adults experiencing distress. The U.S. Public Health Service had responsibility for "grants to the states to support community mental health services and to prevent and reduce the need for hospitalization" (Buck, 1982). The number of outpatient

clinics rose quickly, and the state agencies responsible for administering them were often quite different from the departments controlling the mental hospitals, thus keeping outpatient services relatively separate.

The views of public health authorities stressed prevention and a population-oriented approach to problems rather than an individual psychotherapeutic one. This was the leading edge of a viewpoint to emerge in the 1960s, when politicians began to focus on social causes of individual problems and a mandate emerged for the federal government to address those social causes. Thus, the public health service clinics of the 1950s saw their mission as responding to populations of distressed children and adults early in the course of disturbance and to reduce the need for long-term care.

Joint Commission

In 1955 Congress created the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, which spent the next five years studying the mental health service delivery system and making recommendations. The commission was staffed primarily with psychiatrists who were most familiar with the medical orientation to psychological distress and who favored individual psychotherapy as the treatment of choice. As Snow and Newton (1976: 586) observe, "membership of the Commission created a strong bias in the direction of an individualistic point of view, a clinical treatment frame of reference, and ultimately a recommendation that psychiatry enlarge itself."

The recommendations of the Joint Commission emphasized access to individual treatment for the psychologically disturbed, placed little significance on social factors as potential causes of disturbance, and paid scant attention to prevention or early intervention. Still, the efforts and scrutiny of the Joint Commission made mental health problems a legitimate topic for federal concern, and its efforts laid the groundwork for the major new policy thrust provided by President Kennedy in 1963.

Kennedy and the Community Mental Health Center Legislation

Drawing on the rhetoric of the Joint Commission, in February 1963 President Kennedy formally stated his policy aims of providing comprehensive community-based care for citizens experiencing psychological distress. But breaking with both the Joint Commission and with the public health service authorities, Kennedy made clear the federal intention to ignore the existing system of publicly provided outpatient care and to set up a whole new system of community mental health centers. Planners at the National Institute of Mental Health enthusiastically sought to implement this system after Congress gave legislative direction and approval (Snow and Newton, 1976).

The rhetoric and goals of the three groups we have examined found some expression in this reform movement: The public health group succeeded in promoting the idea, if not always the fact of community health, emphasizing prevention efforts at a population rather than an individual level; the Joint Commission succeeded in increasing amounts of individual clinical services available to the public; and the National Institute of Mental Health program planners were able to bypass the much-discredited state mental hospital systems in favor of a new, broader federal system with direct ties to local communities.

In addition, the broad thrust of the reform movement embodied in the Commu-

nity Mental Health Centers Act emphasized the idea that environmental conditions were related to psychological disturbance. Thus, the community mental health center approach fit well into the era of broad social change, later known as the Great Society Programs, which emphasized the relationship between social inequities and individual well-being (Sundquist, 1968).

Once the political stage was set for the federal government to support community-based outpatient care and legislation was passed to finance those objectives, mental health planners at the National Institute of Mental Health began to implement the new policy. They shared the President's reluctance to become embroiled in the states' mental health departments and dealt directly with local communities in planning and constructing the new centers. Providing comprehensive service delivery at the community level proved difficult. Taking the broad view of social environmental causation for mental illness and seeing needs in many service arenas in addition to mental health, the federal government had tried to provide numerous programs in housing, welfare, health, and other areas. Only later did it discover that its lack of service coordination at the federal level actually compounded the fragmentation of the local service community (Levine, 1981).

Even so, the Community Mental Health Centers program has been implemented. NIMH helps fund 744 fully operational CMHCs in all 50 states. "In 1979 an estimated 2.4 million people received services at CMHCs" and "more than 54 percent of patients seen in centers have an average income of less than $5,000" (U.S. Senate, 1980: 32). We now turn our attention to the impact of that system on those seeking outpatient professional care for psychological distress. Because the community mental health movement was particularly concerned with questions of equity and availability of service, we will concern ourselves primarily with those questions and briefly examine emerging technologies of outpatient care.

Insurance Coverage for Mental Health Services

During the 1960s growing awareness of social problems in the United States and concern over the lack of insurance coverage for physical and psychological problems brought about a broadening in both private and public health insurance programs. Psychiatric benefits began to be included in insurance coverage (Follman, 1970).

Medicare, passed in 1965, provided some psychiatric benefits to the elderly, though this program was designed primarily for health care, by health care experts. Medicaid, designed by planners in the welfare system, significantly assisted the poor in paying for mental health services. These public programs and the private health insurance coverage of mental health benefits together constituted an important increase in resources used to provide outpatient psychiatric services.

Since this change in the resource base for mental health developed in the health care and welfare systems rather than the mental health system, the resulting policies bore the stamp of their origins. One consequence of the change has been the imposition of a health care model on mental health care delivery. As Mechanic (1980: 139) observed, "the typical approach, as in the general medical area, has been to define as legitimate illnesses whatever conditions are treated by the designated experts—most usually psychiatrists."

There have been substantial problems in the structure of the mental health delivery system that have resulted from the fact that its financing has been determined largely by policy makers concerned with health and welfare issues. Nonetheless, it is clear that private and public funds provided through insurance reimbursements have

been partly responsible for the vast increase in the use of outpatient mental health services seen over the last 20 years.

SHIFTS IN THE AVAILABILITY OF CARE PATTERNS OF HELP SEEKING OVER TWO DECADES

Has the community mental health movement and other subsidies for mental health services made a difference in the availability of outpatient care, particularly for the poor? In attempting to assess the impact of the community mental health movement over the past two decades, we should recognize that changes in the pattern of help-seeking and service use among all sectors of society are due to a complex combination of variables. They include changes in public attitudes, class and subcultural differences in orientation to personal problems, the appropriateness of available care, as well as changes in actual service availability. To put it simply, increasing the availability of professional services for mental health problems will not automatically increase their use. Whether the availability of services actually does increase use will depend on how various sectors of the population define their problems, whether they see them as mental health problems, and, if they do, whether they choose to seek professional help.

Both the complexity of the help-seeking process and the complexity of community mental health legislation and service provision make the task of evaluating the impact of that policy shift formidable. We are seldom able to assess the impact of a major effort in legislation such as the Community Mental Health Centers Act as well as concomitant shifts in public attitudes toward the use of professional help. However, Veroff and his colleagues (Veroff, Douvan, and Kulka, 1981; Veroff, Kulka, and Douvan, 1981) have recently published the results of a comprehensive national survey of Americans' mental health, conducted in 1976, that provides some relevant evidence. The survey repeated a 1957 survey (Gurin et al., 1960) that was influential in stimulating the Community Mental Health Centers Act in 1963.

The survey is unique not only because it assesses the current patterns of service use for mental health problems but also because it can assess change in the patterns of help-seeking from 1957 to 1976, a most critical period, spanning the Kennedy/Johnson Great Society era. The two-volume study consists of a detailed examination of changes in Americans' views of their own mental health and their attitudes toward work, family roles, and other issues (Veroff, Douvan, and Kulka, 1981). The second volume (Veroff, Kulka, and Douvan, 1981) provides a detailed account of the patterns of seeking both informal and professional help as they vary among different social classes, racial and religious groups, educational levels, geographical regions, and rural/urban contexts.

Social Class Differences

In an earlier report of these survey results, Kulka et al. (1979) observed that the use of medical care has been highly sensitive to various social change phenomena. They suggested that the use of mental health care may also be sensitive to social change efforts to increase availability of mental health service for people in the lower socioeconomic strata. In their 1979 report, these investigators addressed the question of changes in the patterns of professional help-seeking across different social class levels from 1957 to 1976. In studying patterns of help-seeking, they conceptual-

ized the help-seeking process as a three-step decision process. They argued that (1) a personal problem must be defined by the help seeker as a mental health problem that is relevant for professional help, (2) the individual must then make the decision to actually seek help, and (3) he or she must select a particular type of help source among the range of professionals potentially available.

First, considering the United States' population as a whole, Kulka et al. (1979) reported that members of the American adult population in 1976 were more likely than their counterparts in 1957 to define personal problems in psychological or mental health terms, and they were more likely to have sought professional help for their problems. Furthermore, while the use of professional help has increased across different types of professional help (clergymen, doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, marriage counselors, social service agency personnel, and lawyers), the increase is most striking for mental health professionals.

Kulka et al. (1979: 11) used both education and income as indicators of social class differences in examining the relationship between class and help-seeking for the 1957 and 1976 surveys. In examining education, they found that highly educated people during both time periods were more likely than less educated adults to define personal problems as relevant for professional help, and in particular were more likely to have consulted a psychiatrist or psychologist. Nevertheless, they observed:

> *The relationship between education and use of help is significantly weaker now than 20 years ago. And, among those who had defined a problem in mental health terms, less educated adults in1976 were just as likely as highly educated respondents to have actually sought professional help. This is a distinct change from 1957 when even within this restricted group of respondents the relationship between education and health use of help was clear.*

When they examined the relationship between family income and professional help-seeking across the two time periods, the investigators observed that some of the gaps between low- and high-income respondents they found in1957 had either been narrowed or eliminated in the subsequent two decades.

> *Although in 1976 wealthier respondents are still more likely than poorer ones to consult a psychiatrist or psychologist for help with their personal problems, our findings indicate a significant narrowing of the gap between high and low income people in the use of professionals [Kulka et al., 1979: 11].*

Influences on the Decision to Seek Help

In attempting to understand the factors that lead different socioeconomic groups to seek professional help for psychological problems, Veroff and his colleagues distinguished between two types of influences on the decision to seek help. The first set of influences are "psychological"; the personal orientations and motivational factors that lead a person to be receptive to the idea of going for help. The second set of influences are "facilitating" factors that include the availability of resources in the community, a person's knowledge about the availability of those resoruces, and whether going for such help is perceived as acceptable in a particular social group. Furthermore, they argue that psychological factors are more likely to be important early in the help-seeking process, whereas facilitating factors, including service availability, are likely to be of more importance later in the process. They observe that the

changes in the relationship between social class and readiness for self-referral over the two decades appears to be a reflection of changes in facilitating rather than psychological factors.

> *One cannot, of course, directly attribute any of the changes observed here to variation in any particular facilitating factor or to the influence of specific programs. Nevertheless, as a result of government support for mental health services, manpower training, research, and education these past twenty years have witnessed substantial changes in mental health care typified perhaps by the federally funded comprehensive community mental health centers program. To the extent that these efforts increase the availability of mental health services to the underprivileged have succeeded (Rosen, 1977), the reduction of social class differences in utilization reported here would be generally expected.*

Emerging Technologies of Outpatient Care

While the research by Veroff and his colleagues gives us reason to believe that a broader spectrum of the U.S. population has been reached by outpatient mental health care, we will have to look elsewhere for evidence of the effectiveness of those services. Several important studies have recently been published that lead us to be optimistic about the effectiveness of some outpatient mental health service technologies.

We now have some evidence, at least in the aggregate, that a wide range of outpatient treatment techniques are effective. Smith and Glass (1977) have reviewed some 375 studies of the effectiveness of individual psychotherapy. They found that the average client receiving psychotherapy was better off than 75 percent of the untreated members of control groups in the studies. Smith and Glass also found behavioral and nonbehavioral therapies to be roughly equivalent in their effectiveness. Such positive evidence should encourage those concerned about effective treatment as well as professional groups that deliver psychotherapeutic services and compete for a share of funding.

Another advance with some evidence of success in the outpatient care area is the development of crisis intervention and other forms of early intervention. Delaney et al. (1978) have shown that these services can reduce the need for inpatient care. Emergency mental health services hold the promise of preventing the debilitating effects of institutionalization and therefore deserve serious attention.

Still another question that has been addressed by treatment research has to do with whether less expensive paraprofessional care can be substituted for more expensive professional outpatient care. Reviewing 42 evaluations of paraprofessional services, Durlak (1979: 89) compared the effectiveness of professionals and paraprofessionals and found that

> *the clinical outcomes paraprofessionals achieve are equal to or significantly better than those obtained by professionals. The strongest support for paraprofessionals has come from programs directed at the modification of adults' and college students' specific target problems, and, to a lesser extent, from group and individual therapy programs for non-middle-class adults.*

However, Nietzel and Fisher (1981) have questioned Durlak's conclusions on both methodological and logical grounds. Even taking these criticisms into account, how-

ever, there is little evidence to demonstrate that professionals are more effective than nonprofessionals for most treatment tasks.

This body of research and criticism raises questions about the value of advanced clinical training for certain treatment purposes. The economic and political questions raised by these findings are equally compelling. Professional groups who have long been used to being in a position to claim the exclusive capacity to deliver effective services can be expected to feel challenged by evidence of effective lower-cost services supplied by a potentially larger group of paraprofessionals. However, it must also be noted that none of these technological steps forward has had the kind of impact on policy that kidney dialysis, for example, has had. We do not hear congressmen calling for the latest psychotherapeutic advance to be provided in their congressional districts.

Consultation and Education Services

Still another emerging technology developed in the context of community mental health services has been that of consultation and education services (D'Augelli, 1982; Ketterer, 1981). In describing their development in the 1960s and 1970s, Price and Lynn: (1981: 9, 10) observed:

> *New roles for mental health professionals were beginning to emerge along with new ideas about who was a legitimate client of a community mental health center. Rather than thinking of clients only in terms of people experiencing acute clinical distress, pioneers in the community mental health movement began to see the possibility of giving mental health skills and expertise to other community caregivers who were already engaged in working with various populations. These community caregivers included the police, teachers, the clergy and still others who had only recently been recognized as important sources of help to various community populations. The key insight for many was that it was possible to produce a "multiplier effect" in which the insights and support from a relatively small number of mental health professionals working with other community caregivers could ultimately radiate to much larger populations of people who were in direct daily contact with those caregivers.*

While both Ketterer (1981) and D'Augelli (1982) amply document the promising nature of consultation and education programs as a preventive strategy and one that could enlarge the influence of mental health practitioners on the quality of life in the community, D'Augelli notes that ambiguity about the goals of these services and their place in the organization of mental health care remains.

Perhaps the most important single threat to the continuation of consultation and education services in the community is not a lack of appropriate technology or a recognition of the value of such services, but the changing picture of resources available to support mental health services. Because consultation and education services are "indirect" and serve entire populations rather than individuals, the shift to third-party reimbursements as a payment mechanism for services and the erosion of federal funds to support community mental health place consultation and education services in jeopardy (D'Augelli, forthcoming).

Thus, while there have been some very promising advances in the development of treatment technologies and in the evaluation of their effectiveness, we believe their impact on the organization and availability of care is small compared to the impact of funding and regulatory decisions by government, the insurance industry, and various professional mental health groups. It is to these groups and their current alignment that we now turn.

INTEREST GROUPS AND THE OUTPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH MARKET

When policy is being developed, interest groups align themselves to affect the rules that will determine the allocation of resources in that policy arena. We now turn our attention to the interest groups concerned with the delivery of outpatient mental health care. The values espoused by the various groups often seem similar, since the negotiation for resources is generally in terms of clients' welfare. But as we look behind the words, we may see the interests of the groups dominating their stance. An example already discussed was the concern of the members of the 1955 Joint Commission about the shortage of treatment personnel. Their proposed solution was to expand the number of psychiatrists available to deliver individual psychotherapy, rather than to expand the role of nonmedical treatment personnel to deliver outpatient services (Snow and Newton, 1976).

We will suggest that the context in which interest groups interact can be thought of as a marketplace where exchange of services for resources are made. McGuire (1980: 189) presents this definition of a market which is relevant to our discussion of the system of delivery of outpatient mental health services:

> *A market is a place where people make exchanges of, for example, money for services. An institution that provides services can be called for some purposes a market when each of the two parties [who are making the exchange] has meaningful choice about at least one of the decisions: (1) to enter the market at all, (2) if so, with whom to work or seek service, or (3) the amount of service to be given or received.*

Some of the interest groups are suppliers of services while others are purchasers (consumers) of services, either directly as clients or indirectly as third-party reimbursement agents (insurers). Some of the interest groups are competing for the right to deliver services, while others are concerned with direct financial rewards. The product being delivered in this marketplace varies widely, with different types of professionals delivering different kinds of service—all within the outpatient mental health system.

In what follows, we will examine how the interest groups interact, describing the delivery system as a service industry characterized by imperfect market conditions with both economic and noneconomic consequences for the quality and availability of care.

The Mental Health Professions

When mental health care was delivered primarily in hospital or clinic settings, psychiatrists had primary control over resource allocation and decisions regarding who should deliver care. With the advent of community-based care, other professions have been increasingly recognized as appropriate to provide outpatient service, including psychologists, social workers, and paraprofessionals. These new professions have claimed legitimacy as providers of outpatient care and the right to insurance reimbursement for their services. These claims, understandably enough, have set off a new round of counterclaims regarding each group's appropriateness as providers of outpatient care.

A concept that helps us understand the claims and counterclaims of various pro-

fessional groups is that of "substitutability" (McGuire, 1980). If one type of service or provider can be substituted for another without loss of quality of care and is also less expensive, a claim for substitutability can be made and the market can operate freely.

Professionals who already have substantial control over how resources are allocated for outpatient care and wish to maintain that control, such as psychiatrists, are likely to argue that other services cannot be substituted for their own and will cite unique aspects of their professional expertise, such as the ability to prescribe drugs, as evidence of their special role. Other groups, such as psychologists and social workers, may offer evidence of the equal effectiveness of treatment methods in which they are experts as grounds for establishing legitimacy as providers. For example, recent research on the effectiveness of psychotherapy (Smith and Glass, 1977) could bolster such claims. In a similar vein, research documenting the treatment effectiveness of paraprofessionals (Durlack, 1979) as being at least equivalent to that of established professional groups argues for substitutability at lower cost.

When claims of uniqueness or greater effectiveness fail, some professional groups may move to restrict the marketplace of providers through licensing and accreditation (Buck and Hirschman, 1980). A number of reviewers of this field (Benham, 1978; Friedman, 1962; Koocher, 1977) have concluded that little evidence exists to demonstrate that licensure assures consumer protection, as is often claimed, but the effect in restricting the market providers and controlling the allocation of financial resources is undeniable.

In short, the various mental health professions appear to be engaged in a number of strategies to control market forces in outpatient mental health care in ways that favor the allocation of resources to their own particular group. A "free market" approach does not appear to be the goal.

McGuire (1980:241), in an insightful discussion of regulation and professional substitutability, concluded that "it is clear that the 'natural' forces of supply and demand would continue to move us in the direction of replacement of groups [of professionals] at the top of the occupational hierarchy by those below." He believes that such "competition among therapists and institutions with different ideas about how mental problems should be treated is part of what should happen in the markets for psychotherapy" (1980:243), and he is convinced we give up little in terms of quality of care for individuals if we loosen the regulation strictures that restrict such competition.

Community Mental Health Centers

It may be that the creation of new programs automatically creates new constituencies. Those 70,000 people (U.S. Senate, 1980:25) employed by the federally funded community mental health centers represent another such constituency. During hearings before Congress on the 1980 Mental Health Act (U.S. Senate, 1979), the director of the National Council of Community Mental Health Centers argued for a continued strong federal role in the running of the centers. This group and others expressed the quite realistic fear that with more control at the state level, funds might be diverted from community-based care for those experiencing psychological distress to other programs and priorities. It appears that those who work in community mental health centers, believing the federal government to be more committed to broad availability of outpatient care than the states, wish to influence decisions about the federal-state balance of responsibility.

The States

The rise of federally funded community mental health centers shifted some of the responsibility for outpatient care away from the states. However, as federal support has declined, the states have taken up this responsibility with varying degrees of commitment. In many cases, differing local priorities, shrinking budgets, or both have meant that the states have not supported outpatient care with much vigor.

The states now play an important role on the supply side of the marketplace in licensing and regulating the providers of service. Arguing that state governments must protect consumers, the states, with the consultation of various professional groups, set criteria for licensure and thereby restrict the type and amount of service available. When supply is artificially suppressed, cost will probably increase and quality may suffer.

The states also decide reimbursement policy for the insurance industry in their jurisdictions. Either the regulations in each state can encourage diversity of reimbursable treatment modes, and therefore encourage providers of service with a variety of orientations and backgrounds, or the policies can inhibit innovation. The economic impact of the states' decision making in licensure and in regulation of insurance can have a powerful influence on the outpatient mental health delivery system. Of course, the interest groups of insurers and professional groups may influence legislators at the state level and can determine the level and quality of service available to outpatient consumers.

We may wonder how the states will respond to the current stance of the federal administration that wishes to put more decision-making power back into the hands of the states. The current administration's new federalism may seriously reduce the progress already made in increasing the availability of services.

Federal Insurers

The federal groups that monitor and design public insurance plans such as Medicaid and Medicare constitute another interest group in the mental health system. They set regulatory policy that has a major impact on the delivery of mental health services to clients, though they are not themselves delivering the service. In times of budgetary retrenchment, the implementers of medical coverage for the poor are pressed to reduce benefit levels and still attempt to maintain service. At the same time, they are struggling to maintain their decision-making power to determine allocation rules that will maintain the size of their programs even at the possible expense of other programs (Niskanen, 1973).

Paradoxically, the impact of the federal insurers' subsidy of inpatient care has subverted the goal of comprehensive outpatient care through the community mental health centers. Kiesler (1982:350) notes,

> *The national de jure policy of outpatient care, the main original goal of the community mental health centers system, is undercut by a national de facto policy of inpatient care in allocation of funds through the medicaid system. The total funds spent for mental health services through Medicaid exceeds 4 billion, over half of which goes to nursing homes for mental patients. Quite unintentionally, Medicaid has become the largest single mental health program in the country.*

Because of financial incentives provided by Medicare to hospitalize patients, even when outpatient care would have been more appropriate, federal insurers have dramatically affected the marketplace for outpatient care. When reimbursement for inpatient services is readily available, incentives to develop and offer outpatient services, even when they might be more appropriate, are markedly reduced.

Private Insurers

As we suggested earlier, private insurers also are now participating in the outpatient mental health care market. Private insurers work through the demand side of the market. That is, they subsidize the purchase of psychological treatment for those insured. Obviously, decisions about what services are to be covered and to what degree the cost will be subsidized will have an important affect on the availability of services and what types are offered.

Three issues are important in considering the interests of this group and the ways in which those interests will affect the quality and availability of outpatient care. First, insurers are concerned with overuse of outpatient care and the "moral hazard" of consumers deciding to seek such care at reduced cost when it may not be warranted (Buck, 1980). Decisions about the need for such difficult-to-define services as psychotherapy and the types of problems for which they are appropriate are filled with ambiguity and uncertainty. Insurance costs are difficult for private insurers to predict in such circumstances. The solution for the private insurers has been to limit the amount of coverage for such services, to require co-payments for service (thus insuring coverage of only a portion of the service), and to limit the definition of who can provide such services. It is this last strategy that promotes interprofessional competition.

A second issue for private insurers has to do with who is entitled to reimbursement for delivery of services. The most common practice has been to consider mental health services as part of health care and therefore to limit reimbursement to physicians. One effect of this decision is to encourage expensive inpatient care when outpatient care would be as appropriate (Kiesler, 1982). Another is to restrict the use of nonmedical caregivers whose service may be as satisfactory and effective, and less costly.

Finally, private insurers most often provide coverage through employers for their employees. Thus, people who have not worked long enough in one place to be covered are not likely to receive coverage (Mechanic, 1980). Thus women employed in the home and the youngest portion of the population and others are not likely to covered by private insurance. Private insurers focus their attention on groups with the most resources of their own and those whose disabilities are likely to be least severe.

An Imperfect Market

For analytical convenience, economists often construct models of marketplace behavior as if they were considering a "perfect market." In such a market, consumers have perfect knowledge of the choices available to them, suppliers are in free open competition, and supply and demand determine the price, quality, and availability of goods or services.

In a perfect market the consumer is empowered by his or her ability to choose whether or not to enter the market at all, (2) with whom to engage in exchanges, and

(3) the amount and type of goods or services that will be exchanged. This perspective is consistent with our earlier theoretical discussion of the relationship between power and dependency in the mental health arena. There, we argued that an actor (consumer) is dependent on another actor (provider of service) if a required resource (service) can be obtained only from that provider. Conversely, the consumer has power (in relation to the provider) to the degree that he or she can choose among a number of alternative services.

With this proposition in mind, recall some of the ways in which outpatient mental health care is organized that makes it depart from a market where consumer choice and power is maximized. Professional groups have often specifically argued against substitutability of care and have erected licensure barriers to control the market in their favor. While federal and state subsidies to providers in the form of support for community mental health centers and insurance subsidies for consumers may increase the availability of some forms of care, they also carry with them restrictions on the choice of provider and amount of care provided. Further, private insurers also restrict consumer choice by specifying which services and which providers may be reimbursed. Thus, not only is the outpatient mental health market "imperfect"; it is also a market controlled not by the consumer but by the providers.

None of this may come as news to observers of the health care field. Indeed, some observers may even see as desirable the compromise consumers must make between greater choice of services and increased availability. But it is important to note that increases in the availability of outpatient services have been bought at the expense of reductions in consumer choice.

It is interesting to speculate on the options available to consumers in a provider-controlled market. The consumer could decide not to enter the market at all, concluding that outpatient mental health services as they are currently delivered are either too expensive or do not meet his or her needs. A second option open to the consumer would be to search for alternative sources of care, where the consumer may have a choice of the amount and type of service to be obtained as well as the terms of exchange. One interesting possibility in this regard is self-help groups (Gartner and Riessman, 1976; Hurvitz, 1974; Liberman et al., 1979); no monetary exchange occurs between service provider and either the consumer of care or any third party. There is evidence that such self-help groups are growing rapidly and may soon become an important component in the outpatient mental health market (Sidel and Sidel, 1976). Given the history we have just reviewed, however, one wonders if various professional provider groups will begin to find ways to enter this market as well.

FUTURE MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS AND SERVICE DILEMMAS

Thus far we have devoted our attention almost exclusively to recent history. We have reviewed the community mental health movement and related social changes that occurred over the last two decades in the United States. The interplay of political, economic, and professional forces at federal, state, and local levels has been our major concern, and we have observed that the outcome of contests among these forces has had much to do with the distribution, equity, and quality of care. But what does the future hold? We believe that at least two additional influences, one epidemiological and demographic and the other organizational, are likely to influence the future shape of mental health problems and services.

Mental Health Problems in the Year 2005

Kramer (1980) offered us a sobering perspective on the distribution of mental health and health problems two decades in the future. Taking an epidemiological approach to the problem, Kramer asked the following question: "Suppose the incidence and prevalence rates of specific mental disorders by age, sex and race will be the same in the year 2005 as they are in the year 1980. How many cases of mental disorders would we have in the year 2005? What would be the total (accrued) prevalence rates?"

Kramer then projected the number and distribution of different types of mental disorders and associated chronic diseases to the year 2005 based only on the assumption that we have been unable to lower the prevalence of these major disorders. He based his estimates on expected increases in the population, but not on changes in age, sex, and race distribution of the population or the incidence and prevalence rates of the mental disorders specific for those demographic factors. Thus, his estimates probably underestimate the actual future prevalence rates. His general finding is that crude prevalence rates for chronic health disorders will increase 20 percent by the year 2005. Furthermore, the increase for the white population should be approximately 18 percent and the increase in the accrued prevalence rate for the nonwhite population in the United States should be an enormous 39 percent.

What will account for these extremely large increases in the prevalence of chronic mental health problems and brain disorders in the next 25 years? Kramer first notes that part of the answer has been given by Gruenberg (1977) in his paper, "Failures of Success." Gruenberg argues cogently that recent advances in medical care have reduced the likelihood that chronic conditions would lead to early terminal infections. As Gruenberg points out,

> *the goal of medical research work is to "diminish disease and enrich life," but it produced tools which prolonged disease, diminished lives and so increased the proportion of people who have a disabling or chronic disease.*
>
> *That is a major but unintended effect of many technical improvements stemming from health research. These increasingly common chronic conditions represent the failures of success. Their growing prevalence and longer duration are a product of progress and health technology.*

There is a second force operating to increase these rates which is not taken directly into account in the estimates. There will be an increase in the number of people who we know to be at high risk for these chronic disorders. These are the elderly, the poor, and minority groups. Kramer reminds us that in the past the public health importance of disorder was judged by mortality; that is, by how many people died as a result of the disorder. But now we are living in a different demographic and technological world. We may now have to measure the importance of a disorder in terms of prevalence rates and the extent to which it is contributing to a rising chronic disease epidemic.

Integrating Health and Mental Health Services

If Kramer's projections for the year 2005 are anywhere near the mark, the implications for how services should be delivered in the future will require careful consideration. Clearly, we can expect that chronic health problems will coexist with chronic

mental health problems in a large proportion of the population. Furthermore, we know that most physical disabilities will also have psychological concomitants. Not only will individuals with chronic health disorders experience increased distress associated with disability and diminished freedom in their lives, but their families and other informal caretakers will be required to bear a portion of the burden of care along with formal services. This suggests that the pattern of services to be developed for future populations must be, in many ways, different from the system we have surveyed thus far.

Broskowski et al. (1981) examined the question of how health and mental health services may be linked in the future. Broskowski (1981) observed that since World War II there has been enormous fragmentation in programs and services in the United States. In addition, a number of factors have promoted increasing specialization in delivery of mental health services.

However, Broskowski observed that there are a number of reasons to expect increased coordination between the health care and the mental health care system in the future. These include the fact that health and mental health populations already overlap substantially in their use of services. Regier et al. (1978) estimated that nearly 54 percent of all people seen for diagnosed mental health problems are seen exclusively in the primary health care sector, whereas only 15 percent of all those seen with diagnosed mental health disorders are seen in the mental health sector. They believe that we currently have a de facto mental health services system in which the majority of persons with mental health problems are served in the primary health care sector.

In addition, a number of studies (Mumford et al., 1981) have estimated that savings may result if medical care utilization can be reduced by offering mental health services. While all the evidence is not yet in on this point, Broskowski and his colleagues make a strong case for considering attempts to integrate health and mental health services.

While the benefits of less service fragmentation and reduced costs are emphasized by those advocating service integration, the potential costs to the consumer must also be weighed in the equation. Mental health services delivered in a medical context may be less appropriate to the needs of some segments of the mental health consumer population. Buck (1982) argued cogently that numerous differences exist between the service settings, types of providers, and specific services needed by physical and mental health consumer groups. Failure to attend to these differences may result in less appropriate care in some cases and increased costs in others.

Power and Dependency in Mental Health Consumers

If Kramer (1980) and Broskowski and his colleagues (1981) are correct, the future of mental health will involve larger numbers of chronic health and mental health problems and mental health services that are increasingly intertwined with the medical care system. But what about the relationship between the client and provider of services?

At the outset of this chapter we argued that the relationship between client and service provider could be conceptualized as a set of exchange relations. Furthermore, we suggested that in the exchange of resources between clients and providers power and dependency in the relationship were controlled by the choices available to each party. Thus, a client may be dependent on a provider if the provider has sole possession of a needed resource or service. On the other hand, the client's power is increased if the client can obtain the needed resource or service elsewhere. Thus, it would appear that a key ingredient of mental health consumer empowerment is ac-

cess to a wide range of alternative providers and types of service. Conversely, mechanisms or policies that narrow the range of choices available to the consumer increase consumer dependence.

Seen in this light, a variety of professional practices, governmental decisions, and reimbursement policies take on new meaning (Buck and Hirschman, 1980). Professional prohibitions on the advertising of services, licensure laws that restrict service delivery to a narrow range of provider groups, and insurance rules that restrict the range of reimbursable services and providers are all policies that constrain consumer choice and therefore reduce consumer power in the exchange relationship with service providers.

Will this be the theme of the next two decades in mental health? Clearly, efforts to increase consumer choice are likely to be resisted by professional groups that wish to maintain control over the rules of exchange between clients and themselves. They will argue that mental health service consumers are not capable of choosing for themselves, that high-quality care is available only from certain professional groups, and so on. But to accept such arguments without testing the alternatives can only perpetuate professional dominance and consumer dependence in the decades ahead.

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19

Social Interventions with Older Adults

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Any consideration of social interventions with older adults is necessarily concerned with specific issues involving the provision of social services. These issues cannot be adequately understood, however, unless the multiple dimensions of the policy context that generate and shape them are also considered. First, theories regarding the aging process are important in shaping conceptions of the central problems to be addressed by social intervention and of the appropriate strategies to be employed in dealing with them. Second, the wider configuration of publicly supported strategies related to the needs of older adults (for example, income, health, housing, social) can itself affect and be affected by particular social intervention. Finally, the constraints and opportunities represented by the economic, political, and bureaucratic environment can have a significant impact on the design and implementation of intervention approaches.

The discussion to follow is organized around these three themes. First, we consider the various "constructions of reality" regarding the nature of the aging process and the problems it generates for older adults and for those responsible for developing public policy. The analysis will provide the *value* context in which social interventions with the elderly can be understood. Next, an overview of the range of public programs related to older adults is presented, establishing the *program* context in which issues related to social interventions may be assessed. Third, several economic, political, and bureaucratic conditions affecting programs for older adults will be analyzed, providing the *economic-political* context of social interventions. This will be followed by a consideration of implications for those concerned with the development of effective programs for older adults.

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

For more than three decades social research and theory in gerontology have given primary emphasis to the psychological and social psychological processes of aging, focusing largely on individuals and their adjustment and roles in old age (Dowd, 1980; Estes and Freeman, 1976). The emerging knowledge base has influenced both

societal perceptions of aging and the types of intervention that are deemed appropriate for older adults.

Theories of Aging

Central themes of American gerontology involve the individual and the aging process. Developmental theory is concerned with personality as the pivotal dimension in the aging process (Neugarten et al., 1964); role theory, including disengagement and activity theories, addresses the successful adaptation and social integration of the older adult (Cumming and Henry, 1961; Havighurst, 1963). Age stratification theory is concerned with the biological succession of generations, age strata, and their implications for the allocation of (and socialization to) societal roles and norms (Riley et al., 1972; Riley, 1976). All of these theories emphasize the individual, including those that are concerned with roles and norms.

Reflecting the dominant sociological paradigm of the 1940s-1960s (structural functionalism), furthermore, much of social gerontology has been concerned about aging insofar as it creates problems for the maintenance of the system. This system concern is reflected in the many studies of morale, life satisfaction, and adjustment of the aging. Additional emphasis on individual aging occurs in the biological and biomedical models of aging, the research for which is a high priority of the National Institutes of Health (and the National Institute of Aging within it). This research tradition has furthered the idea that individual characteristics are more important than structural factors in aging, and it has contributed to an individualized and medicalized view of the aging problem and policy solutions for that problem.

The legacy of these theories in policy is clear. For example, disengagement theory—a theory that posits that there is a mutual benefit for the aging individual and society to withdraw (disengage) from one another—provides a rationale for excluding the elderly from the mainstream of society via compulsory retirement by arguing that mutual withdrawal benefits both the individual and society. The inference for policy is that society should assist in the natural disengagement of the individual from society. Thus, disengagement theory would prescribe either no policy intervention interventions that aid the withdrawal of the individual and society from each other The primary policy implication of activity theory involves support for services that provide for the socialization and social integration of the aged (such as recreation programs), because the theory posits that older people successfully age if they continue (or substitute) social involvement. Because the theory is essentially classless and universal in its prescription for continued activity in old age, activity theory offers little insight into the importance of the economic self-sufficiency of the elderly as precondition for meaningful substitution of roles in old age.

Developmental (life cycle) theory provides a rationalization for the continuance multiple and contradictory (or laissez-faire) approaches to problem solving. Because there are so many different patterns of aging (that is, individuation as the personality becomes more consistent with itself with age), there is no single policy solution. Because of the focus on continuity, the emphasis would be on policies that would enable older adults to maintain their social status throughout the life cycle. Consistent with the theoretical and empirical emphasis of gerontology, U.S. policies have tended to treat the problem of old age as an individual problem and as resolvable largely providing services to the individual. Medicare and Medicaid policies, Title XX Social Services, and the Older Americans Act all are predictated on the notion that treating

individuals is the way to treat the "problem" of aging. Such conceptualizations reflect limited gerontological knowledge about how aging is a socially generated problem and status.

Finally, none of the dominant gerontological approaches examines the economic or political conditions of society as potential predictors of the aging status or process that they seek to illuminate. Because gerontological theory and research have not been specifically concerned either with the societal "processing" of the aged (via economic, legal, and political institutions) or with the effects of this "processing" on the aging and the aging process, they offer relatively little guidance about the need for (or the potential effects of) a host of macrostructural-level policy interventions.

The resultant knowledge base has provided the framework for the dominant definitions (and understanding) of aging and old age in America (Estes, 1979). These definitions of reality, although socially generated, have come to be taken as objective reality, and they have set limits not only on what we think is real, but also on what we think is possible.

The major definition of reality about aging in America is that it is a "social problem." Not only is aging seen as a problem, but old people themselves are socially defined as the problem. This perception or construction of reality has diverted attention from the social and political factors in society that, in reality, produce many of the problems plaguing the elderly (such as societal policies that deprive the elderly of adequate work or income and health care appropriate to their needs at an affordable cost). The underlying perspective on aging that has developed has legitimated policy intervention strategies aimed at the *individual*, largely in the form of human service interventions.

As highly systematized, integrated belief systems that are accompanied by strong affective overtones (Shils, 1968), ideologies undergird the society's public policies and interventions. These belief systems serve to organize convictions and to "enforce inevitable value judgements" (Bailey, 1975). Two major ideological orientations support society's definition and treatment of aging as a social problem (Estes and Harrington, 1981).

The first ideology defines old age as a problem characterized by special needs that require special old age policies and services. This belief, which supports governmental interventions that separate the aged from the rest of society (for example, Medicare and Social Security), has had a powerful influence on public policy (Estes, 1979). The second ideology reflects the beliefs that (a) the problems of aging are largely individual, inherent biological consequences (rather than resulting from a combination of social, economic, political, and biological factors) and that (b) the problems of and preferred treatment for the aging are predominantly medical, requiring technical and other medical-type interventions. This medicalization of aging is consistent with the society's tendency to characterize an increasing array of social problems (such as alcholism) as biomedical in origin and to look to medicine for solutions (Zola, 1975). It also explains the support for current health policies that provide high cost and technologically intensive acute care medical services. The services strategy that has been adopted is, then, largely a medical services strategy, with current health care spending outstripping social service spending thirty to one.

Two additional and very important perceptions of reality have been socially constructed by high-level political officials in President Reagan's administration. Both will vitally affect the shape of policy interventions for young and old in the future. They are (1) the declaration of fiscal crisis and (2) the perception that social problems (such as poverty) cannot be solved by national policies and programs, but

rather by state and local programs, by initiatives of the private sector, or by individual efforts. Both perceptions of reality have been incorporated in the two most important legislative enactments of 1981: the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and the Economic Recovery Act. These enactments, in turn, will shape social interventions for older adults for years to come. Further, they reflect the successful imposition of value preference for individual rather than collective responsibility for domestic social problems, and the acceptance of the construction of reality that individual deficiency is more significant than social conditions or public policies in generating the increasing cost of public programs like Social Security and Medicare.

THE POLICY CONTEXT: MAJOR PROGRAMS FOR OLDER ADULTS

As we have argued, social constructions of reality are important in shaping the way policymakers and the elderly themselves define the problem or problems of aging (Estes, 1976, 1979). Because conceptions of the nature of the problems to be addressed represent constraints on the nature and range of alternative solutions that are considered, understanding them is essential to an analysis of intervention strategies for the elderly. But social constructions of reality alone do not determine the nature of service interventions. Economic and political trends, prior policy ments, traditional roles of particular professions, insufficient knowledge r the effectiveness of alternative service strategies, and other factors also sha ventions for older adults.

The magnitude of the growth in the last two decades in governmental authorizations and expenditures for old age programs has been widely discussed (Hudson 1978; Samuelson, 1981). Not only has governmental "effort" on behalf of the elderly risen dramatically, but also this effort has yielded some important improvement the quality of life of the elderly (Hudson, 1980). At the same time, it is apparen considerable unmet need remains among the elderly, because some critical areas have not been addressed adequately. After a brief overview of the major governmental programs for the aged is presented, some of the underlying issues in intervention for the aged will be considered.

Major public expenditures on programs for the elderly fall into four primary categories: social insurance and income maintenance, housing and energy medical services, and social services. That public expenditures for these have been substantial when compared with those for other vulnerable gr as children, single parents, and the disabled) is not really debatable. What is debate is whether in view of the increased incidence of need among the elderly (for l care and income maintenance, for example) older adults receive a fair or disp tionate share of benefits. Apparent, however, is that despite allocations of re large public expenditures, the welfare of the elderly has improved only modestly. certain subpopulations of the elderly, moreover, the quality of life has not impro much at all.

Income Support

Both in terms of expenditure levels and in terms of their potential impact on well-being of the elderly, the most important federal programs for the aged are tho providing income and financial support. Social Security has emerged as the mainst

of retirement income for a majority of the nation's elderly. Without Social Security benefits, 60 percent of elderly families would be poor (Ball, 1978; Clark et al., 1978). There is evidence that the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, tied to public assistance historically and aimed at the low-income elderly, has since its inception in 1974 enhanced the uniformity and stability of "welfare" benefits to the elderly (Albritton, 1979). Even with improvements in Social Security benefits, private pensions, and SSI levels, along with a general rise is retirement savings, one-half of all elderly consumers had a 1976 income of less than $100 per week (Data Resources, Inc., 1980). Given current economic and political constraints, prospects for financial security during the retirement years continue to be less than optimistic for many older adults.

Housing

Like social insurance, federal housing programs designed to benefit the elderly were initiated during the depression era of the 1930s, in this case with the low-rent public housing program (Housing Act of 1937, as amended). The housing acts of 1937, 1949, and 1959 established broad national goals as well as specific program targets, such as numbers of housing units to be developed, but chronically modest funding (when considered in light of the targets) and uncertain political will have severely limited the impact of these programs, both generally and for the elderly. The case of Section 202 housing illustrates the problems attending federal housing policy for old persons.

The National Housing Act of 1959 authorized, under Section 202, a program of direct loans to nonprofit sponsors to develop housing for the aged and the handicapped. This program proved popular, and it seemed to be an economical way to provide decent housing for those with special needs. Nonetheless, a protracted struggle developed in the early 1970s regarding the fate of the program, and funds for loans to develop housing began to flow again only in 1976. The number of units funded for the aged in 1978 was 16,900—far below the 1971 goal of 120,000 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1978). While federal housing programs represent important policy directions for meeting the housing needs of the elderly, their impact has necessarily been very modest (Lee and Estes, 1979).

Health Care

Health services for the elderly through Medicare and Medicaid represent, apart from Social Security, the largest category of governmental expenditure for the elderly. Furthermore, public expenditures for health care for the elderly, which totaled approximately $31.1 billion in 1978, constitute the largest area of federal domestic expenditure outside of social insurance. While spending for health services has risen dramatically since the passage of Titles XVIII (Medicare) and XIX (Medicaid), and while access to medical services has improved, especially for the low-income elderly (Davis and Schoen, 1978), the range of policy issues generated by these programs has commanded a great deal more attention than their achievements (Davidson and Marmor, 1980; Kane and Kane, 1978; Lee and Estes, 1979; U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Aging, 1977; Vladeck, 1980).

Excessive hospitalization, inappropriate utilization of nursing homes, inadequate access to noninstitutional services, and the growing costs of program participation to the elderly themselves are but a few of the complex and expensive problems gener-

ated by fee-for-service health services programs for the elderly. More generally, these programs have been more successful in reimbursing providers for acute care than in meeting the health care needs of elderly recipients, whose primary needs are chronic rather than acute (Butler and Newacheck, 1980). Services designed to address chronic conditions (that is, those of a "long-term" nature) have not until recently been given attention, and such services remain limited in both availability and coverage under major federal and state programs.

Social Services

The Older Americans Act (OAA), enacted in 1965 but significantly modified in the 1970s, was designed to support the development of community services to meet the needs of the elderly of all income levels. Two programs—area planning and social services (Title IIIA) and nutrition (IIIB)—have been of potential importance in stimulating the growth of new services. Because appropriations under these titles have been modest ($590 million in fiscal year 1980) and because state and area agencies have had wide discretion in determining the range and mix of services they provide, the impact of the program has necessarily been limited as well as variable across states and localities. Statutory ambiguity regarding service priorities, appropriate technologies, target populations, and the allocation of authority across levels of government has plagued the program since its inception, particularly since the landmark 1973 Amendments to the Act (Benjamin and Friss, 1980; Estes, 1979). A great deal more attention will be given to these and related issues later in this discussion.

A far larger program, Title XX of the Social Security Act, is of less significance to the elderly as a whole but of some importance to low-income elderly. Estimates vary regarding the percentage of Title XX funds allocated to social services to older persons. One study reported that about 16 percent (of $420 million) went to the elderly in 1976-1977 (Gilbert et al., 1979). Like the Older Americans Act, Title XX has permitted wide variations across states in the range of services provided, and its impact nationally is difficult to assess. Because its services have been targeted at low-income persons, however, it probably has had more impact on the neediest elderly than the Older Americans Act. With the enactment of the social services block grant in 1980, Title XX services have shifted to a reduced level of funding and states have increased discretion governing service allocations. Both are expected to influence the shape of social services for older adults.

Aging and the Services Strategy

Several theories of aging have been described, and it has been argued that these provide important ingredients for definitions of social reality regarding aging in society. As noted, these definitions or constructions of reality, in turn, have influenced both the perception of social problems and our notions about how to deal with them (Estes, 1979). While various paradigms are available to categorize social problems, a perspective developed by Rein (1970) can be usefully adapted to this discussion (Gilbert and Specht, 1974).

The social problems of older persons can be described in terms of three sources from which they derive: resource deficiency, institutional deficiency, and individual deficiency (Rein, 1970). Resource problems are those deriving from a lack of resources; this deficiency occurs because the market does not provide the individual

with an income adequate to acquire needed resources or because the market does not generate enough of the desired resources (such as housing). Institutional problems are those emerging because of malfunctions in social institutions, including government. Inadequate planning and coordination are the most commonly cited of problems caused by institutional deficiencies. Finally, individual problems are those deriving from the inherent characteristics of those experiencing shortages of resources or from shortcomings in indicators of adequate functioning. Here the sources of social problems are to be found within the individual rather than in the market or in the workings of government.

The ways social problems are defined also constrain the range of interventions considered to deal with them. Resource deficiencies are most directly addressed through income transfers, as well as by management of market resources either by revised incentives or direct public provision (such as subsidized housing). Institutional deficiencies are improved either through improved administrative performance ("technical problems") or through increasing the political capacity of deprived groups ("political problems"). Individual deficiencies, in turn, are addressed through attempts to change the behavior and values of target groups through various personal services (Gilbert and Specht, 1974).

Major federal and state programs for the elderly represent a range of social provisions for older persons, as described earlier. In simple expenditure terms, resource solutions to the problems of aging (such as Social Security and SSI) comprise the largest segment of public response to the needs of this population group. At the same time, however, conceptions of the problem of the elderly as ones of individual deficiency seem to permeate the ways such programs are designed and modified over time. The Social Security benefit structure is designed both to provide benefits on the basis of prior earnings levels and to provide a minimum benefit level to those with the lowest earnings levels. The political success of the system was predicated on the notion that the preretirement earnings success of individuals should determine their benefit levels at retirement, and that those who earned least (that is, failed to earn more) should receive less at retirement. Recognition of the limited employment opportunities available to older persons seeking to rectify this benefit gap produced a minimum benefit provision to temper the impact of tying benefit levels solely to prior earning success.

This relative preoccupation with individual earning performance is not merely of historical interest. It seems instead to permeate much current thinking about ways to modify Social Security in light of changing demographics and the fiscal plight of the trust funds. Several themes emerge which suggest that income problems are not seen merely as problems of resource deficiency. First, because of a continuing concern that the aged should plan better for their retirement, a policy of very limited income-replacement (benefit) levels has been invoked, lest individuals be further tempted to plan poorly for retirement. Second, if benefit levels are to be cut, the minimum benefit level has been identified as the most appropriate target, since it is not tied to individual earnings performance but to the welfare notions of a minimum benefit. Third, public scrutiny and regulation of private pension systems have been (and will likely continue to be) limited and hesitant, because these represent government intervention into the relationship between the individual and his or her employer. Fourth, in part because the cessation of employment is viewed as an inevitable condition of natural aging, there has been a reluctance in government to consider seriously the development of substantial employment opportunities, and thus additional sources of earned income, for older persons.

Health services to older persons through Medicare, Medicaid, and other health

care programs can also be characterized as public solutions to problems defined as resource deficiencies, in this care, of health resources. More health care for the elderly is the outcome of a series of public decisions to provide more of these resources to this population in need. As was the case with income resource programs, however, strong elements of "individual deficiency" conceptions of the health problems of older persons permeate current policy debates regarding these programs.

Because physical decline is widely believed to be a concomitant of natural aging processes, there are few serious observers who argue that the health problems of older persons are primarily the result of individual failure. But this has not prevented policymakers from laying the problem of attending to their own health care needs at the bedstead of the elderly themselves and their immediate families, particularly in the case of chronic illness. Although there is ample evidence that excessive and inappropriate utilization of certain forms of health care should be attributed primarily to decisions by providers and to the reimbursement incentives underlying those decisions (Rose, 1979; Schroeder et al., 1979), attempts to control utilization and costs at the federal and state levels often begin with proposals to increase copayments and deductibles for the elderly themselves. Because certain health problems (such as hearing loss and failing eyesight) are perceived to be widespread among the elderly, moreover, it is argued that older persons should somehow be able to manage these for themselves. High incidence of these problems, along with the absence of the urgency associated with more acute conditions, provides a justification for the selective withholding of resources to meet certain chronic health care needs.

Not only is there a tendency to qualify resource definitions of elderly health problems with individual-deficiency explanations; there is also a reluctance to base policy debate on analysis of institutional[1] factors in health care. More exactly, institutional-deficiency explanations are much discussed but much more reluctantly acted upon. The fee-for-service basis of health care reimbursement, the acute care orientation of public-program incentives, and the distortions in regulation of market behavior that result represent some of the political and administrative dimensions of the institutional problems in health care. However, when one moves beyond the rhetoric and assesses the substance of public response, it is apparent that the individual rights of patient and doctor and the avowed sacredness of that relationship continue to be invoked to protect against adopting institutional change strategies.

The impact of individual-deficiency explanations of the problems of older persons is also apparent in the arena of social services for this population. The Older Americans Act and title XX have given considerable attention to those services conceived to compensate for the inability of aged individuals to cope with their life situations (Nelson, 1978). Growth in Title III (Older Americans Act) allocations to social and recreational services is but one example of this service orientation (Benjamin et al., 1979). Interestingly, however, some of the most heated debate about the appropriate direction of programs under the act has concerned the relative commitment to services designed to address institutional deficiencies.

At its passage in 1965, the Older Americans Act defined the core problems of the elderly as social isolation and the lack of social activity. Issues regarding resource differences among the elderly and institutional deficiencies were underplayed, and those problems and solutions for which wide agreement and support could be assured were emphasized (social isolation and recreational services, for example). But subsequent amendments to the act have reflected some support for approaches which address institutional problems. These include statutory mandates to improve and expand the existing service delivery systems through the "indirect" services of planning, coordination, pooling of resources, and advocacy, and the establishment of

federal priorities for legal and access services. The nature and extent of federal commitments to the "indirect" service strategies have been uncertain and changing (Benjamin and Friss, 1980), and definitions of the technologies involved are poorly developed and widely variable. As a result, the implementation of these approaches has represented a tremendous problem for state and local aging agencies, as has the assessment of their success.

To the extent that the provision of legal services and access services addresses institutional patterns that shape the quality of life of the elderly, they represent important alternatives to services designed to deal with individual shortcomings. For example, if biases in hiring or the pension rights of workers are addressed under legal services, and the need for community transportation networks responsive to the living patterns of older adults is dealt with as part of a commitment to transportation services, then allocations to these services represent meaningful (if modest, in expenditure terms) approaches to institutional issues. On the other hand, where such services are more narrowly conceived and are provided on an individual basis with little regard to wider, collective patterns of need, they become something other than institutional solutions. There is some evidence that the latter pattern is at least as common as the former (Benjamin et al., 1979). This suggests a more general problem among service agencies of a tendency for solutions designed to address individual deficiencies to drive out those conceived to deal with institutional problems.

Current Services Issues

The roster of issues related to current service interventions for older adults is lengthy. Rather than chronicle the full range of policy issues that have emerged, we have selected three that are of historical interest, are central to current policy debate, and are of importance across service populations and not just for the elderly. These include issues related to (1) universal versus selective services, (2) the provision of long-term care services, and (3) the development of nonservice approaches.

Universal versus Selective Services

Issues regarding the respective merits of universal and selective services represent one of the oldest debates in the social services field (Hoshino, 1969; Timuss, 1968). Although the distinction between universalism and selectivity is not always precise, the significance of policy questions raised in the debate is quite clear. Universal benefits are those provided to an entire population as a social right, such as those available to the elderly under Social Security or the Older Americans Act. Membership in an age group in itself confers eligibility for benefits under these programs. Selective benefits are those provided on the basis of individual need, determined by a means test. Examples are Supplementary Security Income (SSI) and Title XX Social Services; those elderly who receive benefits under these programs must first go through a "selection" process to establish if they are entitled to care (Gilbert and Specht, 1974).

As indicated, the Older Americans Act (OAA) is an example of legislation with universal entitlement for all members of an age group (60 and older). Because many of the supporters of the OAA represented those elderly from the mobile, middle-class elderly that were become organized politically, the act was designed to provide for the service needs of all older persons regardless of their income (Estes, 1979). To target services based on need, the universalists argued, would discriminate against many

others with "social" needs, if not economic ones; and any form of means testing would lend welfare stigma to the program. Since subsequent experience has revealed that the combination of limited funding and an almost limitless array of service possibilities has made planning and effectiveness increasingly uncertain, amendments to the act have provided that specific attention should be given to those elderly with the greatest need.

While services to low-income, minority, frail, and rural elderly have been identified for particular emphasis, there has been much ambiguity about the means appropriate and the stringency of the requirements needed to implement the vague targeting mandates across multiple groups. The 1978 amendments to the act reinforced the uncertain posture of the OAA toward these groups. While funding preference is to be given to those with the greatest economic or social need, considerable ambiguity remains regarding operational definitions of these need categories, especially the latter (social need). In addition, no mechanisms have been provided for monitoring the extent to which states and localities comply with these directives.

The result has been wide variation among agencies in their "targeting" of Title III services funds to particular subgroups of the elderly. In an analysis of the service contracts of sixteen urban area agencies for 1977, Benjamin et al. (1979) found that while the average agency assigned specific targeting criteria to contracts for nearly two-thirds of its services funds, the range of variation extended from 15 percent to 100 percent. The level of funds to which targeting criteria are assigned, moreover, probably overstates levels of actual operational targeting. Analytical problems are aggravated by the fact that means tests are not permitted for OAA services; data on characteristics of recipients of services simply are not available.

The relationship between universal and selective services for older adults has also been an issue in attempts to integrate Title III of the Older Americans Act and Title XX of the Social Security Act. As noted earlier, the former provides social services to all persons over 60 years of age without consideration of income, while the latter furnishes services to low-income persons, including older adults. In some states, the administration of Title XX aging services has been assumed by state and local aging agencies also administering Title III. Observers of these programs have pointed to both potential opportunities and dangers involved in combining selective, "welfare-based" services (Title XX) with universal, "constituency-based" programs (Title III). In particular, a danger emerges that aging agency mobilization of Title XX funds would generate a universal pull on service resources that would result in a loss of services to the most disadvantaged members of the older population (that is, those to whom Title XX services, however limited, would be directed; see Alfaro and Holmes, 1981, Nelson, 1980). The tension between arguments for broad eligibility and wide dispersal and those for careful targeting is apparent under these circumstances. Given the increasing economic scarcity and political conservatism (Stoesz, 1981) of the 1980s that are now dramatically threatening social programs, the salience of these and related issues can be expected to grow as the poorest and most disadvantaged are most affected by program cutbacks and the middle class finds itself increasingly threatened with economic hardship.

Long-Term Care

The provision of long-term care services to the chronically ill and disabled elderly is emerging as the principal policy issue related to the elderly in the next decade (Hudson, 1980). What began in the mid-1930s as a very limited federal and state

government response to a relatively small-scale need for institutional long-term care for the aged has mushroomed into a huge medical care and social service program affecting millions of the elderly, involving thousands of institutions, and costing billions of dollars (Lee and Estes, 1979). Long-term care encompasses a range of services that address the health, social, and personal care needs of those who lack the capacity for independent self-care. Diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, rehabilitative, supportive, and maintenance services for individuals with chronic physical or mental impairment are included in the broadest conceptions of long-term care. The inability of an individual to function without assistance, rather than a specific diagnosis or type of disability, determines the need for long-term care (Reif and Estes, 1982). Although individuals of any age with physical or mental impairments may require publicly funded long-term care, the elderly are in greatest need of services because of economic, social, and medical factors.

Long-term care services for the elderly are influenced by a variety of public policies, particularly those related to income maintenance, health care, social services, and housing. Federal policies and programs affect the elderly's access to long-term care services as well as the payment for these services. Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, Medicaid, Title XX (Social Services) of the Social Security Act, and the Older Americans Act are of particular importance. Moreover, the states play a key role in determining most of these policies because all of these programs, with the exception of Medicare, give the states wide discretion.

Because of variations in state policies, there are great inequities among states (Davis, 1975; Feder et al., 1980), generating a variety of problems in (a) determining eligibility, (b) assuring availability of services across program jurisdictions, (c) coordinating benefits and services, (d) reimbursing services, (e) setting and enforcing standards, and (f) evaluating the effect of alternative policies. With discretionary state policies there have also been serious problems relating to accountability and cost control.

At the heart of much of the current policy discussion regarding long-term care is a widespread interest in the deinstitutionalization of the elderly. This interest draws some of its strength and much of its complexity from recent trends toward deinstitutionalization in the areas of juvenile delinquency, adult criminal justice, mental retardation, and mental health (Rose, 1979). Considerable agreement has emerged about the excessive and inappropriate dependence on institutions, particularly hospitals and nursing homes, for the elderly (Kane and Kane, 1978; Vladeck, 1980). At the same time, it is apparent that the dramatic increase in attention given to this issue is less the result of the weight of moral arguments and accumulated evidence than the consequence of the growing burden of the public costs of institutional care.

Enthusiasm for moving nursing home patients "back to community" has become sufficiently strong that it may be considered an emerging and important ideology in long-term care, one on which a diversity of interests are converging. At least four separate sources of pressures for deinstitutionalization of the aged and the new ideology of "alternatives to institutionalization" can be identified: (1) the growing concerns of advocates for older adults, (2) the pressures of fiscal crisis in government, (3) the powerful interests of the health care industry, and (4) the efforts of health and social services agencies to command a larger share of program dollars (Estes and Harrington, 1981).

Aging advocates, concerned about the rights of patients in nursing homes and the rehabilitative promise of community care, have sought enlightened deinstitutionalization policies. The combination of unacceptable living conditions, inadequate treatment, fraud and abuse, and the abridgment of civil rights has discredited many forms

of institutional care. While comparable evidence regarding the capacity of community alternatives to avoid these problems is lacking, a strong argument is made by aging advocates for the inherent preferability of community care on both moral and rehabilitative grounds.

The growing movement toward long-term care alternatives to institutionalization also is fueled by the need to reduce the costs of government. Increasingly, federal and state governments are including in their cost-reduction strategies attempts to provide noninstitutional alternatives and to prevent publicly funded institutional placement. While evidence regarding the cost-reduction efficacy of these approaches is debated, some studies have shown cost savings where benefits are not expanded to those not now eligible for nursing home services (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1981). Because nursing home costs continue to represent a large and growing portion of federal and state health care costs, governments at all levels are confronted by pressures toward fiscal austerity, particularly in human services programs, increasing the policy attention given to noninstitutional alternatives.

Although hospital price increases have consistently been identified as the most inflationary part of Medicaid and Medicare budgets (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980), recent attempts to enact federal cost containment legislation have been defeated by the hospital industry and medical lobby (U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Aging, 1980). As federal and state government budgets limit health expenditures and the hospital industry and medical lobby seek to protect their own interests for funding, even greater pressure will be placed on government to control expenditures for the aged in nursing homes.

As available capital investment for nursing homes declines with high interest rates and governmental fiscal crisis places limits on profits and growth in the nursing home sector, health investors can also be expected to move into community-based alternative services (such as home care) on a for-profit basis (Vladeck, 1980). There has already been a strong growth of activity by profit-making organizations in the home care field (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1977). The interests of the private long-term care industry will be supported by a growth in the private markets for both nursing homes and alternative services (Estes and Harrington, 1981).

There is a broad array of social and health service programs and agencies offering long-term care services to the aged as alternatives to institutionalization. These services include home care, adult day health care, nutrition, congregate housing, and a range of special programs and demonstration projects (Brody, 1977; Reif, 1980; U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Aging, 1980). These service providers have developed a particular interest and special expertise in serving the aged in one capacity or another, and they form what Estes (1979) has termed "the aging enterprise." Not surprisingly, numerous representatives of the "aging enterprise" are now attempting to increase the resources available to them by pressing for expansion of community-based service alternatives to institutionalization. Their arguments are shaped in terms of the cost containment potential that community services represent for government (Estes and Harrington, 1981).

The shape of long-term care policy in the 1980s will be influenced by the conceptions of the problem, the strength of special interests, and the larger political and economic context of federal and state policy. The major federal policy shifts of reduced social spending, the revival of new federalism and block grants, and the introduction of procompetitive health proposals (Estes and Lee, 1981) provide that context.

Major issues within long-term care policy include those related to who shall be

served—shall such policies be age-segregated or open to all populations defined as being in need of such services (such as the disabled)? An analysis by Kutza (1981) has concluded that this issue can be addressed only in the context of the kind of intervention that is desirable. Once the target populations are defined, issues remain regarding whether services are to be offered on a targeted or a universal basis (Farrow et al., 1981). More generally, one of the key issues of the decade is whether or not to mount a national policy and publicly funded program for the provision of long-term care and, alternatively, what responsibilities and federal funding will be allocated to state government, local government, the private sector, and the individual. Will long-term care be block granted, and, if so, what implications will a block grant have for the potential tradeoffs between institutional and noninstitutional services? What sources and level of financing will be utilized, and what will be the dominant character of such services—medical and/or social? Finally, what will be the specific role of income maintenance programs in the long-term care strategy?

Nonservice Approaches

Because the viability of public services generally and social services in particular has recently been challenged in a variety of ways, growing attention is being given by scholars and public officials to alternative strategies available to governments. Interest in these strategies, known as "nonservice approaches," has been heightened by four arguments regarding traditional approaches to solving social welfare problems. First, restrictions on the legal or fiscal resources available to support services have limited their potential impact. Second, the complexity of social welfare problems means that service approaches alone can only partially address the level and scope of needs. Third, the inadequacy of conventional social technologies (Schultz, 1968) has meant that the timely and appropriate application of service approaches often seems to be outside the capacity of service bureaucracies. Furthermore, adequate solutions to local problems are best framed at the local level. The result has been a growing interest in considering other strategies available to governments that may address social welfare problems in more adequate ways.

The thrust of these approaches has been described by Gollub and his associates (1980: 7):

> *Nonservice approaches can be defined as interventions that employ government regulation or deregulation, tax policy change, administrative reform, involvement of the private sector, promotion of self-help, or public advocacy to alter the behavior of the private (or quasi-public) sector markets through incentives to induce desired public outcomes. Nonservice approaches are distinct from approaches aimed primarily at the direct delivery of goods or services based on expenditure of public resources because they emphasize the power of* local *governments to* govern *rather than just to* spend.

Gollub et al. (1980) have identified numerous examples of local nonservice approaches within the various categories. Among the most common regulatory strategies are enforcement of building codes, ordinances preventing discrimination in housing and employment against the aged and disabled, and control of the condominium conversion process. Tax policy changes include measures to defer collection of property taxes from the elderly until the sale and transfer of their property, thus permitting them to keep their homes even with a limited income. Administrative reform covers a range of activities, including multiple use and reuse of public buildings and vehicles, new roles for welfare clients in the public sector, and new roles for public

employees (such as having postal staff check on the frail elderly along their routes).

Collaboration with the private sector involves encouraging individual firms voluntarily to pursue community objectives. This may take the form of locating facilities in neighborhoods with high unemployment, providing occupational training for youth, and investing in local housing rehabilitation. Promotion of self-help involves public sector encouragement of individual and group efforts to pool and benefit from personal resources. Groups may work to organize transportation, pools, emergency home maintenance projects, coordinated food-buying clubs for the aged, neighborhood-based day care, and tenant inspection of housing. Public advocacy, which involves the use by governments of their legal powers to deal with other governments and the private sector, can take the form of general advocacy for citizens and social welfare clients, advocacy for (and by) special need populations, and advocacy by geographic area. Public and private sector policies on housing, health care, and employment for the aged are among the targets of public advocacy efforts (Gollub et al., 1980).

Nonservice approaches appeal to a wide range of constituencies, including critics of social welfare services and "big government" generally, as well as those committed to a reduced federal role in state and local government. It is apparent, however, that the thrust of these approaches is toward new uses of older governmental mechanisms and a more varied and aggressive approach to governance at the local level. Their emphasis is not so much on reducing social and health services as on expanding the roles of government in stimulating the provision of services from a range of sources. It is equally apparent that implementation of such approaches will vary enormously across states and localities and that these strategies represent opportunities available to governments rather than a set of resources that will be used in moderately predictable ways within specific guidelines. Whether proven technologies in fact exist that can achieve desired outcomes in a systematic fashion has yet to be demonstrated. The kind of frustration in defining and assessing impact experienced by critics of social and health services approaches may yet confront those committed to nonservice approaches.

POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING AGING SERVICES

The previous discussion was designed to describe in broad strokes the range of intervention strategies used with older adults, as well as to highlight the major issues related to them. In the following analysis our attention will be turned to selected political and bureaucratic trends and issues that seem important in shaping the selection and implementation of intervention approaches. While no such clear distinctions are possible in the study of public policy (Greenberg et al., 1977) for the sake of organizing the discussion it seems reasonable to focus on shifts in the political context as they influence policy selection and in the bureaucratic context, as they shape policy implementation.

Politics and Intervention

Contemporary aging policy has developed until recently in a political environment that has been relatively benign (Pratt, 1976). Because public and social welfare spending generally has been expansionary in the past decade and a half, and be-

cause the population of older Americans as well as the number and size of groups organized to represent their interests has increased considerably during this time, public spending for the elderly has grown in dramatic ways. This rise in fiscal commitments has been fueled by new spending legislation (such as Medicare, Medicaid, and SSI) and by sharp increases in expenditures under existing legislation, especially income and health programs. Recent alterations in the political environment of public policy suggest, however, that the nature of the political constraints within which aging policy is made is also changing in significant ways.

There can be little argument that current efforts to limit both the role of government and levels of government spending are having profound effects on human service programs for all populations in need. The consequences for programs for the elderly are particularly noteworthy, for they signify the end of the benign environment within which these programs have evolved. In a context in which resources are relatively abundant, allocations to a given population group are generally not perceived in terms of their costs to other groups (in other words, politics is not a "zero-sum" game). Instead, allocations are distributed widely to a variety of needy populations, and the costs of a given policy direction are also distributed widely. Where resources are scarce, on the other hand, decisions regarding public spending become much more competitive, and perceptions that one group is receiving an excessive share become highly problematic politically.

The contention of influential political observers (such as Samuelson, 1981) that the elderly have gotten more than their share of public expenditures, combined with the related belief that many of their problems have been solved as a result, has altered the nature of the issues facing those concerned with public policy and the elderly. Rather than questions of how to distribute new resources, policy and program personnel now must consider how to generate new resources for aging services. Rather than asking how resources may best be allocated, the question now becomes one of how cutbacks are to be distributed among programs for older Americans. Instead of addressing issues of universal versus selective services by creating separate service programs for each (for example, Medicare versus Medicaid; the Older Americans Act versus Title XX), policymakers are now confronted with singular choices regarding which older persons will receive services and which will not.

The changing political environment of aging may have important consequences for the role of aging interest groups in the shaping of public policy. The relative prosperity of programs for older Americans during the past decade has led to the growth of a variety of membership organizations and trade associations within the field (Estes, 1979). Studies of organized aging groups have noted both considerable competition among them and a tendency to establish coalitions when political threats were substantial (Binstock, 1972; Hudson, 1980; Pratt, 1976).

Precisely how the present diminution of support for public social programs generally, and for aging programs in particular, will affect the commitments and behavior of these groups is not clear. What is apparent is that in a time when the legitimacy of these programs was high and resources relatively abundant, there was both a political and a fiscal "slack" that permitted groups to compete for influence without visible and measurable policy costs. Under current and much less benign conditions, under which competition across programs and service populations is keen and can have immediate and substantial policy consequences, interest groups encounter strong incentives to develop common agendas and strategies while still confronting their needs organizationally to compete for influence. Until recently, the relative political "popularity" of older persons has probably been much more important in shaping public policy than the political power of organized aging interests. In no small part,

this fact has meant greater political freedom for aging interests. As the environment grows far less supportive of programs for older persons, the constraints on organizations ostensibly created to serve this population grow considerably.

NOTE

1. "Institutional" is used here in the sense that Rein (1970) and Gilbert and Specht (1974) use it, not in the sense of nursing homes.

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20

Government and Families as Interacting Systems

Outputs, Inputs, and Outcomes

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Although the United States has never had an officially stated family policy or policies, it is now acknowledged that almost all government policies affect families directly or indirectly, whether intentionally or not. The slogan "to get government off the backs of people and out of family life," as a reaction to this newly recognized influence, implies that many government policies and programs have been perceived as not only burdensome but as having encroached too far into the family's domain and thus as having overextended government's prerogatives vis-à-vis families. Further, feelings of malaise about government in general seem to have extended to many of the trends in family life for which government somehow is held responsible. That family life, whatever it is, is not what it used to be is partly attributable to government policies and programs that many perceive as having undermined the family's stability and integrity. One legislator, when asked to express his opinion about government's role in family life, responded, "Government policies have eroded family viability in recent decades. . . . The family stands best when it stands alone—not with assorted government crutches" (Zimmerman et al., 1979). Is it true that government policies and programs have been as detrimental to family life as the legislator and others claim? This question will be answered by reviewing the findings of relevant research which provide a far more positive view. Before doing so, however, the nature of families and government as interacting systems will be examined to place the discussion in proper perspective.

FAMILIES AND GOVERNMENT AS INTERACTING SYSTEMS

Social systems are said to be characterized by four properties (Hill, 1971): (1) the tasks they perform to meet the needs and demands of their members and those of their environment; (2) the interrelatedness of positions or the interdependence of component parts that form their structures; (3) boundary maintenance proclivities that serve to differentiate them from other social systems in their environment; and (4) equilibrium and adaptive propensities that tend to ensure their viability as social systems.

The Tasks of Families and Government as Social Systems

The task-performing property of social systems pertains to the functions they are expected to perform. The primary functions families are expected to perform include (1) the physical maintenance and care of family members; (2) the addition of new members through procreation or adoption and their relinquishment when they mature; (3) the socialization of children for adult roles, such as those of spouse, parent, worker, neighbor, voter, and community member; (4) the social control of members, which refers to the maintenance of order within the family and groups external to it; (5) the maintenance of family morale and motivation to ensure task performance both within the family and in other social groups; and (6) the production and consumption of goods and services needed to support and maintain the family unit. Depending in part on the age and sex of family members as well as the urgency of the tasks to be performed, the ways in which these tasks are performed vary with each family and during the family's life cycle. When tasks are specific to stages such as the establishment, childbearing, school age, adolescent, launching, postparental, or retirement stage, they form the basis for family developmental tasks.

The primary tasks that government is expected to perform are promotion, management, regulation, distribution, and redistribution of the goods, services, and benefits that society and its members produce (Musolf, 1967). Using the federal budget as a guide, the federal government performs such tasks in the domains of defense and international affairs; general science, space, and technology; natural resources, environment, and energy; aid to business, agriculture, and communities; human resources, such as education, health, income security, manpower and veteran's benefits; law enforcement, justice, and general government; and revenue-sharing and general-purpose financial assistance (Blechman et al., 1975). The ways in which government performs its tasks in these areas vary according to prevailing ideology emphasizing one set of values over another, such as free enterprise over collective responsibility, or state and local control over federal control, or the private sector over the public, or different points on a value continuum, such as more government or less government. Although government does not necessarily perform its tasks in relation to families except in certain restricted areas, such as AFDC, maternal and child health, family planning, day care, adoption, foster care, family life education, and family counseling, its domain and scope of activities clearly intersect with the family's, especially in the area of human resources. When it performs tasks relating to a particular stage of the family life cycle, such as promoting the health of mothers and infants or managing the social security contributions of covered workers, later redistributing such contributions to workers when they retire, such tasks may be considered in that light, although no explicit statement may officially appear to that effect. Eckstein (1979) says that government's larger purpose is to effect social justice, but recent developments suggest that this statement is more prescriptive than descriptive of government in the United States today.

Interdependence of Component Parts

The concept of interdependence or interrelatedness of positions that comprise a system refers to interacting and reciprocal positions and roles within a system's structure (Hill, 1971). Implied in the concept of system positions are roles that must be

performed if the system is to fulfill its functions. In relation to the family, through the interactions of persons occupying positions of husband-wife, brother-sister, father-son, father-daughter, mother-son and mother-daughter, a network of family relationships develops. Such relationships are based on shared values and normative expectations that serve to unite the family and distinguish it from other social groups. Although this relational network varies with culture and social class, it tends to continue until disrupted by the behaviors of one or more of its members who may challenge its values and norms, add others to it, or temporarily or permanently withdraw from it, psychologically, socially, and/or physically.

In terms of government, a network of relationships also develops through the interactions of persons in designated political and organizational positions, whether at federal, state, county, or city levels. Such positions include those of elected and appointed officials, such as President, governor, or mayor; legislators, judges, agency administrators, program experts, or specialists; service providers, researchers, clerical workers, and so forth; as well as politicians, political party members, interest group members, and citizens. Such a relationship may be evidenced by the presidential appointment of faithful party members to important government positions or, at lower levels, by professional teams composed of members with complementary skills and functions. Other illustrations include the National Advisory Committee for the recent White House Conferences on Families and various governmental councils, such as those concerned with day care, teenage pregnancy, or child abuse. Except in the broadest of contexts, however, such relational networks need not be based on a mutually arrived-at, shared set of values among the immediate actors, but instead may be based on laws, bureaucratic rules and regulations, and practice traditions specifying the rights and obligations inherent in related governmental positions.

In contrast to government, the family as a system functions with a limited number of relatedness positions. When tasks are performed by persons occupying positions they later vacate, such tasks must be reallocated to those in the remaining positions (Hill, 1971). These positions tend to become over-burdened with having too many tasks to perform, as frequently reported by heads of single-parent families whose numbers increased to over 10 million in 1979, or almost 18 percent since 1970, in less than 10 years (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980a: Table 5). Thus it has been suggested that a deficit in family structure occurs when any of these positions are unoccupied. However, because of their greater leadership content, vacancies in parent and spouse positions are likely to be more disruptive to family task performance than vacancies that occur in other positions. Family positions also may become overburdened, not only because of the reallocation of tasks resulting from unoccupied family positions but also because of the allocation of additional tasks to meet new systematic requirements. An example might be the assignment of the care of a frail and elderly parent to a middle-aged working mother with a disabled husband and teenage children living at home. Overburdening of family positions may manifest itself in the psychological stress of family members as well as intrafamilial strains and stresses that may affect the family's overall task performance and relationships to other social systems, such as the workplace or school.

Government, unlike families, functions with a seemingly countless number of relatedness positions, such as the President and his cabinet officers, or, on another level, state commissioners of public welfare and their assistant commissioners, or officials responsible for specific programs at different governmental levels or at the same level in different states. Further, when an occupant of a particular governmental position subsequently vacates it, established procedures exist for filling it, although in

these days of fiscal austerity and changing fiscal arrangements, such positions may not be filled very quickly. Thus, tasks associated with a position that remains open may have to be assigned to other positions. Like the family, these positions may become overburdened with too any tasks to perform, as is often reported by persons assuming duties for vacationing colleagues or during hiring freezes, or when additional tasks are assigned to existing positions, such as evaluation research to program planning and implementation responsibilities. Overburdening of governmental positions often may manifest itself in unreturned phone calls, unanswered letters, services not provided to families, or lengthy agency waiting lists—in short, in the nonperformance of tasks of relevance to families and family members.

In contrast to structural deficit, an excess of structure may occur when too many occupants are available for a given position, such as in the case of stepfamilies or in families of adults sharing the same physical space or household. The latter situation, while far less widespread than the former, may occur more often in the future as housing costs extend beyond the earning capacities of unmarried adult children, making the sharing of living space with parents and other family members a viable living arrangement for many (Cecere, 1981). With regard to stepfamilies, dual problems of underfilled and overfilled positions often may be observed, underfilled for adults who are both parents and stepparents to two or more sets of children, and overfilled for children who may suffer from loss of position and, with it, loss of function and familiar patterns of interaction. One consequence of such loss may be internal family conflict about issues pertaining to position, or perhaps withdrawal from the family itself. In this regard, there is evidence to suggest that stepsibling relationships may be more conflictful than stepparent-child relationships (Marotz-Baden et al., 1979: 10). Because of increased divorce rates, problems associated with structural deficit rather than excess have tended to predominate. However, with the increasing numbers of divorces involving one or two children per divorce, and subsequent high rates of remarriage, the latter is becoming an increasingly prevalent condition among American families. According to the Census Bureau (1980b), one out of every eight children living with two parents lives with a natural parent and stepparent.

Structural excess in government may occur when too many agencies or staff are assigned to perform similar tasks in the same general domain, as sometimes occurred in the 1960s with the creation of the poverty program to compete with more traditional welfare programs. The consequence of such excess in government may be interunit or interorganizational competition and conflict, which, in a unit's or organization's struggle for survival, may result in the misrepresentation of services to families or the channeling of family members into particular agencies or services to assure service utilization. Reflective of such excess is the response of one welfare official, who, when queried about his agency's information and referral service, said, "If there were fewer people and agencies I & Ring each other, more services might be provided to families with the same tax dollars" (Zimmerman, 1977). Structural excess in government and in social services probably is more descriptive of the 1960s than the 1980s, when federal funding for many social programs has been withdrawn. However, double dipping by family members who retire from federal employment who also have acquired work credit in covered employment and thus are eligible to receive both a federal pension and social security could be viewed as structural excess, as could the number of colleges competing for a more limited population of college-aged sons and daughters and the number of hospital beds unoccupied by expectant or new mothers.

Boundary Maintenance

The boundary of any system may be conceptualized as the demarcation line that separates the system from its environment. It may be discerned through differences in the nature and intensity of patterns of interaction that take place within the system and between the system and its external environment. Thus, in relation to families, the boundary pertains to interactional patterns within their relational networks that differ in degree and kind from those that occur between families and such external government and nongovernment organizations as schools, social service agencies, churches, workplaces, and so forth. The family, as a semiclosed, semiopen system, is perceived to open selectively to engage in transactions with such organizations through liaison roles built into family positions (Hill, 1971), such as through sons and daughters who are students, and husbands and wives who not only are parents of sons and daughters who are students but also are consumers, voters, and workers. That the family as a boundary-maintaining system probably is more closed than other social systems is suggested by the intimate functions the family performs for its members protected from public view and by the legal sanctions that can be imposed when its sanctity and privacy are threatened or invaded by outside intruders. Although the family often seems to exclude the outside world when coping with internal family problems, evidence suggests that it has become more open than in the past—or at least that members are more willing to involve persons outside the family's boundaries, such as lawyers, psychotherapists, and family counselors, to help them deal with internal family problems or to use outside support groups such as Parents Anonymous, Alcoholics Anonymous, or caregiver groups for families of stroke victims for similar purposes.

Government, like the family, also has boundaries that serve to differentiate it from its external environment. Like the family, its boundaries too can be discerned by patterns of interaction within its relational network that differ in degree and kind from those that occur between it and other social systems, as illustrated by bureaucratic jargon. In contrast to the family, however, government—at least in the United States—is a more open system, engaging in continuous interactions with other systems in its environment, such as families, through liaison functions built into such roles and positions as teachers, social workers, doctors, administrators, elected officials, and information and referral specialists. Thus, in contrast to families, it often seems to include rather than exclude the outside world when coping with internal problems, tightening its boundaries only when the security of the nation or that of the party in power seems threatened. That government in the United States may be more open than other social systems is suggested by its "fishbowl" characteristic which permits almost all of its actions to be subject to public scrutiny. Some perceive government, because of the openness of its boundaries and the scope of its domain, as having almost no boundaries, or at least very loose and permeable ones. Thus, attempts are now being made to define and maintain its boundaries more sharply through spending cuts withdrawing the federal government from or reducing its participation in such programs and activities as family life education, the women's educational equity program, student loans, school lunch programs, milk subsidies, food stamps, AFDC, medicaid, and many more (COFO Memo, 1981b). Former President Carter recently referred to such actions as "an abrupt departure from government's commitment to its citizens" (Cimons, 1981) and, by extension, to families. Consistent with such actions is the Family Protection Act, which proposes to reduce government's involvement in family situations that threaten chil-

dren's lives by redefining child abuse to exclude discipline and corporal punishment administered by parents and parent surrogates (COFO Memo, 1981a). This is not to say that government is no longer willing to involve itself in family matters when family behaviors deviate too far from the norms advocated by interest groups supported by government leaders. Millions of dollars recently were allocated for the provision of chastity counseling services for teenagers (Minneapolis Tribune, 1981a), involving government in family situations in which teenagers are sexually active or potentially so. The Human Life Amendment also could involve government in the most profound way in family life should it come to pass. Smelser and Halpern (1978) state that such contradictions may be explained by the multiplicity of culturally provided value premises that exist in a heterogeneous society such as the United States around which different groups can mobilize to effect social action on behalf of their definitions and perceptions of the situation.

Equilibrium and Adaptation Propensities

The concepts of system equilibrium and adaptation involve several assumptions. The notion of equilibrium assumes a range of possible states within which a system can function and to which it can adapt (Hill, 1971). In terms of the family, if its interaction patterns develop in conformity with the range of norms members share, it probably can survive as a system. The point at which this range has been exceeded becomes manifest when one or more of its members withdraws from the family, as illustrated by runaway children or wives or fathers who desert. Because of its variable size and rapidly changing age composition, the family is thought to be more vulnerable to internally induced disequilibrium than other organizations, although this may not actually be the case if government and its administration also are considered.

With respect to government, its administration also is likely to persist if its patterns of interactions are in conformity with the range of values and norms shared by most of society's members. The point at which this range has been exceeded becomes apparent when a presidential candidate with markedly different views from those of an incumbent is elected president, or, on a more traumatic scale, when there is rioting in the streets, as during the days of the Vietnam war. In the United States, where elections are regularly scheduled, changes in leadership positions accompanied by the all-too-familiar reorganization of government agencies and the ongoing process of policy making and rule promulgation suggest that governmental operations probably are as subject to internally induced disequilibrium as is the family.

States of equilibrium and adaptation are made possible through negative and positive feedback processes, which can be beneficial or harmful in their consequences (Hill, 1971). To guide their functioning and programming, social systems, regardless of the extent of their openness, use information from their external environment and internal component parts as well as feedback about system performance as forms of systemic self-awareness. Information and feedback incongruent with internally established goals become the basis for modifying system behaviors and operations, and are used as input into systemic decision-making processes.

Negative feedback processes operate to reduce the mismatch between information about a system's performance and its basic values, triggering behaviors to bring about a convergence between the two when they diverge. Thus, with respect to families, information concerning the curtailment of financial incentives for families of working AFDC mothers triggered threats by these mothers to quit working (Henne-

pin County Economic Assistance Department, 1981), just as information concerning increasing interest rates has triggered actions by many families to delay expenditures for such items as a new home or car. In the same vein, information about the escalating costs of Medicare has triggered actions by government to propose charging Medicare patients a minimum per diem fee for each day of hospitalization (Rich, 1981) and reimbursing families for costs involved in caring for ailing members at home. In this sense, negative feedback is a change-resistant set of operations geared toward system sameness or status quo, which indeed may be a desirable state for effective system performance in many situations.

Positive feedback, on the other hand, is a deviation amplifying rather than reducing process which, like negative feedback, also begins with error or mismatch information about a system's behaviors in relation to internal system standards or external criteria (Hill, 1971). Positive feedback processes are viewed as instructive and system-enhancing, contributing to the maintenance of system viability, and are considered essential to the morphogenic process through which systems grow and change. In relation to families, for example, information received from internal sources, such as from an adult son or daughter that he or she is cohabiting without benefit of marriage or intends to marry outside the family's religious faith, or externally, from a family planning clinic that informs parents of their teenage daughter's abortion, sharply amplifies the discrepancy between the deeply held values and beliefs of many parents about sex, marriage, and parental authority and the actual behaviors of their children. In relation to government and the present administration, information received from external sources, such as the National Governor's Association concerning its strong opposition to reductions in government subsidies and programs for poor families, and from internal units, such as the House Education and Labor Committee concerning its opposition to cutbacks in funding for child nutrition programs (COFO Memo, 1981b), amplifies the discrepancy between the administration's goals and priorities and those of its internal and external constituencies. Indeed, one education leader has called the plan to redistribute money from the poor to the rich "Robin Hood in reverse."

The morphogenic process by which systems grow and change can take many forms, among them (1) a dramatic change in intercomponent relationships, such as in parent/child relationships, or, in the case of government, the creation of an Office on Families; (2) a change in system values, purposes, and standards, as may occur in the postparental stage when children leave home, or in changing economic times when family members are out of work, or in the case of government, when a presidential candidate is elected into office representing an ideological perspective substantially different from the one that has prevailed for the last 50 years; (3) a change in internal and external input operations, such as the increased participation of working wives in family decisions, or in the case of government, the recent White House Conferences on Families, the first of such conferences ever to be held in the United States; and (4) the ascendance of components with new and different properties and attributes in the governance and management of the system, as again illustrated by families in which wives have returned to the labor force or adolescents have entered adulthood, or, in the case of government, the increased influence of the Moral Majority as a special interest group.

Integrally related to the concepts of positive feedback and morphogenesis is the idea of "mapping for variety" and the necessity for a continuous flow of varied information, experience, and input into the system (Hill, 1971). Although such "mapping" may reinforce what may be considered a desirable organizational state, positive feed-

back processes that encourage deviation amplification and changed structure appear necessary for taking into account the changing needs of system components and the changing needs of the environment. The environment is conceptualized as comprising conditions external to the system that are both general and specific in relation to it (Hall, 1972). As systems of each other's environment, it is apparent that families and government interact through their respective input and output processes. What are the consequences or outcomes of government outputs as inputs for families? Have government policies and programs been as harmful to family life as some would claim?

OUTCOMES OF GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS AS INPUTS FOR FAMILIES

To ascertain the validity of the frequently asserted claim that government policies and programs have undermined the family's integrity and stability, research findings in several areas of government activity were reviewed. Unfortunately, because outcome questions are seldom asked and, when asked, are seldom framed in a family context, little of the research was found to be of relevance. Nonetheless, research conducted in the areas of income maintenance, deinstitutionalization, compensatory preschool education, divorce reform, and abortion were found to provide important clues for drawing conclusions with regard to the outcomes of government policies and programs for families. Some of these programs, such as social security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) emanate from the federal government. Others, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), are the cooperative efforts of federal, state, and local governments. Still, policies such as divorce reform and abortion laws are primarily outputs of state governments, although with respect to abortion, the passage of a constitutional amendment banning its practice would clearly put it in the domain of the federal government. A few programs, such as compensatory preschool education, local in nature, represent the collaboration of local governmental bodies and private funding organizations, such as foundations. Thus, government policies and programs involve all levels of government, with private interests sometimes joining to support locally based special projects. Regardless of the level of government from which such policies and programs emanate, all seem to be part of larger, nationwide developments and/or initiatives.

Income Maintenance

In the areas of welfare and welfare reform, four experiments were undertaken over a 10-year period in four geographic areas of the country to assess the effects of a guaranteed minimum income in the form of a negative income tax on family work behaviors (Robins, 1980). Participants, randomly assigned to experimental and control groups, were offered different levels of income guarantees and three alternative training programs. One of the experiments took place in New Jersey and Pennsylvania from 1968 to 1972 involving 1300 people; another took place in rural North Carolina and Iowa from 1970 to 1972 that involved 800 persons; a third took place in Seattle and Denver from 1970 to 1978 that involved 4000 people; and a fourth took place in Gary, Indiana from 1971 to 1974 involving 1800 persons. The findings, although inconclusive because of the relatively small sample sizes, differential attrition

of families from the experiments, and imperfect measurements of marital dissolution, are mixed in terms of family outcomes.

At first glance the findings appear to have had negative consequences for families participating in the experiment. Contrary to what might have been expected, family members reduced rather than increased or maintained their work effort, and marital dissolution rates increased rather than decreased. Such consequences were mitigated, however, by other effects. For example, while the income guarantees had the greatest effect on working wives and young people 16 to 21 years of age who reduced their work effort 22 and 20 percent, respectively, participants used their increased nonwork time to devote more time and attention to the rearing and caring of their children, as well as to pursuing additional education, thereby improving their job prospects. In terms of marital dissolution rates, although marriages dissolved 18 to 63 percent more frequently among white families, 15 to 73 percent more frequently among black families, and 37 percent more frequently among Hispanic families supported at below the poverty level than they did in control groups, at 140 percent of the poverty level, the marital dissolution rate was 30 percent lower. This latter finding is often overlooked or disregarded in discussions about the experiments, but it serves to highlight the known relationship between income level and family stability, a relationship that also was made evident in Bishop's (1977) review of data from the National Longitudinal Survey. According to Robert Spiegelman, the economist who directed the income guarantee experiments, the experiments, while not forcing actively encouraging people to divorce, gave them options for changing and improving their personal lives. Such changes were followed by self-reports of enhanced self-concept and self-esteem and a reduction in alcohol consumption, outcomes tha hardly can be considered detrimental to family life. While perhaps disturbing in term of participant work effort, the findings suggest that the income guarantee experiments helped to facilitate family morphogenesis and task performance.

Findings from a panel study inquiring about changes in the economic well of 5000 families in the United States over a five-year period (1968-1973) tha be attributed to public policies complement the findings of the income gua experiments (Morgan et al., 1974). The data base consists of five waves of intervie conducted with a subset of about 2000 families, selected from the Census Bu Survey of Economic Opportunity, whose incomes were less than twice the poverty line and a random sample of families selected from a national sa frame of the Center of Survey Research.

In terms of the influence of welfare policy on changes in family welfare statu findings show that the best predictors of family welfare status are not welfare pc themselves, as so commonly supposed, but such variables as family life cycle family structure or composition, race, and employment rates. For example, tra tions into welfare were found to occur primarily among families with young child recently headed by a woman; families with older children already headed b woman who had not made the transition into welfare at an earlier point in the famil life cycle were no more likely than other families to make the transition later. C they had made the change, however, they were not likely to reverse it until th dren were grown or the women married, a finding that applied equally to bot and black families. Variables showing little or no relationship to changes in economic well-being—that is, in their welfare status—were the employability family head as measured by attitudes and by level of educational achievement ability test scores. Disability, however, was related to welfare status change among those making the transition out of welfare, trusting and goal-related attitude

Once families made the transition into welfare, their economic situation improved with age for all age groups, a relationship that did not hold for family size, however. With each additional child, the level of support for whole families declined consistently, a finding that refutes the commonly held view that AFDC mothers have additional children to increase the size of their AFDC payments.

The view that AFDC, by providing single-parent families with an alternative source of financial support, has a destabilizing effect on existing marriages and decreases the likelihood of remarriage for many AFDC mothers also is refuted by data with regard to both the income guarantee experiments and the AFDC-UP program (Bishop, 1977). Although AFDC-UP is designed to reduce the incentives for families to break up by providing economic assistance to two- rather than one-parent families, as in AFDC, marital dissolution rates are higher among families participating in the AFDC-UP program than among nonparticipating families. Thus family breakup cannot be attributed to AFDC. With regard to remarriage, Bradbury and her colleagues (1977) note that despite the increasingly generous AFDC payments of the recent past, 80 percent of all divorced women eventually remarry. Further, between 1960 and 1974, the number of nonpoor, female-headed families with children increased at a much greater rate than the number of poor, female-headed families with children. Thus, although demographic trends and changes in family composition and structure are correlated with increases in more generous AFDC payments, the program at the most is consistent with prevailing social trends, such as the increased independence of women, general improvements in living standards, and more liberal attitudes toward divorce.

Overall, the findings of the panel study with respect to the economic well-being of welfare families are consistent with the study's larger findings as they pertain to the economic well-being of families in general. That is, changes in family structure and composition over the family life cycle are more important in accounting for changes in family economic well-being than employment rates, wage rates, education, attitudes, or urban/rural residence. By providing the economic resources needed during family life cycle transitions that simultaneously coincide with more disruptive changes in family structure, welfare policies certainly would appear to contribute to family equilibrium and task performance.

The effects of program changes from Old Age Assistance (OAA) to the SSI program on the living arrangements of aged welfare recipients were examined in a panel study of changes in the economic well-being of American families undertaken by the Bureau of the Census (Tissue and McCoy, 1981). Data were collected within a stratified multistage cluster design in which the probability of selection varied by geographic region. Interviews were conducted with over 5000 elderly persons during the last three months of 1973 immediately before their transfer to SSI, a federal income maintenance program for disabled and elderly persons. Based on nationally uniform eligibility criteria and standard administrative procedures, it is in effect a guaranteed minimum income for such persons. Information was gathered not only about their income and assets but also about their household composition, health, housing, diet, and social activities. Follow-up interviews were conducted with 89 percent of the initial cohort during the last three months of 1974. The analysis is based on responses from 3305 persons.

Except for 5 percent who suffered a decline of 20 percent or more because of the program change and inflation, follow-up interviews revealed that the economic well-being of most recipients improved after the change to SSI. Improvement in their economic well-being was not necessarily related to subsequent change in their living ar-

rangements, however; 59 percent of those interviewed who lived alone in 1974 lived alone in 1973; the other 42 percent moved in with others or had others move in with them. While most were better off financially as a consequence of SSI, income change resulted in changed living arrangements only for those who could meet the demands of independent living. Other variables, in addition to income affecting the living arrangements of these older persons, were their age, health, sex, and family status. More specifically, being in the younger age range of the older population, male, a parent, functionally self-sufficient, and living in a combined household prior to SSI and the subsequent change in their financial situation also were important determinants of changes in the living arrangements of persons participating in the study.

Such findings are supported by data relative to the effects of social security payments on the living arrangements of female beneficiaries. The data show that although there appears to be a relationship between the two, such a relationship is modified by family structure. For example, the proportion of women over 65 who were either never married, divorced, separated, or widowed living with relatives decreased sharply between 1940 and 1970, from 58 to 29 percent (Kobrin, 1976). At the same time, older persons experienced a 38 percent increase in real income as a result of the maturation of the social security program and expansion of means-tested programs for older persons (Warlick, 1979). Also occurring at the same time, however, were important demographic changes showing a marked increase in the ratio of older persons to adult children with whom they might live (Kobrin, 1976). Thus, any conclusions with regard to the effects of social security payments on the living arrangements of older persons would have to take into account the nature of their family structures and the alternative living arrangements such structures realistically can provide. During that time in the family life cycle when the family system has contracted and income potential from work has severely diminished, thereby threatening the economic stability of the older family unit, SSI and social security clearly seem to contribute to family equilibrium and task performance.

Deinstitutionalization of Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Members

The same kind of conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn with respect to deinstitutionalization policies as they pertain to families with members who are mentally ill or mentally retarded. One of the first studies on this subject was conducted by Grad and Sainsbury (1968) in England to determine whether the trend toward community care created an additional burden for families of deinstitutionalized mentally ill members. Families of random samples of approximately one in three of all patients referred to two hospitals emphasizing different types for care, one community care and the other traditional hospital care, were visited and followed up. Interviews were conducted one month after referral and again two years later. Family burden was estimated by rating the effects of the patient on the family's income, social life, domestic and school routines, and emotional and physical health. As expected, family burden was greater among families participating in the community care than in the hospital care approach, not only because of the patient's presence in the home but also because home visits were not incorporated in the community care approach as they were in the hospital care approach. These findings suggest that deinstitutionalization policies that do not include supportive services to families of mentally ill person tend to exacerbate family disequilibrium and impaired task performance.

Such a conclusion is supported by other studies of family burden of families of former mental patients. Hoenig and Hamilton (1969) interviewed 179 families living in two English communities in which home care was the preferred approach and who had lived continuously with members who were former mental patients for four years prior to the study. They differentiated between subjective and objective burden by asking families to rate the burden they experienced as a consequence for the home care program, comparing their ratings with those of a social worker on the same item. A little over one-third, or 56, of the families were assessed to be functioning under an objective burden. Families not rated as having an objective burden did not report a subjective one. Variables that contributed to family burden were the patient's age, marital status, severity of illness, and length of hospitalization. More specifically, families experienced greater subjective burden if the member was older, married, rated sicker, or was hospitalized for a longer time during the period covered by the study. Although most families were sympathetic toward the patient, well over half (56 percent) were relieved when the member returned to the hospital.

In this regard, a study of 93 significant others of female psychiatric patients treated on an inpatient or day care basis in a private psychiatric hospital found that family attitudes about mental illness were relatively stable over time and unaffected by the treatment setting, the relationship of the significant other to the patient—that is, whether the significant other was a parent, spouse or lover—or improvement in the patient's pathology (Vaunicelli et al., 1980). Thus, although family stress or burden may vary with the member's relationship to the patient and the availability of treatment or supportive services in the community, apparently attitudes of family members toward mental illness do not. Kelman (1964), in discussing the implications of hospitalization for families of brain-damaged children, states that deviance, while recognized, is not assigned the same priority of family concern and resources as other problems. For these families, hospitalization may be regarded as one way of eliminating one more problem or burden with which they have to deal. Such also may be the case for families with mentally ill members.

The Training in Community Living Program, a project of the Mendota Mental Health Institute in Madison, Wisconsin (Test and Stein, 1977), also addresses the question of family burden in families with deinstitutionalized mentally ill members. Persons participating in the study were those seeking admission to the state hospital on an inpatient basis. Random assignment of 130 persons was made to experimental and control groups, the experimental group being assigned to the Training in Community Living Program, and the control group to short-term hospital treatment with referral to after-care services in the community. Work with families in the experimental group was directed toward altering family relationships and providing both families and patients extensive supportive services. Like the Grad and Sainsbury and Hoenig and Hamilton studies, in this investigation the relative burden of both experimental and control approaches on family members was assessed by obtaining objective information from the most significant other in the patient's family on the amount of disruption the family experienced in areas of employment, school attendance, social and leisure-time activities, household and domestic routines, and relationships with neighbors as a consequence of the patient's illness. Such information was obtained every four months for a one-year period. A subjective measure of burden also was included.

None of the measures revealed a significant difference between the two groups of families. Families of patients in the experimental group did not experience excessive burden or greater burden than those in the control group. Indeed, at four months, experimental families reported a significant decrease in burden with no such decrease reported for families in the control group. The authors attribute these findings to the

tremendous amount of supportive services that both patients and their families in the experimental group received. As Kreisman and Joy (1975) conclude, it appears that optimal conditions for posthospital adjustment vary with each patient and family. For some families the care of a mentally ill member may be so debilitating that the family is destroyed in the process. For other families such care may depend on community supports, whether such supports take the form of counseling, homemaker service, or day care for the patient.

In terms of families with mentally retarded members, the extent to which they are affected by policies of deinstitutionalization is suggested by a national survey showing that about 40 percent of all mentally retarded persons discharged from public institutions return to their natural families. To learn about their situation after discharge and the effects of discharge on their families, a survey using a mail questionnaire was conducted with individuals who had been released from one of six institutions in New York state and who had been institutionalized for at least one year (Willer et al., 1981). It is noteworthy that natural families responded at a considerably lower rate than other caretakers. For group home parents, the response rate was 76 percent; for family care families, 71 percent; for natural families of mentally retarded members place in alternate settings, 35 percent; and for natural families, 31 percent. Follow-up phone calls uncovered considerable resentment among natural families about deinstitutionalization as a policy, as their lower survey participation rate would suggest.

For many families, the deinstitutionalization of the retarded member represented a time of crisis, some because they were fearful that they would be unable to deal effectively with the behaviors of the retarded member and others because they felt guilty about their original decision to institutionalize the member. For most families, particularly female-headed families, implicit in the return of the retarded member was the burden of the member's long-term care. Factors contributing to such feelings were the caretaker's inability to obtain even brief relief from the responsibility of such care, the financial costs implicit in such care, and the generally more limited financial resources of families to whose home retarded members were most likely to return. Because they worked full-time, about one-fourth of female heads of families did not accept the deinstitutionalized member's return to the home, feeling that were they to do so, they would have to relinquish their jobs and change their lifestyle in ways they could not or would not accept. Most families to which a retarded member had returned cited a number of benefits, such as an enriched family life (72 percent), household assistance (60 percent), greater understanding of mental retardation (72 percent), and companionship (76 percent). For this latter group of families, deinstitutionalization policies apparently contributed to family morphogenesis and task performance.

Early Preschool Compensatory Education

Findings of a $3 million study concerning the positive effects of compensatory preschool education for disadvantaged children disputing findings from the earlier Westinghouse study (Schweinhart and Weikart, 1980) also are relevant in ascertaining whether government policies and programs have been detrimental to family life. The research was conducted by the High/Scope Education Research Foundation to Ypsilanti, Michigan, among 123 black children of disadvantaged families selected for the study on the basis of their low cognitive ability and the low educational attainment level and occupational status of their parents. Beginning in 1962, five waves of experimental and control groups of three- and four-year-old children were initiated over four years with 58 children randomly assigned to the experimental group and 65 to

the control group, with some adjustment made to assure matching on social class, IQ, boy/girl ratio, and percentage of working mothers.

The experimental group participated in a preschool program 12 and one-half hours per week for two years. The program emphasized active learning and problem-solving, a high degree of communication with other children, and the encouragement of motivation. It also incorporated weekly home visits designed to inform parents about the educative process in which their children were involved and to encourage mothers to observe and participate in as many teaching activities with their children as possible. Follow-up study 15 years later showed that children who had attended the preschool program scored higher on achievement tests in math, language, and reading; were less antisocial or delinquent; were more likely to hold jobs after school at age 15; and had a higher rate of high school completion, greater interest in attending college, a higher employment rate, and lower arrest records than those who had not. In terms of the value of the mothers' time computed in cost-benefit terms, the program was assessed to be worth $668 per child based on the average wage rate for homemakers in 1968 dollars. In psychological terms, most of the parents of children participating in the preschool program (51 percent) were pleased with the work their children had done in school, compared to only 28 percent of the parents of children in the control group. From the point of view of both parents and children, these findings suggest that the program was conducive to family morphogenesis and task performance, and when generational effects are projected, its benefits would appear to be compounded. However, because of the small number of participants and the special nature of experimental programs, the findings cannot be regarded as applicable to all preschool compensatory education programs. Rather, they indicate that under similar special circumstances, such findings may apply.

Divorce Reform

Analysis of data with regard to policies of a more general or less targeted nature, such as no-fault divorce reform, indicates that although there is a tendency to attribute the rise in divorce rates to no-fault divorce laws based on the principle of marital breakdown or failure rather than the fault of one spouse as opposed to the innocence of the other (Wright and Stetson, 1978), such reforms are the consequences of family decisions and behaviors rather than their causes. To support the view that no-fault divorce laws are the cause of increased divorce rates, the data would have to show that postreform changes in divorce rates in reform states are significantly greater than rates in no-reform states. Instead the data show that divorce rates during the period between 1960 and 1975 tended to climb in both reform and no-reform states, reflecting a nationwide trend. While divorce rates increased substantially in states such as California when no-fault divorce reform was first introduced, part of the increase is attributable to reduction in the waiting period between filing and decree from one year to six months, thus reflecting only a short-term increase in the divorce rates in these states. Indeed, in none of the 25 "experimental" divorce reform states was there a clear and enduring rise in divorce rates. Further, the strong relationship between mobility and divorce in states experiencing large increases in migration indicates that increasing divorce rates are not so much the outcome of liberalized divorce laws as they are of demographic and other social changes affecting marriages. Thus, it would appear that divorce reform laws could very well contribute to subsequent family equilibrium and task performance by alleviating some of the tensions and stresses commonly associated with the legal aspects of the divorce process.

Abortion Reform

Just as high divorce rates cannot be attributed to liberalized divorce laws, increased abortion rates cannot be attributed to liberalized abortion laws which, since the mid-1960s and until very recently, have reflected a shift from a limited to a more widespread tolerance of abortion (Krannich, 1980). A review of demographic trends in marriage and family patterns and past abortion policies in the United States shows that despite laws and policies restricting legal access to it to less than one percent of the total estimated number of annual abortions, abortion was relatively common during the first 65 years of this century. Doctor Willard Cates, Chief of Abortion Surveillance at the National Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, is reported to have prepared a statement that was to have been given as testimony before a Senate judiciary committee saying that in 1965, when abortions were illegal in the United States, abortion-related deaths represented 20 percent of all pregnancy-related deaths (Minneapolis Star, July 13, 1981). Moreover, according to the report, in that same year half of the beds in gynecologic units of large public hospitals in the United States were occupied by women suffering from complications resulting from illegal abortions. In 1976, three years after the Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion, only two abortion-related deaths were reported, which, according to Cates, now makes abortion safer than childbirth.

Not only has legal abortion apparently contributed to a significant decline in high-risk teenage marriages that often produce unwanted babies, but it also has been associated with a decline in out-of-wedlock births in some states. Findings from a series of research studies on teenage childbearing conducted under the auspices of the Center for Population Research show that children born to teenagers suffer intellectual deficits because of the economic and social circumstances of early childbearing and young parenthood (Baldwin and Cain, 1980). Such children are likely not only to spend at least part of their childhood in one-parent families but to have children themselves while they are still adolescents, which suggests a generational effect that has long-term adverse consequences. Another study comparing a group of 220 children born to women twice denied abortion for the same pregnancy with a matched control group of 220 children born to women who had not requested abortion (Dytrych et al., 1975) indicates that the study group of initially unwanted children at age nine had (1) a higher incidence of illness and hospitalization despite having had the same biological start; (2) slightly poorer school grades and performance levels despite having the same level of intelligence; and (3) somewhat poorer peer relationships and thus a higher potential for maladaptation. Among these unwanted children, boys tended to be more vulnerable to problems than girls, showing a higher incidence of chronic disease and a greater degree of excitability and mobility. In such respects, laws criminalizing abortion practice would seem to threaten family life and well-being. Indeed, according to Cate's statement, because mothers are less fearful about the possibility of giving birth to a genetically defective baby, the availability of amniocentesis and abortion has resulted in a 10 percent increase in childbearing among high-risk genetic families.

While it has been predicted that the criminalization of abortion would lead to an increase in illness and disease among American women, not necessarily to the decreased incidence of abortion, it also has been predicted that abortion rates should stabilize by the mid-1980s, given current demographics showing the movement of baby boom era adults into their postreproductive years and more widespread use of fertility control measures (Krannich, 1980). Thus while current abortion policies may

not have caused increased abortion rates, by adapting to actual family behaviors they apparently contribute to enhanced family performance with respect to family procreation and formation, as well as to family equilibrium, which in the context of this discussion is a desirable system state.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion can hardly be considered definitive with respect to the outcomes of government policies and programs for family life, inasmuch as the findings cited pertain to only a few policies and programs. Also, others may interpret and evaluate the findings differently. Nonetheless, to the extent that there is agreement and conclusions can be drawn with respect to the findings of the research reviewed, the answer to the question directing the review—Have government policies and programs been detrimental to family life?—the answer is overall no, government policies and programs have not been detrimental to family life. Indeed, except for policies of deinstitutionalization that have not simultaneously provided services to support affected individuals and families in the community, such policies and programs would seem to have contributed to overall family well-being and task performance. This is not to say that such policies could not be faulted on other grounds in terms of adequacy, equity, individual rights, and so forth, or that they could not have been more beneficent and contributed more to family life. If, for example, a guaranteed minimum income of 140 percent of the poverty level was found to be a greater stabilizer of family life than income assistance below that level, then clearly the appropriate policy response would have been a national guaranteed minimum income at a higher level. Similarly, if supportive services for families of deinstitutionalized mentally ill and mentally retarded members were found to reduce family burden and enhance family functioning and task performance, then clearly policies to provide for such service would seem to be indicated.

That such adaptations on the part of government have not occurred illustrates what Schorr (1972) and Adams and Winston (1980) stated and what is a generally accepted fact. Family criteria are not the most important or salient for policymaking in the United States, except when they are consistent with or further other policy objectives. The refundable tax credit for child care expenses of working parents and federal payments to working parents whose annual income is so low they are disqualified from paying federal income taxes (Minneapolis Tribune, 1981b) are examples of policies that incorporate family criteria consistent with other more major policy objectives—the promotion of work and productivity.

When family considerations diverge from such objectives, as in the case of the guaranteed minimum income experiments in which family members decreased their work effort to increase their family effort, policies often are enacted to bring family behaviors into greater conformity with them through, for example, provisions to strengthen the work requirement for welfare, as evidenced in the latest welfare reform proposal. Policies to effect specific behaviors on the part of families that are more consistent with policy objectives can have only conditional success, however, not because they are inherently ineffectual with respect to such behaviors but because they are only one of many variables impinging on and affecting family systemic processes and outputs. Indeed, just as family concerns may not be salient for policy when they do not further other policy objectives, so policy may not be salient for families, or not as salient as it could be, when it does not address or ignores such variables as

family structure, family stage of development, health of family members, and so forth, as shown by the various panel studies of the economic well-being of families.

In some respects, too much importance may have been attached to government policies and programs vis-à-vis families in recent years. Family behaviors not only often seem to be independent of government rules and regulations, as divorce and abortion rates suggest, but government outputs, as noted above, are only one of many variables that input into family structures and processes. Further, environmental variables, such as the state of the economy, cultural values and attitudes, and demographics, that affect families also affect government, serving to modify family/government interactions and their outcomes for families.

Thus, although families and government, as systems of each other's respective environment, are engaged in ongoing interactions through their respective input/output processes, the nature of their interactions is more complicated than what might appear on the surface. That the nature of their interactions is undergoing dramatic change is clear. Whether these changing interactions will be good or bad or better or worse for families in terms of family morphogenesis or equilibrium and task performance, and for which families, remains to be seen. Those who perceive current policy trends as running counter to the best interests of families should take solace in the fact that government policy oscillates between competing value themes, with one value theme holding a dominant position for a period of time only to be replaced by another (Smelser and Halpern, 1978). Thus, inherent in the present situation is a countercycle of change that already has been set into motion by individuals and groups mobilizing around their perceptual definitions of desirable family/government interactions and the desired family/government relationship. In view of the continuing struggle around such definitions, it behooves policy makers to attend closely to the outcomes of such struggles for families, given the importance of the functions families perform for their members and society at large. In doing so policymakers may help to change the order of the criteria used in formulating policy in the United States, making families at least as salient as economics and productivity in policy matters, a sign that government is undergoing its own morphogenesis.

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tion of the economic system as opposed to personal inadequacies. Unfortunately, this dichotomy continues to surface, and more often than not, we err toward an explanation favoring personal inadequacy.

The income transfer system currently consists of forty separate programs. These income transfer policies fall into several broad categories: non-income-tested social insurance programs, refundable tax credits, income-tested welfare programs, in-kind benefits, and job-related support. The bulk of these programs, both in terms of numbers and dollars, are policies of the federal government (i.e., $267 out of a total of $296 billion), though several, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children, are administered through state and local governments. State and local financing plays its largest role in welfare programs. Income transfer policies are formulated by the donor system and implemented through the administrative system, with little or no meaningful role played by the recipients.

Most of these programs are categorical, in that they separate and treat people differently (e.g., those who are expected to work versus those who are not). Social insurance programs are larger and "lift more people out of poverty than do welfare programs, even though a larger *proportion* of the benefits from welfare go to the poor."

Garfinkel and Haveman report that absolute poverty declined between 1965 and 1974, though overall income inequality remained stable. "If support payments had not increased, the distribution of income would actually have become more unequal during the past 25 years." Furthermore, government transfers dramatically reduced inequality for several population groups, most notably the aged, though as Benjamin and Estes noted, not for the poorest elderly. The disincentive effects of income transfer programs have had far less impact on healthy married males than on married women or older men. This may be a positive result in that it may foster women's independence and enable them to spend more time on child-rearing activities or education so that they can eventually obtain more meaningful and better paid employment (see also Zimmerman).

Garfinkel and Haveman question whether local control of income transfer policies, without national regulations, will ultimately be beneficial. They also go on to provide an elaborate prescription for future policy.

Workplace Interventions

In the subsequent chapter, Levin explores potential strategies for increasing the number of jobs and their attractiveness as human experiences, particularly in a society such as ours in which the vast majority of employed persons work for wages and salaries in large hierarchical and impersonal enterprises, "in which the characteristics of their work schedules and activities are set out in precise detail without their participation." The human and social costs of these conditions are likely to be even further exacerbated by increasing microtechnology, automation, and the resulting job dissatisfaction of an increasingly educated, but unfulfilled and powerless, work force.

Given that the decisions of private business firms are based primarily on the maximization of profits, Levin wonders whether it is a fruitful domain toward which we should, at least initially, direct our energies. He raises this issue with full cognizance of the fact that four-fifths of all jobs are in the private sector.

Increased employment and improved quality of working life are seen to entail a greater degree of democratic control over the workplace. Levin discusses several types of macro- and microstrategies to achieve democracy in the workplace.

One important macrostrategy discussed is the use of legislation to expand the rights of workers in governing the workplace. Illustrations of such laws in the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden are provided. This legislation appears to have been effective in achieving its intended outcomes. However, only the process of mandated negotiations required at the local level (as in the Swedish case) and not detailed solutions for individual firms, are prescribed in the legislation.

Other macrostrategies discussed include the use of worker pension funds to invest in forms that will expand employment and improve working life, policies to expand the establishment, growth and survival of small business and worker-owned firms, and the establishment of worker-owned and democratically managed firms. The first two strategies are suggestions. Policies for facilitating small businesses need to assure access to capital on reasonable terms and technical assistance for their survival and expansion.

Worker-owned and -managed firms are a new national phenomenon. They have been used to save jobs at plants that would otherwise close and to improve both the quality of working life and productivity. The best examples are worker cooperatives that have a long history. These clearly give workers both the sense and reality of ownership, and they are quite empowering. The plywood cooperative of the Pacific Northwest is an excellent and well-studied example. Most recent attention has been inspired by the industrial cooperatives of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain which have been extremely productive in their use of both capital and labor resources. However, the Mondragon model may be difficult to transfer to the United States.

Work reorganization is a microstrategy that goes beyond the previously discussed macrostrategies. This primarily comes about by expanding worker participation in decision making, if not in corporate ownership. It leads to the reorganization of work. These programs have not only led to improved morale, but to greater efficiency and productivity. They increase workers' sense of ownership and feelings of empowerment.

Housing Interventions

Housing developments have been dominated primarily by the free market economy. The result has been a variety of private housing market errors and social inequities. These errors and inequities, as conceptualized by Heumann, have sometimes been responded to with federal, state, or municipal interventions. Such action or inaction has often led to the perpetuation of these problems or other unintended negative effects. As a consequence, an increasingly visible, grassroots neighborhood group movement has evolved over the past dozen years. A wide variety of tactics have been employed by these neighborhood organizations depending on the specific "error" or social inequity to which they responded.

According to Heumann:

> *The activities of both larger governments and grassroot groups have taught us that we have yet to identify all the correct points of intervention into the private housing market. Some intervention programs must begin and remain at the residential neighborhood level. Others are more suited to the municipal level. Still others require the collective action of an entire economic region. The states and federal government also have important roles in funding and leadership. Programs to revitalize residential housing require the involvement of many institutions outside the residential neighborhood, but they will fail without local residential commitment and involvement. The fair and equitable distribution of new low-income housing is a regional economic issue that can*

not be solved by neighborhoods or municipalities. The new housing locations must be linked to job opportunities and public resources spread throughout the economic market. Housing reform and the degree to which the public regulates or replaces the private housing market is a decision that involves all segments of society.

Environmental Interventions

Interventions directed toward changing the architectural or built environment with the goal of enhancing social support and/or personal control are reviewed by Holahan. Environmental design is critically related to patterns of human and social behavior. Furthermore, it appears that architectural plans and arrangements that do not incorporate the cultural habits and mores of the residents lead to a variety of psychosocial dysfunctions. One example is provided by the studies of urban low-rise tenements that were inconsistent with the Puerto Rican residents' natural patterns of behavior (see Chapter 24 for further details).

Energy Conservation Programs

Energy conservation policy has occurred largely outside the federal government (Chapter 25). The guiding forces have come from private organizations and energy-minded grassroot organizations. These latter groups have been "issue centered," in Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet's terms (see Chapter 11), and have developed a national constituency. The current federal government clearly views the responsibility for energy conservation as the domain of local governments and the private sector. Nevertheless, the northwestern states have developed a regional energy policy.

Olsen and Joerges conclude that energy conservation programs are most effective when conducted at the local level and that national and state programs tend to be too broad and rigid to adapt adequately to the varying social, political, and economic conditions of different communities. Yet federal and regional energy agencies do have a vital role to play in formulating policy and helping to fund conservation programs.

Programs must be designed and implemented at the community level. In this way higher-level programs can be adapted to local conditions and oriented toward specific target populations or groups. Citizens need to be involved in the decision-making process, thus enhancing their personal awareness of the context of energy use. In addition to altering the personal context of energy use, the "programs must be designed to change whatever features of the various structural contexts are relevant to its objectives." Here we see what Crowfoot and colleagues (Chapter 11) discussed as organizing, mobilizing, and consciousness raising at the personal, organizational, and institutional levels of society.

Recreation and Leisure Programs

The federal government's role in community leisure has been primarily devoted to the development of outdoor recreation resources and facilities. Most "state legislatures passed enabling laws empowering municipalities and counties to conduct recreation activities" (Murphy, Chapter 26).

The nature of services and target populations has changed with the sociopolitical *zeitgeist*, including the increased time available for leisure activities. Recipients of

services had little role in the determination of service available. More recently, they have begun to take an increasingly active role, and in the generation of financial resources as well. Overall, it appears that the development of recreation and leisure services needs to attuned to the culture and needs of the targeted group.

LESSONS LEARNED

The general principles learned in Part V are identical to those discussed in Part IV. While these points could be enriched with the use of different illustrations from Part V, redundancy will be avoided, and the reader is referred to the Lessons Learned section Part IV.

21

Income Transfer Policy in the United States

A Review and Assessment

Irwin Garfinkel
Robert H. Haveman

Reducing economic insecurity and alleviating poverty have become generally recognized as legitimate government objectives. Stable economic growth, public health and education programs, labor market policies, and public income transfers all contribute to these goals. In this chapter we focus on the role of public income transfers. Income transfer programs have been the major growth area in the federal budget in the past half century. From a base of essentially zero in the early 1930s, federal income transfers in 1981 stood at nearly $300 billion, absorbing 45 percent of federal outlays.

In the first section of the chapter we briefly describe the current income transfer system. In the next section we tell how we got to where we are. In the third section we discuss major issues in income transfer policy and the values that are at stake.

The fourth section is an assessment of income transfer policy. What has been accomplished in terms of reducing poverty, insecurity, and inequality? What side effects in terms of work and savings reduction or family disruption have accompanied the gains? In the final section we discuss where we should go from here, and present some options for the future evolution of income transfer interventions.

THE CURRENT INCOME TRANSFER SYSTEM

Currently, there are over forty separate programs that together constitute the income support system in the United States. Table 21.1 presents estimated public expenditures on the most important ones for fiscal year 1981.

Total income support expenditures for fiscal 1981 are estimated to be nearly $300 billion, amounting to about 10 percent of GNP and about 45 percent of the total federal budget. This is a substantial sum although, by comparison with other Western industrialized countries, not excessive. Average expenditures for income support in the European Economic Community countries in 1972 amounted to about 11 percent of GNP (OCED, 1976). For some Western European countries—Sweden and the Netherlands, for example—income support spending is in excess of 15 percent of GNP.

TABLE 21.1 Estimated Benefit Expenditures for Major Income Support Programs, Fiscal Year 1981 ($ billion)

Program	*Federal*	*State and Local*	*Total*
Total	273.8	27.7	301.5
Social Insurance—Non-Income-Tested	209.8	7.2	217.0
Cash Benefits			
Old Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance and Railroad Retirement	143.6	0	143.6
Special Compensation for Disabled Coal Miners	1.0	0	1.0
Unemployment Insurance	18.8	0	18.8
Veterans' and Survivors' Service-Connected Compensation	7.5	0	7.5
Worker's Compensation	1.5	7.2	8.7
Total	172.4	7.2	179.6
In-Kind Benefits			
Medicare	37.4	0	37.4
Refundable Tax Credits			
Earned Income Tax Credit	1.9	0	1.9
Welfare—Income-Tested	55.4	20.5	75.9
Cash Benefits			
Aid to Families with Dependent Children	6.9	5.8	12.7
Supplemental Security Income	6.9	1.6	8.5
Veterans' and Survivors' Non-Service-Connnected Pensions	4.0	0	4.0
General Assistance	0	1.3	1.3
Total	17.8	8.7	26.5
In-Kind Benefits			
Food Stamps	9.7	0	9.7
Child Nutrition and Other Department of Agriculture Food Assistance	4.2	0	4.2
Medicaid	15.8	11.8	27.6
Housing Assistance	5.5	0	5.5
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants	2.4	0	2.4
Total	37.6	11.8	49.4
Job-Related Support	6.7	NA	6.7
Comprehensive Employment and Training (CETA)	4.4	NA	4.4
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (and related)	.3	NA	.3
Special Employment Programs for Youth	2.0	NA	2.0

SOURCES: The Budget of the United States, Fiscal year 1981, from *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1979). Data on Workers Compensation and General Assistance are for 1977 and come from U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Several characteristics of the current system stand out in Table 21.1. First, the system is clearly a categorical one. There are separate programs for single-parent families, veterans, the aged, blind, and disabled, students from poor families, and the working poor. Most, though not all, of this categorization is a response to the work issue—an attempt to separate out and treat differently those who are expected to work from those who are not. For example, all of the social insurance programs are closely tied to previous labor force attachment. Of these, only the unemployment insurance program aids those expected to work, and even in this case the aid provided is normally short term. The earned income tax credit and several of the

recently enacted welfare programs—most notably food stamps and housing assistance programs—also provide aid to those expected to work. Whereas the President's Commission on Income Maintenance found in 1969 that the working poor were systematically excluded from our categorical welfare system, this is no longer the case. The system remains categorical, but some support is available to the working poor.

Second, expenditures for the social insurance programs are substantially larger than are those for welfare programs—$217 billion compared to $76 billion. In all, social insurance expenditures account for nearly three-quarters of total income support expenditures. As a consequence, social insurance programs lift more people out of poverty than do welfare programs, even though a larger *proportion* of the benefits from welfare go to the poor.

Third, the hybrid earned income tax credit is miniscule in comparison to both social insurance and welfare programs. The federal income tax does, however, provide substantial "tax expenditure" subsidies to nonpoor families for housing, medical care, and child care. These subsidies (not shown in the table) amounted to over $40 billion in 1980.

Fourth, cash benefits account for a larger share of total expenditures than in-kind benefits—$206 billion versus $87 billion. However, it should be noted that welfare benefits that are in kind exceed both cash welfare benefits and in-kind social insurance benefits.

Fifth, although many people identify the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with welfare, it actually accounts for only 17 percent of total welfare expenditures and not much more than 4 percent of total expenditures on income support. By far the largest welfare program is Medicaid.

Sixth, the bulk of income support expenditures is financed by the federal government—$267 billion out of a total of $295 billion. Just as in-kind benefits play a larger role in welfare than in social insurance programs, state and local financing also plays a bigger role in welfare programs than in social insurance.

It should be emphasized that this overview of the income support system would differ if free public elementary and secondary education were included as part of the system. Most analysts of income support programs do not include public education in the list of income support programs; it is included in the more comprehensive list of social welfare expenditures, however (McMillan and Bixby, 1980). If primary and secondary education were privately provided with public transfers—grants or loans—to help families bear the costs, then public expenditures would clearly be counted as part of our income support system. If education expenditures were included, total expenditures on income support would rise by $97 billion, and the difference between expenditures on non-income-tested and income-tested welfare programs would become correspondingly larger—$314 billion (rather than $217 billion) on nonwelfare programs compared to $76 billion on welfare programs.

HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE: THE EVOLUTION OF INCOME TRANSFER POLICY

From the Start to the 1935 Social Security Act

Alleviating poverty has been recognized as an essential—albeit controversial—government responsibility in the United States from the outset (Axinn and Levin,

1975). The colonists brought with them the British poor law, just as they brought with them numerous other British laws and customs. In 1601 the Elizabethan Poor Law established a system of parish relief financed by local taxation. The system was designed to give cash or in-kind support to those not expected to work and to provide work for the able-bodied by supplying them with raw material they were expected to make into goods for sale. By the eighteenth century, the institution of the workhouse, a place where the jobless were housed, maintained, and employed at various tasks, had developed.

By 1789, public assistance was one of the largest items of expenditure in many American towns. Throughout the nineteenth century, responsibility for providing aid to limited groups of the poor, like the blind and the insane, shifted very gradually from local to state governments. By mid-century, free public education was funded by property taxes and provided by local governments. Not until after the Civil War, however, did the federal government assume any responsibility. This was in the form of aid to veterans disabled by the war, aid to widows and orphans, and the short-lived Freedman's Bureau, which provided aid to former slaves.

In the early twentieth century, the trends toward state assumption of responsibility accelerated. The first Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted in Wisconsin in 1908. By 1930, all but a few states had workmen's compensation laws, more than half had widows' pension programs, and seven had aid to the aged programs. In 1932, New York and Wisconsin enacted Unemployment Insurance laws.

The Great Depression in the 1930s led to a dramatic shift from state to federal responsibility for financing and administering aid and insurance programs. State and local governments were simply unable to cope with the large increase in hardship caused by unemployment. The Federal Emergency Relief Act in 1932 appropriated $500 million (later increased to $5 billion) to provide direct relief to states, cities, towns, and counties. Because the incidence of unemployment and poverty was so widespread, many came to view the problem as caused by the economic system rather than by personal inadequacies. In 1934 President Roosevelt appointed a Committee on Economic Security to design and draft permanent legislation to deal with the problem of economic insecurity. Within six months, the Committee prepared the legislation that became the historic 1935 Social Security Act.

The Social Security Act to the War on Poverty

The 1935 Social Security Act established the basic framework of our current income transfer system. It created five new programs. Two were social insurance programs in which eligibility and benefit levels are related to previous employment and contributions by the worker and/or his employer: Old Age Insurance (OAI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI). Three were welfare programs in which eligibility and benefit levels depend on current income: Aid to the Blind (AB), Old Age Assistance (OAA), and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). The two social insurance programs were federally financed and administered. The three welfare programs were funded jointly by federal and state governments (and locally as well in most states, at least initially) and administered by states and localities.

These new programs substantially increased the income support provided to the aged, unemployed, blind, and dependent children. Perhaps even more important, the Social Security Act established a foundation on which other programs could be built.

The traditional distinction between employables and unemployables was made a foundation of the Act. The two social insurance programs (and a permanent work

relief program recommended by the Committee on Economic Security but not enacted) were designed for employables; the welfare programs were for those with no labor force attachment. To quote from the Report of Committee on Economic Security (1935): "The measures we suggest all seek to segregate more clearly distinguishable large groups among those now on relief or on the verge of relief and to apply such differential treatment to each group as will give it the greatest practical degree of economic security."

To some extent, the new social insurance programs also reduced reliance on the family to provide help to those in distress. The most notable change was in the OAI program—the Social Security Retirement program—in which benefits to the aged were not conditional on the ability of the children to support their parents. In the welfare programs, however, the responsibility of relatives still played a large role. In many states, for instance, the aged had to cooperate with the state in suing their children for support as a condition of getting Old Age Assistance (OAA) benefits. Similarly, poor mothers on welfare were under pressure to cooperate in securing support payments from the absent fathers of their children. While this practice has decreased for the elderly, it has not for welfare mothers.

The welfare programs in the Social Security Act were expected to decline in importance over time. OAA was to help those aged poor who had not contributed to, and were therefore not eligible for, the Old Age Insurance Program. As the Old Age Insurance Program matured, it was expected that the number of beneficiaries of the welfare program would dwindle. The welfare programs for both the blind and dependent children were also expected to remain small. Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was viewed as a program for aiding widows; no one envisioned the growth in marital instability that was to convert the program from a minor, relatively uncontroversial, program into the focal point of the welfare reform debate in the 1960s and 1970s.

During the period from 1935 to the War on Poverty, the Social Security Act was amended several times. As a result, the income support system gradually expanded. More aid to more groups was provided at increased cost, and the role of the federal government became larger. There were attempts to reduce the role of welfare by expanding the role of social insurance. In 1938 the Survivors Insurance program was enacted in order to reduce reliance of widows and their children on welfare. In 1950, a welfare program for the disabled—the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled Program—was enacted. In the same year, benefits in the ADC program were extended to the caretaker, usually the mother of the children, and the program name was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In 1956, the Disability Insurance Program was enacted. In 1962 the Social Security Act was again amended to provide social services to AFDC mothers in order to help them leave the welfare rolls and achieve independence.

The War on Poverty, the Great Society, and Their Aftermath

Just as the Great Depression accelerated developments in income support policy in the 1930s, a combination of events led to a similar acceleration during the 1960s and early 1970s. The civil rights movement heightened awareness of social injustice and increased the political power of one of the poorest segments of our society. The assassination of President Kennedy created sympathy for implementing social welfare legislation. Within this context, in March 1964, President Johnson declared his War on Poverty. The Economic Opportunity Act enacted by Congress later that year

established the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and created a series of education and employment and training programs such as Head Start, Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Work Study, Upward Bound, and the Work Experience Program for AFDC mothers.

The War on Poverty, in addition to direct program creation, had a profound indirect effect on income transfer programs. By declaring a War on Poverty, President Johnson had elevated the question, "What does it do for the poor?" to a test for judging government interventions and for orienting national policy (Lampman, 1974).

New income transfer programs were enacted, and in existing programs, eligibility was extended, benefit levels were increased, and the number of beneficiaries expanded. Expenditures increased much more rapidly than they had in the three decades since the 1935 Act. Increases in expenditures that benefit the aged accounted for about two-thirds of the total increase in expenditures.

In 1964 Congress enacted the Food Stamp Program. By 1974, this program had evolved into the only income transfer program entitling all low-income Americans to a uniform, nationwide minimum income guarantee—in food coupons. 1965 was a banner year for income transfer and social policy legislation. In that year, Congress enacted Medicare (a health insurance program for the aged), Medicaid (a medical assistance program for the poor), the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants Program (which provided federal scholarship aid to needy students), and the Aid to Education Program (which provided federal funds to school districts for improving the education of children living in poor neighborhoods).

The Vietnam War and the election of Richard Nixon slowed the pace of income transfer and social program growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It did not, however, end that growth. Indeed, in 1969 President Nixon proposed a new federal Family Assistance Program (FAP) that would have provided a uniform nationwide minimum cash income to families with children and the aged, blind, and disabled. While the proposal for a federal welfare program for families with children did not pass in the Congress, the proposal for the aged, blind, and disabled was enacted in 1972. It is known as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program. The benefits to people with no other income were set at about 75 percent of the poverty level for a single individual and 90 percent for a couple. Like social security and food stamps benefits, the level of these welfare benefits was tied to the cost of living. In an attempt to reduce stigma, the name of the program was chosen to minimize the distinction between social security and welfare, and the Social Security Administration was given responsibility for its administration. In a break from previous practices, the federal government advertised the benefits to which people were entitled, and sought to enroll those who were eligible.

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) also emerged from the FAP Congressional debate. Enacted in 1974, it entitled families with children to an earnings subsidy of 10 cents for each dollar earned up to $4000, for a maximum benefit of $400. Benefits were reduced by 10 cents for each dollar earned in excess of $4000. In 1980, this benefit schedule was expanded so that maximum benefits are now $500 and occur when earnings equal $5000. While benefits go only to those with low earnings, the program is administered by the Internal Revenue Service within the personal income tax framework.

Liberalization of existing programs also continued throughout the 1970s, but at a steadily decreasing pace. Between 1965 and 1972, Old Age Insurance benefits were increased five times by 7 percent, 13 percent, 15 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent. With the last increase in 1972, Congress tied benefits to the cost of living and re-

moved the need for periodic debate on and enactment of increased benefits. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program was amended to allow beneficiaries to keep a small part of their earnings (the first $30 per month plus one of every three dollars earned in excess of $30) in order to encourage work and thereby reduce impoverishment and dependence on welfare. In the 1965-1975 decade, most states increased AFDC benefits more rapidly than inflation. And Community Action lawyers actively helped clients who were entitled to benefits to get them. A higher proportion of applications were accepted. As a result of all these factors and the growth of single-parent families, AFDC rolls expanded dramatically—from 4.4 million in 1965 to 11.4 million in 1975. By 1980, the total number of recipients had decreased to 10.6 million.

Income transfers continued to grow after President Carter was elected in 1976 despite the fact that his welfare reform proposal—the Program for Better Jobs and Income—did not pass in the Congress. During the 1976-1980 period, income support became increasingly tied to labor market programs. The objective was to provide income adequacy for those expected to work by expanding job opportunities for them. Programs designed to expand the demand for low-skill, disadvantaged workers were developed in both the public and private sectors. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) inaugurated a major public service employment program; by fiscal 1980, CETA expenditures totaled $4 billion. As it evolved, the job slots it provided became increasingly targeted on disadvantaged workers. Analogous efforts to expand private sector employment involved employment subsidies. The New Jobs Tax Credit, enacted in 1977, subsidized increased employment by private businesses. The subsidy arrangement encouraged the hiring of low-wage workers. In 1979, this program was replaced by the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit—a program that paid subsidies to employers if workers from particular disadvantaged groups (e.g., poor youths, disabled workers, Vietnam-era veterans) were employed.

1980 and Beyond

The 1980 election was a watershed. Running on a platform that the rapid growth in government—especially in social programs and regulations—had stifled incentives and economic growth, Ronald Reagan was elected. The Program for Economic Recovery announced in 1981 was designed to stop two decades of rapid growth in federal expenditures, and to reverse the trend toward income support and social program spending and away from defense-oriented spending. While income security spending had increased from 21.7 percent of the federal budget in 1965 to 35 percent in 1981, President Reagan would have it fall to 32 percent by 1986. Education, training, and social service spending, which had risen from 1.9 to 4.8 percent of the budget from 1965 to 1981, was scheduled to fall to 2.5 percent of the budget. Reductions in these areas were to be offset by increased military spending and reduced taxes. Clearly a decision had been made to secure increased economic growth and military strength by reducing income transfers and other benefits designed to aid the poor and to address social problems.

UNDERLYING ISSUES AND THE VALUES AT STAKE

Income transfer policy is controversial, in part because of the growth in transfers and the large share of the federal budget they absorb. It is also controversial, perhaps

especially controversial, because it touches on fundamental values about which citizens have strong feelings.

Economists speak of the tradeoff between efficiency and equity (Okun, 1975). But the values touched on by income transfer policies cut even deeper. Citizens care about efficiency because they value material goods and services; they are self-interested. However, they are also compassionate and hence value equity. Security and self-reliance are also deeply held values, and they too are at stake in income transfer policy.

These basic values conflict in nearly every major issue in income support policy. Consider the following fundamental issue faced by every community at all times: Should we spend more to increase the adequacy of income transfers or less to reduce costs? Suppose that only the poor receive increased benefits. Citizens who value both a better life for the poor and low taxes for themselves find it difficult to decide where to strike the balance. Hence, the controversy in setting benefit levels. Moreover, the issue is never so clear cut. The nonpoor always get something from benefit increases. For example, social insurance programs provide direct benefits and, hence, economic security to Americans of all income classes. Even welfare programs provide insurance to the nonpoor against the risk of becoming poor. And providing either too much or too little security may undermine self-reliance.

In this section of this chapter we discuss the conflicts and complementarities among self-interest, compassion, security, and self-reliance with respect to five major issues of income support policy: (1) Should the income transfer system be categorical? (2) Should benefits be provided only to the poor or to all regardless of income? (3) Should benefits be provided in cash or in kind? (4) Should benefits be provided with no quid pro quo or only in return for work? (5) Should benefits be financed and disbursed by federal, state, or local governments?

Should Transfer Programs Be Categorical?

Some groups are considered more deserving than are other groups. Some groups are less costly to aid than are other groups. Some groups have greater needs than do other groups. Some groups are expected to work, while others are not. Consider the blind and the severely disabled as an example. This group has always been considered more deserving of assistance than are the able-bodied poor. And because they are also fewer in number, they will always be cheaper to aid adequately than are the able-bodied poor. Similarly, because they are so few in number and different from the rest of us in such obvious ways, the moral costs of excusing them from the obligation to earn their own way is small.

Aiding different groups of poor people differently does, however, have economic costs. Ascertaining which group someone belongs to, for example, can entail substantial administrative costs (such as the necessity of a thorough physical examination to ascertain whether or not someone is disabled). Treating different groups differently can also create inequities. And it may create incentives to change behavior in undesirable directions.

Inequities exist when equally needy families are given unequal amounts of aid or when the income positions of families are reversed by benefit payments. Avoiding such inequities may require sacrificing other values. For example, if the disabled are treated more generously than are the able-bodied, as is currently the case, a family headed by a long-term unemployed, 60-year-old, "relatively unhealthy" male will receive less aid than a family of identical income and size that is headed by a "dis-

abled" male. This may not only be unfair; it also creates an incentive for the relatively unhealthy male to become classified as disabled. If the distinction between the able-bodied and disabled is abandoned, however, either all of the able-bodied must be treated as generously as the disabled are or the disabled must be treated in the same way the able-bodied are. The first entails a decrease in the commitment to self-reliance; the second, a reduction in compassion.

Should Transfer Benefits Be Targeted on the Poor or Provided to All?

Should benefits be provided to all members of the community regardless of income (non-income tested) or should they be restricted to those who need them most (income tested)? This is a question that pervades the debate about benefit programs. Free public education and social security programs are universal; Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children are income tested.

All income-tested or welfare programs are characterized by an individual determination of "need." Benefits are then related to the difference between the individuals needs and his or her resources. Often, it is required that assets be largely liquidated and used up before benefits are provided. Benefits in non-income-tested programs, on the other hand, are based on average or presumptive need. That is, they depend only on a few readily verifiable personal or family characteristics such as age, previous earnings, number of dependents, or health status. There is no detailed investigation of individual resources and needs, and benefits are typically not reduced according to some schedule as the earnings of beneficiaries increases. And there are no assets tests.

Non-income-tested programs reflect a broader interpretation of the basis for providing assistance than do income-tested programs. Underlying these programs is the belief that the near poor, and even segments of the middle class, need some assistance, as do the very poorest. The problems of the poorest are obviously not unique; they are simply more acute than are those of the near poor or the middle class. Whether a program should be income tested or not depends in part on our views about how generalizable the problems of the poor are.

But the greater the number of people who receive benefits, the more costly is the program to nonbeneficiaries. Programs that provide benefits to everyone—for example, public education—will be more costly to upper-middle-income and upper-income people than are programs that provide equal levels of benefit only to the poorest.

Non-income-tested programs also promote self-reliance among the poor more than do means-tested ones—they do not reduce benefits as income increases. If benefits are reduced as earnings increase, the incentive to work is reduced. At a benefit reduction rate of 50 percent, working at a wage rate of $4.00 per hour nets the welfare recipient only $2.00 per hour. If benefits are reduced by one dollar for each dollar of other income, of course, there is no incentive to increase work effort. Non-income-tested programs may, however, weaken the self-reliance of all citizens potentially affected by the programs. For example, universal old age insurance programs (like our own social security) may substitute some public savings for private saving on the part of all potential beneficiaries.

Choosing the extent to which benefits should be targeted on the poor, then, requires that the community again strike a balance. Providing more generous benefits to near-poor and lower-middle-income families may reduce incentives for the poor to become financially independent. Imposing greater costs on the nonpoor may

weaken incentives to become part of this group. Where the community strikes this balance depends on the political power balance in society, on notions of fairness, and on beliefs about whether providing greater incentives to become nonpoor is more or less important to the overall economic well-being of the community than is providing incentives to become rich.

Should Benefits Be in Cash or in Kind?

The issue of cash versus in-kind benefits also raises a conflict among values. The independence and self-reliance of beneficiaries is greater if aid is provided in cash rather than in kind. In-kind benefits restrict the choices available to beneficiaries. Food Stamps can be spent only on food, housing subsidies on housing, Medicaid on medical care, and so on. On the other hand, the providers of benefits, taxpayers, know that beneficiaries are receiving goods and services that meet basic needs if benefits are provided in kind.

Consider public education as an example. Both cost and compassion considerations suggest that education assistance should be an in-kind rather than a cash subsidy. First, the children of the poor are generally considered more deserving than are their parents. Poor children are considered innocent victims of poverty; their adult parents often are not. Second, outlays on children (regarded as an investment) may be viewed as having a higher payoff to the community than is equal cash aid to the adult poor. One way to be sure that the support provided is invested in the children is to subsidize education (an in-kind benefit) rather than providing the cash equivalent to their parents.

Education is an easy case in which to find a rationale for in-kind provision. Whether to provide cash instead of food or housing subsidies is more difficult to resolve. The basic conflict for the community is whether to provide unrestricted income support, thereby encouraging self-reliance and dependence of the poor, or to provide in-kind assistance, ensuring that the benefit goes for what the givers regard as suitable purposes.

Should Work Be Required in Order to Receive Assistance?

The most effective, and the financially cheapest, way to stimulate self-reliance on the part of the poor who are expected to work is to provide them with no aid whatsoever. This solution is, obviously, a harsh one. A more generous alternative for the able-bodied poor is the provision of work relief instead of cash. More recently, this has been discussed as the provision of "jobs versus cash."

In a pure jobs program, help is provided only in proportion to the work efforts of the beneficiary. The social message is clear cut and the pressure to be self-reliant unambiguous. Programs that combine jobs and cash reinforce self-reliance correspondingly less. Providing aid through pure cash programs reinforces self-reliance least.

A jobs program that provides decent jobs to all who want them both increases the incomes of the poor and assures them an opportunity to work at a decent job. Such an option may provide dignity and self-respect for the poor as well as cash.

But providing *decent* jobs to all who want them is not cheap. The more decent the pay and working conditions, the more expensive each job is to create. More impor-

tant, the better the jobs that are created, the greater is the demand for them, as private sector workers may find them more attractive.

Jobs programs can also be used as a means of degrading beneficiaries rather than of enhancing their self-respect. Harsh work tests, for example, are degrading. Fortunately, neither WPA or, more recently, CETA has been criticized for this form of abuse.

Are jobs programs cheaper than cash programs? A jobs program that transfers the same dollar amount to participants as a cash program will tend to cost more because of the higher overhead costs of organizing employment. But the jobs program will almost certainly lead to smaller reductions in work effort, and there will be some useful goods and services produced by the workers who get the jobs. The answer to the question is unresolved. Clearly, however, the costs of providing jobs rather than cash to the severely disabled or low-skill, inexperienced workers is more costly than is providing jobs to skilled and able-bodied.

This issue again stirs conflicts among values. Concern with the independence, self-reliance, and the contribution of beneficiaries argues in favor of jobs as a quid pro quo for assistance. Costs may argue otherwise.

At Which Governmental Level Should Transfers Be Provided?

The level of government to be made responsible for financing and administering income support programs has long been a contentious one. The principal arguments for local control of income support programs are special applications of the general argument for decentralized government. First, the smaller the unit of decision-making power, the greater the chances that citizens can participate directly in self-government. Second, lodging responsibility in the many local governments rather than in single central government stimulates competition within the government sector. Third, in a large and diverse country, appropriate policy for one area may be quite inappropriate in another. The nature of the poverty problem in the South, for example, may be substantially different than that in the rest of the nation.

There are also strong arguments for central control. First, poverty has come to be regarded as a national problem. And, it is argued, the minimum income to be assured should be equivalent across jurisdictions. Second, when welfare is handled on a local level, the competition stimulated is regarded by many as an unhealthy, negative kind of competition. Each state or locality has an incentive to keep benefits low and refuse benefits to those defined as nonresidents. The former leads to inadequate benefits for all; the latter inhibits mobility. Third, state and local governments must maintain a balanced budget. This may entail cutbacks in income support in recessions, a time during which the poor need assistance the most. Finally, it has been argued that it is inequitable for some jurisdictions to bear a higher share of the national cost of reducing poverty simply because they have a higher incidence of poverty in their midst. Again, national financing is required.

These arguments for and against local control again reflect a conflict of values and objectives. On balance, it seems likely that local control, without national regulation or minimum standards, will entail a greater unevenness among jurisdictions in both benefit adequacy and the treatment and stigmatizing of beneficiaries. It will also result in a lower average level of income support and constraints on migration among jurisdictions. The question of whether the gains in administrative efficiency or in the tailoring of assistance to need because of local administration outweigh these costs remains unresolved.

SOME BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INCOME TRANSFERS

Reductions in poverty and insecurity are clearly recognized as benefits of income transfers. In the first part of this section we examine the effects of transfers on poverty, insecurity, and the more controversial indicator, inequality. The second section examines the degree to which transfers have had adverse effects on work, savings, and the family.

Effects on Poverty, Insecurity, and Inequality

Rapid growth in coverage and benefit levels of income support programs has significantly reduced the incidence of poverty. Table 21.2, column 1, presents the changes in income poverty from 1965 to 1976 if all cash receipts, including cash income support payments are taken into account. These data, the official census poverty statistics, show that poverty fell by 25 percent between 1965 and 1972, but that there has been no real progress since. The second column adjusts census data for underreporting of incomes, payment of federal income and payroll taxes, and most important, the receipt of in-kind transfers, and shows that poverty declined by almost 50 percent when income is so defined. The adjusted poverty data suggest a less serious problem in each year, but also show no substantial progress since 1972. However, even an incidence of 6.5 percent means that 14 million persons remain poor, and among some groups, even adjusted poverty levels remain shockingly high. About one-third of black female households, one-fifth of white female households, and one-tenth of black male households remain poor.

Poverty has declined, but not because the programs of the War on Poverty successfully provided a "hand up" to enable the poor to earn their way out of poverty, as President Johnson had advocated. If only income from private sources is counted, the percentage of the population below the poverty line—the "pretransfer poor"—has remained almost constant at about 20 percent since 1965 (Plotnick and Smeeding, 1979). Cash and in-kind benefits, not increased earnings, account for all the progress.

In retrospect, this is not surprising. At the onset of the War on Poverty one of every three old people was poor. The rhetoric about providing a "hand up" notwithstanding, the only way to reduce this mass poverty among the aged was to increase their incomes directly through cash and in-kind transfers. Transfers were appropriate and

TABLE 21.2 Trend in the Incidence of Poverty Among Persons (1965-1976)

	Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line	
Year	*Census Income*	*Adjusted Income*
1965	15.6	12.1
1968	12.8	10.1
1970	12.6	9.4
1972	11.9	6.2
1974	11.6	7.8
1976	11.8	6.5
% change, 1965-1976	−24.4	−46.2

SOURCE: Plotnick and Smeeding (1979: 259).

did the job. If in-kind transfers are counted, only 6 percent of the aged are now poor. The average per capita income of the aged is now equal to that of the nonaged.

Social security programs provide nearly all Americans with economic security against old age, premature death, disability, and unemployment. Old Age Insurance benefits replaced 63 percent of the earnings of a single low-wage worker ($4600) at age 65 in 1978 and 35 percent of the earnings of a high-wage worker ($16,500). For a worker with a spouse, the comparable figures are 94 and 52 percent, respectively (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1978). Similarly one study indicates that in 1971, unemployment and welfare benefits replaced 31 cents for each dollar of earnings lost due to unemployment in families headed by men. The comparable figure was 56 cents in families headed by women (Gramlich, 1974). Because both unemployment insurance and food stamps have grown since then, these figures underestimate the current effect of these programs.

While absolute poverty has declined, overall income inequality has remained remarkably stable. If support payments had not increased, the distribution of income would actually have become more unequal during the past 25 years. While demographic change accounted for some of the increase in pretransfer inequality during the period, inequality would not have decreased in the absence of demographic change. Table 21.3 examines the impact on inequality of the level and rapid growth of transfers in this period. (The distributional effects of the taxes required to finance the transfers are not reflected in the table.) The table indicates that government transfers dramatically reduced inequality for several population subgroups and had a significant impact on the aggregate degree of inequality. This impact increased between 1965 and 1974.

TABLE 21.3 The Impact of Transfers on the Level and Distribution of Income, 1965 and 1974

	1965		*1974*	
Demographic Group	*Change[a] in Gini Coefficient*	*Change[a] in Mean Income*	*Change[a] in Gini Coefficient*	*Change[a] in Mean Income*
Total population	−11.0%	7.5%	−14.4%	10.1%
Families headed by:				
Young Men	−2.1	1.3	−4.5	2.8
Prime-age Men	−3.1	2.8	−6.3	3.8
Aged Men	−32.6	47.3	−38.4	65.6
Young Women	−25.3	25.6	−34.0	44.0
Prime-age Women	−22.4	22.6	−24.2	25.0
Aged Women	−24.5	32.5	−36.3	41.4
Individuals who are:				
Young Men	−2.6	1.9	−3.4	3.0
Prime-age Men	−7.8	5.4	−10.4	5.9
Aged Men	−46.9	96.0	−41.5	88.7
Young Women	−0.5	0.7	−5.0	3.3
Prime-age Women	−10.8	7.2	−15.1	9.3
Aged Women	−44.0	100.7	−51.2	152.0

SOURCE: Danziger et al. (1981).
[a]Changes are defined as [(Xpost − Xpre)/Xpre] × (100).

Effects on Work, Savings, and the Family

The Effects on Work

Providing help to the poorest members of society may reduce their own efforts to help themselves and may also weaken the efforts of those who would escape poverty on their own if no help were provided. Such consequences will increase the costs of income transfers that the nonpoor will have to bear. Any income support program will enable beneficiaries to work less if they so desire by providing them with an alternative source of income. Benefit reduction or tax rates in income support programs also induce beneficiaries to work less by reducing the net reward from work. These incentive effects are well analyzed in economic theory. But what economic theory does not tell us is how large the reductions in work will be.

In the absence of evidence, the worst fear is that because of reductions in work due to transfers, the costs of reducing poverty will be prohibitively higher than first appears—relieving poverty breeds poverty. Set against this "worst case" fear is the view that low-income individuals want to work and to better themselves in much the same way as do the nonpoor. In this view, transfers are unlikely to seriously diminish work effort and, over the longer run, may actually increase it.

While almost any aspect of an income support program might cause beneficiaries to alter their work effort, two key financial characteristics—the guarantee and the benefit reduction or tax rate—are most important. The guarantee, which often varies with family size, is the maximum payment that a person or family could receive. For example, a family of four with no other income might be guaranteed a cash grant of $1000. The tax rate is the percentage by which this payment is reduced as earnings increase. For example, if benefit payments are reduced by 60 cents for each dollar of earnings, the benefit reduction rate is 60 percent. In most income support programs—for example, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, and Old Age Insurance for those younger than age 72—these benefit reduction rates are positive and rather high. In several programs, however, benefits do not depend on earnings; neither OAI benefits for those over 72 nor veteran disability payments are reduced as earnings rise.

Economic theory predicts that the guarantee will reduce work effort. By providing additional income, the guarantee enables beneficiaries who value activities other than work to engage in them. Taxes reduce income and thereby encourage work. On the other hand, they reduce the reward for work and thereby reduce work. In transfer programs, the reduction in income from the tax rate is always less than the increase from the guarantee. Therefore, transfer programs with positive guarantees always reduce work.[1]

Numerous studies—both social experiments and more conventional analyses of data—have confirmed that both guarantees and tax rates affect work effort (Danziger et al., 1981; Masters and Garfinkel, 1978). The range in the estimates of the size of the effects is quite large. Systematic reviews of the literature, however, have produced relatively consistent estimates with a narrower range. Studies that have examined the behavior of different groups have consistently found that the magnitude of the effects differs among demographic groups. Prime-age, healthy married males respond much less to economic disincentives than do married women or older men (Masters and Garfinkel, 1978).

A few studies have examined the aggregate effect of all transfer programs. Robert Lampman's (1978) "guesstimate" of the effect of the expansion of all social welfare

expenditures on total work effort concluded that the system's expansion from 1950 to 1976—from 9 to 21 percent of GNP—caused hours worked to decline by 7 percent from what they would have been if the system had not expanded. The effects of some programs (e.g., public education) not in the income support system (Table 21.1) were included in the study. Moreover, the effect on work of the taxes required to finance the expansion was also included.

Danziger et al. (1981) also reviewed the effects of the programs listed in Table 21.1 and summed up their estimates of the effect of each program. The procedure suggests a total work reduction of 4 to 5 percent. This result is consistent with the 7 percent figure obtained by Lampman, because the programs in Table 21.1 exclude some major components of total social welfare expenditures. Moreover, these authors did not include the disincentive effect of the increased taxes required to finance the outlays.

Neither of these estimates supports the view that increased income support or social welfare spending has seriously disrupted the functioning of the labor market. The percentage reduction in total economic activity caused by these disincentives will be less than either the 7 percent or 4 to 5 percent reduction in time worked because the earnings of most recipients are well below the average of U.S. workers.

Finally, this evidence provides no support for the proposition that the high rates of unemployment experienced recently are primarily attributable to the growth of income transfers. In view of the fact that high unemployment rates appeared historically long before the growth of the income transfer system—and indeed were a principal cause the development of that system—these findings should not be surprising.

The Effects on Savings

Transfers theoretically affect savings in at least four different ways—two of which decrease and two of which increase savings. First, transfers tend to reduce savings because income is transferred to lower-income people, who have higher propensities to consume, and away from higher-income people, who tend to save more. In a fully employed economy, the increased consumption could come only at the expense investment and would result in some slackening of production and growth. In economy with slack resources, however, this expansion in consumption would resul in greater output and employment and might induce greater investment.

Second, the expectation of Social Security benefits may lead citizens to save less for their retirement. Because the system operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, public saving does not occur to offset the reduced private saving. As a result, total saving the economy is likely to fall. On the other hand, because of Social Security, some people may retire earlier and hence require more retirement income than would otherwise be the case. This may cause them to save more in their preretirement years thus increasing total saving in the economy. Finally, again because the Social Secu system is on a pay-as-you-go basis, income is being transferred from young peopl older people. If parents wish to leave a bequest to children, they may increase amount to offset the increased tax burden on children caused by the Social Secu System. The result may be an increase in saving.

In recent years a large number of researchers have addressed the Social S savings nexus (Danziger et al., 1981). An impressive array of variables and empirical equations have been mustered in the "regression wars" among these contenders. The general result—and perhaps the current consensus among economists—is tha

Social Security has depressed private savings by a small amount, but that this amount has not yet been measured precisely.

These studies, it should be noted, focus on Social Security alone, not on the effect of the entire income support system, and they do so in the context of a fully employed economy. As noted above, for a slack economy the case is quite different. Given the failure of the American economy to achieve full employment over most of the post-war period, the overall effect of the income support system on the level of savings—and hence on the growth rate of GNP—may well have been positive.

The Effect on Family Stability

The role of the family is a central issue in income support policy. Such programs compensate for failures of the family to perform certain economic functions and, in doing so, reduce the costs of family splitting. At the same time, however, they may strengthen the self-reliance, independence, and freedom of choice of particular family members.

Consider the case of female-headed families. One of the considerations that prevents some women who feel trapped in a bad marriage from leaving is fear concerning how they will support themselves and their children. (A similar concern and the guilt attached thereto undoubtedly restrain some men as well.) Perhaps even more important, public provision of aid to female-headed families reduces the dependence of women on husbands as a means of support by reducing the economic pressure to find another husband to support them. Aiding female-headed families may weaken the institution of the intact family, therefore, but increase the independence of women.

There are two reasons for concern about the effects on marital stability of aiding single-parent families: cost and the effects on the children. The seriousness of each, of course, depends on the magnitude of the impact of transfers on marital stability. In view of all the other factors that affect the success and failure of marriages, it would be surprising if the effects of providing income support to female heads were very large.

As suggested above, income transfer programs that provide aid only to split families would tend to increase the number of split families. Similarly, the more generous the benefits, the greater the expected effect on splits. Research studies do find positive correlations between AFDC benefit levels and the percentage of female-headed families. The extent to which these correlations are evidence of causation, however, is still in dispute (Bradbury et al., 1977; MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978). For example, New York and California have high AFDC benefits and a high incidence of female headship. But they also have very liberal divorce laws.

It is impossible to predict a priori the effects of income transfer programs that provide aid to both intact and split families. The destabilizing independence effect of providing aid to split families could be either partially or more than fully offset by the stabilizing income effect of providing aid to intact families. This logic suggests—and both researchers and policymakers believe—that a program that provides aid to intact as well as split families would lead to fewer marital splits than would a program that provided aid only to split families.

It is in this context that the initial findings in the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment that the experimental negative income tax programs increased marital splits were surprising (Hannan et al., 1976, 1978). Subsequent analysis of the results by Cain suggests that the original analysis may have been misleading because it: (1) confounded the effects of experimental training programs with experimental

NIT programs, (2) failed to distinguish between the effects on childless couples (who are not eligible for AFDC) and on couples with children, (3) arbitrarily focused on couples enrolled for five rather than only three years despite the fact that doing so excludes two-thirds of the sample and (4) incorrectly dismissed the possibility that differential attrition of experimentals and controls biased the results (Cain, 1981 Until other scholars have had the opportunity to reexamine the SIME-DIME results, healthy dose of skepticism is warranted. Finally, despite intense interest, much research, and many assertions, because existing research was so poorly designed we know virtually nothing about the effects on children of growing up in single-parent families (Ross and Sawhill, 1975).

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Our review has emphasized both the structure of the nation's income transfer system and its effects on the level of poverty, work effort, savings, and family stability the U.S. economy. This review was mixed. Substantial reductions in income poverty are attributable to the current system; at the same time, transfer programs have incentives for reducing labor supply, saving, and marital stability, and apparently do so to some limited extent. This conclusion leads immediately to the next question Can the gains achieved by the system be sustained or expanded, while some of the adverse side effects, gaps in coverage, and other structural problems be corrected?

In this section, we will suggest several major changes in the income transfer system designed to retain the gains it is achieving while correcting some of its problems. Before suggesting these changes, however, we will be explicit about the objectives that these proposals seek to meet and the judgments on which they rest. We will state these assumptions and judgments in summary form:

- Although some observers believe that the costs of expanded transfers have exceeded the gains and that retrenchment is in order, we believe that the evidence does not justify these conclusions. Reductions in income support would lose much in the way poverty reduction and gain little in the way of supply side incentives.
- While the existing categorical nature of the system has adverse effects—high administration costs, gaps in coverage, horizontal inequities—the distinction between those who are expected to work and those who are not is an important one, and should be maintained.
- While some in-kind transfers appear to reflect strong taxpayer-contributor tastes (e.g., health and education), others do not. In particular, food stamps, which induce little if any additional food consumption while seriously stigmatizing beneficiaries, should be converted to cash.
- To the extent feasible, numerous income-tested programs should be replaced by a single non-income-tested program. This is especially true for support provided for those expected to work, where the high tax rates in welfare programs do generate work disincentives.
- Progress toward assisting those expected to work requires policies designed to enhance earnings and employment opportunities in the labor market for low-income workers. Through such policies (e.g., employment subsidies) the low level of job opportunities could be expanded. Such policies offset the adverse employment effects caused by minimum wages and other gaps between worker productivity and the wage costs borne by employers.
- Support for children in single-parent, low-income families is provided better through universal system financed largely by absent parents, rather than by a categorical welfare program and a haphazard pattern of legal family separation settlements.

- To maintain the geographical mobility of labor and to reduce the most serious regionally based horizontal inequities, income transfer policy should be principally a function of the federal government. States should be allowed to supplement federal benefits, however, and to provide support for emergencies and other special needs.
- Comprehensive reform of the current income transfers system requires that transfer programs be carefully integrated with the personal income and payroll tax programs. Such integration may entail radical alteration of positive tax policies.

To achieve the objectives implicit in these judgments, we suggest a four-part agenda for reorienting income support interventions.

First, in place of the current Food Stamp program and the personal income tax, a Credit Income Tax (CIT) with a modest income guarantee (about $600 per person) would be adopted. The per capita tax credits—essentially income grants to all families—would replace both the personal exemptions in the current income tax and the Food Stamp program and would be paid in monthly installments to all persons in the manner of children's allowances in other countries. Making payments to everyone would solve the problems of nonparticipation and application in the current system and simplify benefit administration. In order to keep the tax rate required to finance the CIT from becoming too high, the tax base would be made comprehensive by eliminating itemized deductions in addition to the personal exemption and by making income from all sources (except the credits themselves) taxable. The tax rate would be identical on all incomes except the very highest, which would pay surtaxes. This is a major change, and would accomplish several objectives. The comprehensive tax base and constant marginal tax rate (for most of the population) would simplify tax administration and result in a slight increase in total tax payments for upper-income families while allowing for a decrease in marginal tax rates on their earnings.

Second, the SSI program would be eliminated by supplementing the credits in the CIT for the aged, blind, and disabled to the current SSI plus Food Stamp level. This change would permit the Social Security Retirement Program to focus on earnings replacement, rather than on the current objectives of earnings replacement and minimum income. The burden of income redistribution would be removed from what is essentially an insurance program.

Third, a Social Child Support program would be adopted in lieu of the current AFDC program. It would work as follows. All children with an absent living parent would be eligible for a public child support payment. This payment would not depend on the income of the single parent. Together with the per capita tax credit, the minimum child support payment would be set high enough to eliminate AFDC in most states. (Very high benefit states could supplement the payments.) The payments would be financed by a tax on absent parents equal to some proportion of their income for each child not living with them (for example, the tax could be 15 to 20 percent of income for the first absent child and an additional 5 to 10 percentage points for each additional child). The child would be entitled to a child support benefit from the government that would equal either a minimum payment or the amount of tax paid by the absent parent—whichever is larger. If the tax paid by the absent spouse fell below the minimum payment, the shortfall would be financed from general revenues.

This child support system would more effectively accomplish what AFDC intends: adequate income guarantees for children in one-parent families. Responsibility for these children would be largely shifted from taxpayers in general to absent parents (thereby reducing incentives for marital splits), single parents would not face the high

AFDC tax rate, welfare administration would be simplified, and the burden on the court system would be reduced.

The CIT and the Social Child Support system would consolidate and simplify programs, increase the payoff for work, and assist female-headed families, but it would leave a major problem untouched. Although these reforms encourage poor families to substitute earned income for welfare income, they do not increase the demand for low-skilled workers.

The *fourth* part of our proposal focuses on the demand side of the labor market. To provide work opportunities for low-skilled workers, many of whom are now supported by income transfers, there should be a program of targeted employment subsidies. Such a program is exemplified by the current Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Program. Appropriately designed, this strategy would allow low-skilled workers to be paid a higher wage than their level of productivity would normally command, while ensuring that the net cost to employers of hiring such workers would be no greater than their productivity indicated. This program would thereby offset the adverse employment effects of minimum wage legislation and expand employment without adding to inflation. Such benefits should outweigh any worker displacement or reduced productivity growth that might occur.

As policy instruments for expanding the work opportunities of the low skilled, employment subsidies to private employers are preferable to special public service employment programs. The costs to the taxpayer per job created would be somewhat lower, and employment in a private enterprise would ensure gross productivity at least equivalent to the employer's wage cost. Moreover, we do not have the knowledge or skill required to administer large-scale public service employment programs successfully.

Nevertheless, a residual low-wage public service employment program would seem essential in completing the transition to an earnings-based system. There are bound to be some workers who will not be employed by the private sector, even with the subsidy. Equity would seem to require that some work opportunity be afforded them as well. The combination of a program guaranteeing jobs at the minimum wage and the CIT would enable those expected to work, but unsuccessful in finding subsidized job, to achieve an income level at about the poverty line.

A credit income tax with an expanded tax base, a universal child support system for children in single-parent families, and the adoption of a targeted employment subsidy program with a residual public jobs program form the core of our reform package. These proposals represent a fundamental shift in the nation's approach the problem of poverty and income distribution. This new approach reflects certain ideals, but is not unrealistic. Although a modest increase in net taxes would be required of very high income families, the volume of cash income support to the poor would not rise markedly. Some of the subsidies paid would go to support the expansion of work opportunities for current welfare beneficiaries. The essence of the proposed change is to further the antipoverty effort by reducing reliance on income tested transfers and emphasizing the importance of earned income.

Clearly, such a reorientation requires a great deal more knowledge about the benefits, costs, and administrative design of specific initiatives. Nevertheless, it offers the potential for reducing poverty and dependence on welfare, while inducing those with low skill to increase their work effort and employers to increase their demands such workers. Sacrificing the potential for these gains in the drive for short-term trenchment would seem myopic, at best.

NOTE

1. A wage rate subsidy provides no benefit without work. It has no guarantee. It may either increase or decrease work.

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22

The Workplace

Employment and Business Interventions

Henry M. Levin

Woody Allen begins his film, *Annie Hall*, with a story about two women who have gone to a vacation resort together. The first complains about the terrible quality of the food, saying, "It's so awful, it's inedible." The second nods in vigorous agreement, adding her complaint, ". . . and the portions are so small." Woody Allen intercedes with his gloomy interpretation that this is the story of life: "It's both miserable and too short."

Certainly, this is the challenge of the workplace in the United States and most the world in the latter part of the twentieth century. There are too few jobs to go around, and most of those that are available are undesirable. But, even vacationers must eat to assuage their hunger, and most adults must work to pay their bills. The questions that will be addressed in this chapter are how we might increase the number of jobs and their attractiveness as human experiences.

The shortage of jobs is a social problem of such magnitude in the United States, and in most other countries, that it hardly needs documentation. At the beginning 1982, the official unemployment rate approached 9 percent, meaning that almost 11 million persons without productive employment were seeking work (Economic Report of the President, 1982: 269). The average length of unemployment was about months, but well over a million workers had been unemployed for 6 months or more (Economic Report of the President, 1982: 272). Further, among teenagers and minorities the impact of unemployment was far worse. For example, the unemployment rate among nonwhites was almost 16 percent, and among nonwhite teenagers approached 40 percent (Economic Report of the President, 1982: 271). Rates unemployment for whites in all of these categories were about half as large.

It is widely recognized that official unemployment rates tend to understate the true unemployment picture. First, such statistics assign part-time workers who are seeking full-time work to the employed category, without taking account of the fact that they are underemployed. Even more serious, they do not take account of those individuals who have given up looking for work because they view the odds of finding a job as very low. That is, such discouraged workers are no longer considered part of the labor force, and are not counted among the unemployed.

The poor quality of the work experience cannot be documented in terms of such simple and easily calculable statistics (Blauner, 1964). Although there have been surveys of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, they suffer from both operational definitions and conceptual problems. For example, to the degree that many workers feel that they

must accept whatever the labor market has to offer them, regardless of the consequences, they may not express or even be aware of the human toll that their jobs exact. If one has lived all one's life in an environment of polluted air, one may not even be aware that there are alternatives—even when such an environment is detrimental to one's health and that of others. Lack of awareness of the health hazard does not mean that there are not consequences that are deleterious for both the individual and for society. What is the problem of the work experience, and what are the consequences?

The vast majority of persons are employed in large bureaucratic organizations in which work is divided into jobs predicated upon a division of labor in which individuals are expected to do fairly predictable and routinized tasks (Braverman, 1974). Although at the time of the birth of the nation most persons worked as their own "bosses" as independent farmers, artisans, merchants, and professionals, over 90 percent of the contemporary labor force serve as employees in work organizations owned by and managed on behalf of others. The vast majority of these workers are employed for wages and salaries in large hierarchical firms in which the characteristics of their work schedules and activities are set out in precise detail without their participation. That is, they are placed into work roles that have been specified by organizations that do not take account of the needs, preferences, and talents of their prospective workers as much as they reflect the needs of the firm to rationalize, supervise, and control the work process and its articulation (Edwards, 1978).

Further, most workers are found in rather large and impersonal enterprises in which there are relatively few positions at the upper levels in contrast with vast numbers of jobs at the lower levels. In a recent survey of some 3.5 million industrial units employing 70 percent of the civilian labor force, one-half of the employees were working in only 2 percent of the firms, and more than one-fourth were employed in only one-third of 1 percent of the firms (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973: 21).

Inside these organizations, work is organized according to a pyramid of positions in which there are large numbers of persons at the bottom working under close supervision within a system of pervasive rules and regulations. In the intermediate levels, a considerably smaller group of employees have work and supervisory responsibilities over the workers at the bottom and under the relatively few managers at the top. The production of goods and services is subdivided into a large number of simple operations, and the contribution of each employee is to specialize in a limited number of tasks that will be repeated again and again over the working day and working year. Although this division of work was once associated only with manufacturing, it has spread to such major service occupations as clerical work, wholesale and retail sales, government agencies, and many areas of the professions (Cooley, 1980; Goldhaber, 1980; Greenbaum, 1979).

In 1776, Adam Smith extolled the gains in productivity that could be achieved by transforming artisan and workshop production into a large number of repetitive and simple tasks that could be executed by relatively unskilled workers. Under such a plan of organization, production could be centralized under a single capitalist entrepreneur, in contrast with the large number of small and decentralized operations of the traditional workshop. The individuality of artisan operations would be replaced by masses of workers, each performing a preassigned task with high predictability of output throughout the work day. Such a plan would make it easier to supervise workers and enable the hiring of workers with fewer skills.

However, even Smith (1937: 734–735) recognized a major "side-effect" of such organization on workers:

> *In the process of the division of labor, the employment of the far greater part of those who have labor, that is of the greatest body of people, come to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently one or two. As a result, the workman . . . generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.*

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the approach described by Smith was being applied widely to American manufacturing under principles set out by Frederick Taylor (Haber, 1964). These practices have been refined and applied through the use of new technologies to much of the American occupational structure.

It is little wonder that recent studies of American workers at all occupational levels have found that the most oppressive characteristics of work are:

> *constant supervision and coercion, lack of variety, monotony, meaningless tasks, and isolation. An increasing number of workers want more autonomy in tackling their tasks, greater opportunity for increasing their skills, rewards that are directly connected to the intrinsic aspects of work, and greater participation in the design of work and formulation of their tasks* [*U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973: 13*].

That is, the intrinsic characteristics of work are neither satisfying nor fulfilling as human experiences. Workers perform tasks that are empty in terms of filling basic human needs, motivated primarily by the payment received for the work rather than by the work activity. Moreover, they feel powerless to improve their situations (Blauner, 1964).

The consequences in terms of pain, anxiety, and health problems are enormous—although incalculable in their magnitude. Studies of individual workers find a great deal of malaise in the way that they describe their jobs (Lasson, 1972; Terkel, 1974). Various problems of worker turnover, absenteeism, alcoholism, drugs, and sabotage seem to be tied to the quality of working life, and major issues of productivity and product quality have been attributed to the poor fit between human needs and job demands (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973). Finally, occupational stresses have been implicated strongly in a wide variety of physical and mental health impairments (Ferman and Jordus, 1979; House, 1974; Kasl, 1974; Margolis and Kroes, 1974).

A rather ominous specter looms as two rather different trends seem to be colliding. On the one hand, the American work force is becoming more heavily educated as each cohort of youth seeks more education than its predecessors. The average unemployed worker in 1979 had some college experience and almost as much education as the average *employed* worker (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981: A10). On the other hand, there seems to be a tendency for jobs that previously required substantial skills and education to become increasingly "deskilled" by technology so that the jobs are more routinized and require fewer judgments and talents of the worker (Braverman, 1974). In particular, use of microprocessors is making it possible to simplify and routinize major components of office work, sales, professional services, management, and government operations.

Thus the historical "degradation" of work may be accelerating with the ability to use microcomputers to automate many jobs that in the past required substantial education and training (Cooley, 1980; Goldhaber, 1980). At the same time, the tendency toward more education of the labor force continues as Americans pursue their quest for upward mobility through the only route that appears feasible. Even at present there is considerable evidence that young workers are acquiring more education than will be required for the jobs they will be able to obtain (Rumberger, 1981). To the degree that this situation increases worker frustrations and dashes expectations, we

can expect to see increased pressures on the workplace, families, and social institutions more generally as the consequences of this phenomenon play themselves out.

In summary, we are facing two rather pervasive challenges of the American workplace in the last decades of the twentieth century. First, there is a shortage of jobs in absolute terms for those who desire to work and who must work to support themselves. Second, many existing jobs are harmful to the satisfaction of human needs and probably have adverse consequences for productivity, health, and the costs of social services in American society. Further, the tendency for emerging transformations of the workplace to underutilize increasingly the products of the educational system suggest that the disjunctures in the quality of working life will assert themselves for the foreseeable future.

The general solutions for addressing the problem of unemployment are to create new jobs and to try to maintain existing ones. However, an effective approach for improving the quality of working life is more problematic. Obviously, different work situations will have different needs for change. What seems to be common to most concerns is the feeling of powerlessness that workers feel with regard to influencing the nature and conditions of their work. This is the point that is made so eloquently by Blauner (1964) and Blumberg (1968), and it is also recognized by recent surveys of workers such as those cited in the *Work in America* report (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973).

Accordingly, much of the search for a generic improvement in the quality of working life should point in the direction of ways to increase the participation of workers in the decisions that affect their daily work lives. Fortunately, a burgeoning literature on workplace democracy has arisen in the last decade that discusses a wide range of alternatives that might be implemented as well as the principles for democracy in work organization (Bernstein, 1976; Blumberg, 1968; Gyllenhammar, 1977; Pateman, 1970; Susman, 1976). Of particular interest in this regard is that a substantial body of research finds that the extent of worker participation is related directly to worker productivity (Jones and Svejnar, 1982). Thus greater workplace democracy may also be a solution to lagging U.S. productivity. In the next section we will address the formulation of interventions that will increase employment and improve the quality of working life, as well as suggest some general strategies. In the following section we will address a selected number of specific strategies.

FORMULATING INTERVENTIONS

The statement of a social dilemma does not, in itself, suggest solutions. First, one must have some measure of access to the phenomenon in order to intervene, and, second, one must have a range of potential interventions or solutions at one's disposal. Clearly, there is a relation between these two in the sense that the intervention will depend on the nature of the relation between the intervener and the institution in which the intervention will be made. Indeed, a discussion of different types of solutions must depend on the point of intervention.

Employment in the United States is determined primarily by private decisions of business firms. Some four-fifths of jobs are found in the private sector, and these are subject to the conditions established by the owners and managers of the firms in which they are located. Employment and working conditions are hardly an objective of the private firm as much as they are an ancillary outcome of investment, production, and organizational decisions designed to maximize profits. If a given decision

affecting the work environment or employment is likely to be profitable, it will generally be pursued. Of course, if it is not likely to yield profit, it will not be followed.

As a general proposition, this phenomenon means that the margin of external intervention in affecting the employment decisions and working conditions in millions of firms, or even the top 1000 or so that account for so much employment, will be limited. There is no direct access to the internal affairs and decisions of private firms regarding these matters, unless it can be shown that there are immediate and direct threats to the health and safety of workers or violations of specific laws.

One should not understate the difficulty of altering the functioning of institutions that are under private control. Clearly, one is not faced with the option of determining what types of interventions are necessary and then seeking ways of implementing them in the sense that one might in the public sector.[1] Rather, one must ascertain what types of policy actions within the realm of feasibility can induce the private workplace to consider objectives of employment and improvement of working life. Although this is not a hopeless exercise, it is surely one that requires a great deal of imagination and even optimism to believe that private firms can be induced to consider such larger social objectives.

Of course, one-fifth of the jobs in the U.S. economy are in the public sector, and one can attempt to expand public employment and improve government working conditions. However, job expansion in the public sector depends in itself upon the expansion of government revenues, a factor that is heavily dependent on the rate of economic growth. Since the decade of the sixties, economic growth has been slow. This has been responsible in large measure for the high rates of unemployment. Moreover, government attempts to expand the economy while holding down price levels have been unsuccessful. Many causes have been posited for this failure, including the price of oil, worldwide recession, basic shifts in transnational production, and so on (Economic Report of the President, 1982: chs. 3-5). Whatever the causes of the inability to use monetary and fiscal policies to maintain stable prices and high growth rates, it is clear that government policies cannot be relied on to create more vigorous economic activity in the private sector and rapidly growing government revenues in the public sector.

Without growth in public revenues, the funding of expanded government employment or even government-funded wage subsidies in the private sector is not possible. Indeed, the frustrations of so-called stagflation—a stagnant or even a declining economy with rising price levels—has stimulated movements among the states and in the nation as a whole toward tax and expenditure limitation measures. Whatever the merits of Proposition 13 in California, Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts, and the myriad attempts in other states and in the U.S. Congress to limit the size of the public sector, their one major effect has been to limit the growth of public employment. Although this may be a mere passing phase of history, in that it is not possible to starve the public sector and have a healthy society and private sector at the same time (O'Connor, 1973), any return to the type of public sector growth characteristic of the sixties is beyond the reach of public policy for the foreseeable future.

In contrast, the improvement of existing public sector jobs may be more accessible. There are serious issues of public sector morale and productivity raised on a daily basis. To the degree that the government work force is being reduced in size or limited in growth, these problems may become even more pressing. Much recent literature on the improvement of productivity suggests that changes in working conditions and the work environment and particularly the expansion of worker participation in the work setting may improve worker satisfaction and productivity (Blumberg, 1968;

Susman, 1976; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973). Accordingly, the amelioration of work in the public sector may be the one area in which direct intervention is possible.

Indirect Interventions

That there are few direct interventions that one can make in the workplace should not preclude the possibility that some indirect interventions can be important. Accordingly, a number of these are noted.

Economic Growth

Although it was stated that policy instruments for promoting economic growth with price stability are considered to be far more limited and problematic in the eighties than in the sixties, the phenomenon of economic growth can increase employment in both the public and private sectors (Okun, 1970). If there is an increase in productive activity in the economy as a whole, the number of jobs will increase. By expanding government revenues through increased economic activity, the basis for increased public employment is also established. Such policies as deficit spending and low interest rates can certainly have expansionary effects, although in recent years their inflationary consequences have been so pernicious that they have not been utilized effectively.

More to the point, the pattern of economic growth is also important. For example, if growth is predicated upon military spending, it appears that fewer jobs will be created, and the types of jobs will differ from those associated with the expansion of production of civilian goods (U.S. Department of Labor, 1975: ch. 7). Rationalization of the world economy through transnational enterprises will also have an impact on how general economic expansion is visited on employment. Different industries require different levels of capital investment in relation to the number of jobs that they create. If economic expansion promotes industries with high capital intensiveness for each job created, the employment effects may be modest. Likewise, if the investment in new capital that is prompted by rapid economic growth tends to displace labor through the use of greater automation or robotics, many old jobs will be lost, even as new ones are created. It is even conceivable that there could be no net gain in jobs or even net losses from such investments.

Greater Labor Intensiveness in Production

Perhaps a more direct way of increasing employment would be to create incentives for the private sector to pursue labor-intensive methods of production (Hammermesh, 1978). In general, there is a reasonably wide range of substitution for most industries in which one can use relatively more labor and less capital to produce goods and services. From the perspective of the firm, it is important to choose that combination of labor and capital which provides the maximum output relative to the costs of these inputs. By providing tax incentives that might decrease the costs of labor relative to capital, firms might be induced to choose more labor-intensive methods of production. For example, tax credits could be given for increases in employment that tend to reduce capital-labor ratios in firms.

Current tax policies are exactly contrary to these goals because they provide in-

centives for capital investment. That is, they tend to promote the expansion of capital by providing tax credits for new investment as well as permitting the use of accelerated depreciation, which enables the firm to charge off—for tax purposes—the cost of new investment over a shorter period than the actual life of the plan and equipment (Economic Report of the President, 1982: 122-125). Thus current policies are hardly neutral between labor and capital and favor capital intensiveness rather than employment. Such policies presume that new capital investment will always create new jobs. However, to the degree that new capital investment is less labor intensive than older investments, exactly the opposite may actually take place. Moreover, the economic expansion predicated on such policies tends to follow a more capital-intensive path than it would in the absence of present policies.

Training and Wage Subsidies

One of the major goals of government human resource training and employment programs has been to provide appropriate job skills and placements for expanding employment (Palmer, 1978). Training is designed to take persons who would be otherwise unemployed and assist them in the development of skills for occupational areas in which demands for labor are high. Placement aspects of such programs attempt to ascertain the nature and location of existing jobs both for training and for finding jobs for trainees. Employment programs emphasize the creation of jobs in the public sector as well as wage subsidies and other inducements to create jobs in the private sector. It is probably fair to say that these programs have been remarkably *unsuccessful* on the average (Palmer, 1978: Levin, 1977). In general, firms do not expand employment under weak economic conditions, regardless of the subsidies for doing so (Ball et al., 1981). Training for jobs will not create jobs, and placement programs can only be effective when there are openings for new employees.

The seventies were a decade of imaginative expansion of training, placement, and wage subsidy programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1972. The decade ended with a pessimism based on both the relatively poor results of these programs and the lack of promising results from the various experiments that promised to expand employment through wage subsidies. The biggest single obstacle to the success of such programs was the poor economy, with its limits for creating additional jobs. Strong government training, placement, and employment programs cannot succeed without a reasonably vigorous economy that can absorb trainees into productive positions.

Persuasion

A final indirect intervention is that of persuading firms in the private sector to expand employment and improve working conditions. Certainly this tactic has been attempted in the past to get firms to hire the young and disadvantaged, but there little evidence of success (Ball et al., 1981; Levin, 1977: 176). Although the possibility of increasing jobs through appeal to a national obligation is not likely to be effective, may be possible to provide improvements in working life through this route. Substantial evidence has been emerging from both experiments in the United States and experiments in other countries that a major route to increased productivity is that of greater worker involvement in decision making (Frieden, 1980). Such increases in worker participation and worker democracy are seen as a key to reducing worker turnover and absenteeism and increasing product quality. If firms can be convinced

that the evidence is valid for their operations, as well as given direction in how to modify their work organizations to take advantage of these methods, it may be possible to improve the work experience through persuasion.

MACROSTRATEGIES

The fact that most employment in the United States is in the private sector means that changes in the nature of work and employment cannot be easily accomplished through direct, public interventions in the workplace. This has meant that there have been stringent limits on what can be accomplished because of the necessarily indirect nature of interventions. Indirect interventions with private entities must always rely on the ability to induce changes in behavior through the provision of the appropriate incentives to move them in the directions that are desired. Although the goals of increasing employment and improving the quality of the work experience have broad social benefits and implications, there is little direct leverage for addressing them. However, it is possible to explore what types of macrostrategies might be feasible to support workplace objectives.

Macrostrategies are those that establish broad mechanisms for increasing employment and raising the quality of working life. Essentially, these mechanisms must entail a greater degree of democratic control over the workplace (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980). Democratic control means the ability to get productive organizations to respond to such needs as employment and the quality of the work experience. There are at least four strategies for achieving this: (1) legislation that increases the role of those affected by employment and work organization in influencing decisions in those areas; (2) use of worker pension funds to influence policies of firms; (3) expanding the establishment and growth of small business and worker-owned firms; and (4) establishment of worker-owned and -managed firms.

Legislation

Some Western European countries have taken a much more direct interest in the rights of workers to participate in decisions that affect the number of jobs and conditions of employment by passing supportive legislation. Presumably, if the inputs of workers themselves into the operations of their enterprises are increased, decisions will become more oriented toward the needs of workers. The best examples of this approach are those of the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.

The approach that the West Germans have taken is known as "codetermination" (*Mitbestimmung*). Since the early fifties, a succession of laws have been passed to expand the rights of workers in governing the workplace through worker members on the boards and work councils (Furstenberg, 1977; Jenkins, 1974: ch. 8; Svejnar, 1982: ch. 10). Firms with 500 employees or more must allocate one-third of the seats on their boards of directors to worker representatives. In addition, all plants with 5 or more employees must establish work councils. Council members are elected by secret ballot every 2 years, and work councils have the rights to handle grievances; to administer the social welfare provisions for the company; to supervise the enforcement of applicable labor laws; to negotiate with management on wages and working conditions, hiring and firing, work rules, and such changes in the plant as those emanating from shifts in technology, mergers, and introduction of new work methods;

and to be informed on all relevant matters. According to the 1972 Works Constitution Act, the work councils have equal power with management on matters of job evaluation, employment policies, training, layoffs, working hours, accident prevention, and wage structure.

Such an approach provides for two levels of influence on decisions regarding employment and the quality of working life. At the corporate level a provision is made worker input on major decisions such as investment, pricing, products, expansion plants, and other matters that clearly affect employment levels and work experiences. It should be noted that worker representatives are in the minority, so they clearl need to forge a coalition with representatives of stockholders on any truly divisive matters. Where any particular issue is viewed as strictly a struggle between labor and stockholders or capital, this type of coalition is unlikely to be feasible. Accordingly, th minority position of the labor representatives limits their ability to have full codetermination on important matters that affect the welfare of the labor constituency.

In contrast, on the shop floor there is much greater parity with the work council Codetermination has been established over a large variety of policies that have important implications for workers and employment levels. Further, the fact that these decisions involve representatives of workers at the plant level and from the variou shop floors means that there is an important potential for improving situations on basis that is reasonably sensitive to the highly diverse situations that are likely to aris within any particular plant. The work councils also contribute to a much broade base of worker participation than mere representation on the governing boards larger firms.

The West German model represents a way of addressing decisions on issues employment and working conditions by empowering workers to participate in affect ing such decisions in their own firms. Thus the legislation provides a means of influencing these decisions directly by the persons most affected by them. Although such policies have been proposed in the United Kingdom and in other Common Marke countries, none have gone as far as West Germany (Pipkorn, 1980).

Sweden has followed a different route with similar consequences. In 1976 th Swedish parliament passed legislation that provided for the rights of negotiation of the unions on all matters regarding the enterprise (Ministry of Labour, 1975). Virtually all the Swedish labor force is unionized, and the unions have represented traditionally the interests of the workers at the central bargaining sessions on wage policy that are hel each year to establish the range of wage increases as well as to negotiate the "local" aspects of the negotiated agreement at the plant level. Although codetermination West Germany is based upon representatives of union and nonunion workers, all representation in Sweden is through the two major unions. It is also important to note tha Sweden has long had a history of supportive labor policies (Johnson, 1962). The new law requires that management and labor obtain agreement on employee participation in decision making, including the size of the work force, hiring and firing, work load distribution of work and its organization, technological change as it affects employment, and factors of health and safety. In addition, there is worker provision on board for firms with 25 or more employees. It is also interesting to note that many of the sam provisions for codetermination are applicable to the public sector except where suc agreements would conflict with political democracy.

The Swedish agreement operates on the premise that industrial democracy can empowered by law, but its details must be worked out at the local level for each case mandating negotiations on matters covered by the law. Trade union representatives the plant level have full codetermination rights with management to reach agreement

on both employment and the quality of working life. Further, management is required by law to provide workers with the necessary information on finances, investment plans, technological change, and other factors that will enable the workers to be fully informed on issues that concern them and that are part of the agreement.

In both the West German and Swedish cases, legislation has been used to protect the interests of workers both in employment decisions and in the nature and details of work organization and jobs. These represent the two outstanding cases of Western industrialized countries making attempts to democratize the decisions that affect the welfare of the labor force. However, it is important to point out that both countries have strong movements of organized labor and have had a long history of social democratic governments during the periods of major legislation. Even the recent Conservative governments in Sweden have continued to be supportive of industrial democracy.

Whether the powerful coalition needed to gain such legislative change could be achieved in the United States is highly dubious at the present time. Union membership represents only about 22 percent of the work force, and, with the exception of the first two decades of this century, labor negotiations have been restricted most commonly to wages, benefits, and certain working conditions rather than to issues of worker control itself. Indeed, Aronowitz (1973) and Hyman (1973) have argued that traditional trade unionism necessarily undermines the ability of workers to organize for greater participation in the crucial decisions that affect their welfare. This view is also reflected in the work of Gorz (1968), who argues that work reforms must always move beyond the standard trade union issues to reduce the traditional prerogatives of managerial control over labor and expand worker control.

Worker Pension Funds

A second direct intervention is that of using worker pension funds to invest in firms that will expand employment and improve working life. As Drucker (1976) points out, at least 25 percent of equity capital in American business is owned by workers in the form of the investment of their pension funds. Although the precise amount of such funds is unknown, it has been estimated at almost 800 billion dollars (Barber, 1982). If these funds were used for investment that promoted policies supportive of workers in America, a major force could be established to expand employment and its quality. Thus the question is what obstacles exist?

The major obstacle that exists is that workers do not actually directly control these funds. Although both workers and employers contribute to the formation of the huge assets of pension plans, the funds are actually placed in trust to be invested in behalf of the workers. Typically, these trusts are placed in the hands of large banks or investment managers. The largest 100 banks in America, alone, controlled almost $150 billion of such funds in 1975 (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980: 105). Presumably, the trustees are protecting the funds in behalf of workers and attempting to maximize investment returns. However, there is ample evidence that the investment performance is hardly optimal (Barber, 1982). Further, the funds seem to be used by the trustees to meet their own private needs, such as banks using the investments in corporate stock as leverage to induce firms in which they hold stock to do business with the bank on other matters (Herman, 1975).

If worker pension funds were used to provide leverage for worker-oriented reforms in employment and job policies, what types of changes would be needed? First, trusts would have to be established that were clearly answerable to the worker

entities whose funds they were investing. In some cases, this could be accomplished by changes in laws, and in other cases by collective agreement. In the cases of many union pension funds and those of government employees, there is already representation of labor on the boards that govern the trusts and investment policies. Second, policies would have to be established that balance a variety of types of performance including investment returns. For example, such factors as the contribution to domestic (as opposed to foreign) investment and employment of firms and the treatment of labor could be weighed into the performance of firms when the investment pension funds is considered. Third, arrangements would be made to vote stock on behalf of corporate directors and policies that would benefit labor. Finally, where was not possible to obtain direct control over worker pension funds, there should be an attempt to shift the trust to institutions that are willing to satisfy a number of labor-oriented criteria in the investment of funds. The trusts are so large and lucrative that competition for them should be substantial.

These types of changes could go a long way to increase the control of workers over employment and job policies in the American economy. With respect to the criticism that investment performance in terms of returns would suffer by such an approach, should be emphasized that present patterns of returns are not enviable (Barber 1982). That is, it is conceivable that a more labor-oriented approach could yield higher financial returns and greater employment benefits.

Promoting Small Businesses

There is a tendency to view the potential for employment or job expansion largely in terms of the actions of the largest corporations. It is true that in manufacturing there are many major industries that are dominated by just a few firms. Further, a single investment decision by such firms can create hundreds or thousands of jobs. However, these assessments do not take a number of factors into account. First, such firms make up the most capital-intensive sector of the economy, producing the fewest jobs for any level of capital investment. Second, such entities are multinational operations, and much of their success is reflected in employment expansion in other countries even when they are headquartered in the United States. Finally, even though a single investment decision in a local community can generate hundreds or thousands of jobs, a decision to close a plant has symmetrical effects. That is, the decision to close a local plant—often made in the corporate planning offices of a conglomerate a thousand or more miles away—can have devastating consequences for a community (Stern et al., 1979: ch. 2).

These realities are reflected in the fact that the overall contribution to job expansion of the large corporate conglomerates has been rather dismal in the recent past. Between 1969 and 1976 some 9.5 million jobs were added to the American economy, but less than 1 percent were produced by the top 1000 firms, while small businesses were responsible for 6 million new jobs (U.S. Small Business Administration 1979). This does not mean that the largest corporations did not expand and prosper. Although some reduced their work forces, others expanded them. But the reliance on intensive models of production and foreign expansion meant that there was little gain in domestic jobs in these corporate giants.

The evidence suggests that smaller firms utilize less capital to create each job and represent a more dynamic potential for employment expansion. Often, employment gains in the larger firms are due to their purchase of or mergers with existing firms,

rather than the creation of new jobs. The result is that much more attention must be paid to fostering policies to stimulate the expansion and survival of smaller businesses with their greater potential for employment generation. It is important to note that in other countries as well as in the United States there is evidence that capital is used more efficiently by smaller firms (World Bank, 1978: ch. 2). For example, even in Japan, with its highly productive corporate giants, this pattern seems to hold (World Bank, 1978: 65).

In the United States, small businesses are generally viewed as those with fewer than 500 employees. That size would be a rather large firm in most other societies. Even in the United States we suggest that attention be devoted to firms with far fewer employees, including those with below 50 employees. Such firms are widely varied in terms of size, products, and the challenges that they face (Hollander et al., 1967). However, they often need two major types of assistance to survive and expand: access to capital on reasonable terms and technical assistance. The first of these is of particular importance. Unlike their large corporate counterparts, small businesses often lack adequate access to capital at low rates of interest with appropriate repayment terms.

In part, small businesses must pay higher interest rates than larger firms by virtue of their more limited financial strength and assets. In part, they lack the close ties to the larger banks that are able to provide the most favorable loans, since such banks often overlook smaller firms with more modest financial resources and activity. Finally, smaller businesses are subject to a wider set of external factors that are beyond their control in affecting the profitability of their operations. The largest firms often have considerable influence over their markets, labor supply, and other resource inputs because of their sheer size and market dominance. The high interest rates of the late seventies and early eighties have been particularly hard on small businesses.

Technical assistance is also necessary to assist small businesses in getting a healthy start and adapting to change. Particularly in such areas as rapidly changing technologies and market demand, such firms must obtain information well in advance of having to make adaptive decisions. Their relatively small size means that these firms often cannot afford to have specialized staff that can devote itself to these matters.

Both technical assistance and loans can be provided by public authorities such as the Small Business Administration (SBA). However, the SBA has very limited capability for providing technical assistance or guaranteeing low-interest loans relative to the potential demands and needs for such services. The result is that it must ration its resources, and there is often a danger that favoritism is shown to businesses whose owners have political connections with the party in power or with members of Congress in the specific service areas of the regional SBA offices. Certainly this has been a traditional criticism of the operations of the SBA. However, the biggest single problem is that the SBA and similar state agencies do not have the budgets and capability to make much more than a small impact on meeting the goals of supporting a thriving and expanding small business sector. Clearly, a larger commitment must be made to meet those objectives if small businesses are to be relied on to raise employment levels.

Although small businesses appear to have an advantage over larger ones in terms of employment potential, it is not clear that they always provide a better work environment. To the degree that they are small, they may provide intrinsic opportunities for personalization and a sense of belonging. Also, their small size contributes to the possibilities of greater worker participation in decisions. However, depending on the nature of the business and the particular style of the proprietor, such businesses can also be extremely authoritarian in structure. Their work tasks can be highly routinized

and repetitive, with little chance for human development, just as in larger firms. Accordingly, it is worth considering a form of business organization that might increase both employment and worker participation at the same time.

Worker-Owned and -Managed Firms

A relatively new national phenomenon in the United States has been that of worker-owned and -managed firms. Such firms are both owned by their employees and managed democratically through both direct participation and representation in the selection of managers. This movement has become important in recent years for a number of reasons. First, in increasing numbers of cases, it is becoming evident that profitable plants are being closed because they can be made more profitable moved to lower wage areas, or they do not fit the plans of some parent firm or conglomerate that has purchased them (Bluestone and Harrison, 1980). In these cases, purchase of the firm by the present work force represents a way to maintain an employment base (Stern et al., 1979). Second, there is a mechanism that can be used for such purchases, the Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP), that has major tax advantages for the firm (U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1976). Third, such worker-owned firms can be managed democratically by their own employees through both direct participation and an elected board or elected managers. Thus the approach can incorporate worker participation and workplace democracy. Finally, there is increasing evidence that such firms have rates of productivity that are as high or higher than comparable firms of a more conventional form (Levin, 1982).

Thus worker-owned firms can be used to save jobs at plants that would otherwise close, and they can also be used to improve the quality of working life and possibly productivity as well. Further, they represent an approach to starting new businesses, since the future employees or members of the firm themselves can share in raising capital rather than relying strictly on a small base of ownership. Even with relatively small capital subscriptions per member, the amount of capital that can be raised can be substantial.

At the national level, the movement toward worker-owned firms has been promoted by Senator Russell Long and other members of Congress, and a substantial number of firms have moved in this direction (Whyte and Blasi, 1980). Of particular interest as a model for the employee-owned firm is the traditional worker cooperative. Worker cooperatives have a very long history, going back to the revolutionary period in the United States (Jones, 1979). They represent firms that are both owned and managed by their employees, with relatively equal ownership of shares among their members. In the United States the best known and most studied of these firms are the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest (Bellas, 1972; Berman, 196 Bernstein, 1976). However, the cooperative movement that has inspired the most recent attention has been that of the industrial cooperatives of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain (Johnson and Whyte, 1977; Oakeshott, 1978: ch. 10 Thomas and Logan, 1982).

The Mondragon group of cooperatives is impressive because of its size, range products, growth, high productivity, and its ability to solve the traditional obstacles survival of cooperatives. The first of these cooperatives was established in 1958. Two decades later the sales were in the $750 million range, with about one-fifth of this amount sold abroad. Products of the 70 cooperatives include refrigerators and other home appliances, heavy machinery, hydraulic presses, steel, semiconductors, sele-

nium rectifiers, and a large variety of other items. The movement includes the largest refrigerator manufacturer in Spain, a bank with some half billion dollars in assets, a research and development center, a technical high school and engineering college, and an extensive social security system with clinics and other services.

Each member must invest a specified amount in his or her firm, and a portion of the surplus is allocated to his or her capital account each year in proportion to the hours of work and the job rating. The maximum to minimum pay ratio is 3:1, a highly egalitarian arrangement. The payments for labor, which are received bimonthly, are superior to pay levels in private industry for the lower jobs, comparable for middle-level jobs and middle management, and considerably below the comparable pay in the private sector for high-level executives. The board of each firm is elected by all the members, and the board appoints the managers. There is also a social council of representatives of all workers at lower levels of the firm that deals directly with the management board on all issues affecting this constituency.

Most impressive are both the job and productivity consequences of the cooperatives. A study found that in 1972, the cooperatives used only one-fourth as much capital for each worker as the 500 largest firms in Spain (Levin, forthcoming b). Yet worker productivity in the cooperatives was about 80 percent of that of the far more capital-intensive top 500. Stated in another way, the top 500 capitalist firms in Spain used 4 times as much capital per worker, but each worker in those firms was able to produce only about 20 percent more than each worker in the cooperatives. Thus when both capital and labor inputs were taken into account, the cooperatives were far more productive in their use of resources.

Although the Mondragon model has become the one that represents the most successful prototype for a worker cooperative movement, it will not be an easy chore to transfer its features to the United States. It is clear that Basque solidarity has been an important determinant of its success. Further, there is nothing comparable to the banking system of the Mondragon cooperatives that represents a basis for access to financial capital and for expansion of the movement in the United States. Although the SBA has been able to make loans to cooperatives since 1980, its limited budget suggests that it will not be a major financial factor in supporting the movement. Moreover, the National Consumer Cooperatives Bank that was established in the late seventies will be turned over to private sponsors with little or no federal funding by the Reagan administration. The technical assistance provided by the banking system of the Mondragon cooperatives is also absent, and there is no system of training and education for the cooperative workplace that is comparable to that of Mondragon. This means that although there is much that can be learned from Mondragon, the basic infrastructure to support worker cooperatives in the United States has yet to be built.

MICROSTRATEGIES

In the last section, macrostrategies for expanding employment and improving the nature of jobs were discussed. In this section I wish to suggest several specific strategies or microstrategies for intervention. Microstrategies are those that might be applied at a community or enterprise level. Of particular concern are two microsituations: communities faced with very high unemployment or the threat of possible plant closures that will have highly disruptive effects and firms in which work is especially onerous. The three microstrategies that will be discussed are: (1) establishment of community enterprises, (2) establishment of employee-owned firms and worker cooperatives, and (3) work reorganization.

Establishment of Community Enterprises

The main problem that communities face with respect to the availability and nature of jobs is that many of the factors that determine the quality and quantity of jobs are determined by factors outside of the community. That is, overall economic conditions, availability of cheaper labor or other inputs at another location, conglomerate mergers that may affect the operations of a firm or plant, and a host of other reasons can affect investment and employment decisions in a specific community. Although the attraction of a plant with large numbers of jobs may be a boon to the community that will accelerate economic development, its loss for any of the above reasons can have a devastating impact on the economic base of that community. For this reason, communities must seek to provide for a pattern of economic development that is diversified and that provides some components of community input.

"Diversification" refers to a mixture of firms and employment opportunities, as opposed to reliance on one or two large employers. Even when such employers commit themselves to long-term operations in a community, any single employer is subject to large vicissitudes in product demand with concomitant employment consequences. A community should simply not be tied to the fortunes or vagaries of a single firm or a small number of firms, since healthy communities require relative stability and a reasonable planning horizon for their residents, businesses, and community agencies. Diversification means the ability to rely on a wide range of different types of business and government enterprises with an appropriate mix of small, medium-size and large establishments. If a community has a range of such entities, the employment situation will not be subject to the business fortunes of a single firm or industry.

"Community input" refers to some measure of democratic control of the economic base. This can be done through community agencies that are designed to develop jobs for community members by attracting business and industry through a variety of incentives. If these agencies provide proper incentives, the appropriate mix of firms might be obtained and provisions might be negotiated that will optimize future employment. Specific incentives include low-cost or guaranteed loans, training of the necessary work force, and possible tax concessions or public services.

These incentives can be provided through community development corporations (CDCs) or other forms of community economic organizations (Kotler, 1978; Sclar, 1970). CDCs attract capital and invest it in neighborhood enterprises. In some cases, government loans or grants have been available for such agencies as under the now defunct Office of Economic Opportunity and its successor, the Community Services Administration (which was eliminated by the Reagan administration), or under the U.S. Small Business Administration (1979: 11-13). However, it is not clear that SBA programs are as effective as they might be with respect to job creation (Comptroller General of the United States, 1976). With the demise of the antipoverty agencies and the Economic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, finding sources of investment capital has become problematic, but not impossible (Smollen, 1976).

Community control of such enterprises can be vested in the form of a board composed entirely or partially of elected representatives of the communities or neighborhoods in which the CDC operates (Kelly, 1976). The board can be divided further into representation from particular constituencies such as residents, businesses, government agencies, and nonprofit groups, with a specific allocation of board members from each. CDCs can take different legal forms, with the most common being the nonprofit, public corporation, although some have "for profit" subsidiaries. It was estimated that there were some 500 CDCs in 1978 (Kotler, 1978), with technical

assistance available from the Center for Community Economic Development and the Economic Development Law Project.[2]

In general, a CDC or similar agency would consider the types of development and employment it wishes to attract and ascertain the types of incentives necessary to attract them. Then it would seek to obtain the interest of prospective businesses of the type that are desirable and serve as a broker to make arrangements to provide facilities, training, credit, or other needs. Finally, it would monitor and evaluate the situation on a continual basis, taking appropriate actions to make improvements and alter strategies, if necessary.

In this respect, the reliance on low-cost public loans that were available in the sixties and seventies is no longer as probable, given the withdrawal of federal agencies from such endeavors in the eighties. However, state agencies still have an interest in local economic development, and it is conceivable that a portion of worker pension funds from both public and private sectors could be put to use in such directions (Barber, 1982). Such approaches might provide capital, training, facilities, and public services in exchange for job commitments, early warnings on prospective employment changes so that the community could anticipate and plan for them, and negotiations on matters of importance to the community.

Establishment of Worker-Owned Firms and Worker Cooperatives

Worker-owned firms are those in which ownership is vested in the employees through any of a variety of forms. Worker cooperatives incorporate not only the dimension of worker ownership, but also democratic management of the enterprise by the worker-owners (Bernstein, 1976; Ellerman, 1982; Jackall and Levin, forthcoming). This approach represents a response for addressing several specific aspects of the creation, maintenance, and improvement of jobs. First, it is a potential response to the closing of plants or firms that are still economically viable. Second, it provides a mechanism for raising capital by broadening the base of capital subscriptions to the entire work force of a potential or existing firm. Finally, it creates a basis for full worker participation and decision making, overcoming many of the sources of worker alienation and powerlessness.

The saving of jobs through employee purchases of firms that would otherwise close has become a much-discussed strategy in recent years for stabilizing the economic base of communities. Although in many cases firms are closed because of a lack of profitability, this is not always the case (Bluestone and Harrison, 1980). In some cases, profits are less than a parent conglomerate could get by shifting production abroad or to some other area of the country. In other cases, the plant may not fit into the marketing or production plans for a conglomerate because it is not central to the overall strategy. In still other cases, there are important tax incentives for closing plants that are only marginally profitable.

In these cases, workers may be able to save their jobs by purchasing the firm. Indeed, vested pension funds can be used to assist in the purchase. A rather typical approach is to rely on an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) for such purchases (Ellerman, 1982; Gunn, 1981; Stern et al., 1979; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1976). Essentially, such a plan enables a shift from present owners to workers by placing the shares in a trust. The trust is then used as collateral for a commercial or government loan, which is used in turn to purchase the firm from the

present owners. Under the ESOP, periodic payments are made by the firm to the trust in an amount equal to the loan payments. As the loan is paid off, stock becomes unencumbered and is transferred to the workers until the firm is completely owned by its work force. Because the payments made by the firm to the trust in behalf of its employees are considered to be tax deductible as contributions to a qualified employee-deferred compensation trust, the firm is able to obtain a loan at considerably lower cost than it would in the absence of the ESOP. Under normal circumstances, only the payment of interest is tax deductible, while payments of both interest and principal are tax deductible under the ESOP approach.

Notable examples of firms in which employee purchases under ESOPs were able to save jobs include a group of firms in New York State (Stern et al., 1979); a lathe producer in Indiana (Zwerdling, 1978: 64-68); and a roller-bearing plant in New Jersey (Moberg, 1980). The Rath Meatpacking Company in Iowa, with 2000 employees, is currently moving in this direction (Gunn, 1981). The benefits of using ESOPs to save jobs are a subject of wide debate (Ellerman, 1982; Gordon and Hecksher, 1982), and there exists a National Center for Employee Ownership to assist in considering alternatives and implementing worker buyouts.[3]

Jobs can also be created through employee establishment of new firms. One major advantage of this form of ownership is that it provides access to a large base from which capital can be raised. Particularly in times of high interest rates and capital scarcity, the access to relatively small investments by prospective employees can contribute to a substantial investment base. That is, firms can be started through a process that incorporates both planning and investment by prospective employees into the firm. By obtaining relatively small investments of even a few thousand dollars from each of the initial members of the work force of an enterprise, it may be possible to initiate a small business. Also, this amount can be used as leverage in obtaining a loan from a commercial or government source or a community development agency.

Finally worker ownership provides the basis for creating worker cooperatives with a fully democratic work organization and worker participation. Employee ownership, in itself, is not tantamount to employee control of the enterprise. Often, for example, ESOPs have been used to reduce the costs of borrowing capital for a firm, but the control of the stock was not relinquished to its workers (Ellerman 1982; Levin, forthcoming a). A worker cooperative is the ultimate form for introducing democracy into the workplace and overcoming the syndrome of worker alienation. Through both direct participation on the shop floor and indirect participation through representative decision bodies that select and advise managers, workers can become involved in influencing the factors that affect their daily work lives. In addition, they can take responsibility for their decisions by sharing in the economic fortunes of the firm. There is a large and emerging literature on worker cooperatives, with particular emphasis on emulating the successful features of the Mondragon firms of Spain (Jackall and Levin, forthcoming; Jones and Svejnar, 1982; Oakeshott, 1978; Thomas and Logan, 1982). Producer cooperatives can create employment while providing a truly self-governing workplace in which workers can be full "citizens" with both political and economic rights to participate (Pateman, 1970).

Work Reorganization

Even within private and government work organizations, some effort can be made to improve the quality of working life by expanding worker participation in

decisions. The incentive for firms to incorporate such changes is that they seem to be associated with higher productivity. Especially important are the sociotechnical forms of work reorganization and autonomous work groups that emphasize the use of work teams and the division of the enterprise into organic work units around which the work process is organized (Susman, 1976; Thorsrud et al., 1976). The work groups plan, execute, and evaluate work within their units, as well as participate in the selection and training of new personnel and advise on the design and purchase of new equipment and technologies.

Some of the most interesting examples that have been documented have been found in Swedish automobile manufacture, such as Volvo (Gyllenhammar, 1977). Because of high worker turnover and problems of product quality, Saab has also undertaken such work modifications. For example, Saab management and the union initiated a team approach to door assembly with groups of seven workers, including a coordinator and six other members who worked in pairs (Logue, 1981). The coordinator position was rotated among workers on a weekly basis. The team did most of the quality control and maintenance of machinery, and, in consultation with management, hired new members and allocated a budget for equipment. Training was also done by the group. Workers were given a slight increase in wages for managing their own operations, and interviews with them suggested that they were more satisfied with their work situations.

Not only did the workers' situations improve, but so did the productivity and profitability of Saab. Quality-control problems diminished, and the number of quality-control inspectors was reduced. In addition, worker turnover declined from over 50 percent to about 14 percent. Annual savings were estimated to be about nine times the annual costs, and Saab recovered its full investment for converting from repetitive assembly line techniques to team assembly in only two and one-half years (Logue, 1981).

Thus a movement in the direction of improvement in the quality of working life and that of improved profitability can be compatible under some circumstances. The importance of this phenomenon is that, increasingly, firms will view it as being in their self-interest to consider various forms of worker participation and changes in work organization that may reduce worker alienation. As a direct intervention in improving the quality of working life, the promise of higher productivity and profitability can be a powerful incentive for employers. The major challenges in formulating such interventions will be to select those that meet the needs of both workers and the firm. These goals are often incompatible, as stressed by Greenberg (1975).

POLICY INITIATIVES OF THE EIGHTIES

In the prior section it was suggested that community enterprises, employee-owned firms and worker cooperatives, and various forms of work reorganization should be considered as direct interventions for increasing employment, productivity, and improving the quality of working life. Each of these approaches may be suitable under appropriate conditions.

However, the major federal and state initiatives of the eighties seem to be in different directions. They are based on two broad strategies. The first is the reliance on a combination of tax cuts, expenditure reductions for social services, rising defense expenditures, and curtailing of government regulations to generate an economic recovery that will expand employment rapidly. The second is the emphasis on promoting enterprise zones to revive depressed urban communities.

There is little evidence that the first approach, so-called supply-side economics, will be successful. This approach is predicated on the assumption that the principal reason for poor economic performance is the lack of incentive for persons to work and to save, and for firms to invest when their tax rates on additional income are high. It also assumes that lagging investment is due to excessive government regulations, which impede the investment process and profitability. There is little direct evidence of any sort that supports the first assumption, and the second one ignores the benefits of regulation in the form of improved health, environment, market information, and other social gains. Of course, in selected cases, marginal tax rates may be too high and regulation may be unnecessarily burdensome. In these cases, the appropriate adjustments should be made (Bardach and Kagan, 1982).

Of course, some economic recovery is likely to take place regardless of government policy. A slowdown in economic activity tends to deplete inventories and depreciate existing capital so that at some point it is necessary to replenish inventories and replace capital. At this stage, the new investment will increase employment, income, consumption, and savings, fueling a further economic expansion. However, the extent of the expansion may be relatively shallow and its duration brief unless there is a major rebound in the underlying behavior of the economy. Whether the supply-side approach will create such a rebound is considered to be problematic at best.

Even if one assumes that the overall economic situation improves, there is still a localized problem of communities that are not much affected by the general improvement in economic conditions. These are cases where plants have closed and the local employment base has eroded so seriously that there is little spillover from national economic improvement. Many of the urban areas of the North and Midwest are characterized by these conditions, with unemployment rates that continue to be relatively high even during periods of recovery. The strategy expounded by the federal and state governments for expanding employment in these areas is that of urban enterprise zones.

The notion behind enterprise zones is that special areas of cities and even rural areas might be put aside for the attraction of industry through a number of special concessions that would reduce costs (Goldsmith, 1982). Attraction would be mainly in the form of lower wages and taxes and waivers of health, safety, and environmental regulations. Thus minimum wage levels and taxes, as well as other health and safety requirements that protect workers, would be reduced for firms operating in the enterprise zones. Presumably, these cost reductions would be adequate to attract investment and expand employment.

However, without even addressing the implications of reducing minimum wages and other employee protections as a social policy, it is important to ask where the new jobs will come from. The theory of the enterprise zone suggests that manufacturers will wish to locate in these areas because the cost of production will be cheaper than in other areas. But if the zones simply shift employment from one area of the United States to other areas, the net effect on employment levels will be nil. Indeed, the shifts may be from other high-unemployment areas to the enterprise zones. The underlying expectation is that the cost of manufacture in the enterprise zones will become so low that these areas will attract investment that would otherwise have gone abroad.

However, a reduction in the minimum wage from $3.35 per hour to $2.50 per hour, as well as a relaxation of health, safety, and environmental regulations, can hardly compete with the costs of manufacture in Asia and much of Latin America. In these countries, wages are rarely as high as $1.00 per hour, and health, safety, and environmental restrictions are minimal if they exist at all. Further, the high costs of crime, insurance, and energy that characterize many of the urban areas of the North-

eastern and Midwestern United States are typically less important in counties with military dictatorships, few contingencies to insure against, and temperate climates. In many Third World countries, such sophisticated manufactures as computer chips and high-technology electronics are produced at a lower cost than any U.S. enterprise zone could possibly provide (Goldsmith, 1982). The result is that enterprise zones would hardly be an effective means of getting multinational firms to shift their investments to the United States rather than to the Third World. Although the changes in regulations associated with such zones may reduce environmental and worker protections, they will still not bring costs down to the level of Asia or Latin America, where wages are still in the range of 15 to 25 cents per hour.

In summary, the enterprise zone notion is likely to be a rather weak strategy with respect to improving the job situation, since it appears to have greater consequences for shifting employment from one area to another than for creating new jobs. Further, it will undermine the relatively minimal wage, health, and safety protections for workers. Finally, it is questionable whether these incentives' tax concessions and social costs will be offset by adequate social benefits. The main advantage of the enterprise zone is its simplicity in contrast to the multiple strategies outlined in the body of this chapter. It simply requires exempting such zones from existing laws. However, the underlying complexities of improving the employment and quality of work situation in the United States suggest that there is not likely to be a simple and straightforward "quick fix." Rather, we must choose the most appropriate interventions and strategies for any given situation and pursue their development and implementation with great energy and dedication. While the latter approach is probably less cheerful, it is more realistic and likely to be more effective.[5]

NOTES

1. Even in the public sector, implementation is highly problematic; see Berman and McLaughlin (1975).

2. The best source for references to published works and groups that might be of assistance in community economic development is Kotler (1978). General assistance is available from the Center for Community Economic Development, 639 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA. Legal assistance is available from the Economic Development Law Project, 2150 Shattuck, Berkeley, CA 94704.

3. Further information on employee ownership is available from the National Center for Employee Ownership, 4836 South 28th Street, Arlington, VA 22206.

4. The Association for Workplace Democracy, 1747 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009, produces a journal called *Workplace Democracy* and holds annual conferences. Technical assistance for worker cooperatives is available from the Industrial Cooperative Association, 249 Elm Street, Somerville, MA 02144.

5. For a strategy based on community and worker control of economic development, see Wylie and Walsh (1982).

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23

The Grassroots Response to Government Housing Interventions

Leonard F. Heumann

In a free market economy, housing interventions into the private market can be defined as any organized or collective activity to address housing supply errors or unmet housing needs resulting from purely private housing market activity. Such interventions can be conducted by duly elected governments (municipal, state, and federal), private institutions sanctioned or regulated by governments (such as banks and insurance companies), nonprofit, civic, fraternal, or religious organizations, and "grassroots" neighborhood groups. Of particular interest to this chapter will be housing interventions that have started at the grassroots level.

The chapter will document the great increase in grassroots orginated housing interventions over the past dozen years and will attempt to explain the phenomenon. The chapter will not ignore other types of housing interventions. To the contrary, a central thesis of this chapter is that the majority of recent grassroots housing interventions are a response to (1) the failure of past government housing interventions, (2) government housing interventions that have exacerbated an existing neighborhood market error or created new market errors, and (3) lack of government intervention to correct an error or inequity in the private housing market. Therefore, it will be necessary to trace the history of economic market errors and social inequities that result in unmet housing needs starting with federal, state, and municipal responses, errors resulting from government action or inaction, and then to describe the more recent grassroots responses to the entire history.

The chapter will proceed by first defining and documenting the recent increase in grassroots housing interventions. This topic could fill the entire space allotted this chapter, but since the goal is to describe the evolution and predisposing factors leading to recent grassroots intervention, the section will of necessity be brief and illustrative. The main body of the chapter attempts to define private market housing errors and related social inequities, and the progression of government interventions leading up to and including the latest grassroots activities. This lengthy section is itself limited to key examples of major housing market errors and government interventions because of the enormity of the subject. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions concerning the future growth and ultimate size of the grassroots housing interventions "movement" and its implications for better government planning in American cities.

THE RECENT GROWTH OF GRASSROOTS HOUSING INTERVENTIONS

Over the past dozen years or so, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of grassroots organizations and citizen participation. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of Neighborhoods, Voluntary Associations and Consumer Affairs identifies nearly 15,000 consumer and citizen groups concerned with neighborhood problems (Perlman, 1978). Independently, the National Commission on Neighborhoods has identified over 8,000 grassroots organizations (Perlman, 1978; Rosenbloom, 1981). While these grassroots organizations have been formed to address numerous issues from health care to environmental pollution, several studies indicate housing problems are often the initial catalyst and frequently a primary sustaining activity of these neighborhood organizations (Bowsher, 1980; Hutcheson, 1980; Morris and Hess, 1975; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980). One author has concluded that "in recent years grassroots political mobilization around housing issues has become one of the characteristics of inner city politics [in the United States]" (Montgomery and Mandelker, 1979: 240).

The overall growth in neighborhood political activism around housing issues is interesting, but, as some cynics would be quick to note, a greater deal of the activity does not constitute fundamental and long-lived market interventions. Many of these neighborhoods conduct only single-issue and short-lived outreach, information, and referral assistance; others concentrate on "clean-up" and "spruce-up" activities; and still others are government-conceived citizen input groups that only "rubber stamp" community development proposals to meet federal requirements. For the purposes of this chapter, we clearly need more rigor in our definition and will therefore require at least the first two of the following five characteristics for eligibility as grassroots housing interventions: (1) The housing issues and organization should be locally conceived and the organization's activities should address a fundamental failure to provide adequate housing by the private housing market or a related failure by a larger government to ameliorate a private market error or inequity. (2) By *addressing* a fundamental issue, we mean effective political *lobbying* for public action, such as for (a) new legislation, (b) better enforcement of existing regulations, (c) new resource allocations to ameliorate the problem, or *direct* market *intervention* by such means as a neighborhood housing corporation that either directly purchases and/or constructs and/or rehabilitates and/or manages and/or sells housing. (3) The organization, while starting with a single housing issue, should evolve to where it can analyze, plan, and implement any collective activity that can be successfully conducted at the neighborhood level. (4) The organization should become a permanent political force, linking up with other nearby communities active in local politics. (5) The organization should link up with umbrella organizations that develop and standardize successful neighborhood housing and other market intervention models, lobby for recognition, funding, and new legislation, and make direct court challenges of illegal private market and larger government activities at the metropolitan-area, state, and federal levels.

Some readers might feel that these housing intervention characteristics of grassroots organizations are too rigorous, limiting further discussion to only one or two eligible groups in only the largest cities. However, this is far from the case. There are now several national neighborhood housing intervention programs and numerous national lobby groups representing such grassroots activities. These national

umbrella organizations include National Neighbors, Neighborhood Housing Service (NHS), Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), National Housing Partnership, and the National Low Income Housing Coalition, to mention just a few of the larger and more clearly housing-oriented intervention organizations. National Neighbors and Neighborhood Housing Services represent over 190 and 80 neighborhoods respectively, across the country, that fit the above characteristics. Most of these umbrella organizations and their member communities were founded during the last twelve years.

The city of Chicago recently identified 236 grassroots organizations (Cataldo, 1981). Some of these organizations only provide services such as advocacy, community organizing, counseling, emergency housing, information, and referrals. Others provide services such as legal assistance, legislative lobbying, training, and technical assistance that involve, but are not limited to, housing. Of greatest interest are the number of grassroots groups involved in direct supply-side interventions in housing financing, new construction, and rehabilitation. Seventy-three, or almost 31 percent, of all the groups listed provided direct housing rehabilitation services alone. This percentage could be further increased, since a group like NHS is listed only once, even though it represents six different housing reinvestment neighborhoods in Chicago. There are also numerous other grassroots housing interventions known to the author outside center city, in surrounding metropolitan Chicago.

The issue throughout the central portion of this chapter is why these grassroots housing interventions have emerged at this time in our history. Three very popular explanations have been offered over the last five years. The first is the tremendous recession combined with inflating costs in the private housing market. Residents of neighborhoods below middle income are finding they can no longer afford new private market housing, and interest rates on housing loans and the costs for private rehabilitation and maintenance work have become prohibitive. Second is the diminishing housing and planning support from larger governments. Public housing construction and rent subsidies for existing housing have not kept pace with the growing number of persons facing excessive rent burdens as a result of the recent recession, while dwindling community development funds have been diverted to "wealthier" parts of the city as the recession spreads (National Citizens' Monitoring Project, 1981). The current federal government is proposing the total elimination of some housing support programs in addition to continued cutbacks in others (Clute and Lincoln, 1981). Third is the presidential call for greater local volunteerism, neighborhood self-help, and citizen involvement. While this has been a central philosophy of the Reagan administration, Carter also called for a new partnership with neighborhood and community groups (Ross and Kotler, 1979; Nenno, 1981). While all three factors can help explain the most recent increase in grassroots housing interventions and can be expected to continue to fuel the growth of neighborhood organization and self-help, they do not explain why the pioneering neighborhood housing efforts, and many of the national housing intervention models, were developed ten to twelve years ago when there was no private market recession, government spending was at a historic peak, and presidents were not calling for decentralizing public planning to the neighborhood level.

A more likely explanation for the beginning of grassroots housing interventions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and their steady growth since, is a changing attitude in certain kinds of neighborhoods toward collective action to solve local housing problems, along with a growing belief that both the private market and more centralized government are unable and even *unwilling* at times to solve the neighborhood hous-

ing problems. For decades, the residents of poorer neighborhoods have been told that the existence and spread of substandard housing were primarily their fault. Today, private speculators and central government are increasingly being seen as the source of many low-income neighborhood housing problems. Beginning with the riots and protests of the late 1960s, grassroots efforts have grown into organized community action and neighborhood housing development corporations. However, grassroots groups began to develop intervention models that had a chance of improving housing conditions in their neighborhoods only when they realized that (1) private market errors and disinvestments in their neighborhoods were a partial problem, (2) larger government failures to address these private errors and disinvestments were a partial problem, and (3) incorrect government responses to local conditions often worsened chances of reinvestment and recovery.

PRIVATE MARKET ERRORS AND PUBLIC INTERVENTIONS

The widely held belief in private market economies such as ours is that private market activity by individual buyers and sellers in a free and competitive setting is the most efficient and fairest way to distribute goods and services. We have traditionally resisted public intervention into the private economy, and even when we have intervened it has been more to regulate private activity than to replace it. If the capitalistic market place worked perfectly, there would be no need for any local public planning or government intervention. Unfortunately, planners and economists have identified numerous market shortcomings and complexities, which have resulted in loss of information, failure to produce goods, failure of buyer and seller to connect up, private enterprise that has produced spillover costs to innocent third parties, and missed opportunities because costs and risks were too high for individual private suppliers. Planners also recognize social inequities which, though not direct errors of the economic market, nevertheless unfairly penalize some persons when they attempt to fulfill their needs and wants through private economic transactions. The most notable social inequities are insufficient income to register a preference for even the most basic needs provided through the private market, and social discrimination from full and equal participation in the private market.

Perhaps in no area are the multiple effects of private market errors and social inequities more severely felt by low-income households than in the housing market. Housing is one of those basic consumption goods that at some point becomes an absolute necessity. Everyone needs some basic minimum amount of decent shelter, no matter what the cost, in order to function—for protection from the elements, for health, and for privacy for self and family. Housing by virtue of its many physical and social functions is the most complex, expensive, and durable good the average consumer purchases. Furthermore, because it is fixed in a given neighborhood location, each house carries with it numerous other amenities and opportunities such as knowledge of, and availability of, types of work, quality of schools, density of living, safety from crime, and clean air. Being denied basic opportunities to compete equally in the private housing market can severely cripple many low-income households' ability to compete in all other markets. This, then, is why housing issues are so frequently the organizational focus of grassroots groups. In order to understand the specific types of grassroots housing interventions being attempted today, we must first understand the predisposing private market errors and larger government responses. Table 23.1 is an attempt to

TABLE 23.1 Examples of Public Responses to Private Housing Market Errors and Social Inequalities

Private Housing Market Errors and Social Inequities	*Private Market Reaction*	*Major State and Federal Interventions*	*Typical Municipal Interventions*	*Errors Resulting from Government Action/ Inaction*	*Leading Grassroot Interventions*
Product Complexity: incomplete and imperfect information	The real estate industry	Minimal: • Licensing • Information services	None	• Buyer "steering" • Seller "blockbusting" neighborhood instability	Monitoring and substituting for the private real estate industry
Financial complexity: high sunk cost and purchase price	Home mortgage and finance industry	FHLBB/FSLIC, FHA, secondary markets (Community Reinvestment Act)	None	• Neighborhood financial disinvestment	• pressure tactics to achieve reinvestment • high-risk loan pools
Externalities	None	None	• Land Use Zoning • Housing use and building construction codes	• "snob" zoning and codes • inflexible codes • owner disinvestment	• anti-snob-litigation • flexible code enforcement • collective reinvestment strategies
Suboptimal Income Distribution	None	Housing subsidies: • to construction • to renters • public housing • rehabilitation • community development	Administration of: • public housing • rent subsidy • CDBG	Programs that are: • incomplete • mismanaged • underfunded	• collective ownership • collective management • sweat equity • attempts at new housing development
Social Discrimination	None	Fair housing laws: • incomplete • uninforced • uninforceable • meager penalties	None	continued discrimination by race, sex, age, and family type/size	• picketing • withdrawal of business • educating, lobbying • law suits
Multiple Effect of Errors and Inequities	Unscrupulous, uncontested, illegal: • speculation • collusion • profiteering	Very little	Speculators and profiteers can either influence authority or become the local authority.	rent gouging	• rent control • political activism • government reform

summarize this discussion. Listed down the left-hand column of the table are the major private market errors and social inequities that have precipitated many of the recent grassroots housing interventions. The column headings across the top of the table cover, first, key private market reactions, followed by major state and federal responses, typical municipal responses, errors resulting from government action/inaction, and finally key grassroots interventions. The following text describes each of these market errors and social inequities and the history of responses. As any housing expert knows, many more market errors and government responses could be added to the short list in each cell of the table. The purpose of this table and text are only to highlight the leading grassroots interventions and the major private market and larger government actions that precipitated them.

Product Complexity: Incomplete and Imperfect Information

In a "perfect" market, consumers and suppliers would have free and equal access to information, and everyone would always be fully informed. Economists have long known that lack of full and perfect knowledge increases the cost of some goods and services and prevents the production/consumption of others. However, as long as the lags in supply are short-range or for nonessential goods, or cost increases are relatively small, society is willing to incorporate the higher costs and unmet demand resulting from incomplete and imperfect information without public intervention.

Incomplete and imperfect information can be extremely costly in the housing market, especially to low-income buyers and renters. Because housing is a durable and costly good, the majority of homes up for sale at any time are *used* homes and each seller typically has only one piece of property up for sale. Many of the purchasers in the market have never purchased or rented before or at most have done so only once or twice before. There is no natural "marketplace" where one can shop for a house; each house must be visited and inspected. There is no clear standardization of product, and the purchase contains many complex considerations about number and arrangement of rooms, quality of the structure, quality of nearby amenities, and the like. A mistake in purchase can have long-range and costly effects, yet choosing the right or best product is seldom obvious and never free. The low-income buyer in particular cannot afford to visit many sites and often does not possess the skills to accurately compare and weigh the houses he or she does see.

It would seem logical for the housing market to invent brokers who could bring buyer and seller together and who could explain all the complexities and represent buyer and seller interests. The real estate broker is the market's response. However, the real estate broker receives his or her income from a percentage or commission from the sale of property—the higher the sales price, the larger the commission, and the more houses sold and the faster they are sold, the more income the broker can make. Therefore, the real estate broker represents the seller's interests, not the buyer's interests and not neighborhood stability interests. There is no one to represent the buyer, renter, or neighborhood interests in the housing market, yet they must rely on some information source, and that source is typically the real estate agent. Because of the complexity of the market and the lack of other market information sources, the real estate agent has a tremendous influence over what property the buyer sees and what type of buyers enter a neighborhood. If the agent feels a family would be "uncomfortable" or "unwelcome" in a given area, the agent can "steer" the family away

without ever consulting them, by simply not showing them houses in certain areas. Conversely, the agent can steer a family to an area where the agent feels the family will be most "compatible" with or "acceptable" to other residents. Whole areas and neighborhoods can come to develop real estate "images" for better or worse. The image can be one of high turnover/low stability; it can be all white or "where black buyers go" when seeking a home. In addition to "steering," unscrupulous agents have been known to generate new business among potential sellers by spreading rumors of pending racial or economic change; this is called "blockbusting."

Renting can be just as complex a process as buying, with almost as much at stake, especially for low-income families. In the rental market there is seldom even a brokerage system. Renters must use newspaper ads that often tell precious little other than that a rental is available at a given location. Low-income renters must often visit many apartments to find anything decent, let alone the best buy for their money. A landlord who chooses not to rent based on his or her own prejudices can do so easily. In the rare locations where outright discrimination by age, race, sex of head of household, or handicap exist and are enforced, other characteristics can be used. Excluding children, for example, is a legal form of discrimination in all but six states and a "handful of localities" (National Voter, 1981). The most common ploy is just to tell the prospective renter the unit is rented or has a deposit on it; most low-income households cannot afford to challenge even a blatant lie.

There has been very little in the way of state and federal response to the high level of incomplete and imperfect information and the high cost of information that faces all consumers in the housing market. States are the primary regulators, licensers, and auditors of the real estate industry, but regulations are minimal and no auditing or policing of real estate practices is regularly conducted. Some states and the federal department of Housing and Urban Development have consumer brochures and information and discrimination hotlines, but none of these services is designed to aid and assist the consumer in search of housing in a special local market. The municipal government is the most logical location for buyer aid offices, audits of real estate and landlord practices, fair housing ordinances, and, if need be, public intervention in the form of a brokerage system that represents both buyers and sellers. The typical municipality has no such services.

As a result of lack of response by larger governments, housing consumer advocacy has become a primary focus for grassroots intervention over the last decade. There are two major activities: (1) policing and seeking prosecution of illegal practices by the private real estate industry and (2) replacing the private real estate industry.

Real estate brokers are monitored for compliance with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and lawsuits are filed if there is evidence of racial steering. Evidence is assembled by use of "auditors," persons who pretend to be prospective buyers. The auditors keep records of the locations of homes they are offered by real estate salespersons, and the records are analyzed to determine if persons of different races are referred to housing in different locations (Heumann, 1981). In addition to organized attempts to prevent steering, neighborhoods and even some municipalities form legal aid and renter organizations that can represent plaintiffs and help defer legal costs incurred by renters, buyers, or owners who seek redress for discriminatory or blockbusting practices by real estate agents, landlords, or speculators.

Grassroots attempts to substitute or replace housing brokers' services vary by degree of intervention. Some groups just provide local information and regional information and referrals regarding sales and rentals for prospective consumers. A

more ambitious program is one in which the consumer is actually accompanied and represented by a support service representative in his or her search for a home. The most ambitious programs, as represented by the East Side Housing Advisory Committee (ESHAC), a neighborhood group in Milwaukee, are nonprofit home brokerage and counseling services designed to replace in part or entirely the role of private real estate agents. The ESHAC service received initial financing from the State Department of Local Affairs and Development until it would become self-sustaining through sales commissions. The state agreed with the neighborhoods, case against private real estate agents whose use of dishonest pressure tactics on elderly owners, and encouragement of speculative buying in the neighborhood threatened neighborhood stability (ESHAC Newsletter, 1979; Milwaukee Journal, 1979).

FINANCING COMPLEXITY: HIGH SUPPLIER SUNK COSTS, HIGH PURCHASE PRICE

The second row in Table 23.1 describes the dependence of the private housing market on money brokers and suppliers in order to function. Unlike most other markets, in which the majority of buyers and sellers can complete a one-time transaction with cash, the housing market is heavily dependent on financial brokers for the construction, purchase, and even rehabilitation of the vast majority of the existing housing stock. Without money brokers and an independent supply of mortgage money, the size of the private housing market would be greatly reduced; new and totally private construction would be limited to the richest one-fifth of the population at best. Without additional government regulation of banking and money markets, as well as outright tax incentives, many more Americans would be renters, and renters of units far below the current minimum housing standards. With government interventions, housing has grown into one of the largest industries in America, and there are more private homeowners in America than in any other country.

It has proven difficult to adapt the home building industry to the factory technology, modern production lines, and corporate investment of other industries. The fact that homes are large cumbersome products that must be fixed to a site has kept on-site construction competitive with factory innovations and production economies and has kept the typical builder small (less than 10 to 20 units per year in nonrecession years). These small builders are confronted with enormous up front or sunk costs. The time between the purchase of land options to final sale and occupancy of a house can be 18 to 30 months (Sternlieb, 1978). During this time land, material, labor, and interest costs on a construction loan mount up. The system requires that builders and developers sell off the houses they build to pay off loans and outstanding debts. Most developers could not afford to build without a construction loan, and the knowledge that buyers can assume full legal ownership via a mortgage.

Prior to the collapse of the banking industry in 1929, mortgage bankers were small, uninsured, and largely unregulated. The better bankers used extremely conservative underwriting techniques for mortgage loans, requiring a large initial equity of 50 percent or so of total sales price (down payment), and short amortization periods (loan pay-back periods). As a result, even with a mortgage, most buyers had to be reasonably wealthy.

A series of federal interventions into the private market beginning in the 1930s has greatly expanded the size of the separate housing money market, lowered the cost of housing purchases, and thus expanded the size of the home construction industry.

First, the federal government established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC); the former established/regulates and the latter insures a savings and loan industry separate from commercial banks, with the primary purpose of providing a pool of local home mortgage funds. Also established was the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which is responsible for administering government mortgage guarantee programs for borrowers *below* the income and other underwriting eligibility of conventional mortgage loans. The specific subsidy programs of the FHA are discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. The FHA is introduced here because FHA programs demonstrated to conservative private lenders that they could safely require smaller down payments and longer amortization periods for conventional loans without greatly increasing the risk of mortgage defaults. This, along with federal income tax incentives for homeownership, made millions of more Americans eligible for, and interested in, homeownership via a mortgage. Finally, the federal government established a secondary mortgage market. At first the exclusive buyer on this market was the federal government, which bought the potentially riskier loans made by local savings and loans. The savings and loans were therefore merely local loan processors, while the federal government assumed all risk. As these potentially riskier loans proved safe, other buyers appeared on the secondary market (mostly insurance companies), who were willing to assume more "seasoned" mortgages at a slightly lower than current interest rate. By selling their mortgage portfolios on the secondary market, local savings and loans gained new liquidity to make additional mortgage loans, thus further expanding the size of the housing market.

This relatively lengthy description of federal government intervention is revealing in two ways: (1) The federal government made some major and successful interventions into a private banking industry on behalf of *new* housing construction and *new* home buyers; (2) the banking industry is a very conservative industry that has shown little leadership or innovations of its own, while treating with great skepticism all government efforts to lower the eligibility for home mortgages to middle- and moderate-income Americans.

Today, savings and loans are again the focus of government reform and intervention, but this time the effort has been led by local neighborhood organizations. The federal regulations and incentives have continually focused on, and favored, new construction and new home mortgages at the suburban fringe. The savings and loans have consistently welcomed owners of older inner-city homes as depositors, while *disinvesting* in them as borrowers. Deposits are instead funneled into "safer," more profitable suburban communities. Both new construction loans and loans to upgrade and maintain housing have been denied many inner-city neighborhoods. The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which forced savings and loans to disclose the location patterns of depositors and borrowers, was, in large measure, the result of pressures brought to bear by disenfranchised urban neighborhoods (Pascal, 1980). Armed with these deposit/investment patterns, neighborhood groups have begun to achieve some success in pursuading the FHLBB and local savings and loans to redirect investment priorities. In most inner-city localities where savings and loan associations have agreed to reinvest, a number of associations have jointly contributed to a "high-risk" loan pool especially for the inner-city neighborhoods, thereby minimizing the reinvestment risk. The problems of neighborhood disinvestment and reinvestment involve more than just the banking industry. This topic will be discussed further in the following section on externalities.

Externalities

In microeconomics, the term "externality" is used to define any external cost or benefit to a third party that occurs incidentally to an otherwise legal market transaction between a buyer and a seller. Perhaps the most classic public attempt to ameliorate negative market externalities related to housing is the separation of noncompatible land uses by means of zoning. By separating industry from residential neighborhoods, the noise, air pollution, and dangerous traffic spillovers of industry are kept away from residential neighborhoods. Closely related to zoning are housing codes and ordinances. Most codes and ordinances are theoretically conceived to prevent negative externalities in the use of residential property. An occupancy code that regulates the number of persons that can occupy a unit is designed to prevent noise, health, and safety externalities. Construction codes are meant to prevent someone from using shoddy building and rehabilitation techniques, which can result in negative health, safety, aesthetic, and financial externalities on neighboring property. Unfortunately, local government interventions, such as zoning and codes, can result in various forms of overregulation which inhibit redevelopment, encourage private disinvestment, and discriminate against lower-income homebuyers. These problems have inspired grassroots counterinterventions, as is illustrated by the following examples.

Misuse

Zoning ordinances and codes can be misused. Some municipalities have created what are called "snob" zoning laws and housing codes to keep out "undesirables." Zones and codes can be written in such a way as to allow only single family homes, with a large minimum square footage, on large lots, using only the most expensive building materials, thus assuring only the wealthiest homeowners "can afford" to live in the community. When this becomes a pattern throughout suburbia, it effectively "locks out" all low- and moderate-income households, even when these suburban municipalities are accepting high-tax-paying, center-city industrial relocatees with many low-skill jobs needed by low- and moderate-income households. The grassroots fight to overturn snob zoning and housing codes is led by the few suburban municipalities that want a stable mix of all socioeconomic groups but face undue pressure to absorb all the suburban demand for low- and moderate-income housing forced on them by snob ordinances in neighboring municipalities. The fight for open and equal housing opportunities throughout metropolitan areas is usually carried out by umbrella groups representing a consortium of grassroots housing referral groups, such as the Leadership Council for Open Housing in Chicago.

Overregulation

Most municipal codes are not conceived of in a comprehensive way, but rather are modified and added to as problems arise. Two resulting consequences are that (1) outdated and unnecessary regulations remain on the books and (2) the only way to design such codes is to use rigid minimum standards and categorical building techniques. Such codes can prevent innovation and cost reduction in new construction building techniques (Wright, 1971). In older residential neighborhoods, such rigid codes can make housing rehabilitation extremely costly, if not prohibitive (Rogg, 1977).

Overregulation of codes has led to several forms of grassroots intervention. One is organized subterfuge, which hides rehabilitation work. This includes collusion not to take out building (rehabilitation) permits, to hide work from street view, and to disperse the refuse resulting from rehabilitation among trash cans throughout the neighborhood. More open techniques are to educate the city to the negative effect of rigid codes and to design with city code inspectors a "flexible code inforcement" technique that makes necessary repairs and alterations feasible (Ahlbrandt, 1976). At the national level, work is under way to convince the federal government to create a single national uniform code that replaces categorical minimal use standards with "performance standards" now in use in several Western European countries (Wright, 1971).

Ineffectiveness

There are neighborhood externalities that city zoning and codes fail to prevent. The most damaging is the disinvestment process introduced in the previous section. When a few owners of deteriorating property become unwilling or unable to keep up their property, it can have far-reaching negative spillovers. The presence of hazardous or just unsightly housing can cause bank appraisers to undervalue neighboring units or to deny rehabilitation loans; home insurers to increase their rates or even deny coverage for the full investment; and other residents to either sell out or move out, converting their houses into very low-maintenance rental units. As I have shown elsewhere (Heumann, 1979b), this process can spread quickly. Because mortgage lenders make twenty-year loans, they often project the rate at which disinvestment is spreading and refuse loans in currently standard neighborhoods. Real estate sale staff begin to discourage investors from searching for homes "in the path" of disinvestment, and city service agencies halt needed capital improvement for schools, parks, and streets, arguing that the costly and long-lived improvements might outlive the current residential neighborhood. There are a number of national models to prevent the spiraling negative externalities resulting from such disinvestment; perhaps the Neighborhood Housing Service (NHS) is the best known. To be an eligible NHS site, a neighborhood must show signs of disinvestment but have basically sound structures, be predominantly owner-occupied, have clear boundaries, have an established and representative neighborhood organization, and have a commitment from local government to provide "sensitive" housing inspection and upgrade services to the neighborhood (Urban Reinvestment Task Force, 1974). With that commitment, an NHS site staff of three, overseen by a board made up of neighborhood representatives and local savings and loan officials, is formed and begins to analyze housing needs and set repair priorities. Most borrowers are granted conventional loans, but a high-risk fund is held in reserve for the riskiest borrowers. The concept began in Pittsburgh in 1968. In 1974 the Urban Reinvestment Task Force was formed jointly by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the FHLBB to fund the natural expansion of the program. Today NHS is actually finishing up its work and leaving some revitalized neighborhoods, and is relaxing its eligibility criteria and going into more severely deteriorated neighborhoods with fewer homeowners and developing a commercial reinvestment model as well (Clay, 1981).

Income Distribution

The free market cannot produce an optimum income distribution; it is based on the assumption that everyone has the economic ability to register his or her demands and

preferences and purchase the goods and services needed. Unfortunately, many poor people cannot successfully compete for decent, safe, and sanitary housing on the private market. At the end of the most recent period of prosperity in America, 1972, the Annual Housing Survey still showed 24.2 percent of all U. S. households suffered some housing deprivation (The Nation's Housing, 1977). Since then we have suffered a recession in low-cost rental housing as severe as that during the Great Depression. It has been estimated that low-income housing production in general fell 46 percent below the amount needed for the decade of 1968-1978 (Nenno, 1978). In every year of the latter half of the last decade, housing costs rose faster than the median income, creating an ever-widening housing affordability gap for those below the median income (Heumann, 1979a). These trends are most disturbing to low-income communities attempting to develop grassroots interventions that can ease the high costs of decent housing. Very poor neighborhoods can communally pool resources and cooperatively own apartment buildings, form nonprofit housing corporations to rehabilitate and manage housing and eliminate profits, and employ massive amounts of their own sweat equity; but too often even these grassroots interventions require massive amounts of additional outside financial resources to succeed.

The federal government has tried literally hundreds of subsidy programs over the years, but each administration has concentrated funds on its own categorical program at the expense of all others; all the programs have been heavily influenced by private interests (such as builders, bankers and real estate associations), often at the expense of the ultimate low-income recipients; and programs are typically abandoned only as we have begun to recognize their attributes and flaws. These many programs can be categorized into four broad areas, which are reviewed below. None represents a comprehensive solution in itself, but all have merit in different housing situations.

Federally Subsidized Low-Income Housing Construction

Perhaps the largest attempt to involve the private market and subsidize the building of new low-income private housing is represented by the 235 (owner-occupied) and 236 (rental housing) programs in which private banks, developers, and brokers handled the actual financing, construction, and sales/rentals of the low-cost housing while the federal government subsidized the construction and underwrote all the risk. The programs were developed during the Johnson administration but were implemented during an unsympathetic Nixon administration. Poor underwriting, shoddy construction, and low-grade materials all led to thousands of housing units that were either initially unfit for occupancy or soon became so (Business Week, 1972; Thelen, 1972). By 1973 the federal government had become the nation's single largest slum landlord. Important lessons were learned from these programs, and they were consequently rewritten to include better screening and underwriting of renters and buyers, longer-range maintenance and management liability by builder-developers, and "equity sharing" between the federal government and low-income owners upon the sale of 235 homes. Nevertheless, the programs fell from political favor with the next administration and have been virtually abandoned.

Rental Subsidies

In place of the supply-side subsidy programs, the Nixon administration proposed another strategy that would also rely heavily on the private housing market: subsidizing renters so they could compete on the private market for decent housing. The

Section 8 housing assistance program adopted in the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act is a compromise program that makes a direct payment to a private landlord for that portion of a low-income family's "fair market rent" that exceeded 25 percent of their income. Instead of competing on the private market, the participant household must rent an apartment in a building where the landlord has agreed to participate in the program. The Reagan administration is now dismantling this program, which has been plagued by low private market participation and excessively high costs. As a result of the recent recession in new rental starts, vacancy rates among existing rentals have declined dramatically, and landlords of buildings above minimum standards can easily fill their units with conventional tenants and avoid what they see as the aggravation of dealing with the government and subsidized tenants. This has meant that most Section 8 subsidies have had to be placed in *newly* constructed low-income housing. However, in order to "attract" private developers to this market, the government has had to establish very high "fair market rents," provide greatly accelerated tax depreciation allowances for wealthy private investors, and promise rent subsidy guarantees far into the future (often twenty years). Given the current high interest rates and projecting even a modest rate of inflation, the Section 8 new construction program is extremely cost-inefficient.

The Reagan administration feels that the Section 8 program was not a fair test of the renter subsidy concept because the rental subsidy accompanied the rental apartment and not the renter. They have therefore proposed that a cash subsidy be given low-income households, making them competitive with, yet indistinguishable from, higher-income renters who can afford standard rental housing (President's Commission on Housing, 1981). The theory is that if landlords cannot distinguish a nonsubsidized from a subsidized renter, they will merely respond to the increased demand for standard housing created by the cash subsidies and build additional units to meet the demand privately and competitively. There is a great deal of room for skepticism. The government would have to fund almost every eligible household (far above their intention) in order to generate enough demand for new private rental construction at the local level, especially with interest rates as high as they currently are. Increased demand over the last half decade by persons with incomes who can afford modest conventional rental housing has not generated new private construction, so why would this program? Instead, we could find working-class persons just above eligibility for a rent subsidy being hurt by the new competition in a tight rental market or many low-income subsidized renters becoming frustrated and spending the rent voucher money on other goods, or both. The biggest fear is that racial discrimination and lack of market savvy will find many low-income subsidized renters spending more for substandard housing.

Public Housing

It is not surprising, given the foregoing description of private market participation in housing subsidy programs, that some critics are calling for a fresh look at the public housing program (Struyk, 1980) to avoid any co-partnership with reluctant and unenthusiastic private enterprise. Currently, public housing accounts for only about 4 percent of our total housing stock. It has had a very negative image in the past and is still subject to gross mismanagement, particularly in the larger cities. When the program was created, during the Great Depression, it was seen as only "temporary" housing for the "deserving white-middle-class poor" of those days. During the 1950s and 1960s, the public housing program was kept alive as housing for persons "relo-

cated" from "slum clearance" projects. Most of that housing was built as racially segregated, spartan, and high-density in design, with management philosophies that deterred any sense of permanency or community (Freedman, 1969). The negative image has lessened recently, especially in smaller SMSA cities and rural areas where public housing has developed more humane design and management techniques and has filled the low-income rental housing gap caused by the recent recession for both families and the elderly. Despite the improving record in smaller SMSA and rural areas (which account for 75 percent of the total U. S. public housing stock; Freedman, 1969), the Reagan administration is proposing to end support for local public housing authorities in favor of the single private market rent voucher program mentioned above (President's Commission on Housing, 1981).

Rehabilitation of Substandard Housing and Removal of Delapidated Housing

Housing rehabilitation and demolition programs were at one time separate categorical federal grant-in-aid programs. Currently they are lumped with literally scores of other eligible community infrastructure programs (for streets, sewers, sidewalk, lighting, landscaping, and the like) under the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG). Prior to the 1974 Community Development Act, a municipality seeking federal assistance with a variety of community infrastructure problems had to submit competitive proposals for each categorical project for which assistance was sought. Since the CD Act, the larger cities and counties are automatically entitled to a block grant under a federal distribution formula that allows local government to spend money on any of the many community development activities included under the act. The primary beneficiaries of this program were to be low- and moderate-income people, and because the federal government required citizen participation through low-income target neighborhoods in each city, the CDBG became the largest program in recent years in which government support to grassroots housing interventions was possible. Unfortunately, the CDBG program had a secondary goal, that of meeting general community development needs, and a recent study of the program performance and accountability clearly shows the latter goal has taken precedence (National Citizens' Monitoring Project, 1981). This latest report reinforces previous findings. A 1976 study showed that only 5 percent of all CDBG funds were spent in low-income census tracts, 26 percent went to moderate-income tracts, 30 percent went to middle-income tracts, and 39 percent were spent in *high*-income tracts (National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1977). The latest Federal Regulations have further abandoned the low-income objective. Low-income target neighborhoods and citizen participation in any form are no longer necessary for CDBG funding eligiblity (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1982).

Two conclusions I have previously made elsewhere are worth repeating in a review of government intervention to ameliorate the problems produced by incomes too low to successfully compete for decent, safe, and sanitary housing on the private market (Heumann, 1979a, 1979b). First, partisan politics, not comprehensive planning and analysis, has created our low-income housing subsidy programs. Each administration has funded its own categorical solution to a complex array of low-income housing problems that exist in different economic markets around the country. Second, the U. S. government does not include low-income housing production goals as part of its yearly economic and financial plans. It has relied too heavily on

older private market housing to trickle down to the poor in increasingly better condition over the years, as the private market addresses demand at higher-income levels for new housing of increasingly higher standards. Trickle-down, even if it worked, does not address issues of housing location, both for upward mobility of the poor and for the high dependency of the poor on peer support networks. The fact is, trickle-down has not been fast enough to upgrade the low-income housing stock since the mid-1960s, and may never do so again. The result of inadequate government support has been a steady increase in low-income housing problems during the recent economic recession, probably to the point where all the improvements in the low-income housing stock made over the decade preceding the recent recession have been lost.

The grassroots response to poverty reflected in housing needs has, as indicated at the outset of this section, been useful but insufficient. Efforts at collective ownership, management, and sweat equity maintenance and rehabilitation can help cut housing costs, but they cannot buy tools and materials or pay utilities and taxes. Most low-income grassroots activity is focused on existing buildings, and grassroots organizations are generally incapable of financing and developing the new housing needed to replace units deteriorated beyond rehabilitation.

Social Discrimination

Over a decade ago the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) demonstrated the existence of widespread racial discrimination in the housing market regardless of income. More recent findings show it is still very prevalent. Of all blacks in metropolitan areas, 87 percent, by the latest accounts, live in center cities—almost twice the percentage of whites living in metropolitan areas (Schnare, 1978). The same study shows 65 percent of all whites live in census tracts with populations less than 1 percent black, and only 12 percent of all whites live in integrated census tracts, defined as 6-30 percent black. The small percentage of integrated tracts can be further reduced if we require *stable* interracial living, since most interracial tracts experience rapid racial trasition from white to black. A recent Housing and Urban Development study sent out 300 white and 300 black auditors in matched pairs to shop for housing advertised in forty metropolitan-area newspapers. The study found that "a black who visits [just] four rental agents can expect to encounter at least one instance of discrimination 72% of the time; . . . a black who visits four sales agents can expect one or more instances of discrimination 48% of the time" (Wienk et al., 1979: ES-2). Race is not the only form of housing discrimination; discrimination by sex, age, household type, and household size are not uncommon.

All levels of government—municipal, state, and federal—have been unable and even unwilling to address fully the costs of discrimination in housing and vigorously pursue and penalize the perpetrators. Where fair housing laws exist, they are incomplete in their coverage and conservative in their penalties. Most are unenforced and/or unenforceable. It is typically the victim who must document discriminatory practices before government will act. A new federal fair housing bill that would have given the Department of Housing and Urban Development the authority and staff to audit suspected discrimination in housing died in Congress in 1980 and the Reagan Administration has shown no signs of reviving it.

Grassroots organizations have used varied techniques to combat discrimination from full and equal participation in the market, some quite inventive. One neighborhood group was faced with a situation in which real estate agents were steering black

and white buyers to different subareas of their neighborhood (Heumann, 1973). The costs of audits and lawsuits were prohibitive, and city government was not responsive, so through its block captains the neighborhood organization asked all owner-occupants contemplating a sale to use the neighborhood organization as a clearinghouse to screen the real estate firms that would be used. The organization got widespread cooperation and then announced that the real estate firm(s) that would follow the organization's guidelines for showing homes would get all the sales. Within two years, 90 percent of the real estate offices were in compliance with neighborhood standards of practice. Tactics ranging from picketing and deposit withdrawals to rent strikes have been employed with mixed success on discriminatory banks and landlords. While pursuing such tactics on the home front, grassroots groups have joined regional and national umbrella groups seeking stronger fair/open housing legislation and funding to prosecute acts of market discrimination aggressively.

The Multiple Effects of Market Errors and Social Inequities

The combination of poor public regulation of housing market errors, almost no prosecution for social discrimination, and the inability of some members of society to compete fairly for even the most basic housing needs is not only working to keep the poor from getting out of the welfare cycle, but also is allowing wealthy owners and housing speculators to prosper at the expense of the poor, the victim of discrimination, and the middle-income taxpaying public. The poor and minority households entering the private market clearly suffer from multiple jeopardy. They lack the time, knowledge, and in some cases the physical ability, as well as the money and proper social trappings and appearances, to compete in the private housing market successfuly. As was shown at the outset of this chapter, the nature of the housing product, its great cost, its geographic dispersion, its lack of standardization, the multiple service function of the structure, and its surrounding environment all combine to make it costly for anyone to shop for housing and difficult to optimize housing alternatives. Those shoppers with the least money, time, and market savvy will be shown, and end up purchasing, housing with the poorest cost-to-quality ratio. Just as poverty presents a *dynamic disadvantage* for competing in the private market, wealth and ability to speculate, influence, collude, and discriminate, all with little fear of penalty, produces a *dynamic advantage* in the housing market.

Recent studies indicate that a small number of realty interests can influence public housing projects and regulations governing housing use to their own advantage (Gross and Kraus, 1982; Mollenkopf and Pynoos, 1973). A study of Cambridge, Massachusetts, shows how these relatively few land owners, banks, and politicians can form an interlocking network that controls political patronage and controls the boards and commissions that regulate and police the housing market and influence the current and future value of the very property they own (Mollenkopf and Pynoos, 1973).

The general public must be made aware that the type of market information suggested here is not just a problem for the poor and minority renter. Control of key housing and community development commissions by land speculators can hurt the middle-class taxpayer as well. A wealthy speculator who purchases undeveloped land on the city's boarder and then influences annexation and public improvements (streets, sewers, lighting, and so on) with taxpayers' money stands to make great profits at the public's expense.

The question many grassroots activists are asking themselves and the rest of us these

days is: Why any housing, but especially housing for the poor, be a private market good subject to private speculation and profit (Hawley, 1978). Why can't a basic minimal amount of decent and affordable housing be a public or collective good—a natural right in a just society, similar to the right to a free and equal education?

We all understand the evils of monopolies and oligopolistic collusion and how they can lead to price gouging. In situations such as that described in the Cambridge study, a small number of key owners can influence or even control both the price and the quality of housing to suit their own ends. However, even without such market influence and political collusion, rent gouging can and does occur. The key factor is that some minimum amount of housing is an absolute necessity no matter how poor you are or how much that minimum amount of shelter costs. In other words, at some point the consumer's demand becomes totally inelastic. If we add to this factor a very tight market with a low vacancy rate due to a recession in new housing starts, and limited market choices due to discrimination and low income, then even a small, noninfluential landlord of a substandard unit can become a rent gouger.

These ingredients are all too prevalent today. Rent gouging has spawned grassroots renter organizations, which often start by providing legal assistance and advocacy to renters or information and referral on rental vacancies. Many, however, grow into populist political forces for municipal-wide rent control and legislation and broad government reform (Bach et al., 1982; Boyte, 1982). The most famous case of a grassroots rent control issue spreading to a total government reform is the recent experience of Santa Monica, California, a city of approximately 90,000 (Shearer, 1982). The Santa Monicans for Renters' Rights (SMRR) was established in the fall of 1978. It developed into an electoral coalition powerful and popular enough to win a majority of the city council seats in 1981. In just its first 100 days in control, the new council passed a number of housing interventions to accompany the existing rent control referendum. The council developed criteria for "planning agreements" in which private developers wishing to build high-income housing or commercial projects in Santa Monica would have to include affordable housing for lower-income families in their projects. The city planning commission began holding hearings on innovative housing interventions such as "city sponsorship of a Community Housing Development Corporation and city financing of tenant-managed housing" (Shearer, 1982: 14).

CONCLUSIONS

It seems that in recent years democracy has become little more than a periodic electoral act and that the fundamental meaning of grassroots participation has been lost. In this light, the numerous grassroots housing interventions that have emerged over the past twelve years must be seen as a healthy revitalization of fundamental democratic processes. Yet the relative percentage of neighborhoods involved in grassroots interventions is small, and not all of them have produced positive results. In these concluding paragraphs I wish to explore how many residential neighborhoods are likely to get involved in housing interventions and neighborhood governments, and the implications of these interventions for sound, comprehensive planning.

A recent study of neighborhood activity identified six neighborhood types: Integral, Parochial, Stepping-Stone, Diffuse, Transitory, and Anomic (Warren and Warren, 1975). The first three seem very likely to spawn grassroots housing interventions; the latter three do not. The "Integral" neighborhood is one in which residents have

influential jobs and linkages outside the community but also are very active and dedicated to the neighborhood. Such a description might fit a highly educated and liberal community that has made a moral commitment to stable racial integration and is active in regional and national umbrella organizations, such as National Neighbors, that lobby for fair and open housing. The "Parochial" neighborhood is described as totally inward-looking but very intimate and friendly. This description could fit an older working-class ethnic neighborhood with sound structures that are nevertheless in need of repair. Such a neighborhood might organize to combat growing disinvestment by private housing institutions and city services. A "Stepping-Stone" neighborhood is one with high turnover but young, upwardly mobile, and energetic residents. There may be a totally new population every four years and residents with no strong commitment to the specific place but still dedicated to the concept of grassroots activism. A campus town like Berkeley, California, with a progressive attitude toward all dimensions of housing reform might fit this type.

The three types not likely to spawn grassroots activity are the "Diffuse" neighborhoods, which are pleasant, well-kept working-class neighborhoods in which residents should have a lot in common but share very little with one another; "Transitory" neighborhoods, which lack all sense of place and have an institutional fabric designed for anonymity and fast turnover; and "Anomic" neighborhoods, in which residents have no interaction and lack all sense of trust—each household is an island. The Anomic type of neighborhood can occur as readily in a very wealthy suburb as in the worst inner-city ghetto.

The Warrens do not estimate what percentages of American neighborhoods fit each type, but it is my impression that the latter three are unfortunately far more common and may even be on the increase. In other words, I do not envision a neighborhood movement centered on housing or any other type of intervention in current American society. Rather, I see increasing community without propinquity (Webber, 1963) and a growing individualistic as opposed to communally oriented society. That is not to say that some of the grassroots housing interventions will not grow into political forces beyond the neighborhood boundaries. It is just that such activities will be limited to cities where the first three types of neighborhoods defined by Warren and Warren predominate, and such cities appear to be in the minority.

It appears that one of the real limits of grassroots housing interventions is that they are frequently stopgap solutions to an immediate emergency and not long-range housing solutions. In fact, some grassroots actions can actually worsen the long-range housing situation. Where rent control, for example, is the *only action* to stop the rent gouger, it cam dampen long-range investment in rental housing and lower upkeep of the current rental stock.

Grassroots activities can become very "in-group" and chauvinistic and can work against many of the common needs and reform goals neighborhoods should share. Neighborhoods can become "antidotes to class consciousness" (Jones, 1979). Milton Kotler, one of the founders of the National Association of Neighborhoods, agrees that there is a danger in neighborhood activism that "only has an ethnic or cultural agenda" (Silverstein and Kotler, 1982). The fact that so many neighborhood activities are centered on broad and fundamental housing issues is a good sign.

The activities of both larger governments and grassroots groups have taught us that we have yet to identify all the correct points of interventions into the private housing market. Some intervention programs must begin and remain at the residential neighborhood level. Others are more suited to the municipal level. Still others require the collective action of an entire economic region. The states and federal

government also have important roles in funding and leadership. Programs to revitalize residential housing require the involvement of many institutions outside the residential neighborhood, but they will fail without local residential commitment and involvement. The fair and equitable distribution of new low-income housing is a regional economic issue that cannot be solved by neighborhoods or municipalities. The new housing locations must be linked to job opportunities and public resources spread throughout the economic market. Housing reform and the degree to which the public regulates or replaces the private housing market is a decision that involves all segments of society. This chapter has shown that many carefully and thoughtfully planned out housing interventions are urgently needed. The chapter has also shown that the recent growth in grassroots interventions is symptomatic of the lack of leadership, organization, and will on the part of governments.

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24

Interventions to Reduce Environmental Stress

Enhancing Social Support and Personal Control

Charles J. Holahan

Over thirty years ago, Winston Churchill cautioned: "First we shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us." More recently, a prominent architectural critic concluded: "The dominant situation of modern life is individuals living in a setting which was not built for them'" (Boutourline, 1970). These observations set the stage for the present chapter; today, many of us reside in environments that are appallingly designed in terms of our social and psychological needs. Environmental stress from crowds, noise, and pollution has become an habitual aspect of urban life; stress from an almost total loss of privacy and personal space is endemic to life in total institutions. Because the physical environment can pose a major threat to individual and group health, it represents a prime target for social and community interventions. This chapter explores the underlying values, nature, and outcomes of interventions aimed at reducing environmental stress.

In the mid-1960s a new field of applied research, environmental psychology, emerged in response to these pressing environmental concerns. An important characteristic of environmental psychology is the *interdisciplinary* nature of the field. Since its inception, environmental psychology has attracted scholars, researchers, and practitioners from a variety of disciplines, including sociology, geography, anthropology, medicine, architecture, and planning, as well as psychology (Craik, 1970; Proshansky and Altman, 1979). The nature of environmental psychology's interest in human behavior in physical settings necessitates an interdisciplinary orientation that includes a variety of social scientists concerned with learning about how people behave in naturalistic settings, as well as the architects and planners responsible for designing human settings. Thus, the label environmental *psychology* should be understood as describing the problem area of the field rather than suggesting a disciplinary restriction.

VALUES UNDERLYING ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS

Habitability

Central to environmental interventions is a concern with the *habitability* of the built environment, with its "livability" in social and psychological terms. In fact, the catalyst that brought environmental psychology into being was not theoretical concerns on the part of academic investigators, but rather practical questions posed by people actually engaged in the design of physical settings. Proshansky (1972) pointed out that environmental psychology is "problem-oriented" in that it attempts to answer a wide range of practical questions asked by architects, interior designers, and city planners about the social and psychological effects of their designs.

Moreover, the rapid growth of environmental psychology during the 1960s was facilitated by the prevailing social concerns that characterized the decade of the sixties (Proshansky and Altman, 1979). The quality of the physical environment and the long-term consequences on the environment of industrial pollution, careless waste disposal, and poor resource management were topics of heated public debate. "Earth Day" in 1970 represented a dramatic expression of the social consciousness around environmental issues that typified this period. Proshansky and Altman explained that the social concern with people's effects on the environment grew to encompass a similar concern with the long-term effects of the physical environment on human beings. As people became more sensitive to surrounding environmental conditions, they came to recognize more fully the many subtle ways in which the environment can affect human functioning.

An Adaptive View

Environmental interventions are also founded on a concern with the *adaptive psychological processes* that mediate the effects of physical settings on human activity (Holahan, 1978, 1982). The emphasis is on the positive and adaptive ways in which people cope with environmental challenges. This view encourages us to see the active, varied, and creative ways that people have learned to deal with the environment. Such an orientation is important because if we fail to appreciate the active ways in which people cope with the environment, we will tend to develop a view that inaccurately implies that people are acted upon in a passive way by an overwhelming environmental context.

Even when faced with difficult environmental challenges, such as the demands of high-rise urban housing or a poorly designed institutional environment, people are able to develop positive and often creative ways to meet their personal and social needs. Such an adaptational model of environment and behavior may be represented graphically as follows:



According to this adaptational model, the effects of environment on behavior are seen as mediated by a variety of adaptive psychological processes in which people engage when dealing with the environment. This adaptational model shows that the direction of effect in the environment-behavior relationship is reciprocal; people may act on environmental conditions as well as the environment acting on human behavior.

STRESS-INDUCING ENVIRONMENTS

Urban Stress

An essential task for researchers investigating environmental stress has been to identify those environmental conditions that operate as stressors. The preponderance of work in this area has been concerned with identifying stressful features of the urban environment. The features of the physical environment of cities that have been most fully investigated as environmental stressors are crowding, noise, and air pollution. For example, an extensive body of literature in environmental psychology has investigated noise as an urban stressor (Glass and Singer, 1972). Researchers have been interested in learning about the potential effects on people's health and behavior of long-term exposure to the noise of heavy traffic, building construction, wailing sirens, and street repair, all of which characterize the urban environment.

The largest body of research on urban stress, however, has focused on the psychological stresses associated with crowding. Researchers have shown that crowding can induce stress-related physiological responses in people, such as increased heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance (Aiello et al., 1977; Evans, 1970; Novaco et al., 1979). Whether crowding can cause physical illness is not yet certain, although some evidence suggests that crowding may be a partial cause of illness in some settings. College students have been found, for example, to make more visits to the student health center when they live in dormitories characterized by high (in contrast to low) social density (Baron et al., 1976), and when the level of perceived residential crowding is high rather than low (Stokols et al., 1978).

Investigators have also found that crowding can have negative effects on people's social behavior. For example, studies of college students in university dormitory settings showed that students living in more socially dense environments were less talkative, less sociable, and less group-oriented than students living in less dense settings (Baum et al., 1975; Baum and Valins, 1977). Researchers also found that students living in socially dense university housing were less willing to mail a stamped letter that had been lost and less willing to join in cooperative group projects than were residents of less dense settings (Bickman et al., 1973; Jorgenson and Dukes, 1976). In addition, the level of social density in a large shopping center was inversely related to people's willingness to help and to the amount of time they helped when they encountered another person (an experimental accomplice) who feigned losing a contact lens (Cohen and Spacapan, 1978).

Total Institutions

Another environmental setting that has been heavily investigated by environmental researchers in terms of its stress-inducing properties is that of total institutions—

psychiatric hospitals, residential treatment settings for children, and nursing homes. Goffman (1961) described in poignant terms the almost total loss of personal privacy faced by mental patients. In the hospital he observed, patients were stripped of personal possessions, physical examinations and property inspections were conducted at the staff's will, many toilets were without doors, and patients' activities were constantly observed throughout the day. In addition, not only are many total institutions designed without safe, personal territories where users can retreat from the bustle and activity of institutional life, but even articles of personal property may be confiscated to achieve a standardized institutional life. Schwartz (1968) explained that strong feelings of "social nakedness" are experienced by mental patients who are confronted with total surveillance of their lives.

More recently, Sommer and Kroll (1979) conducted a survey study to assess the suitability of the physical environment of a California psychiatric hospital in meeting the social and psychological needs of its patients and staff. A recurring area of discontent with the hospital environment reported by patients concerned the hospital's lack of privacy. Patients felt that the lack of privacy in their sleeping areas and bathrooms was among the worst features of the hospital. Particular complaints concerned the lack of shower curtains and toilet doors in the bathrooms. Similarly, patients were upset about a bathroom design that placed tubs, showers, and open toilets in the direct line of sight of the bathroom entrance.

Elderly persons are especially vulnerable to the negative social psychological effects of total institutions. The effects of aging on perceptual acuity, physical strength and endurance, and ease of mobility make many environmental features that younger persons may cope with easily a source of special challenge and frustration for the elderly (Carp, 1976; Lawton, 1977). Investigators have been particularly distressed by the debilitating social and psychological consequences for elderly residents of the almost total loss of individual responsibility and personal control that is characteristic of life in many nursing homes and geriatric hospitals (Lawton, 1977; Moos, 1980).

TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS

In response to environmental change agents' growing awareness of the adverse social psychological effects of the stress of urban life and residence in total institutions, a growing number of environmental interventions have been directed toward these two settings. Consistent with the underlying concern with habitability, the goal of environmental interventions has been to improve the match of urban and institutional environments with the social and psychological needs of their residents. In accord with the underlying emphasis on adaptive processes, environmental interventions have most often been directed toward enhancing the adaptive social and psychological processes that mediate between stressful environmental conditions and their functional consequences.

Particular attention has been addressed to two types of mediating processes—*social support* at the group level and *personal control* at the individual level. This characteristic of environmental interventions is consistent with recent formulations of social and community interventions more generally. For example, Cowen (1977:6), in considering areas in which efforts at primary prevention might be based, proposed: "Two broad areas strike me as ideal candidates for primary prevention: the analysis and modification of social environments, and competence building." Kelly et al. (1977) underscored the need for social interventions oriented toward building competencies in social and cognitive skills.

Most of the interventions in environmental psychology are directed toward changing the architectural or built environment. In fact, all of the interventions we will discuss that are directed toward enhancing social support, and most of those directed toward fostering personal control, focus on features of the built environment. For example, interventions will involve interior and outdoor spaces in public housing environments, dayroom and ward design in psychiatric hospitals, high-rise student housing environments, tenement housing, and nursing home design. In each case, the purpose of the environmental intervention will be to enhance either social support or personal control in the setting.

Occasionally, however, a stressful environment may be intransigent or highly resistant to change. Here, it may be possible to alleviate the negative effects of the environmental stress by intervening directly at the level of the underlying psychological process rather than at the level of the stressful environmental condition. A few such examples will be discussed in considering interventions directed at fostering personal control. For example, we will discuss one intervention in consumer environments aimed at alleviating crowding stress by increasing people's feelings of personal control in the crowded setting. In addition, we will review a few interventions that attempt to reduce stress in nursing home environments by altering the operating policies in the settings to allow residents a higher level of personal control.

ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD ENHANCING SOCIAL SUPPORT

Social Support Theory

Smith and Hobbs (1966) proposed that a breakdown in *social support* plays a causative role in the onset of mental illness. They argued that mental disorder is not the "private misery of an individual," but is closely tied to the failure of natural sources of social support in the individual's life to function effectively, including support available through the extended family, the neighborhood, and friendship. The report of the President's Commission on Mental Health (1978) included among its findings a consideration of the close link between social support and mental health. The report pointed out that people faced with psychological stresses typically turn first to informal networks of social support, including family, neighbors, and community organizations. A social support system incorporates an enduring pattern of ties (Caplan, 1974) or a network of relationships (Sarason, 1976), which constitute an individual's link to essential resources.

Empirical evidence from a variety of sources has supported the contention that social support is positively associated with mental health. For example, correlational studies have shown that individuals who have higher levels of social support available to them show fewer signs of psychological (such as depression or anxiety) and psychosomatic illnesses (such as headaches or ulcers; Holahan and Moos, 1981; Lin et al., 1979; Rabkin and Struening, 1976). Further, longitudinal research involving a series of measures over a period of from one to five years has demonstrated that social support can be used to predict future psychological and psychosomatic complaints (Eaton, 1978; Gore, 1978; Holahan and Moos, 1981; Medalie and Goldbourt, 1976).

Recently, investigators have developed a conceptual model that postulates an interactional relationship between social support and the overall level of stress an indi-

vidual is experiencing in their life in predicting mental health. Researchers now believe that social support serves a particularly important role in enabling the individual to sustain positive psychological adjustment during periods of high "stressful life events," such as the stress associated with moving to a new setting, suffering a financial setback, or having a serious illness in the family. Some investigators (Dohrenwend, 1978; Moos, 1981) have proposed a model of mental health that incorporates social support as a mediating variable between stressful life events as a precipating factor and psychological functioning as an outcome variable. A number of research studies have, in fact, indicated that persons experiencing a high level of stress in their lives are protected from harmful psychological consequences when the stress occurs in the presence of adequate levels of social support (Antonovsky, 1979· Caplan, 1974; Dean and Lin, 1977).

Social Support and Urban Stress

Based on the awareness that social support plays a key role in psychological adjustment, especially during periods of stress, environmental change agents have engaged in a variety of environmental interventions directed toward enhancing social support. Because the urban environment is a stressful setting, as well as the context for a variety of interlocking social networks (Fried and Gleicher, 1961; Kelly, 1964), it has been the target for a number of such interventions. Of special concern has been the stress associated with high-rise public housing.

Semi-public interior space. One of the most thoroughly investigated case studies of the breakdown of social support in high-rise public housing involved the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis. The Pruitt-Igoe project consisted of approximately 40 eleven-story buildings, with a total of almost 3000 apartments. From its inception, the project failed overwhelmingly to meet the social and psychological needs of its residents. Pruitt-Igoe became notorious for its rampant vandalism and constant sense of fear and distrust (Rainwater, 1966).

Yancy (1971) conducted a series of interviews with residents of Pruitt-Igoe in an effort to uncover why the project failed as a human habitat. Yancy discovered that Pruitt-Igoe lacked the cohesion and mutual support that have been found to characterize many central city neighborhoods. In analyzing the cause of this breakdown in natural social support, Yancy concluded that the physical design of the Pruitt-Igoe project had exerted an "atomizing" effect on the informal social networks that typify many inner-city neighborhoods. Yancy strongly criticized the philosophy behind Pruitt-Igoe's design that encouraged minimizing "wasted space," that is, semi-public space within the buildings that was outside of individual apartments. Yancy pointed out that an initial review of Pruitt-Igoe (Architectural Forum, 1951) praised the architects for limiting the semi-public space between apartments.

Yancy, however, argued for the reverse design philosophy. He suggested that the designers of multifamily housing for low-income residents, rather than seeing the space between apartments as something to be avoided, should strive to provide an appropriate amount of space between dwelling units. At the core of the problem, he argued, was a lack of adequate "defensible space"—physical space that is characterized by a high level of social responsibility and personal safety (see also Newman, 1972). Yancy explained that defensible space is achieved when the semi-public space between apartments is actively used by a large number of residents who assume

some personal responsibility and interest in keeping the area safe. He explained that such semi-public space and facilities would offer areas that smaller and identifiable groups of residents could organize with a sense of personal "turf." He emphasized that designers should minimize space in the residential setting that belongs to no one, and foster the development of spaces between dwelling units over which groups of residents will share a feeling of informal control.

Newman (1972) has further developed the notion of defensible space in high-rise public housing environments, emphasizing that by improving the social functioning of public housing, the level of crime in these settings can be significantly reduced. Newman explained that defensible space is a characteristic of housing environments that inhibit criminal activity by presenting a physical setting that gives the impression of an underlying social order that can defend itself. He proposed that central to defensible space is the natural surveillance of the setting by its residents. He defined natural surveillance as the ability of residents to observe the public areas of the residential environment while they are engaged in their daily activities.

Newman suggested that natural surveillance can be best achieved by designing the residential setting in such a way that people will naturally view the common paths, entry and lobby areas, and outdoor areas in the residential environment. When natural surveillance is achieved, an intruder will perceive that his or her activities are under observation by residents, and that unlawful activity will be easily recognized and dealt with. He advanced a number of design criteria for achieving natural surveillance. For example, he recommended dividing corridor space within buildings into distinct zones, each with its own small cluster of apartments. This might be done by placing unlocked swinging doors at strategic points along the corridor. He also proposed designing buildings so that their lobbies faced toward rather than away from the surrounding city streets, and including several apartments near the lobby area in order that their residents might oversee activity in the lobby area.

Public outdoor space. Holahan (1976b) conducted an empirically based evaluation of a highly innovative design in the outdoor open-space area of the Jacob Riis public housing project in New York City's Lower East Side. The project consisted of eighteen buildings of up to fourteen floors. Although the project itself was completed in 1959, a major remodeling of the project's public outdoor space in 1965 added a modernistic open-space area to encourage informal social contact among residents in the previously underutilized space around the project. The innovative outdoor design boasted an attractive adventure playground and pedestrian mall, as well as a sunken amphitheatre.

To assess the effectiveness of the new outdoor design in encouraging informal socializing among residents, Holahan employed a naturalistic observation strategy, systematically comparing informal socializing in the Jacob Riis project, an adjacent traditionally designed public housing project, and the low-rise tenement neighborhood alongside both projects.[1] He discovered that the innovatively designed project fostered significantly more social activity than did the traditional project design. In comparison with the tenement neighborhood, however, findings were more complex. In general, the innovative design worked well in encouraging group activities among children, but failed to generate socializing among adult residents.

Based on his findings, Holahan advanced a number of design suggestions for encouraging behavioral diversity in the open spaces surrounding housing projects. He asserted that even an aesthetically attractive environment is not sufficient to encourage outdoor socializing among adults unless the environmental setting is able to

support a range of diverse functional activities. He suggested a design approach that would integrate the project with the natural patterns of urban life in the surrounding city environment. He explained that such a design philosophy might include both mixed functional uses of the outdoor space and appropriate design features to facilitate socializing. For example, the design of project space might encourage mixed functional uses—recreational, leisure activities, consumer behaviors, and task-oriented activities—that would attract project residents to use available outdoor space. Then, innovative design features in the outdoor setting, such as nooks, benches, tables, and recreational equipment, might be added to support the informal social contact likely to occur between residents who meet accidentally while pursuing diversified tasks in such multifunctional space.

One limitation of environmental interventions directed toward both interior space and outdoor space in high-rise public housing is that the evaluations have focused on the social and psychological limitations of *existing* projects, but the recommendations for change in public housing design have been directed toward architects and urban decision makers for application in *future* designs. As yet, there have been no efforts to alter the physical environment in existing public housing settings as part of an ongoing evaluation and social change program. Although there are financial obstacles to changing environmental conditions in existing housing projects, more effort needs to be directed toward exploring ways to acquire funding for relatively focused environmental design changes in public housing settings that can enhance social support among residents already living in these environments.

Social Support and Total Institutions

Environmental interventions have also been directed toward enhancing social support in psychiatric hospital settings. Ironically, many psychiatric hospital environments inhibit the very social behaviors that are the expressed goals of the hospitals' therapeutic programs. Interventions in this area have involved efforts to alter the interior design or furniture arrangements in ongoing psychiatric ward settings in an effort to encourage more social contact and group cooperation on the part of patients.

Dayroom arrangement. Sommer and Ross (1958) were asked to increase social interaction among female patients on a geriatric ward in a psychiatric hospital in Saskatchewan, Canada. Although, as part of a recent remodeling, the ward had been cheerfully painted and new furniture added in the dayroom, the dayroom was remarkable for its lack of social interaction. The experimenters noted that the chairs in the dayroom had been arranged in a highly unsocial manner, with most seating shoulder-to-shoulder along the walls of the room. The field experiment involved rearranging the chairs in a more social manner, in groupings around small tables situated throughout the dayroom. Behavioral observations conducted in the dayroom before and after the change in seating revealed that the amount of social interaction between patients was twice as high under the social arrangement as under the unsocial one.

Holahan (1972) replicated Sommer and Ross's findings in an experimental dayroom in a psychiatric hospital where extraneous environmental influences could be carefully controlled and patients could be randomly assigned to experimental conditions. In an unsocial dayroom arrangement, chairs were placed shoulder-to-shoulder along the walls of the room in a manner that approximated the unsocial atmosphere that is so often typical of psychiatric hospitals. In a social arrangement, in contrast,

chairs were situated around small tables in the middle of the room in an effort to facilitate social interaction environmentally among patients. Behavioral observations in the contrasting dayroom settings demonstrated that patients in the social arrangement engaged in significantly more interpersonal interaction and conversation than did those in the unsocial arrangement. The most pronounced difference between the settings was in conversations that involved more than two persons. While such multiperson conversations were frequent under the social arrangement, they almost never occurred in the unsocial setting.

Ward design. Holahan and Saegert (1973) planned and conducted a large-scale physical remodeling on a psychiatric ward of a New York City hospital. The remodeling was intended to encourage social involvement and cooperation among patients and to discourage the high level of social withdrawal that had become typical of the ward. The remodeling involved repainting the ward in bright, attractive colors; adding comfortable, modern furniture to the ward dayrooms and bedrooms; and creating semi-private areas in the dormitorylike bedrooms by installing six-foot-high partitions to divide the bedroom space into two-bed sections.

To evaluate the efforts of the design changes, Holahan and Saegert carried out systematic behavioral observations on the remodeled ward six months after the renovation had been completed. In comparison to an unchanged control ward that was identical to the remodeled ward before renovation and that had a similar sample of patients, the newly designed ward showed significantly more social interaction among patients and significantly less passive, isolated behavior. In addition, the remodeled ward demonstrated a higher level of social contact between patients and ward staff members, as well as more socializing between patients and visiting family members and friends.

Holahan (1976a) examined the effects of the ward remodeling in terms of its broader effects on the ward social system. He noted that social effects of the renovation were evident in a number of important (though unanticipated) areas, including role relationships and job investment on the part of ward staff. For example, after the remodeling, ward physicians became more open to feedback from other staff members and more responsive to staff and patient needs. In addition, nurses' aides gained the right to contribute suggestions to therapeutic planning, and to express their attitudes openly about ward functioning and patient care to other staff members at all levels.

ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD FOSTERING PERSONAL CONTROL

Personal Control Theory

Recently, several investigators have argued that the negative psychological effects of environmental stressors can be reduced when individuals achieve *personal control* over the stressful situation (Moos, 1981). Averill (1973) defined *behavioral* control as the availability of a response that can directly modify a threatening event, such as moving to a less dense neighborhood to cope with the stress of urban crowding. He defined *cognitive* control, in contrast, as the way an individual interprets a threatening situation, such as deciding that air pollution is a small price to pay for the diverse cultural advantages of life in a big city. Averill pointed out that being able to predict

the nature and timing of a stressful event is a form of cognitive control, providing the individual with "informational control" over the stressor.

Laboratory studies of personal control have consistently found that personal control attenuates the adverse psychological effects of stressful situations. For example, the negative psychological consequences of experimental crowding are reduced when people are able to exert some degree of personal control over the situation (Cohen et al., 1979; Sherrod, 1974; Sherrod and Cohen, 1979). Similarly, when subjects are told that they can terminate aversive noise by pressing a button attached to their chairs—even if they never actually use the button—the adverse psychological effects of the noise are substantially reduced (Glass et al., 1971; Glass and Singer, 1972; Glass et al., 1977).

Some environmental researchers have proposed that the negative psychological consequences of an inability to exert personal control over adverse environmental circumstances are mediated by the experience of "learned helplessness." Seligman (1974, 1975) described learned helplessness as a psychological condition in which an individual develops the expectation that his or her responses are independent of future (typically aversive) outcomes; that is, the person comes to believe that his or her actions will be unable to influence the outcome of unpleasant future environmental events. He explained that learned helplessness involves a reduction in motivation to persist at a task, a resistance to relearning at a cognitive level that personal actions can successfully manage environmental outcomes, and emotional feelings of depression. A considerable body of research in laboratory settings involving escape responses with aversive stimuli (usually loud noise) or random reinforcement on difficult or unsolvable problems (such as anagram solutions) has provided empirical support for the learned helplessness model (Burger and Arkin, 1980; Hiroto and Seligman, 1975; Miller and Seligman, 1975).

Personal Control and Urban Stress

In light of the important role of personal control in mitigating the adverse psychological consequences of environmental stress, environmental change agents have instituted a variety of interventions directed toward fostering personal control in stressful situations. Since many of the laboratory studies of personal control have involved stresses that are common in the urban environment, such as high levels of crowding and noise, environmental interventions involving efforts to enhance personal control have focused heavily on aspects of the urban environment. Typically, these interventions have been carried out in small-scale field settings that represent the particular contexts where people are likely to encounter urban stress, such as residential, transportation, and consumer settings.

High-rise housing. Residential interventions have focused on a setting that provides an analogue of the stressful condition of urban residential life—high-rise student housing. Research evidence has demonstrated that high levels of crowding in student housing designs that involve long, double-loaded corridors and common facilities shared by large numbers of residents, when coupled with an inability on the part of residents to effectively control their social contacts with other residents, have negative social and psychological effects on residents' functioning (Baum et al., 1978; Baum et al., 1975; Baum and Valins, 1977).

Baum and Davis (1980) conducted an environmental intervention designed to

reduce crowding stress through allowing residents in a high-rise dormitory more behavioral control over their social contacts with other residents. They were interested in learning how a crowded, long-corridor dormitory at a small liberal arts college might be improved through relatively simple design modifications. Initially, the dormitory consisted of a long corridor shared by a single group of over forty residents. The investigators pointed out that the long, double-loaded corridor led to a general loss of personal control over social contacts in the hallway and other shared spaces. They explained that the dormitory's design resulted in students meeting other residents in the hallway when interaction was unwanted, such as when a student desiring to use the bathroom or study lounge encountered another resident with whom he or she had not yet established comfortable modes of relating.

Baum and Davis carried out a design modification on one floor of the dormitory that involved converting three central bedrooms to lounge space, creating two separate social groups of about twenty students each. In order to evaluate the effects of this design modification, Baum and Davis systematically assessed residents' behavior and experiences during a three-month period on the modified floor, on another long corridor in the same dormitory that was not changed, and on a short corridor in a comparable dormitory. The investigators found that the design modification in the long corridor significantly improved the social psychological functioning of residents on the remodeled floor. The modified corridor design was characterized by positive patterns of social interaction that were more like those on the short corridor than on the unchanged long corridor. Similarly, students on the remodeled floor and on the short corridor were more able to regulate effectively their social contacts with other residents and experienced less crowding stress than residents on the unmodified long corridor.

Another shared space in high-rise student housing where students' behavioral control over their social contacts with other students is limited is the dining commons. Holahan and Wilcox (Holahan, 1977; Holahan and Wilcox, 1977) conducted an environmental intervention in the dining commons of a high-rise dormitory housing 3000 students oriented toward enhancing students' personal control. The investigation allowed student residents to play an active role in determining the nature of the intervention. They began by surveying residents of the dormitory to learn how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with their residential environment. They found that students were especially dissatisfied with the dormitory's lack of privacy, and that a particular area of dissatisfaction involved the communal dining area, which students felt was too institutional in appearance and uncomfortable for socializing.

Based on this information about user dissatisfaction in the setting, the investigators met with student representatives and residence hall staff in planning design improvements in the dining commons. Attractive and colorfully designed partitions were added to part of the previously open dining room to allow students more personal control over their contacts with other students. Depending on the level of privacy sought, students could join a large group of other students in the traditional open-space areas or select a more private area behind the new partitions to eat alone or engage in a personal conversation with one or more fellow students.

Holahan and Wilcox evaluated the effects of the design changes by systematically observing the behavior of students in the dining area during the semester before and the semester after the intervention. They found that there was significantly more small-group conservation in the dining commons after the design changes were implemented. In addition, to assess students' attitudes about the intervention, the investigators surveyed students during the semester after the design changes had been completed. They found that students were significantly more satisfied with the new dining commons environment than with the previously undifferentiated dining area.

One limitation of these environmental interventions in high-rise housing environments concerns the effort to use student housing settings as an analogue of conditions in urban high-rise housing. While the findings in student housing suggest important directions for application in urban settings, the differences between the residents of the two types of settings in age, income, education, and family composition argue that generalizations be made cautiously. Needed are extensions of this work to include environmental interventions aimed at fostering personal control in actual high-rise urban housing environments based on what has been learned in student housing settings.

Tenement housing. Although most environmental interventions involving stress in urban residential environments have focused on high-rise housing, this is not to say that stress is not associated with other types of housing. Zeisel (1971, 1973) has, in fact, suggested that another cause of stress in urban life is the design of low-rise tenement housing environments that are inconsistent with the natural patterns of behavior of their residents. He argued that a chief cause of such incompatibilities in housing design is the discrepancy in ethnic and social class background between most architects and the low-income urban populations they design for.

Implicit in Zeisel's criticism is the lack of personal control that low-income urban residents are able to exert in the housing design decisions that affect their lives. Zeisel has developed an alternative strategy for reaching decisions in planning urban housing for low-income residents that greatly enhances the control of the residents themselves in the design choices. He designed two tenement buildings for Puerto Rican families in New York City based on a series of detailed observations and in-depth discussions with the future residents.

Zeisel found that for these Puerto Rican families, the kitchen tended to serve as a "turnstile" to and from the apartment, with the person in the kitchen acting as the controller. Based on this observation, he designed the new setting so that the person in the kitchen would be the first person to see who entered the apartment and the last person to see who left the apartment. In addition, he discovered that the Puerto Rican residents used the kitchen and living room areas for very different and distinct functions; the kitchen was used for informal gatherings and eating, while the living room served more formal functions. For these reasons, Zeisel clearly separated the kitchen and living room in his design. Finally, he found that the families used apartment windows for the observation of and communication with ongoing street activities. He thus arranged the new apartment plan so that both the kitchen and living room had windows facing the street.

Zeisel contrasted his new plan for a three-bedroom apartment with that of an architect whose design plan reflected his own preconceptions as a middle-class, white American. In sharp contrast to Zeisel's plan, the middle-class architect's plan allowed visitors to pass the bedroom area before reaching the kitchen, had the kitchen and living room sharing an open space area, and had no kitchen windows facing the street. Clearly, the middle-class architect's assumptions about housing were out of step with the spatial needs and behavior patterns of the user group for which he was designing.

Consumer environments. Another setting in the urban environment where people are confronted with the stresses of overcrowding is that of consumer settings, such as large department stores and supermarkets. For example, a study in a Manhattan department store (Saegert et al., 1975) demonstrated that during crowded periods, in contrast to uncrowded ones, shoppers were more anxious and aggressive and showed more indications of negative mood. In addition, the informational overload

associated with crowding resulted in shoppers during peak periods being less able to recall details about the store's merchandise and physical layout than persons in the store during less crowded times.

Langer and Saegert (1977) carried out an intervention aimed at reducing crowding stress in a consumer environment through enhancing people's personal control over the setting. Rather than altering the environment itself, the intervention focused on reducing crowding stress by enhancing people's feelings of cognitive control in the overcrowded context. Drawing on available research concerning stress and health, they suggested that people can be helped to cope with the stress of crowding by providing them with accurate information about the likely physiological and psychological reactions to crowding. They reasoned that providing people with prior knowledge about the physiological and psychological effects of crowding would help them to develop anticipatory adjustments to the crowded situation.

Langer and Saegert evaluated the effectiveness of this cognitive coping strategy in a field study conducted in New York City supermarkets. They recruited eighty female shoppers and assigned them the task of selecting the most economical product for each item on a prearranged grocery list. The shoppers completed the assigned task under conditions of high and low social density. In addition, half of the subjects were provided with increased cognitive control in the situation by informing them beforehand that the crowded situation might cause them to feel aroused or anxious. Langer and Saegert found that the aversiveness of the high density situation was reduced through increased cognitive control. The shoppers who were provided with increased cognitive control felt more comfortable and were able to complete successfully more of the assigned tasks than were subjects who were not provided with prior information.

Personal Control and Total Institutions

Environmental interventions have also involved efforts to increase personal control in institutional environments. A key target for these interventions has been the nursing home environment, a total institution that for many elderly persons involves an almost total loss of personal control over their lives. Environmental interventions in nursing homes have been directed both toward designing settings that foster personal control and toward helping residents to gain more personal control in traditionally designed settings.

Nursing home design. Lawton (1971, 1979) has encouraged a design philosophy at the Philadelphia Geriatric Center that is oriented toward enhancing residents' sense of personal control. Lawton explained that residents' control can be enhanced by creating designs that generate a range of social options within the setting. For instance, a geriatric setting might be designed with a large communal space for active, group participation, a smaller lounge area where more personal conversation might be pursued, and private or semiprivate bedrooms where residents might think, meditate, or read by themselves.

In addition, Lawton suggested that a variety of spaces might be planned in institutional environments that would allow residents to maintain and practice personal skills and competencies, and to pursue personal interests or hobbies. For instance, a setting might include facilities for cooking and planning meals; washing, drying, and ironing clothes; and for personal activities, crafts, and hobbies. He also encouraged design features that would facilitate recognition and orientation in the environment, thus per-

mitting residents to function more independently in traveling about the setting. For instance, he noted that at the Philadelphia Geriatric Center's Weiss Institute, which was designed for the needs of older persons with serious behavioral deficits, residents' rooms are color-coded to facilitate recognition, elevator-area colors are different on each floor, large-size, three-dimensional room numbers are located outside each room, large-lettered names of occupants are affixed to room doors, and large signs and maps indicating the location of important areas are situated on each floor.

Lipman and Slater (1979) have provided architectural plans for nursing homes that are intended to minimize residents' dependence on staff and to encourage independent functioning. Their plans favor small, group living units that are physically separated from staff accommodations. Staff services are minimized, and the plans encourage residents to care for themselves in carrying out their daily functions. The authors explained that they sacrificed large communal areas, such as a lounge for twenty persons or a dining area for thirty persons, in favor of smaller, dispersed accommodations. For example, a group living unit for seven persons provides appropriate spaces for residents to engage in a variety of normal day-to-day activities, such as preparing their food, eating or socializing in small groups, and toileting and bathing themselves in privacy. The authors noted that in conventional nursing homes, built on an institutional scale, residents need to ask for staff assistance even for such a simple activity as preparing a cup of tea. In addition, the small-group design separated from staff accommodations encourages residents to provide mutual assistance to one another when help is required instead of relying exclusively on staff support.

Policy changes. Additional interventions have been aimed at fostering policy changes that can enhance residents' feelings of personal control in traditionally designed nursing homes. In an intervention conducted in a nursing home in Connecticut, Langer and Rodin (1976) compared a group of residents whose *decisional control* and *behavioral control* were enhanced with a group whose control in these areas remained low. Residents in an *enhanced control* condition were given a talk that emphasized that they were responsible for themselves, and offered plants they could care for themselves. Persons in a *low-control* condition, in contrast, were told that the nursing home staff were responsible for them, and then given plants that were cared for by the staff. Behavioral measures and survey ratings revealed that residents in the *enhanced control* condition, in comparison to the *low-control* condition, were more improved after three weeks in terms of alertness, active participation, and general sense of well-being. In a follow-up evaluation, Rodin and Langer (1977) assessed the long-term effects of their manipulation of personal control in the nursing home 18 months after the initial study. They reported that the positive effects of control on residents' functioning found in the earlier study persisted over the 18-month period.

Schulz (1976) investigated the effects of increases in both personal control and predictability on the well-being of residents in a retirement home in North Carolina. In a field experiment, he had college students visit the residents under three conditions: (a) residents in a *no-control* condition were visited on a random schedule; (b) persons in a *predictability* condition were informed when a visit would occur and how long it would last; and (c) individuals in a *behavioral control* condition were allowed to determine the frequency and duration of visits. In addition, residents in a fourth condition were not visited, and served as a baseline *comparison* group. Schulz found that both the *behavioral control* and *predictability* conditions had positive effects on the well-being of the elderly residents. Residents in these conditions were more healthy physically, more positive psychologically, and more active than those in the *no-control* and *comparison* conditions.

Schulz and Hanusa (1978), however, in evaluating the long-term effects (up to three-and-one-half years) of their intervention program, discovered that the initial beneficial effects of control and predictability on residents' well-being did not persist after the initial study was terminated. To explain the differences in long-term effects between their intervention and that of Langer and Rodin, Schulz and Hanusa drew on recent reformulations of learned helplessness theory that have explained the learned helplessness syndrome in terms of the underlying attributions that individuals make about the cause of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their behavior (Abramson et al., 1978; Miller and Norman, 1979). They explained that the Langer and Rodin manipulation emphasizing residents' *responsibility for themselves* probably encouraged residents to make internal, stable, and global attributions. In contrast, the Schulz manipulation, involving a *particular visiting program,* probably led residents to make external, unstable, and specific attributions. They concluded that according to the attributional model of learned helplessness, we would expect that the beneficial effects of the Langer and Rodin study would endure after the initial study was terminated, while those from the Schulz study would not.

Moos (1980) has developed a comprehensive assessment instrument called the Multiphasic Environmental Assessment Procedure (MEAP), which can be used to evaluate the overall environmental context of institutions for the elderly. The MEAP includes measures of an institution's architectural features, policy orientation, social environment, and resident and staff characteristics. It is appropriate for use in planning for and evaluating the types and levels of resident control that may characterize a setting.

The MEAP's resident control scale affords an assessment of the degree of behavioral control available to residents in a facility. This scale measures the extent to which the institution allows residents formal and informal input in running the facility (for example, residents help to plan menus and play a role in making the rules about attendance at activities). An index of policy choice assesses the level of decisional control residents have by measuring the degree to which the institution provides options from which residents can select individual patterns for daily activities (for example, residents can choose the times they get up, have meals, and go to bed).

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the variety of interventions carried out in urban and institutional environments, it is clear that such efforts provide a powerful and important intervention strategy for individuals engaged in social and community change. Interventions in both urban and institutional environments have been highly effective in attaining their social and psychological goals. Moreover, the success of such efforts has been demonstrated across a wide diversity of environmental contexts, including public housing, consumer environments, high-rise housing, psychiatric hospitals, and nursing homes. In addition, the effectiveness of efforts aimed *directly* at enhancing feelings of personal control (for example, Langer and Saegert, 1977; Rodin and Langer, 1977; Schulz, 1976), rather than achieving changes in control through environmental manipulations, provides an added flexibility in environmentally oriented interventions, even when the stressful environment is intransigent. Finally, the success of these environmental interventions achieves added weight in light of the systematic, empirically based evaluations that have characteristically been included in such programs.

Some of the limitations of environmental interventions noted earlier should be

reiterated. Interventions in public housing environments have assessed the social psychological limitations of existing projects, while recommendations for change have typically been directed at future designs. Intervention efforts to improve environmental conditions in *existing* public housing settings are greatly needed. Similarly, interventions in residential environments have involved high-rise student housing rather than housing in real inner-city neighborhoods. Findings from student settings need to be extended to efforts to intervene in real inner-city environments where the adverse effects of environmental stress are being experienced every day.

Further, environmental interventions need to be viewed within a broader sociocultural context. The effects of the physical environment do not operate in isolation, but rather interact in a complex fashion with factors in the social and organizational context, economic realities, and cultural diversity. Environmental researchers need to be aware of simultaneous influences from other levels as they focus on environmental change. Moos (1980) has, for example, recently developed a conceptual and measurement framework for sheltered-care settings for the elderly that is appropriate to assessing the simultaneous effects of architectural features, institutional and organizational factors, and characteristics of the social environment.

In addition, environmental change agents must coordinate their intervention efforts across disciplinary lines. Because the problems involved in human environment relationships entail interlocking factors that cut across the physical, psychological, societal, and cultural realms, the field of environmental psychology is by definition interdisciplinary (Proshansky and Altman, 1979). The expertise required to accommodate the complex physical, human, and sociocultural demands implicit in the design of human settings necessarily crosses the boundaries of several disciplines. Wohlwill (1970) has encouraged environmental researchers to work to strengthen and broaden their interdisciplinary ties by improving the avenues for effective communication and collaboration between the varied disciplines engaged in work in this area. We must hope that as environmental psychology continues to move into the arena of social and community change that this multidisciplinary cooperation remains an integral and vital aspect of the endeavor.

NOTE

1. Based on current census data, the two projects and the tenement neighborhood were comparable in the economic level, social distribution, and mobility patterns of their residents.

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25

Consumer Energy Conservation Programs

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PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

The principal conclusion of several recent studies of the world energy situation has been that increased conservation should be pursued vigorously as a fundamental national and local policy (Landsberg, 1979; Schurr et al., 1979; Stobaugh and Yergin, 1979). In the United States, the National Energy Act of 1978 sought to make conservation the cornerstone of U.S. energy policy, and it has been estimated that total U.S. energy consumption could be reduced by 30 to 40 percent without affecting the quality of life (CONAES, 1980). In Europe, conservation has become a critical component of most national energy plans (Directorate-General, 1979; Gradin, 1981), and one study concluded that conservation could reduce future European energy requirements by more than 25 percent (Myer-Abich, 1978).

Current Situation

Since 1980, several industrial countries have begun to reduce slightly their total energy consumption. In the United States, total national energy consumption during 1980 dropped to 76.2 quads (quadrillion BTUs), compared to 79.0 quads in 1979, for a reduction of 3.5 percent. And in 1981 it was only 74.2 quads, which was a reduction of 2.6 percent over 1980 and 6.1 percent over 1979 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 1981, 1982). A recent analysis of energy consumption rates in this country concluded that about half of the observed reduction could be attributed to a slower rate of economic growth, while the other half was apparently a result of conservation efforts induced by a combination of rising energy prices and community conservation programs (Hirst et al., 1981b).

No country has yet begun to approach its potential energy savings through conservation, however. A recent examination of the energy conservation programs of the 21 members of the International Energy Association concludes that "the battle to moderate or reduce energy demand is far from won in IEA countries; progress in implementing conservation programmes has been considerably less than expected" (Gradin, 1981). To achieve the goal of reducing energy consumption by 25 percent—

which is theoretically possible in all industrial nations—all countries will have to undertake much more extensive conservation efforts than have been made thus far.

The attitudinal and behavioral responses of American consumers to past efforts to promote energy conservation are succinctly summarized by Van Til (1982: 154). In the concluding chapter of his book, he examines and updates several conclusions about Americans' efforts to conserve energy that had been formulated earlier by Olsen (1978: ch. 8):

- While most people can define an energy crisis, half the population is unaware of the basic facts of our dependence upon foreign oil.
- While belief in the seriousness of the energy crisis is widespread, Americans remain highly confident that it will ultimately be resolved.
- Almost everyone has taken a number of conservation actions, and, as a partial result, historical patterns of energy growth have been stabilized.
- Relatively few people have taken major conservation steps, and the pace of this activity is not dramatically increasing.
- Acceptance of proposed conservation measures is widespread indeed.

The last of the above points is expecially noteworthy. Several surveys conducted in the United States during the past few years have discovered that large proportions of the public—often two-thirds to three-fourths of all citizens—are in favor of a number of rather stringent energy conservation measures, including mandatory energy efficiency standards for new and existing buildings, higher efficiency standards for automobiles, and utility rates that rise with increasing consumption (Olsen, 1981b; Olsen et al., 1982). Since none of these proposals has yet been adopted by the federal government as a national policy it appears that the bulk of the American public is far ahead of the government in accepting the importance of conserving energy.

Purpose

If energy is to be conserved in the United States and other industrial nations, it is clear that effective programs must be developed to alter the ways in which people use energy. This chapter explores the process of designing and implementing community intervention programs to promote energy conservation among consumers. We focus on consumer energy use—in households, personal travel, and noncommercial buildings—because (1) direct consumption of energy by consumers accounts for one-third to one-half of all energy use in industrial nations (Darmstadter et al., 1977); and (2) much of the energy consumed by the industrial and commercial sectors in all countries is used to manufacture and distribute consumer goods and services, and hence ultimately becomes indirect energy consumption by consumers.

This analysis deals entirely with energy conservation programs because so much of the recent social science research on resource consumption has pertained to energy, but the intervention process we describe is equally applicable—with only minor modifications—to conservation programs dealing with all types of natural resources.

From a theorectical perspective, this chapter is an analysis of the process of intentional social change through social intervention programs. From an applied perspective, it describes the steps that policymakers and program directors can take to promote greater energy conservation among consumers.

Our analysis of the process of consumer energy conservation is considerably

broader in scope than previous treatments of this topic (Ellis and Gaskell, 1978; Olsen and Goodnight, 1977; Perlman and Warren, 1977; Seligman et al., 1977 1978; Shippee, 1980; Stern et al., 1981; Warkov, 1978; Winnett and Neale, 1979). To overcome the limitations of those earlier studies, we

- encompass the total process of promoting consumer energy conservation;
- incorporate five different contexts—both structural and personal—that affect patterns of energy consumption;
- examine a wide range of instruments that can be used to implement consumer energy conservation programs;
- view energy conservation as an interactive process of citizen involvement in policy formation and implementation; and
- emphasize the local community as the most effective setting for consumer energy conservation programs.

The subsequent parts of this chapter deal with policies and objectives of consumer energy conservation programs; program strategies, including both the contexts of energy use and implementation instruments; program implementation, covering the design and operation of consumer energy conservation programs; program evaluations, which focus on energy savings and program costs; and conclusions.

POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

Prior to 1973, the idea of conserving energy had barely entered the consciousness of most Americans, and—with a few exceptions (for example, see Office of Emergency Preparedness, 1972)—was not a topic of serious national policy discussion. Most public policymakers, energy managers, and energy economists firmly believed that continually increasing energy use was imperative for economic growth and national well-being.

U.S. National Policies

One of the first indications that the United States might be grossly underestimating its potential for reducing energy consumption appeared in late 1976, when Schipper and Lichtenberg (1976) published a widely read article that pointed out that Sweden then consumed only 54 percent as much energy per capita as the United States, despite its colder climate and its higher gross national product per capita. Part of Sweden's lower level of energy use was attributable to differences in lifestyles (more multi-family housing, fewer automobiles), but a considerable portion of it resulted from more efficient energy use in all realms of life. Later research (Darmstadter et al., 1977) demonstrated that all other industrialized nations (except Canada) use less than one-half as much energy per capita as the United States. These and subsequent studies suggested to more and more people that continual energy growth might not be necessary for economic well-being in modern nations (empirical evidence supporting that conclusion had been available as early as 1974, in Mazur and Rosa).

In 1978, the report of the Demand and Conservation Panel of the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES, 1979) of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that with "aggressive" energy conservation policies directed

toward maximum efficiency, plus minor lifestyle changes and steadily rising energy prices, energy demand in 2010 could be only 77 quads per year—compared to 78 quads in 1978. The following year, the Council on Environmental Quality (1979) concluded from its review of all energy studies conducted up to then that "energy demand in the year 2000 could even be significantly less than today's, while still allowing a steady increase in GNP."

A critical point about the evolution of a national energy policy in the United States since 1973 is that it has occurred largely outside the federal government. The principal participants in this process have been private organizations such as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, Resources for the Future, the Worldwatch Institute, Friends of the Earth, the Solar Lobby, and others. Their thinking, analyses, and proposals have consistently been far ahead of those of the U.S. Department of Energy.

The U.S. government, meanwhile, has never treated energy conservation as a top-priority goal. Under President Carter, Congress made what might be described as a "halfhearted" attempt to promote conservation by enacting a series of laws aimed primarily at the individual states. None of the conservation efforts created by that legislation were very ambitious in goals or extensive in scope, however, and all of them were very inadequately funded.

The Reagan administration strongly emphasizes energy production over conservation. Its National Energy Policy Plan states that conservation of energy is to be achieved largely in the marketplace as a result of rising energy prices, especially as promoted by deregulation of oil and natural gas prices. The application of this policy has resulted in almost total elimination of all efforts by the federal government to promote energy conservation.

Basically, the present policy of the United States government toward energy conservation is that (1) the federal government has little or no responsibility for promoting energy conservation; (2) this is a proper concern for local governments if they wish to undertake it, but they must fund all such efforts themselves; (3) the primary responsibility for conserving energy lies in the private sector, with private utilities, oil companies, and firms providing conservation goods and services; and (4) the decision of whether or not to conserve energy must ultimately rest with each individual consumer, acting in the marketplace. As succinctly stated in the 1981 National Energy Policy Plan: "When individual choices are made with a maximum of personal understanding and a minimum of government restraints, the result is the most appropriate energy policy" (U.S. Department of Energy, 1981: 1).

Regional Energy Policy

Although the United States lacks a comprehensive national energy policy, in 1980 Congress established such a policy for the Pacific Northwest region, consisting of the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. The enabling legislation, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, deals only with electricity. By necessity, nevertheless, it created a broad policy framework for all energy planning and conservation in the region. The major purpose of the act was "to encourage (a) conservation and efficiency in the use of electric power, and (b) renewable resources development in the Pacific Northwest, while (c) assuring an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable regional power supply" (Bonneville Power Administration, 1981; Northwest Public Power Association, 1981).

To achieve these objectives, the Regional Energy Act created the Pacific Northwest

Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council, with two members appointed by the governor of each of the four states. The principal function of the council is to prepare a Regional Electric Power and Conservation Plan by the fall of 1983. That plan must contain an extensive energy conservation program for the region, and a 20-year electric power demand forecast for the region that takes into account the likely power savings from the conservation program.

The most novel and significant aspect of this act is its stipulation that the Regional Plan must give highest priority to cost-effective conservation as a source of power to meet regional power needs, with second priority going to renewable energy resources and third priority to co-generation. Only after those top three categories of power sources have been fully utilized can the plan consider constructing any new conventional (coal, oil, natural gas, or nuclear) generating facilities. The conservation program to be developed by the council for the region must outline specific activities to be undertaken by the Bonneville Power Administration, state and local governments, and utilities to promote reduced electricity consumption and development of renewable energy sources.

In short, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act provides an ideal model for creating energy planning and conservation policies and programs in all regions of the United States and other industrial countries.

Local Energy Policy

It has become abundantly clear and widely accepted in recent years that consumer energy conservation programs are most effective when conducted at the *local community* level, including municipalities, counties, utility districts, and neighborhoods (Olsen and Joerges, 1981; Stern et al., 1981). National and state conservation programs tend to be too broad and too rigid to be applicable to the wide variety of economic, political, and social conditions existing in local communities. Federal and regional governmental agencies have vital roles to play in formulating energy conservation policies and helping to fund conservation programs, but program design and implementation must occur at the community level if these programs are to be relevant to that setting.

Within various communities, several different kinds of *agencies or organizations* have taken the lead in promoting energy conservation. In many cases it has been the local utility, and that pattern is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the country. In the Pacific Northwest, the Power Planning Council and the Bonneville Power Authority view local utilities as the primary—though not the only—vehicles for carrying out conservation programs. In other cases, the primary impetus for promoting energy conservation has come from a city energy office or other agency of the local government. A third pattern, found in small communities, is for the city council to be the leader in the conservation movement. There is also the possibility of a fourth pattern, in which the lead is assumed by some existing or ad hoc interest association of concerned private citizens, although this has not been prevalent thus far. Whatever the lead agency or organization in a particular community, however, it is vital that it (1) command the respect of the entire community, and (2) be able to cooperate smoothly with all the other groups and organizations in the community that are working for or are concerned about energy conservation (Stern et al., 1981).

Local energy policy must also determine *how much energy savings* is desired. Should an energy conservation program seek only to eliminate energy waste and use

energy more efficiently? Should it attempt to achieve a designated annual energy growth rate, such as no more than 2 percent per year? Should it aim at a zero energy growth rate? Should it seek a small annual decline in energy use? Or should it be designed to achieve major energy savings of 25 percent or more per year? The answer to this basic policy question will influence all subsequent program efforts. A political consideration also arises here. No one objects to conservation if it is defined simply as greater efficiency in energy use. But when the possibilities of "curtailment" or "lifestyle modifications" are introduced, many policymakers become wary of or opposed to energy conservation as a community goal. Consequently, most conservation programs have been described solely in efficiency terms, even if they were in fact intended to produce absolute reductions in energy use.

Another basic policy that has been strongly emphasized in a few communities—such as Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and Davis, California—has been to actively *involve citizens* in all planning and decision making concerning conservation programs. As stated by the executive of King County (which includes Seattle): "Based on our experience in Seattle, . . . effective citizen participation helps produce better energy policies and significantly increases the chance of successfully implementing them. We have therefore concluded that knowledgeable, hard-working, and dedicated citizens are an essential ingredient for effective energy policy-making" (Revelle, 1979). Without explicit citizen involvement in conservation policy formation, there is always a strong possibility that many public interests and needs—especially those of less influential or minority people—will be ignored.

Goals and Objectives

The basic goal of all energy conservation programs is to *reduce the consumption of energy from nonrenewable sources.* To achieve that broad goal through community intervention programs, specific objectives must be developed that answer the following four questions:

Who are to be the target populations for the program? Different kinds of people have vastly different needs and concerns in regard to energy use. If conservation programs are to be effective, they must be tailored to specified target populations—such as renters, low-income families, apartment dwellers, and ethnic groups—rather than be generally intended for all consumers.

Which conservation approaches are to be emphasized? Will primary emphasis be on (1) encouraging people to purchase more energy efficient equipment; (2) modifying the ways in which people use their energy-consuming equipment; (3) promoting the use of solar or other renewable energy sources; or (4) encouraging people to adopt less energy-demanding lifestyles? All four of these approaches to energy conservation involve both technical and social components that interrelate to form complex sociotechnical systems of energy use.

Which areas of energy use are to be included in the program? Four broad energy use areas—each of which could be the focus of a comprehensive community conservation program—are (1) space conditioning (heating and cooling), (2) household appliances, (3) transportation, and (4) consumer purchasing. Most consumer conservation efforts have thus far dealt with the first area of space heating and cooling,

since by far the largest proportion of energy use in all residences is for that purpose. In the area of household appliances, primary attention has been given to water heaters, which are the most energy-demanding appliances in all households. Conservation programs aimed at personal transportation have primarily attempted to persuade people to form carpools or vanpools, or to walk or use public transportation more frequently. Very few conservation programs have dealt with consumer purchasing of energy-intensive goods and services. In Figure 25.1, these four areas of energy use are combined with the four conservation approaches to form a matrix of sixteen possible objectives for community conservation programs, each of which is illustrated with two examples.

What criteria should be used in selecting program actions? Five relevant criteria for making these decisions are the following: (1) energy effectiveness, or the amount of nonrenewable energy saved in comparison with present levels of consumption; (2) cost effectiveness, or total financial and other costs in relation to energy savings; (3) environmental effects, or impacts on the natural environment and natural resources; (4) consumer protection, or the amount and kinds of risks or hazards encountered by consumers; and (5) side effects, or all other psychological, social, and cultural consequences for individuals, families, and communities. These same criteria can also be used later in the process of program management to evaluate the outcomes of a community conservation program.

Active citizen involvement is particularly critical in this process of establishing program objectives, since citizens often have a better understanding than politicians about the kinds of programs that will and will not be acceptable to the public. An excellent illustration of citizen involvement in energy conservation planning is provided by Seattle, Washington. Several citizen committees have played an active role in (1) convincing the city to adopt a policy of relying on conservation rather than new generating plants to meet future demands for electricity; (2) writing an energy conservation code for all new buildings; and (3) developing retrofitting requirements for all existing buildings (Revelle, 1979).

PROGRAM STRATEGIES

A strategy is a course of action that guides the development and implementation of programs that are intended to achieve the objectives of a broad policy. Designing appropriate, effective, and acceptable strategies is therefore the pivotal step in the process of policy enactment. With energy conservation, this process involves two interrelated activities: identifying the relevant contexts of energy consumption that must be changed to conserve energy, and developing a set of implementation instruments to alter the relevant contexts and influence people's actions.

Consumption Contexts

Although considerable research has been conducted on the ways in which people in various countries use energy (Darmstadter et al., 1977; Joerges and Kiene, 1979; Newman and Day, 1975; Perlman and Warren, 1977; Schipper and Lichtenberg, 1976), very little attention has been given to the contexts that shape those patterns

CONSERVATION APPROACHES	ENERGY CONSUMPTION AREAS			
	Space Heating	*Household Appliances*	*Transportation*	*Consumer Purchasing*
Efficiency Improvement	Add insulation to the attic, walls, and floors. Have the heating system serviced regularly.	Insulate the hot water heater. Defrost the refrigerator/ freezer regularly.	Buy a fuel-efficient car. Have the car tuned regularly.	Buy a small car. Repair broken appliances rather than buying new ones.
Source Substitution	Install a passive solar heating system. Use a wood stove for supplemental heating.	Install a solar hot water heater. Use a wood stove for cooking whenever it is lighted.	Buy a bicycle. Use gasahol as an automobile fuel.	Don't buy a clothes dryer, but dry with solar energy. Buy clothes made of cotton or wool rather than synthetic materials.
Use Modification	Install an automatic clock thermostat set at 20°C (day) and 13°C (night). Manually turn down the thermostat at night.	Lower the hot water heater temperature to 50°C. Turn off lights when not being used.	Organize a carpool for travelling to work. Ride public transportation to work.	Buy a microwave oven rather than a standard oven. Don't buy goods in plastic or aluminium containers.
Lifestyle Alteration	Live in multi-family rather than single-family housing. Close off one or more rooms during the winter.	Get rid of the TV set. Take showers rather than baths.	Move close to one's job location. Walk to work.	Live without a car. Share the use of household goods with neighbors.

FIGURE 25.1 Types of Consumer Energy Conservation Actions (with illustrations of both one-time and repeated actions)

energy consumption. Energy consumption patterns are always a combined product of (1) the technical characteristics of the equipment used in producing, distributing, and using energy; (2) the structures and practices of existing economic institutions; (3) existing legal institutions; (4) features of the social and cultural settings in which people use energy; and (5) personal characteristics of individual consumers. Changes in any one of these contexts will commonly produce stresses and conflicts in other contexts, necessitating complex adaptations before consumption patterns become stabilized at a new level. Any strategy for promoting energy conservation must therefore be based on an understanding of the ways in which all of these interactive contexts shape patterns of energy consumption.

Technical context. Most conservation programs conducted thus far have had a predominant orientation toward changing the technical context of energy consumption. They have viewed conservation as essentially a task of improving the thermal characteristics of buildings, increasing the efficiency of heating and cooling systems, replacing energy-inefficient appliances with more efficient ones, or producing more fuel-efficient automobiles. More specifically, the major features of the technical context of consumer energy consumption include the following: (a) types and amounts of energy available for consumption; (b) size, construction, thermal properties, and design of dwelling units; (c) fuel, design, efficiency, and use of space conditioning equipment; (d) nature and efficiency of household appliances; (e) type and efficiency of motor vehicles; and (f) spatial patterns of land use, transportation systems, and the like.

Two serious problems with a purely "technical fix" approach to energy conservation are that the actual energy savings obtained through these kinds of measures tend to vary widely among different situations, and that energy consumption is also strongly influenced by all the other contexts.

Economic context. When conservation planners have moved beyond purely technical considerations, their next concern has usually been with economic factors such as the following: (a) energy prices and rate structures; (b) manner and frequency of billing procedures; (c) availability and price of conservation equipment or renewable fuels; (d) payback periods for consumers; (e) structure of the energy industry; and (f) actions of energy, utility, and automobile companies to control markets, advertise certain products, label products, and so on.

All of these economic factors affect energy consumption and must be taken into account when designing conservation programs. But a very common misconception among energy policymakers has been to assume that energy consumption is just an economic purchase, governed only by principles of rational exchange in the marketplace. In fact, a wide variety of noneconomic factors also influence energy consumption.

Legal context. The legal statutes of a society and the government agencies that enact those laws exercise extensive control over both the technical and economic contexts of energy use. The most important features of this context include: (a) regulations governing the functioning of energy companies and utilities; (b) energy pricing regulations; (c) conservation tax credits, energy buy-back provisions, and the like; (d) performance and/or labeling requirements for buildings, appliances, motor vehicles, and so on; (e) zoning laws, solar access ordinances, and other community codes; (f) energy allocation procedures; and (g) research and development policies

concerning energy conservation.

The major problem with this context thus far has been lack of adequate attention. Our understanding of how the legal context influences energy consumption, and hence the ways in which legal changes can stimulate conservation, is still quite incomplete. Hence this context has not been fully incorporated into conservation strategy designs.

Sociocultural context. Within the limits set by available technology, energy consumption is affected as much by existing social and cultural conditions as by economic and legal institutions. This context includes complex sets of factors such as: (a) cultural belief systems regarding growth versus stability and resource exploitation versus stewardship; (b) prevailing cultural values concerning consumption, living conditions, status symbols, and so on; (c) patterns of community organization and power arrangements; (d) networks of interpersonal and neighborhood interaction and communication; (e) size and composition of households, family role expectations, and so on; and (f) activities of special interest associations in the community.

A number of social scientists have written about the importance of these various sociocultural aspects of energy consumption (for example, Gentemann, 1981; Von Til, 1982; Warkov, 1978), but relatively little empirical research has been done on any of these topics. As a result of our ignorance about their effects on energy consumption, they have not been taken into consideration in designing most conservation strategies.

Personal context. Because energy consumption is always mediated by numerous personal characteristics of consumers, many conservation strategies have attempted to alter this context of energy use. Major factors constituting the personal context include: (a) perceptions of the reality and seriousness of the energy problem; (b) lifestyle desires concerning housing, transportation, personal consumption, leisure, and the like; (c) knowledge about and attitudes toward energy conservation; (d) past experiences with conservation activities, such as exposure to information about conservation or to others practicing it; and (e) indicators of social position, such as age, sex, race, education, occupation, income, and so on.

A great deal of research has been conducted by psychologists and social psychologists on the effects of the personal context on energy use (for a comprehensive review of this research, see Stern and Gardner, 1981). In general, this research has discovered that personal or psychological factors affect between 10 and 50 percent of a person's energy consumption, depending on the factors and conditions involved. But there is also a clear limit to the influence of these personal factors, since the personal context is always shaped and constrained by the larger sociocultural context.

Implementation Instruments

To alter the various contexts that shape energy consumption and induce people to take more energy conserving actions, sets of implementation instruments must be utilized. An effective conservation program may employ several different instruments that are appropriate to the contexts to be changed, for there is no one best way of promoting energy savings (Stern et al., 1981). Any particular instrument, moreover, may be carried out in a variety of different ways, depending on the particular procedures employed. For example, information on how to save energy in the home can be conveyed to consumers via the mass media, in booklets or pamphlets, at

workshops, or through home energy audits. In this chapter we focus on basic types of implementation instruments rather than on particular procedures, since the list of possible procedures is virtually infinite, whereas there are only a limited number of types of instruments.

Writers dealing with the general process of intentional social change (Vago, 1980; Warwick and Kelman, 1973; Zaltman and Duncan, 1977) and with the specific topic of promoting energy conservation (Ellis and Gaskell, 1978; Hirst, 1976; Olsen, 1978) have identified a wide variety of instruments that might be applied to the problems of reducing consumer energy consumption. In general, all those instruments can be grouped into three broad categories: communicative, financial, and regulatory.

Communicative instruments. These kinds of instruments are based on social-psychological theories of change, such as cognitive, attitudinal, and interpersonal influence theories. With all these approaches, various kinds of messages—informational, emotional, persuasive, or supportive—are communicated to the targets of intended change. The purpose of these messages is to increase the recipients' knowledge of the desired new actions, their motivation for taking those actions, and their personal ability to carry out such actions.

Financial instruments. These instruments are based on microeconomic and psychological-behavioral theories of change, both of which emphasize the importance of rewards and punishments in altering people's actions. With these approaches, monetary or other desired inducements and deprivations are manipulated—through such means as prices, taxes, credits, and rebates—to make it beneficial for people to take the desired actions.

Regulatory instruments. These instruments are based on social power and social structural theories of change, as developed in sociology and political science. With these approaches, public officials and/or power leaders exert sociopolitical power on the macro level to alter the social and physical environments in which people live. Individuals then cope with or respond to the new conditions by altering their actions in desired ways.

It has become common in the literature on intentional social change to describe communicative instruments as voluntary in nature and regulatory instruments mandatory, with financial instruments somewhere in between. In reality, however, the dimension of voluntariness-involuntariness is quite independent of these three categories of instruments, so that there can be all degrees of voluntariness or involuntariness within each category. In the communicative category, an educational program conducted through the mass media is entirely voluntary in nature, but "brainwashing" prisoners or converts under conditions of severe stress is virtually mandatory. Within the financial category, a tax credit can be taken or ignored (provided that one files a tax return), but an excise tax on all energy consumers would be involuntary for everyone. And in the regulatory category, customers can give as little or as much attention as they wish to appliance energy-efficiency labels, but a mandatory energy rationing program would affect all consumers, regardless of their personal wishes.

Three specific instruments falling within each of the above categories are listed in Figure 25.2; these are discussed below.

(1) Information. The information conveyed may pertain to the nature or serious

FIGURE 25.2 Energy Conservation Implementation Instruments

Communicative Instruments	
(1) Information	Informing people about the energy problem, their current energy use levels, how to reduce their energy consumption, and the effects of their conservation actions (feedback).
(2) Persuasion	Disseminating messages with strong psychological/emotional components, of either a positive or negative nature, to induce people to conserve energy or avoid wasting it.
(3) Participation	Exposing people to situations in which they will observe new activities, experience new expectations, and be influenced by others to organize collective conservation efforts.
Financial Instruments	
(4) Pricing	Allowing energy prices to fluctuate in the marketplace according to supply and demand, on the assumption that energy use is relatively price elastic and will decline as prices rise.
(5) Taxing	Imposing taxes on energy at some point from initial extraction to final end-use so as to raise energy costs above market levels or to discourage people from purchasing certain items.
(6) Incentives	Offering monetary or other benefits, such as grants, loans, tax credits, tax deductions, bonuses, or rebates to induce consumers to conserve energy or avoid wasting it.
Regulatory Instruments	
(7) Standards	Setting, disseminating, and enforcing criteria for energy efficiency in the production and/or use of goods and services, including buildings, space conditioning, appliances, and vehicles.
(8) Allocation	Controlling the distribution and/or consumption of energy through fuel allocation plans, restrictions on the use of energy-consuming equipment, or end-use quotas (rationing).
(9) Reorganization	On the community level, this involves using planning, zoning, and other legal techniques to alter building designs, land-use patterns, transportation systems, and overall patterns of life.

ness of the energy problem; one's current patterns and levels of energy use; actions that one can take to reduce energy consumption; the potential energy and monetary savings of those actions; or feedback concerning the amount of energy that is actually being saved through conservation actions. Information is certainly necessary if people are to increase their "energy literacy" and practice conservation competently. Without adequate information they will have no understanding of why conservation is necessary, how to do it, or the effectiveness of their actions (Gaskell et al., 1981; Joerges and Kiene, 1979).

Many studies of information campaigns have concluded that information alone is rarely sufficient by itself to produce significant energy savings among most of the population (Beck et al., 1980; Ellis and Gaskell, 1978; Gradin, 1981; Hayes and Cone, 1977; Milstein, 1977; Palmer et al., 1977; Shippee, 1980; Stern and Gardner, 1980; Winnett and Neale, 1979). This is particularly true when information is presented through the mass media or in printed form.

There is some evidence, however, that information can promote conservation actions when it reaches people through home energy audits, conservation classes

and workshops, or in the form of consumption feedback. Evaluations of home energy audit programs (Olsen and Cluett, 1982) and of conservation classes and workshops (Olsen and Dethman, 1981) have found that these procedures appear to reduce household energy consumption by 10 to 15 percent—although the people who choose to participate in these programs are already concerned about saving energy. Findings from numerous studies of consumption feedback are inconclusive (Gaskell et al., 1981). Some of these experiments have reduced electricity consumption from 10 to 20 percent, especially when consumers set demanding goals for themselves (McClelland and Cook, 1978; Palmer et al., 1977; Seligman et al., 1977-1978). But a number of other studies that combined feedback with financial incentives found that only the incentives reduced consumption significantly, while feedback by itself produced no energy savings (Hayes and Cone, 1977; Kohlenberg et al., 1978; Winnett and Neale, 1979).

(2) Persuasion. Information campaigns often shade imperceptibly into persuasion efforts, since all such campaigns are implicitly or explicitly trying to promote energy conservation. Some messages, however, contain strong psychological or emotional components that are designed to sway people's attitudes and beliefs.

Many efforts to persuade people to practice conservation have been directed at *general* attitudes or orientations concerning (a) the seriousness of the energy problem, (b) support for various conservation policies, or (c) a broad "environmental ethic." For the most part these efforts have not been successful. Researchers are in agreement that there is no empirical relationship between belief in the reality and seriousness of the energy problem and taking conservation actions (Cunningham and Lapreato, 1977; Gottlieb and Matre, 1976; Olsen and Cluett, 1982; Perlman and Warren, 1972; Sears et al., 1978). Nor does there appear to be any relationship between acceptance of governmental conservation policies and taking conservation actions (Sears et al., 1978). However, people who hold a broad environmental ethic, or sense of "ecosystem awareness," are more likely than others to practice energy conservation (Beck et al., 1980: 93; Krusche and Joerges, 1981; Olsen and Cluett, 1982) and to support government conservation policies (Gladhart et al., 1978). It therefore appears that attempts to persuade people to change their general orientations toward energy should be aimed at creating a new environmental ethic rather than focused on particular aspects of the energy problem or conservation policies.

Energy attitudes may also be quite *specific* in nature. Two specific attitudes that have been investigated in relation to conservation are (a) a sense of personal responsibility to help solve the energy problem, and (b) anticipated personal consequences of reducing one's energy consumption. The former attitude has been variously termed "human responsibility" (Gladhart et al., 1978), "civic duty" (Curtin, 1975), a "personal norm of conversation" (Leonard-Barton and Rogers, 1979), and "locus of control" (Van Raaij, 1978). All of those researchers found moderate relationships between their responsibility measures and taking conservation actions. A diffuse sense of obligation is not as salient to most individuals, however, as are immediate personal consequences of either a desirable or undesirable nature. Policymakers have commonly emphasized the financial benefits of conservation as a means of persuading people to take conservation actions, and several studies have found that people cite the rising cost of energy as a critical motivating factor for conservation (Beck et al., 1980; Cunningham and Lapreato, 1977; Krusche and Joerges, 1981; Milstein, 1977; Olsen and Cluett, 1982; Perlman and Warren, 1977). But these and other studies have also clearly demonstrated that nonfinancial considerations such as

personal health and comfort, safety, convenience, and the desire to live a less materialistic life can be powerful motivating forces for conservation (Leonard-Barton and Rogers, 1979; Sears et al., 1978; Seligman et al., 1977-1978).

(3) Participation. This instrument emphasizes the transmission of new experiences, expectations, and interpersonal influences rather than information or persuasion. A large body of social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that people are most accepting of new ideas and practices that reach them through other individuals they respect or through organizations to which they belong. More recently, considerable attention has been given to neighborhood organizations as dymanic vehicles for introducing social change (Krusche and Joerges, 1981; O'Brien, 1975). Interpersonal influences are especially salient in local social settings in which people interact in a relatively informal manner. These include neighborhood groups and associations, local recreational groups and special interest associations, neighborhood or community councils, and community-oriented schools.

The vital role of interpersonal relationships and local organizations in promoting energy conservation was first observed by Warren (1974): "The incentives for continuing conservation which took place during the energy crisis can largely be attributed to the social pressures and sense of pride and attachment to community and neighbors that was manifest at a very local level." Another study (Barnaby and Reinstein, 1975) reported that people who belonged to civic clubs and organizations were much more likely than others to prefer lower levels of energy consumption.

Participation efforts can be conducted within neighborhoods, voluntary associations, and communities. Neighborhood-level activities may include block workshops, neighborhood workshops, and conservation programs in local schools. Conservation programs conducted by voluntary associations of all kinds can have considerable influence on both their participating members (Verba and Nie, 1972) and on the general public. Comprehensive community conservation programs—such as that of Davis, California—may include a wide variety of activities aimed at different people and situations in an effort to mobilize the entire community (McGregor, 1977).

(4) Pricing. Many economists and energy policymakers believe that energy use has considerable price elasticity, so that as prices rise, consumption will decline. The best ways of promoting energy conservation, they argue, are to decontrol fossil fuel prices so that they will rise to world market levels and to raise the rates of regulated gas and electric utilities and district heating systems. In addition, energy rates can be structured in various ways to further encourage conservation—such as increasing block rates or time-of-day pricing. These and other pricing principles and issues in EEC countries are discussed more fully by Coldwell (1980).

A recent effort to determine energy price elasticities in nine industrial countries for the period 1960-1976 (Griffin, 1979) reported an overall elasticity of -.47, meaning that a 1.0 percent price rise produced a 0.47 percent reduction in energy consumption. This relationship varied tremendously among countries, however, with Japan (-.59) and France (-.51) being highest, the United States (-.24) and Sweden (-.29) in the middle, and Great Britain (-.08) and the Netherlands (.00) being very low. Elasticities also differed considerably among energy use sectors, generally being highest for transportation, moderate for buildings, and lowest for industry.

The moderate responsiveness of energy consumption to price increases that is

implied by these aggregate elasticity figures is questioned by many behavioral and opinion studies on several grounds. First is the well-demonstrated fact that people with low incomes are the least likely to take conservation actions, even though they have the greatest economic need to do so. A second observation is that "energy consumption may be so tied to the 'good things in life' for Americans that the cost of energy (at least at present levels) is insignificant for many in their usage decisions" (Beck et al., 1980: 200). This possibility was substantiated by a Gallup Poll (1977), which found that half the respondents were willing to pay considerably more for energy if they could be guaranteed no shortage. Third, in times of general inflation, consumers tend to become insensitive to rising prices of any particular item such as energy (Beck et al., 1980). Fourth, comparisons of the actions of consumers exposed to energy price increases and those not experiencing such increases have found that many people are quite unresponsive to rising prices in the short run (Peck and Doering, 1976; Gladhart et al., 1978). This is at least partly due to the fact that consumers have invested considerable money in their present homes, cars, and appliances, and hence will continue to use them as long as possible.

In addition, the pricing approach is highly inequitable in its economic consequences. Since low-income people generally use minimal amounts of energy, while spending a disproportionately large share of their budget for it, a price increase can create severe financial problems for them without reducing their energy consumption (Newman and Day, 1975; Morrison, 1978). They may also be forced by economic and legal constraints to continue using energy-inefficient residences, autos, and other equipment (Joerges, 1979). In contrast, high-income families—who tend to be heavy energy users—can afford to pay more for the energy they use, and hence are not very responsive to rising energy prices (Kilkeary, 1975; Morrison, 1978).

(5) Taxing. If government officials feel that market prices for energy are not high enough to produce sufficient conservation, they can impose taxes on energy to raise its cost even higher. These taxes may be applied to the initial extraction or generation of energy, or they may be imposed on end-use energy sales in the form of a surtax. Although energy taxes are frequently proposed as an instrument for encouraging conservation, and although all countries currently tax energy to some extent, there is little evidence that taxes are a very effective conservation instrument. They suffer from all of the problems of the pricing approach, including price insensitivity, long lag times, and inequitable outcomes.

There is also the question of what to do with the revenues generated by the energy taxes. They could be used to subsidize energy companies in the search for additonal deposits of oil and natural gas. They could be used for research and development of nuclear energy. They could be used to finance conservation programs and subsidize conservation actions. They could be used for research and development on renewable energy sources and technologies. Or, as proposed by several writers (Energy Policy Project, 1974; Hannon, 1975; Schneider, 1978), the revenue from a surtax on all purchases of energy from nonrenewable sources could be redistributed equally to all adults at the end of the year as an "energy refund." Large energy users (primarily high-income people) would pay more energy taxes than their refund, while small energy uses (primarily low-income people) would receive a larger refund than they paid in energy taxes, thus providing an equitable inducement to conserve energy.

(6) Incentives. These are financial or other rewards that are offered for taking desired actions, as well as penalties that may be imposed on undesired actions. Many

public officials and policymakers have a strong preference for financial incentives in promoting change, since they presumably offer more motivation than communicative instruments, yet avoid the political hazards of inequitable pricing or unpopular regulatory standards. All industrial countries offer some financial incentives for conservation actions (Gradin, 1981). These include outright grants (primarily to low-income people), low-interest or no-interest loans, tax deductions or tax credits, and cash bonuses or cash rebates.

The effects of financial incentives on energy consumption have been examined in several studies, with mixed findings. It has become clear than many people will not borrow money for conservation improvements to their homes, even when it is offered with no interest (Olsen and Cluett, forthcoming; Stern et al., 1981). But over three-fourths of the respondents in a recent survey said that U.S. governmental tax credits for up to 15 percent of expenditures on home insulation would have "some" or "much" influence on their decision to take this action (Olsen and Cluett, forthcoming). Similar results were reported in a study of solar installations in Germany (Klein, 1979a, 1979b). Several field experiments that gave cash rebates to people for reducing their electricity consumption found that these incentives had few or no effects on energy use except when they were at least twice as large as the cost of the electricity saved (Hayes and Cone, 1977; Kohlenberg et al., 1978; Winnett and Neale, 1979).

(7) Standards. With this instrument, a governmental agency establishes, disseminates, and enforces criteria for energy use in the production of goods and services and for energy efficiency in the operation of equipment. A common example of such standards is the energy efficiency codes governing the construction of new buildings that now exist (or are being prepared) in all Western industrial countries (Gradin, 1981). Nine of these countries have also adopted energy-efficiency standards for existing buildings, although the prescribed standards differ greatly. In the area of transportation, almost all of these nations have established speed limits—typically ranging between 80 and 100 km/hr (50-60 mph)—to conserve gasoline. But only the United States and Canada have established minimum fuel-efficiency standards for all fleets of new cars.

Advocates of production and performance standards often argue that this instrument could be extremely effective in promoting energy conservation. However, the amount of energy saved will depend largely on the nature of the standards established and how effectively they are enforced. A standard that is rejected by most of the population is virtually impossible to implement, and even if a standard is widely accepted there still may be numerous problems of administration, surveillance, and enforcement. (This assumes that compliance with the standard is required to at least some degree; purely voluntary "guidelines" avoid these problems but are much less effective in changing people's actions.) One way of minimizing administrative, surveillance, and enforcement costs of energy standards is to apply them to producers rather than to consumers. The fewer the number of actors with whom an enforcement agency must deal, the easier the administrative process and the more uniform enforcement is likely to be. This "macro-constraints" approach (Pirages and Ehrlich, 1974) preserves considerable freedom of choice for individual consumers, but its use may be severely limited by powerful interest organizations. Consequently, "intermediate constraints" at the community level may be most effective with energy conservation.

(8) Allocation. This instrument brings the government directly into the process of deciding how energy will be distributed or consumed. Allocation programs must be

mandatory if they are to be effective, but they can vary considerably in their scope and requirements. At the minimal end of this continuum might be a limitation on the number of new dwelling units that may be connected to an existing electricity or natural gas system for heating purposes. Toward the maximum end would be various procedures for restricting or rationing the consumption of energy, including electricity "brown-outs," a mandatory reduction in electricity use, or limits on the amount of gasoline one can buy per week.

The problems of administration, surveillance, and enforcement mentioned in regard to energy standards also apply to allocation, but with even more severity (Hall, 1979). Three main findings have emerged from the limited social science research on allocation procedures: (a) Energy rationing is widely disliked by the public, and most people want to avoid it if at all possible (Milstein, 1977). (b) Rationing often hurts poor people the most (Newman and Day, 1975). (c) The imposition of mandatory energy rationing would almost certainly lead to the rise of "black markets" unless the government permitted a legal "white market" for trading or selling rationing coupons.

Allocation is perhaps most usefully viewed as an instrument of "last resort" to be used only in crisis situations or when all other strategies fail. But government officials cannot plead the existence of a crisis too frequently or they will lose all credibility with the public (Beck et al., 1980: 196).

(9) Reorganization. If our communities—including their buildings, transportation systems, and land-use patterns—had initially been designed for energy efficiency, we might not have an energy problem today. The intent of the reorganization instrument is to compensate for that historical oversight by redesigning and redeveloping our communities for greater energy efficiency. The local community thus becomes the setting for an "intermediate-constraints" approach to energy conservation.

Community reorganization might be accomplished through a variety of legal techniques, including comprehensive planning, zoning and building requirements, public ordinances, administrative procedures, and financial subsidies (Harwood, 1977; Sewell and Foster, 1980). The goals of these efforts might include constructing more multifamily dwellings, redeveloping inner-city areas to attract middle-class residents, locating industries in "industrial parks" with nearby housing for their workers, developing new forms of mass transportation, substituting communication facilities for transportation lines, or arranging cities into "neighborhood clusters" containing all necessary services and facilities within easy walking distance.

One advocate of this approach has estimated that if it were taken seriously, it could reduce the consumption of energy in a community by as much as one-half (Harwood, 1977). A computer simulation of what reorganization might accomplish in one U.S. county predicted energy savings of about 25 percent (Carroll et al., 1977). Awareness of this approach has thus far been limited largely to architects and city planners (Goodman, 1977), although social scientists have recently begun to incorporate it into discussions of community planning and organization (Van Til, 1982).

A recent study by Olsen (1982) investigated the extent to which the public favored six of the above instruments as ways of promoting energy conservation. In a sample of Washington State residents, by far the most preferred instrument was offering *financial incentives* to consumers, which was favored by 83 percent of the respondents. Also receiving fairly strong support were the instruments of voluntary community *participation programs*, favored by 63 percent of the sample, and mandatory energy *efficiency standards*, for which the figure was 61 percent. In contrast, *land-use changes* were favored by only 33 percent of the sample, despite the enthusiastic

endorsement often given to this instrument by professional planners. Even fewer people favored imposing energy *consumption limits* on consumers, supported by just 24 percent of the sample. Finally, energy *price increases* (either in the marketplace or with additional taxes) were acceptable to a mere 9 percent of these people. Very clearly, people do not want to be driven to reduce their energy consumption by rising energy prices.

The Olsen (1982) study also examined several predictors of acceptance of the various instruments, both separately and in a combined index. Among all the variables analyzed, the strongest predictor of scores on the combined index and four of the six instruments was supporting a "soft energy path" (renewable resources and conservation) rather than a "hard energy path" (oil, gas, coal, and nuclear) as a long-term energy policy (Lovins, 1977). A second strong predictor of the combined index and most of the separate instruments was the belief that the energy problem was serious or very serious. Three other relevant predictors were willingness to reduce one's energy consumption by 25 percent if necessary, having taken behavioral (but not retrofitting) conservation actions, and education. Together, those five variables explain 20 percent of the variance on the combined index.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The process of implementing a consumer energy conservation program can be examined in terms of five questions: (1) Who will conduct the program? (2) How will the program be organized? (3) How will the program reach its targets? (4) How will the program remove existing policy, program, and operational barriers to conservation in the technical, economic, legal, and sociocultural contexts? (5) How will the program mobilize individuals to take conservation actions? The following discussions of these questions draw fairly heavily on an analysis of 23 community conservation programs that was recently conducted by Stern et al. (1981), and to a lesser extent on an analysis of twelve such programs that was conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (1979).

Who will conduct the program? Consumer confidence in the agency conducting a conservation program is critical for its success. As a general rule, consumers tend to place much more trust in local government agencies than in state or federal agencies, which suggests that energy conservation programs are most likely to be successful when conducted by a community energy office or similar agency. Understanding of the importance of community-based conservation programs spread quite rapidly among energy planners in the United States during the late 1970s, which led to a number of conferences and publications on this theme (for example, see Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979).

A problem arises from the fact, however, that many local governments, especially in smaller communities, lack the technical knowledge, staff personnel, and financial resources to conduct adequate conservation programs. To meet these needs, the local government must often turn to other organizations, including energy companies, utilities, private businesses, community organizations, and special-interest groups. However, some of these organizations—especially energy companies and utilities—are viewed by the public as having a conflict of interest between selling energy and promoting conservation. One way of surmounting this difficulty is for the

local government to establish a public-oriented but semiautonomous organization in the community to direct the conservation program. Whatever the nature of the organizational arrangements, experience has demonstrated that extensive citizen participation in conducting the program is vital to its success.

How will the program be organized? As large numbers of individuals, neighborhoods, community organizations, utilities, local government agencies, and state and federal energy offices become involved in implementing a community conservation program, problems of communication and coordination can increase acutely. An effective way of providing coordination is to organize all of the conservation efforts into a set of sequential consumer conservation services that will parallel the steps through which consumers go in carrying out their own personal "programs" of action. Stern et al. (1981) describe this procedure as offering a "package program" of conservation services that enables consumers to do "one-stop shopping" for all their conservation needs.

Included within a comprehensive consumer energy conservation package program might be the following services: (1) information about the actions that consumers can take to save energy, approximately how much each action is likely to cost and how much energy it may save, and other important benefits or problems associated with it; (2) audits of residences to identify ways in which they are wasting energy, steps that might be taken to reduce those energy losses, and the likely effects of those actions; (3) workshops to teach interested persons how to carry out household conservation actions; (4) assistance to households in taking conservation actions, such as handling all arrangements with a contractor to do the necessary work, or providing a list of recommended contractors, or supplying materials to people who want to do the work themselves; (5) financial services, including help in applying for available grants and tax credits, providing no-interest loans, and arranging with utilities to "buy back" the energy saved by consumers through conservation or generated by solar facilities; (6) inspection of all conservation work to ensure that it meets established performance and safety standards; and (7) protection of consumers through such services as offering warranties on all work performed, handling complaints, and providing legal assistance when necessary.

How will the program reach its target? Conservation information and persuasion programs have used a variety of communication channels, including television and radio, newspapers, pamphlets and brochures, announcements with utility bills, lectures, workshops, classes, graphic displays, energy fairs with displays, and others. Evaluations of these efforts have discovered that they reach a fair proportion of the population, especially people who are already at least moderately interested in energy problems. The main limitation to this approach is that it fails to reach several other categories of people, including those who are poorly educated, elderly, or socially isolated, those who do not speak the prevailing language, or those are not interested in saving energy.

To reach many of these special categories of consumers, conventional communication channels must be supplemented with alternative channels. One such channel is to contact people through existing local organizations of all kinds. Stern et al. (1981) argue that programs should "work through organizations that have access to the people who will probably not be reached through the standard channels: social clubs, tenant associations, church groups, and block associations." Another alternative communication channel is an organized word-of-mouth campaign, in which

"opinion leaders" in the community are asked to tell several other people about the program, with the understanding that each of them will in turn tell several more people, and so on.

How will the program remove existing barriers to conservation in the technical, economic, legal, and sociocultural contexts? In many communities, existing policies, programs, and practices constitute serious barriers to implementing conservation programs and inducing consumers to take energy conserving actions. These barriers may occur in community land-use patterns, construction techniques used in homes and other buildings, utility pricing practices, national economic policies, local zoning ordinances, building codes, prevailing cultural values, or community decision-making structures. The nature of the barriers encountered by a conservation program will vary widely among communities and also at different times within any given community. Moreover, to the extent that these barriers originate at the national or other higher levels of government, or in national corporations, many of them may be largely beyond the immediate control of a local community.

Those barriers—whatever their nature or origin—must be overcome or circumvented, however, if a community conservation program is to achieve its objectives. Critical steps in the process of removing barriers to community energy conservation programs include the following: (1) Identify all existing or potential barriers during the initial design of the program, describing the nature, source, and effects of each one. (2) Develop a strategy for dealing with each barrier in the most expeditious manner possible, so as to minimize the amount of program resources devoted to these efforts and to maximize possibilities for removing the barriers in one way or another. (3) With barriers that originate outside the community, look for leverages that the community can apply to the source of the barrier, such as political pressure, economic sanctions, or social conflict. (4) With barriers that originate within the community, implement an information and/or action campaign to alter or remove the barrier, which may involve making trade-offs among affected parties. (5) Incorporate into the conservation program various procedures to prevent those barriers from reoccurring at a later time or new ones arising.

This process of removing structural barriers to energy conservation programs can become quite complex and demanding, but it is absolutely essential. If it is ignored or unsuccessful, consumers will often be unable to take conservation actions, regardless of their desires or intentions. Because of the strong tradition of local community action in the United States, compared to many European nations, the process of removing structural barriers to conservation may likely be easier in the United States than elsewhere. Even in this country, however, conservation program planners have frequently overlooked the crucial importance of developing action strategies to remove existing structural barriers to consumer energy conservation.

How will the program mobilize individuals to take action? The process of mobilizing individual consumers to take energy-conserving actions can be divided into the four steps described below. Most community conservation programs have included the first three steps in some manner, but often without any kind of purposeful planning. The fourth step has been largely ignored thus far.

(1) *Awareness:* Although awareness of the energy problem is not sufficient by itself to produce conservation actions, it is a critical first step in the consumer mobilization process. And as people develop awareness of the energy problem, they are also likely to form opinions about existing and proposed energy policies. In the

United States, public opinion toward conservation policies is quite favorable, with a majority of the public supporting mandatory energy efficiency standards for new buildings, mandatory standards for appliances, and other rather stringent conservation measures (Olsen et al., 1982).

(2) *Motivation:* Consumer energy conservation programs have generally been found to be most successful when they appeal to several different motives simultaneously. Research has indicated that all of the following kinds of motivating messages can encourage conservation actions (Beck et al., 1980; Leonard-Barton and Rogers, 1979; Olsen and Cluett, 1982; Stern et al., 1981; Van Raaij, 1978; Winnett and Neale, 1979): (a) the importance of a broad environmental ethic that links energy conservation with environmental protection, population control, and less materialistic lifestyles; (b) the cost-effectiveness of energy conservation, relating conservation costs to people's concerns about cost-conscious consumption, long-range financial savings as energy costs continue to rise, and maintaining the market value of their residences; (c) the nonmaterial benefits of energy conservation, such as enabling people to help solve the national energy problem, improving the comfort and healthfulness of one's home, and being a social innovator by contributing to a new social trend; and (d) the legal sanctions for noncompliance with mandatory conservation requirements, and the manner in which violators will be handled.

(3) *Knowledge:* People must know what to do if they are to act in ways that will save energy. This knowledge must include: (a) the manner and extent to which one is currently consuming energy; (b) actions one can take to reduce that consumption; (c) how to go about taking those actions; and (d) how much energy those actions will save and how much they will cost.

(4) *Confirmation:* If action is to be sustained over time, the consumer must receive confirmation that desired effects are being achieved, that there are no undesired side effects, and that others approve of his or her course of action. The energy consumer will therefore want to know if his or her conservation actions are saving energy, whether those savings justify the costs involved, if any of those actions affect health or comfort or safety, and if other people in the consumer's social environment accept or preferably approve of his or her conservation actions. The point here is that completing one successful conservation action can become a strong impetus for taking additional actions (Beck et al., 1980), provided that one's actions are confirmed by others.

PROGRAM EVALUATION

Programs to promote intentional social change are virtually worthless unless they are thoroughly evaluated. Until quite recently, few efforts were made to evaluate conservation programs (Stern et al., 1981), and the evaluation studies that were conducted were often rather superficial (Hirst et al., 1981a) But many energy policymakers and program directors are now realizing that failure to evaluate can result in wasted effort and resources, while a competent evaluation can improve the effectiveness of a program. A thorough program evaluation is not a one-time activity conducted after the program is completed, but an integral part of the entire program from initial design through implementation to final outcomes (Olsen et al., 1980).

The direct effects of consumer energy conservation programs are commonly measured in terms of (1) changes produced in the contexts of energy consumption, (2) conservation actions taken by consumers, and (3) savings of energy from nonrenewable sources. Any of these three types of effects—but especially energy sav-

ings—can then be compared with the total financial and other costs of a program to determine its cost-effectiveness. Conservation programs can also have many different kinds of indirect effects on the natural environment, the economic system, social conditions, and political activities. Those secondary program effects—which are usually termed "environmental and social impacts"—are not discussed here, but the interested reader is referred to Edelson and Olsen (1980), Morrison and Lodwick (1981), and Olsen (1981a).

Contextual Changes

The structural contexts of energy consumption and conservation include the technical, economic, legal, and sociocultural systems that exist in a society or community. Any energy conservation program, as we saw previously, must employ appropriate implementation instruments to change the structural contexts that are relevant to its goals and objectives. Without these contextual changes, any program of intentional social change will likely fail, no matter how strongly it motivates individuals to alter their behavior, since personal actions are always constrained and shaped by the various structural contexts in which they occur. Consequently, those contexts must be made congruent with and supportive of the desired new courses of individual action.

An effective consumer energy conservation program will therefore create changes in numerous features of the structural contexts of energy use. To evaluate the effectiveness of the program in producing such changes, the following questions must be answered: (1) Which specific features of each context was the program designed to change? (2) What was the condition of each of those features prior to the program? (3) What changes occured in each of those features as a result of the program? (4) What other features of the various structural contexts were unintentionally affected by the program? (5) What alterations occurred in the system of linkages among all of the structural contexts?

If people are to reduce their use of energy, changes in the structural contexts of energy consumption must be linked to alterations in the personal context of individual consumers. People must be mobilized to take energy-conserving actions that are in accord with the changed structural contexts. When evaluating the effects of a conservation program on the personal context of energy use, the following questions must be addressed: (1) How aware are people becoming of the nature of the energy problem, various energy policies, and the conservation ethic? (2) What kinds of motivational appeals are having the greatest effects on various types of consumers? (3) Are consumers acquiring the kinds of technical, financial, and other information they need to take conservation actions? (4) What kinds of services or assistance are consumers seeking from community conservation programs, and are those needs being adequately satisfied? (5) Are consumers who take conservation actions receiving sufficient feedback and confirmation concerning their actions?

Conservation Actions

The purpose of this phase of the evaluation is to determine how extensively various kinds of energy saving actions have been undertaken by people as a result of the conservation program. The evaluator will quite likely also be interested in what kind of people—in terms of such factors as age, race, family status, education, income,

household size, and home ownership status—have taken what actions. Although this would seem to be a relatively straightforward matter of asking consumers to describe the conservation actions they have taken, the data that result are often rather inaccurate. For a variety of reasons, many people do not know, cannot remember, will not say, or intentionally or unintentionally distort their self-reports of conservation actions. Various methods have been devised to circumvent these reporting biases (Beck et al., 1980: 69-81), but they are a persistent problem in all attempts to discover what conservation actions people are really taking.

A typical example of the many studies of conservation actions that have been conducted in recent years was an evaluation of the Washington Energy Extension Services (WEES; Olsen and Dethman, 1981). The King County (Seattle) office of WEES offers evening and weekend classes on a wide variety of conservation and renewable resource actions that people can take in their homes. Eight types of WEES classes were evaluated to discover if persons who attended them subsequently took conservation or solar actions. The results showed that class participants took such actions approximately twice as frequently as a comparison group of nonparticipants. However, many of the actions taken by the class participants were in addition to, or different from, those taught in the classes. In other words, there was a "spillover effect" from the specific topics of the classes to a general concern with saving energy. On a Total Weighted Action Index of all conservation actions taken after attending a WEES class, participants had a mean score of 10.7, compared to scores of 5.6 if they had not been exposed to any other conservation program, 8.6 if they had been influenced by mass media programs about conservation, and 10.1 if they had attended other conservation workshops or had a home energy audit. Rough calculations indicate that if the class participants had actually taken all the conservation actions they claimed—which is quite doubtful—they had reduced their total energy consumption by an average of about 30 percent. And since the extent of reported conservation actions was approximately the same across all income levels, higher-income households (which typically use two to three times as much energy as lower-income households) were possibly saving quite substantial amounts of energy.

Energy Savings

The value of any conservation program depends ultimately on the amount of nonrenewable energy it saves. Efforts at conservation will not save much energy, however, if they are basically only symbolic in nature—such as turning out a light or two. Such actions may give people a feeling that they are contributing to the conservation effort, but will not produce significant reductions in energy consumption. Actions may also be ineffective if the "Boomerang Law of Energy Conservation" (Hayes, 1976: 63) comes into operation. This law states that "(1) whenever we save energy we save money; and (2) whatever we spend that money on will require energy." If the later purchases involve more energy consumption (direct or indirect) than the original activity, no energy has been saved.

An adequate evaluation of an energy conservation program must, therefore, measure the amount of energy saved by that program. This involves conducting a field experiment in which actual readings are taken of the amount of energy consumed by a household before and after participating in the program. Without going into the methodological details of this type of research—which are described in two recently prepared guidebooks (Olsen et al., 1980; Soderstrom et al., 1981)—two kinds of

problems that are common to all experimental evaluations of conservation energy savings can be mentioned.

(1) Accurate data on household or automobile energy consumption are often quite difficult to obtain. Researchers who have asked consumers to keep records of their own energy use have found that most people cannot do this on a consistent basis. Hence most researchers make these measurements themselves. Electricity and natural gas consumption are relatively easy to measure, since they are metered, but the utility must be willing to give the evaluator access to its records. This is generally much less of a problem with public than with private utilities, since with the latter it may be necessary to obtain a signed consent form from each customer. Oil, coal, wood, and other heating fuels that are delivered irregularly in varying amounts are extremely difficult to measure. And no one has yet devised a fully satisfactory method of measuring people's gasoline consumption for evaluation purposes.

(2) It is not sufficient to just measure a household's energy use before and after being exposed to a conservation program. That would not enable the researcher to determine whether any changes in energy consumption were caused by the program or by other factors. To make that causal inference with confidence, the evaluator must hold constant the effects of all other factors that might also have influenced the household's energy consumption during the course of the study. These include changes in the weather, in the building, in any energy-using equipment, in the number of people in the dwelling unit, in the price or availability of energy, in political conditions, and in people's exposure to other conservation messages or programs. A variety of methodological techniques must be used to hold constant the effects of all other possible causal factors—including selecting a matched comparison group, statistically adjusting the data to eliminate the effects of weather and other compounding factors, and dropping deviant cases from the analysis.

Only a few evaluations of consumer energy conservation programs have thus far attempted to measure the actual energy savings produced by the program, while holding constant the effects of all other variables. One of these was a study of the Neighborhood Energy Conservation Program conducted by Seattle City Light (the municipal utility) in 1978-1979 (Olsen and Cluett, 1982). This program was based on the principle of implementing conservation through neighborhood activities and personal contacts. Three kinds of conservation activities were carried out in various combinations in different areas of the city: neighborhood information campaigns, block conservation workshops, and home energy audits. People exposed to the program reported taking significantly more conservation actions than did a comparison group of nonparticipants, with home energy checks producing the largest number of conservation actions.

The main concern of the evaluation, therefore, was to determine how much energy savings resulted from having a home energy check. To measure those effects, records for all forms of energy consumption for the year preceding and following the program were obtained for both program participants and nonparticipants. In all-electric homes (that is, homes with electric space heating, water heating, and cooking), persons exposed to the City Light program reduced their total energy consumption by an average of 5.6 kilowatt hours per day, for an energy saving of 8.6 percent, whereas persons not exposed to the program used approximately the same amount of electricity before and after the program was conducted. Roughly similar energy savings occurred in homes heated with oil or natural gas, for both their furnace fuel and their electricity consumption. However, people's scores on an index of reported

conservation actions were unrelated to their actual energy savings, which indicates the importance in such evaluations of directly measuring energy consumption and not relying on people's verbal statements about what they have done to save energy.

Cost-Effectiveness

Calculating the cost-effectiveness of a conservation program involves two major difficulties, beyond the requirement that detailed records be kept of all program expenses: (1) The effectiveness of the program in energy savings must be determined before its cost effectiveness can be calculated. Because of the measurements and control problems discussed above, this can be quite difficult with energy conservation programs. (2) Some monetary value must be placed on the energy saved by the program. With continually rising energy prices, it is not realistic to evaluate the program on the basis of current prices, for that would grossly underestimate probable future financial savings.

An alternative technique is to use the marginal cost of obtaining the energy that was saved, had it been needed. With some fuels this marginal price may be almost the same as the current price, but with electricity it is often much higher because of the need to build new generating plants to supply additional power. Another approach is to assume some rate of future energy price increases, and base the evaluation on that rising price curve. The difficulty here is that no one knows what levels energy prices will reach in even the near future, and most previous estimates have proved to be far too low. Hence determining the overall cost-effectiveness of any energy conservation program is far from an exact science.

The most ambitious effort made thus far to estimate the potential energy savings and cost-effectiveness of various conservation programs was the recently conducted Pacific Northwest Conservation Assessment (Synergic Resources Corporation, 1982). This study pertained only to electricity consumption, however, and did not consider gasoline, heating oil, or natural gas consumption. The study examined all sectors of electricity use, but this discussion is limited to the residential sector. Twenty residential conservation programs were selected for analysis, primarily because they have all been implemented and some data were available on their effectiveness. The analytical procedure followed in the assessment consisted of the following steps: (1 Estimate the likely "penetration rate" of each program, or the number of households that are likely to be reached by that program. (2) Estimate the likely "implementation rate" of each program, or the number of households that will take the desired conservation actions. To obtain that figure, it was first necessary to estimate the "gross implementation rate," or the number of households that will take the actions with or without the program. The expected number of households that will act without being influenced by the program was then subtracted from the gross implementation rate to arrive at a figure for the "net implementation rate," or the number of households that will take the action as a result of program exposure. (3) Obtain figures for the amount of potential energy savings associated with each possible kind of conservation action. Since most of those figures are available from existing engineering studies, this was the most reliable step in the process. (4) Estimate the full financial costs of each program, including start-up costs, total investments for agencies and households, administrative costs, and (with mandatory programs) enforcement costs. Since most of those costs were not known, it was necessary to estimate them from experiences with other types of public programs. (5) Calculate the expected present value cost-effectiveness of each program over the entire lifetime of the program.

The results of the assessment—which are only rough estimates—indicated that the greatest electricity savings are expected to result from establishing mandatory thermal efficiency standards for all new residential buildings. The next most effective programs are setting mandatory efficiency standards for all new appliances, charging a fee for converting from gas or oil heating to electric heating, and giving rebates for installing water heater pumps. Three other programs that promise to yield relatively large electricity savings are labeling appliances to show their energy efficiency, giving rebates on the purchase of energy-efficient appliances, and providing loans for weatherizing single-family homes. The cost-effectiveness figures for all twenty programs—expressed in mills per kilowatt hour (KWH) saved—range from 0 to 46, but, with the exception of two programs for mobile homes, all of the figures are less than 35 mills. In comparison, the current cost of constructing new coal or nuclear generating plants is approximately 70 mills per KWH—and that figure is constantly rising. Consequently, all of the residential energy conservation programs examined in the assessment are unquestionably highly cost-efficient when compared with the cost of building new electric generating plants.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal points emphasized in this chapter can be stated in the following ten generalizations and related policy recommendations concerning consumer energy conservation programs.

Generalizations and Recommendations

(1) Consumers in all countries have thus far reduced their consumption of nonrenewable energy by only a small fraction of what is theoretically and practically possible. Therefore, adopting purposeful energy conservation policies could improve this situation markedly.

(2) Energy conservation programs are most likely to be effective when they are designed and implemented at the community level, utilizing existing community organizations and networks of interpersonal relationships, and adapting higher-level programs to local conditions. Therefore, the local community should be the operational setting for all consumer energy conservation programs, providing a dynamic linkage between (a) consumers and their immediate social groups and (b) conservation policies and programs of higher-level governments or other organizations.

(3) The entire process of enacting policies for consumer energy conservation must involve citizens in decision-making roles at every stage if the process is to be successful. Therefore, conservation programs should seek to maximize meaningful citizen involvement.

(4) As a process of intentional social change, consumer energy conservation programs must create alterations in the structural contexts—technical, economic, legal, and sociocultural—that shape patterns of energy consumption. Therefore, conservation programs must be designed to change those features of the various structural contexts that are relevant to their objectives.

(5) As a process of intentional social change, consumer energy conservation programs must alter the personal context of energy use by mobilizing individuals through increasing energy awareness, motivation to act, knowledge of conservation actions,

capability to take those actions, and confirmation of outcomes. Therefore, conservation programs must be designed to promote this mobilization process as fully as possible.

(6) A variety of communicative, financial, and regulatory instruments can be used to implement changes in the structural and personal contexts of energy use, although (a) purely informational instruments are rarely sufficient by themselves; (b) persuasive appeals also have limited effectiveness; and (c) price increases and mandatory allocation programs are strongly disliked by the public; so that (d) participatory programs, financial incentives, and equitably designed efficiency standards appear to be the most effective types of implementation instruments. Therefore, a successful conservation program will carefully select the set of instruments that are most appropriate and likely to be most effective in that situation.

(7) Energy conservation programs are most likely to be effective when they are specifically oriented toward particular target populations or groups. Therefore, a comprehensive community conservation program should contain many different kinds of activities aimed at various specified targets.

(8) Energy conservation programs are most likely to be effective when they provide a complete package of all necessary services to consumers. Therefore, conservation programs should be organized and conducted in the manner that is most accessible to consumers and tailored to their requirements.

(9) Energy conservation programs can induce consumers to take conservation actions that will reduce their consumption of energy, but the extent of those actions and the amount of energy saved can only be determined through careful evaluations. Therefore, all energy conservation programs should be continually and thoroughly evaluated.

(10) Most kinds of consumer energy conservation programs are highly cost-efficient in terms of their financial costs and energy savings, especially when compared with the costs of constructing new energy-producing facilities. Therefore—as has been done in the Pacific Northwest—the policy should be adopted of meeting all future energy needs as fully as possible through conservation and renewable energy programs.

Final Thoughts

If and when energy conservation becomes a dominant policy in industrial societies, it will stimulate and reinforce a much broader process of social change, the initial features of which are already evident in several countries. Energy use is a basic aspect of most economic and social activities, so that as levels and modes of energy use shift, this will have ramifications for most other aspects of society. Thus intervention programs to promote greater energy conservation can become pivotal points for intentional social change to transform our present industrial societies into a new form of truly postindustrial society. One certain consequence of such a transformation would be wider use of renewable resources and preservation of the natural environment, so that energy conservation is undoubtedly the best type of environmental policy.

As has been evident throughout this chapter, the process of promoting energy conservation through intervention programs is much more than just seeking a new "technical fix" solution to the energy problem. This process is as much a sociocultural as a technical challenge to industrial societies. Consequently, there is a great need for cooperative social research among many disciplines, and also across interrelated areas such

as energy conservation, resource preservation, and environmental protection. In addition, this basic and applied social research must be integrated with policy planning in such areas as economic development, community organization, and household functioning. It is therefore imperative that social scientists concerned about energy problems cooperate closely with policymakers and program administrators in all realms of society to design and implement effective intervention programs that will promote wise and judicious use of energy and other vital resources.

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26

Community Leisure Studies

A Holistic Perspective

James F. Murphy

The emergence of leisure in contemporary American society owes its heritage primarily to the "second wave" or Industrial Revolution in which an altered form of community life was created. Prior to the industrialization of America's economy and the resulting social patterns, life in rural towns was geared primarily to handcraft trades and farming. Families were rooted to the land. Larger cities were gathering places for banking and commerce, but the country's chief social network existed within the homogeneous extended family context.

By the middle to late 1800s, with the establishment of a mass production factory system, opportunities for work became more prevalent in urban centers. This development resulted in an exodus of individuals from the isolated but small homogeneous network of families and friends residing in the countryside and towns to larger, more densely populated urban areas. With this geographical shift came social and psychological changes that stimulated the development of an altered form of community and family life.

The highly individualistic nature of the rugged pioneer family member which epitomized the American national character began to give way to a new form of social interaction pattern—both in family and community life. The self-sufficient economic unit—the family—largely dissolved with the introduction of mass production, which necessitated the use of functionally interdependent (but autonomous) parts to sustain the industrial factory system. This resulted in breaking up the relatively stable, economically independent family unit and creating a gap in social control and support for dependent family members—children, youths, and older adults.

THE RECREATION AND PARK MOVEMENT

The recreation and park movement was spawned in the late 1800s because of the recognition by social workers, social reform leaders, and interested citizens that there was an imperative need to provide constructive recreation and leisure opportunities for children and youth living in urban slums, and a need to build facilities and play areas for city dwellers no longer free to roam the relatively uninhabited and uncluttered countryside. The beginning of the movement is credited to the Boston Sand Garden in 1885, where public-spirited citizens converted a sand pile and animal

grazing area into a much-needed play area in a working-class district. Similarly, other recreation areas were developed by socially conscious individuals in run-down communities. Butler states:

> *The conscience of civic leaders and social workers such as Jacob Riis in New York City and Jane Addams in Chicago was stirred into action by the slum conditions and their effect upon the children and youth living in blighted neighborhoods. Joseph Lee was shocked to see boys arrested for playing in the Boston streets, and George E. Johnson was moved at the pathos of the attempts of little children to play in the narrow, crowded alleys of Pittsburg* [*1970: v*].

The early efforts of the play pioneers were instrumental in establishing a frame of reference for recreation expression as being oriented to character-building activity. Sessoms comments:

> *Recreation activities were thought of as a means of building character, installing values, and providing formal teaching. The philosophy and programs of this period were distinctive; recreation was a means to an end—the building of better citizens* [*1971: 435*].

The provision of community recreation came to be seen as a surrogate for families—providing informal age-related opportunities for children and youth that normally occurred within the home, a respite for individuals seeking diversion from the mindless but physically arduous tasks demanded of factory workers, and a new institutional form that provided a socially acceptable means for instilling values and behavioral traits desirous in the emerging industrial society. As summarized by Neumeyer and Neumeyer (1958), the recreation and park movement grew out of the following factors impinging upon urban life.

> *It grew out of a situation of need owing to such factors as technological developments, particularly the introduction of modern machinery of production with its monotonous and nerve-racking work; urbanization, especially the over-crowded living conditions in sections of the cities; changing home conditions and family disorganization; the speed of living, including increased mobility and daily rushing about; and the increase of leisure* [*1958: 66*].

The initial efforts to encourage community responsibility for providing wholesome recreation opportunities were largely the inspiration and dedication of lay citizens and socially minded civic leaders. However, by the turn of the century several related issues inevitably led to the formalization of an organized recreation field in 1906. According to Butler (1940: 60-61):

> *Bad housing conditions resulting from the growth of tenement slum areas, the great influx of immigrants, the rising tide of juvenile delinquency, the increase in factories accompanied by the evils of child labor and unsanitary and unsafe working conditions, the spread of commercialized amusements which were often associated with vice—all helped to create a condition which made the provision of wholesome recreation [in communities] a necessity.*

The formation of the Playground Association of America in 1906 (with Theodore Roosevelt serving as the association's first honorary president) was the culmination of some three decades of concern, and served to unite the various scattered attempts of

communities to provide organized recreation, leadership, equipment, and facilities for people. It was at this stage in the development of community life in America that the importance of recreation as a necessary part of normal life was recognized and that local government should assume responsibility for the provision of recreation.

A second stage in the evolution of the recreation and park movement was a result of conservationists and park planners having the visionary ability to set aside open spaces, creating natural park areas in urban centers to provide pleasant, passive surroundings. Such ecologically interconnected areas (e.g., Olmstead and Voux's Central Park in New York, Franklin Park in Boston, and Fairmont Park in Philadelphia) were designed to link the natural landscape with urban life. Parks were built to provide city dwellers with an opportunity to enjoy "country" living amidst an urban milieu.

The third phase in the development of community recreation was the institution of responsibility for the provision of recreation by local government. This stage of development, characterized by the importance of recreation being recognized as a fundamental part of community life, occurred following the end of World War I. Local public authorities were pressured to assume responsibility for the provision of recreation. High government officials, prominent organizations, citizens, and economists voiced the opinion that public parks and recreation centers were like schools, essential to the health, safety, and welfare of the community. State legislatures passed enabling laws empowering municipalities and counties to conduct recreation activities.

As noted by Murphy:

> *The development of public, tax-supported recreation service was primarily a northern urban phenomenon; a response to overcrowding, inadequate housing, and generally deleterious social conditions arising from the Industrial Revolution. The welfare-motivated leaders of the play movement in America were not primarily concerned about the needs of blacks and other nonwhite minority groups. The early propagation of play in urban areas was a consideration for the needs of white immigrant slum children* [1975: 44].

The specific interest in providing recreation opportunities for nonwhite minority groups was a consequence of World War I, which resulted in greater numbers of racial minorities migrating to the northern urban communities. For the first time blacks were brought into contact and competition with whites for employment, education, housing, and recreation. The expanding concern for race relations necessitated a change in the provision of public recreation service, resulting in a specialized attempt to meet the leisure needs of black citizens through the Bureau of Colored Work of the Playground Recreation Association of America (renamed in 1911), the major professional agency of the recreation and park movement. It provided consultation services aimed at assisting racially segregated community recreation programs until World War II. The prevailing separate but equal doctrine (a result of the *Plessy v. Ferguson* 1896 Supreme Court ruling), which dictated the nature of relations between blacks and whites, was also applicable to recreation during the first half of the twentieth century.

The influence of World War I and the War Camp Community Service was particularly important to the recreation and park movement, inasmuch as over 600 recreation programs were established in communities near military bases. For the first time in many parts of the country recreation activities were conducted for all family members and it was this broadening role of recreation in community life that led to an improved image, and the "Recreation for All" slogan became a symbolic concept as a consequence of wider and more representative recreation opportunities.

A fourth phase of development emerged during the 1930s and early 1940s as a

result of the Depression and enforced unemployment, impoverished conditions, and a surplus of free time. Recreation became recognized as a diversionary instrument of community life to help break the monotony of poverty. Because of the reduction in the workweek and the high unemployment, recreation received more attention during the Depression from the federal government. Carlson et al. (1972: 49-50) comment: "The resulting increased demand for recreation and decreased supply of opportunities available caused federal agencies to try to take up the slack, giving the recreation movement more impetus than it ever had before."

The Recreation Division of the World Progress Administration provided direct leadership and guidance in the offering of recreation activities in over 23,000 local communities during the 1930s. Other federal programs, including the National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, provided service to communities and outdoor areas by constructing various kinds of recreation facilities, including picnic grounds, camps, parks, trails, swimming pools, and playgrounds.

With the advent of America's involvement in World War II, the government renewed its emphasis on recreation. Several services, including the USO, American Red Cross, Army Special Services Division, the Welfare and Recreation Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Recreation Service of the Marine Corps, promoted programs on the battlefields, in hospitals, and in camps. The Federal Security Agency's Office of Community Service set up a new Recreation Division that assisted in the construction and operations of child-care centers and recreation buildings, of which several were taken over by cities as tax-supported recreation departments. Sessoms (1971: 435) comments on the influence of World War II and its impact accelerating the growth of comprehensive community recreation: "This movement toward comprehensive organized recreation was accelerated during World War II, when the need to get away from the tragedy of war increased the demand for activities of amusement and diversion for all groups."

During the 1950s and 1960s organized recreation's profile had a marked increase on community life, advanced by an increasing concern for physical fitness, programs for the ill, aged, and disabled, and an upsurge in outdoor recreation and park development, involvement in the arts, professional education, unification of the parks and recreation professional organizations, and the impact of civil unrest and youth dissent. During the 1960s two additional phases of the recreation and park movement developed simultaneously. First, the tumultuous period of the 1960s was marked by a period of civil unrest and social upheaval and this activity stimulated a return by organized community recreation agencies to issues of social concern. It was during the 1960s that community recreation agencies began to give special attention to the complex needs of the poor, disabled, and elderly—especially nonwhite individuals living in urban slum areas. It was only after several riots and civil disorders in many of the nation's cities that the needs of the inner-city residents were brought forcefully to the attention of the public. Many of the efforts initiated by municipal recreation departments were typically oriented to providing special summer crash, cooling off programs and were partially or totally subsidized by the former federal government agency, Office of Economic Opportunity.

During this time recreation and leisure service came to be seen as a *threshold* activity that drew participants to other forms of involvement for the purposes of improving community life, organizing neighborhoods for socially constructive activity, and an opportunity to actualize human potential through leisure expression. As a result of the social upheaval and the application of recreation services in local government and private agencies and as recognized by the Kerner Commission Report on

Civil Disorders, the delivery of leisure services came to be seen as an opportunity system to improve the quality of life, reduce social pathology, build constructive values in citizens, and generally make communities better places to live.

Second, there was an increase in outdoor recreation participation. It was precipitated through the expansion of state and federal provision for additional camping and water sports opportunities and the promotion of vacation travel. The development of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in 1958 served as a catalyst to this phase of the Recreation and Park Movement in the 1960s. The establishment of the now defunct Land and Water Conservation Fund and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (later known as Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service) spurred increased federal support for conservation and open-space development. State planning and accelerated municipal land acquisition programs were important elements during this period. The outdoor recreation phase later merged with the environmental movement at the beginning of the 1970s to widen the scope of understanding and sensitivity of the natural world and its contribution to society.

A human development phase emerged at the onset of the 1970s. This period has been characterized by a concern for the individual and a focusing by the human service agencies to respond to a person's total needs. Essentially, a new social character emerged, one in which an individual, whether that person be able-bodied or disabled, old or young, male or female, or white or nonwhite, could grow and develop throughout the life span. New avenues were paved during the 1970s with landmark legislation providing the disabled with similar civil rights won by blacks a decade before. Women, older persons, and working-class individuals progressed via social legislation and efforts from all sectors of society to less fractionalization in their lives. By the end of the decade there were various efforts by individuals and groups to integrate all of their lives. Such a holistic view of life appears to be on the threshold of becoming a more stable, enduring pattern reflective of community life in the 1980s.

THE MEANING OF LEISURE

Leisure has emerged as an important social science discipline and as an integral component of everyday life. The focus on leisure is evidenced by increased labor efforts to realign the workweek and intersperse work careers with more personal autonomy; by greater expenditure of public dollars, especially for entertainment of all kinds, fitness, and personal growth commodities and experiences, travel, and tourism; and by the emergence of non-WASP members of society as active participants in work and nonwork activities.

Defining Leisure

The basis of defining leisure in the first three decades of the twentieth century relied on analyses of total participation and expenditures of participants engaged in leisure pursuits. Later most studies examined socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of participants. These studies underscored the importance of social aggregate variables—age, gender, income, education, and occupation—as the most important factors influencing leisure activity choice. The influence of social aggregate variables still exists but they have less apparent effect on leisure choices now because various forms of social participation in community life, reflective of these social in-



SOURCE: James F. Murphy, *Concepts of Leisure*, 2nd ed., © 1981, p. 123. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

FIGURE 26.1 A Conceptual Typology of Leisure

dexes, are being altered. While American society is still heavily dominated by white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant males, social change sparked by egalitarian Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s and 1960s, the New Frontier and Great Society legislation engineered by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson respectively, and increased public consciousness and social participation by women, racial minority groups, disabled persons, older adults, and gay people has resulted in a growing equalization of leisure expression and opportunity for all individuals in society. Social change in community life has prompted the development of several conceptualizations and resulting analyses of leisure relating to one's personality, attitudes, behavior, life style, and personal goals.

Traditional View of Leisure

The most common definition of leisure has been the discretionary time concept or view of leisure as free time, and unobligated activity set apart from work, as depicted on the left-land side of Figure 26.1 (Murphy, 1981: 123). This view of leisure as free time (time that is left over after all the essential requirements of existence and subsistence have been fulfilled) is peculiarly limited to industrial societies. This single-factor theory of leisure, based on the premise that one's occupation stems from the organization of work, has largely been accepted as the main factor determining all other aspects of everyday life in the twentieth century, including leisure.

Leisure as Function

In addition to having temporal characteristics, leisure is viewed as serving various functions (see center of Figure 26.1). In this sense, leisure has at least three perspectives: behavioral, psychological, and social.

In a behavioral context, leisure can be viewed as nonwork behavior people engage in during their free time. Such leisure behavior is recognized as an expression of the individual's total self, where one's cognitive, affective, and motor domains are potentially engaged. To French sociologist Joffre Dumazedier:

> *Leisure is activity—apart from the obligations of work, family and society—to which the individual turns at will, for either relaxation, diversion, or broadening his individual and his spontaneous social participation, the free exercise of his creative capacity* [*1967: 16-17*].

The psychology of leisure refers to enjoyment of an activity for its own sake. Leisure in this sense means that leisure is a state of mind or being. The psychological perspective of leisure places the emphasis of leisure participation on personal fulfillment and self-development rather than on the number of activities engaged or frequency of participation. The psychological perspective analyzes leisure activities according to the needs they satisfy. Therefore, leisure activity choices become a reflection of the personality.

Leisure is also viewed as a means of establishing and sustaining intragroup solidarity. The leisure milieu helps shape and control leisure behavior. Taste, according to Cheek and Burch (1976: 124-149), becomes a primary shaper of the social group, and lifestyle tastes (preferences exercised in response to felt normative pressures) arise from small social groups based on kinship and friendship. Individuals tend to belong to a number of social circles consisting of people who share common interests. While taste provides social boundaries, social circles are permeable. That is, they can also cut across geographic, ethnic, and social class differences where individuals hold a common interest.

A substantial body of leisure research has focused on the identification of socioeconomic and demographic factors (age, gender, education, occupation, income, social class, race, etc.) associated with leisure participation, and on whether the identified factors are useful for predicting leisure behavior. These studies have either found or imply that socioeconomic differences exist between the diverse groups of leisure participants; therefore, socioeconomic variables are worthwhile predictors of participation by activity clusters.

Environmental Perspectives of Leisure

The physical environment affects where people engage in leisure activity and contributes to the way in which people participate and react in such settings (see right-hand portion of Figure 26.1). Social groups view the environment from symbolic, ritualistic, or functional points of view. Leisure locales, places where people engage in nonwork behavior (including amusement parks, scout camps, zoos, shopping centers, museums, theaters, and school playgrounds) provide unique experiences for people, and they provide the sustenance for reaffirming one's identity.

Holism and Leisure

The holistic view of leisure serves as an integrative, synthesizing theoretical perspective in which elements of leisure are expressed in all aspects of human behavior—work, play, education, religion, and other social spheres. A holistic view suggests that leisure is a multifaceted, dynamic phenomenon inherent in each individual and

subject to circumstances, conditions, and functions that result in various meanings and expressions.

Levy (1978: 186) offers an eclectic conceptual paradigm for the study of leisure. His model recognizes the principle of multiple determinants of behavior. It may be inferred from Levy's model that play (leisure) behavior is determined by the interaction of the person and the environment and it also provides a perspective for the interdisciplinary study of human leisure behavior.

Leisure, according to Levy, is seen as the complementary relationship between effort (output) and relaxation (input) at all levels of human biology and psychology. It is suggested by Levy that when work (effort) and leisure (relaxation) take this form, the traditional dichotomy of work and leisure, each of them being subordinate to the other, is removed.

PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY LIFE

Community life in America, particularly in urban centers, has become disintegrating for a growing number of people. The relationship between family, education, leisure, and work has become increasingly fractionalized and disjointed. While transience has become a by-product of a highly technological society and reflects a self-selected lifestyle preference for change adopted by a mobile population, this new migratory lifestyle represents a low degree of community involvement and small numbers of intimate friends. This mobile pattern (roughly a third of all families move every three years) also suggests a new sense of community life based on a greater degree of individual flexibility, vocational choice and selectivity, and leisure options.

People are apparently seeking a new sense of community transcending kinship ties, geography, and social distance barriers. The traditional social web of relationships once embedded in the context of the family has been replaced by a wider community network based on *mutual compatibility* and *shared interests.*

In the future community, life may actually become centered around people's common leisure interests and lifestyle preferences, meaning that such communities will be distinguished not so much by family composition, ethnicity, or geographical orientation, but rather reflect distinctive lifestyles, including social relationships, environments, dress, and mores emanating from avocational interests. Participation in these communities will be voluntary and will continue as long as the member is motivated to participate in the community, and will terminate when that person is not. Thus, recreation and leisure service conceivably could become the locus of community life and may well serve as the prime generator of values and the nucleus for communication, participation, and involvement.

Community leisure styles of life are seen occurring as a result of the fragmentation of human associations as reflected by (1) the growing secondary nature of work, as represented by the growth of the four-day work week, increased absenteeism and worker dissatisfaction, rise in national "leisure" holidays having no particular symbolic significance, earlier retirements, and the rise in craft vocations that seemingly integrate work and leisure; (2) disengagement of nuclear family and traditional kinship groups, represented by a number of experimental living arrangements and nonmarried couples living together, and the development of specialty villages, including communities for singles, young marrieds, and retired people; and (3) disruption of neighborhood life, represented by over one-quarter of America's workers crossing county lines to go to work and the transience resulting from approximately 40 million people moving each year.

Essentially, leisure lifestyles, as opposed to work or kinship associations and ties, are emerging as the framework for community participation by people who are seeking to preserve individual identity and integrity in the midst of a highly mobile and fractionalized society, which is occurring as a result of an unprecedented exponentially changing social, cultural, political, and economic environment. There is a need to develop such institutions on a human scale that will permit the individual to identify with others of similar orientation on a more relaxed, less hectic basis.

The segmentation of human relationships in contemporary urban society in particular has posed some unique problems and challenges for human service organizations. Urban dwellers are increasingly dependent upon more people for the satisfaction of their life needs than are rural residents, and are thus associated with a greater number of organized groups. However, people living in urban areas are less dependent upon particular persons, and their dependence upon others is confined to a highly fractionalized aspect of the other's day-to-day activities. City life is thus characterized by secondary rather than primary contacts, and while they indeed may be face to face, they are nevertheless often impersonal, superficial, transitory, and segmental.

A significant percentage of the American population moves each year, as previously noted. Packard (1972) noted that mobility is a chief phenomenon of our society, resulting in the fragmentation of families, individual disengagement from commitment to social causes, loneliness, and suffering. The relative high rate of disengagement of people from geographical locations disrupts homes, neighborhoods, industries and businesses, and community life. People residing in close proximity are nonetheless strangers to each other. This has implications for recreation and leisure service agencies. where our acquaintances tend to stand only in a relationship of utility to us.

The segmental character and utilitarian accent of interpersonal relations in the city have resulted in the proliferation of specialized tasks occurring within an institutional framework to handle the needs of people. The family has been altered considerably as a unit of social life, and individual members have been emancipated from the larger kinship group characteristic of the nuclear family to pursue their own diverging interests in their work, educational, religious, recreation, and political life. The functions of various community services related to health, and methods of alleviating hardships associated with personal and social security, to provisions for education, recreation, and cultural enhancement and expression have given rise to highly specialized institutions and agencies on a community-wide and even national basis. Because of the relative impotence of the individual in contemporary urban life, the city dweller particularly finds himself or herself being exhorted to join with others of similar interest into organized groups to meet personal needs. In this sense many recreation and leisure service agencies provide a means for creative self-expression and spontaneous group association unavailable within the family milieu.

STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LEISURE SERVICES

Events occurring in community life since 1960 have signaled an end to passive professional roles in human service organizations. Citizens have begun to take an active stance themselves in demanding more control over their own lives and wanting a chance to direct the destiny of the communities in which they live. Organizations that merely fill demand without providing insight into the altered and depressed state

of the economy and its dramatic impact on ways of life are not seen as reliable stewards of the quality of life by community residents.

Leisure service, if it is to be of significance in the years ahead, will have to become more fundamentally involved in the total fabric of community life. If park and recreation agencies continue to isolate play and recreation from the rest of a person's life, they discourage or ignore people who desire relief from boredom and ways of coping with stress, if they do not teach skills for improving the likability of their neighborhoods, and/or facilitate opportunities for self-expression in myriad activities that promote human development, they will become expendable and irrelevant to community life.

Recreation and leisure agencies will need to become more active in promoting human development and incorporating a full range of professional roles along a service delivery continuum that ranges from direct service to broker/information-referral and from enabler to advocate. All of these roles are legitimate and serve to increase the integrity of the professional recreator who exists within the community often as the closest human service worker with access to people. Without a broadening of service delivery, parks and recreation will cease to be viable in urban communities.

We live in a pluralistic society, meaning that there are a variety of ways of life that represent personal interest emphases for defining lifestyle rather than a national cultural interpretation. In this sense, individual identity is linked through leisure expression to subcultural identity.

ORGANIZING LEISURE SERVICE DELIVERY— THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY WORKER

It is important to recognize and utilize the full continuum of leisure services in meeting the needs of community members. Essentially, there are four major approaches to leisure service delivery.

Direct Provider

Leisure service personnel select, plan, and organize recreation activities for people. This approach is characterized by a centralized agency-determined profile to the delivery of programs and services. A ready-made array of leisure opportunities are preassembled by professional staff and offered to participants to pick and choose, cafeteria style, from the vast assortment of possibilities made available to them (Murphy and Howard, 1977).

In the direct service approach a minimum amount of input into the formulation and conduct of programs is required from service recipients. Such an approach can create a dependence on the consumer since it is largely facility oriented and assumes that citizens will somehow have the means and ability to attend the activities offered on their own accord.

Information-Referral/Broker

This important delivery approach incorporates the use of coordination, referral, and technical assistance. This expanded orientation may entail the cosponsorship of programs with other agencies such as the YMCA or the school district, the initiation of a leisure opportunity referral system, and the offering of technical and consultative

services to community groups. The adoption of the information-referral role is a recognition that no one agency can meet all the leisure needs of a community.

Enabler

The enabler role incorporates a facilitation process of professional personnel providing guidance to individuals to allow them to make self-directed choices and to gradually transfer (where possible) full responsibility for leisure planning and programming from professional to participant. Murphy and Howard explain.

> *By adopting the facilitative approach, the recreation agency transcends a preoccupation with the development of its own programs to emphasize providing services which enable individuals and other organizations to expand and improve their own leisure opportunities. In doing so, the recreation agency makes great progress toward increasing the leisure self-sufficiency of its clientele as well as maximizing the limited resources it has at its disposal* [1977: 75].

Another important and growing attribute of the facilitator role is leisure education. All leisure personnel are viewed in this context as working to improve the community's attitudes, knowledge, skills, and awareness of community resources for actualizing leisure interests and meeting personal needs. Therefore, a professional community leisure service worker recognizes that there are conditions and barriers affecting one's ability to meet certain leisure interests and that by taking on a preventative and educational service role, recreation becomes a more viable option for individuals.

Advocacy

This role, increasingly utilized by leisure service personnel, is characterized by an intervention approach in community social processes designed to change current conditions, status, level of service, or existing laws to enable individuals to realize more personal freedom of expression. This role initially involved professional personnel directly representing the interests of alienated, deviant, or disadvantaged groups. The right to personal fulfillment is dependent upon having the available means to participate, a feeling of self-worth to provide necessary impetus and sense of free will to engage in personally satisfying experiences, and a leisure opportunity system that responds to the whole person.

These professional roles represent two types of services—*direct* and *indirect*. The direct service program role, which utilizes the social planning model of community organization, suggests that community leisure personnel use their

> *professional training and knowledge to diagnose the needs of the environment and to intervene in order to provide services. The second type of service (indirect) is based on the application of the locality development model of community organization. The role of the programmer in this strategy is to enable or encourage the participant to assert his or her own skills in the initiation of programs and services that he or she feels will meet his or her needs* [Edgington et al, 1980: 69].

This latter approach is designed to encourage self-help through collaboration between the leisure service professional and the community resident.

Operationally, the previously discussed professional roles can be implemented based upon the most suitable fit or appropriate circumstances existing in a given

community. While no empirical studies exist per se, it appears that the use of all of these professional roles by a leisure service agency is more likely to result in an effective match of participant leisure needs and interests and professional expertise.

An example of a leisure service agency employing all of the professional leisure service roles is exemplified by the Westchester County Singles Council program. was determined in 1978 that the leisure needs of single residents (representing close to 19 percent of Westchester's population) were being overlooked. It was recognized that while some direct services were being provided individuals, Westchester County could expand its approach to promote support services, develop a central information service, and establish a council to assist existing singles groups to improve their activities and make information available to a larger segment of the single population (Parks and Recreation, 1982: 17).

Recent tax-cutting initiatives across the country have greatly reduced local government revenues and have severely hampered public community recreation agencies from responding with as full and complete direct service programs as in ... However, many community park and recreation agencies did not develop public support to withstand local and federal government cutbacks. This was because those agencies have often related poorly with the public and have not fully interpreted their role" (Krichbaum, 1982: 9).

In an effort to offset the effects of serious budget reductions in Detroit's park and recreation programs, and to increase public understanding of the diversity and importance of recreation and leisure services provided by the city, the Detroit Department Parks and Recreation established the Partner's Program. Much like the Singles Council program in Westchester County, New York, the Partner's Program represents an effort to expand the service delivery continuum and respond more fully to Detroit's diverse constituency. The Partner's Program has three major components:

> *(1) an outreach effort to community groups and individuals who may want to donate to a particular park or center; (2) solicitations of foundations for grants of all sizes that enhance the ability of the department to provide services; and (3) a corporate gifts program which provides tax deductible contribution for businesses that want to fulfill a civic responsibility* [*Krichbaum, 1982: 9*].

Several other communities, representing both public and private agencies, are incorporating similar programs to make their operations more viable. While ... nity agencies have taken the brunt of apparent citizen complaints and absorbed a disproportionate share of government cutbacks, the actual criticism seems more accurately directed toward *how* government services are delivered. The director of Detroit's Recreation Department comments:

> *Citizens are tired of getting an impolite or disinterested response to a suggestion; people are annoyed when they are shuttled from one office to another without finding the correct person to listen to their complaints; citizens are angry at government employees who are paid adequate wages and give indifferent service. Many citizens want economy and a closer tie to government rather than a full-scale reduction in government service* [*Krichbaum, 1982: 10*].

By acting as direct service workers, enablers, information-referral coordinators and advocates, leisure service personnel extend the service delivery continuum and make more relevant leisure expression within a wider network to prospective participants. By utilizing all possible service delivery approaches interchangeably as cha

ing circumstances and conditions dictate, recreators assume responsibility for understanding the impact and relationship of their decisions on the community as a whole.

ECOLOGY OF LEISURE SERVICE

The relationship of the various factors that contribute to community life can best be understood in an ecological framework. The leisure service worker has assumed a more comprehensive and flexible role in the past two decades and this is partially attributed to the ecological model utilized by many community agencies. The model mandates that agencies accept a responsibility to the whole person, and this can best be fulfilled by the worker recognizing the interrelationships that exist between people and their physical and social environment, and the way these relationships influence, or are influenced by various social and organizational processes. The elements of the delivery system—the physical environment, social environment, community members, and the leisure service delivery organization—must be viewed in a holistic manner. Murphy et al. (1973: 1) comment:

> *It is holisitic in the sense that any change in the population being served will affect the nature of programming and vice versa. Each component is an integral part of the overall delivery system and each influences another segment of the unit. All the elements mutually modify one another.*

The various elements of the delivery system are outlined in Table 26.1 and a general overview of each component suggests the dynamics and range of concern, influence, and impact that the provision of recreation opportunity has in contemporary society. Each subsystem of the leisure delivery system can initially be viewed separately as each has a separate set of objectives and its own processes, but requires a corollary understanding of the relationships of each component of the delivery system.

Participants

The provision of recreation opportunities will yield a variety of individual behavioral response patterns. A community recreation program must be expected to meet

TABLE 26.1 Components (Ecology Design) of the Leisure Service Delivery System

Social Components	*Physical Components*	*Participant Components*	*Agency Components*
Ethnicity	Climate	Human needs	Goals
Cultural heritage	Transportation system	Motivation	Objectives
Social class	Topography	Individual self-concept	Philosophy
Race	Business and industry	Age	Organizational structure
Family	Schools	Sex	Leadership
Mores/folkways	Churches	Experience	Recreation areas and facilities
Religion	Environmental quality	Attitudes	
Health	Population density/ crowdedness	Interests	Open space
Sanitation		Desires	Locality
Education		Goals	Priorities
Allied humor		Competencies	Financial support and distribution
Service resources		Capabilities	
Justice/courts			Equipment

SOURCE: Murphy and Howard (1977: 21).

a wide range and a completely interrelated diversity of individual differences occurring in the recreation setting. As indicated earlier in the chapter, the recreation experience is influenced by a number of interrelated social, psychological, and physical factors. Individual considerations such as position in the life cycle, interests, motivation, needs, and personality influence recreation behavior.

Social Environment

Community life also represents various social elements contributing to the livability of an area—housing, occupation, transportation, sanitation, distribution of income, education, race, religion, and social class. The differential impact of these social aspects will result in varied conditioning circumstances for members of the community. To a large extent leisure choices, preferences, and forms of ethnic, class, sex, age, and racial expression have been significantly influenced, even dictated, by the dominant society.

Jensen comments on the distinctions in the values of social and ethnic classes, for example, that account for many of the differences affecting program opportunity among community members.

> *For example, the amount of income available to a family is a primary determinant of ability to buy services. A higher income is indicative of discretionary income and can be interpreted to reflect the availability of private transportation, participation in programs which require fees, and the availability of individuals who have uncommitted time and are willing to serve as volunteers. The income level is also considered an index of educational achievement. The higher the educational level, the greater the number of recreational experiences these persons have had, and the more mobility there is of these individuals wishing to pursue them further. In contrast, low income areas are generally related to high density population areas, limited space for recreation, fewer personal cars, and limited education. The limited education of persons in low income areas, therefore, can mean that the opportunity to participate in recreational activities is restricted to recreational sites within walking distance. The service radius in a low income area is generally less than the service radius in higher income neighborhoods. Socioeconomic data are important to the direction, intensity, and quality of recreation and park goals and objectives. For example, substantial increase in the number of families receiving welfare payments, correlated with rapidly deteriorating housing, are indicators to alert officials of a potential trouble spot in the community. Park and recreation departments should react to such implicit dangers by goal reformation to maximize services to this sector of the community at little or no cost to the participants. It would be well to consider these new goals as possessing a high priority for capital improvement projects [Jensen, 1972: 23].*

Physical Environment

The provision and quality of and accessibility to open space, park lands, and recreation areas and facilities no doubt have an influence on their use by various segments of the population. The environment, reflective of places and settings where recreation behavior occurs, contributes an important element to a holistic configuration of leisure that "may be best understood in terms of meanings assigned to them by particular sociocultural groups" (Cheek et al., 1976: 31). Further, it is noted by Cheek et al. (1976: 32) that the "physical environment is important for maintaining orderly relationships because it serves as a repository of meanings for symbolizing relationships and also provides a spatial field in which social life can be organized."

Environmental settings or physical places can be identified by particular qualitative characteristics relating to particular symbolic, ritualistic, and/or functional meanings by various social groups. Cheek and Burch (1976: 156) have developed a taxonomy of *leisure locales,* each with its own particular social value, design, and structural features and constraints.[1] The leisure locale provides experiences that are typically unique and emotion-filled, and set apart occasions differing from other work instrumental aspects of our daily routine.

Additionally, the physical environment also represents topography, transportation patterns, residential, industry, and open-space arrangements. Each has several characteristics influencing the manner in which people exhibit recreation behavior. Some individuals may be deterred from participating because of distance, physical barriers or obstructions to access, and/or nature of the layout and design of areas and facilities that foster certain forms of expression.

Leisure Service Agencies

The provision of community recreation opportunities is activated and coordinated by commercial, private, and public organizations. Collectively, they comprise the



SOURCE: J. F. Murphy and D. R. Howard, *Delivery of Community Leisure Services* (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger), p. 134. © 1977 by Lea and Febiger. Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 26.2 Community Recreation System

community recreation and leisure system (Murphy and Howard, 1977: 134) as depicted in Figure 26.2. Leisure service agencies, then, exist to provide opportunities for people, individually and collectively, to engage in leisure behavior in order that certain personal and/or social goals can be satisfied.

Agencies structure opportunities which elicit various kinds of recreation behavior through the manipulation of the human and physical environments that are a part of their organization and operation. While all three types of community leisure service organizations (see Table 26.2) are involved in the provision of formal, organized leisure activities, each is sufficiently different from the other with respect to philosophy, objectives, and financing to allow for their independent classification (Murphy and Howard, 1977: 132-133).

The provision of park and recreation services in community settings is primarily the responsibility of local government. Traditionally, the primary role of state and federal government is to provide technical and financial assistance in support of local community recreation.

The responsibilities of community recreation and leisure service agencies fall under three major headings, according to Kraus (1978: 246):

(1) *Direct Provision of Recreation Opportunities.* Municipal departments acquire, develop, and maintain facilities needed for recreational participation, and provide skilled leadership to meet the needs of various age groups and individuals within the community.
(2) *Coordination of Other Programs.* They provide in-service training and advisory services for other private, voluntary, or therapeutic agencies in the community, and help them coordinate their efforts to avoid duplication and overlap.
(3) *Cooperate with Other Governmental Agencies.* They work closely with other branches of local government, and with federal, state, and county authorities to develop long-range planning, effective programs of land acquisition, and, when feasible, joint programs of direct service.

The power to establish local government recreation and leisure service programs is generally granted to municipal governments by constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions granted by the state legislature. This is known as "enabling legislation." It authorizes municipal governments to acquire, develop, operate facilities, and provide programs under leadership. Enabling legislation varies from state to state. It is permissive and not mandatory, allowing local communities to establish recreation and leisure programs, but it does not compel them to do so. Enabling laws range from rather simple authorizations to fully detailed codes. Additionally, state park and recreation agencies assist local governments in a number of ways, including providing consultants, conducting research studies, and promoting the work of recreation and leisure service agencies in local community settings.

While many states provide excellent consultant, research, and informational services to local governments in addition to vast networks of parks and outdoor recreation resources, it is becoming clear that state governments must expand their services. The problems of urban unrest and pollution, for example, are becoming increasingly unmanageable. These and other problems must be approached on a statewide or regional basis. The state could serve more as an enabler and function as a link between federal and local governments.

The federal government's role in community leisure milieus has been minimal in relation to direct service provisions. The federal emphasis has been primarily devoted to the development of outdoor recreation resources and facilities. This is represented by thousands of acres of land managed by the National Park Service, Forest

TABLE 26.2 Comparison and Contrast Study of Public, Private (Voluntary Agencies), and Commercial Recreation

	Philosophy of Recreation
Public	Enrichment of the life of the total community by providing opportunities for the worthy use of leisure. Nonprofit in nature.
Private	Enrichment of the life of participating members by offering opportunities for worthy use of leisure, frequently with emphasis on the group and the individual. Nonprofit in nature.
Commercial	Attempt to satisfy public demands in an effort to produce profit. Dollars from, as well as for, recreation.
	Objectives of Recreation
Public	To provide leisure opportunities which contribute to the social, physical, educational, cultural, and general well-being of the community and its people.
Private	Similar to public, but limited by membership, race, religion, age, and the like. To provide opportunities for close group association with emphasis on citizenship, behavior, and life philosophy values. To provide activities that appeal to members.
Commercial	To provide activities or programs which will appeal to customers. To meet competition. To net profit. To serve the public.
	Administrative Organization
Public	Governmental agencies (federal, state, county, and local).
Private	Boy Scouts, settlements, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, "Y" organizations, and others.
Commercial	Corporations, syndicates, partnerships, private ownerships. Examples: motion picture, television, and radio companies, resorts, bowling centers, skating rinks.
	Finance
Public	Primarily by taxes. Also by gifts, grants, trust funds, small charges, and fees to defray cost.
Private	By gifts, grants, endowments, donations, drives, and membership fees.
Commercial	By the owner or promoters. By the users: admission and charges.
	Facilities
Public	Community buildings, parks (national, state, local), athletic fields, playgrounds, playfields, stadiums, camps, beaches, museums, zoos, golf courses, school facilities, etc.
Private	Settlement houses, youth centers, churches, play areas, clubs, camps, and others.
Commercial	Theaters, clubs, taverns, night clubs, lounges, race tracks, bowling lanes, stadiums, and others.
	Leadership
Public	Professionally prepared to provide extensive recreation programs for large numbers of people. Frequently subject to Civil Service regulations. Volunteers as well as professionals. College training facilities growing.
Private	Professionally prepared to provide programs on a social group-work basis. Employed at discretion of managing agency. Volunteers as well as professionals.
Commercial	Frequently trained by employing agency. Employed to secure greatest financial returns. Employed and retained at the discretion of the employers. *No* volunteers.
	Program
Public	Designed to provide a wide variety of activities, year-round, for all groups, regardless of age, sex, race, creed, social or economic status.

TABLE 26.2 Continued

	Philosophy of Recreation
Private	Designed to provide programs of a specialized nature for groups and in keeping with the aims and objectives of the agency.
Commercial	Program designed to tap spending power in compliance with state and local laws.
	Membership
Public	Unlimited—open to all.
Private	Limited by organizational restrictions, such as age, sex, religion, and the like.
Commercial	Limited by: Law (local, state, and federal). Social conception regarding status and strata in some places. Economics—limited to those who have the price to pay.

SOURCE: Murphy and Howard (1977: 132-133).

Service, Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and so on. The federal government has made some effort to respond to the needs of urban residents with the development of recreation areas near the metropolitan centers of New York and San Francisco. However, federal funding has gone almost exclusively to the acquisition of property and the development of facilities—without concern for operation of programs. Kraus comments:

> *Typically, in many housing projects with playgrounds and community centers constructed with federal assistance, there are no funds for program operation; without federal aid, many economically depressed cities are unable to finance recreation programs* [*1978: 227*].

The role of the federal government has slackened considerably since the early 1980s as Washington politics have dictated a move away from block grant fiscal support to a new federalism approach negating a decade of community leisure program and facility assistance. Under new federalism, previously mandated and funded social, educational, and recreation programs are largely shifted to the states. While there is some appeal in returning control and operation of certain programs to state and local government, inadequate transfer of funds to local communities has resulted in local agencies losing to the transferred federal programs and other local activities in competition for the beleaguered pool of public funds.

The strategy in the near future for leisure service agencies to withstand the loss of federal government financial assistance would appear to require community agencies to employ a number of professional service methodologies, as outlined earlier in the chapter, and to become more self-supporting and intertwined within the network of public, private, and commercial sponsorship.

The leisure service delivery system is based on the agency's commitment to provide opportunities encouraging and facilitating selected kinds of recreation behavior; the specific nature of these behaviors depends upon the goals and objectives and delivery approach of the particular agency and the available human and physical resources.

RESPONDING TO THE WHOLE COMMUNITY

Most leisure service agencies, like other local and state government services, traditionally have operated under a centralized authority that has perpetuated a "chain-link fence" philosophy for the operation of recreation facilities. Gray (1968: 10) has suggested that the most deleterious effect of the chain-link fence delivery approach is on the deployment of staff. Such a philosophy holds that the primary concern of the professional staff is to operate the recreation facility, whether it be a community center, playground, softball field, or amusement park. It identifies the primary task of surveillance of grounds to assure compliance with rules, safety, proper use of facilities, and control of equipment; development of a schedule for use of the facility; planning and execution of a program of activities with the staff in face-to-face leadership roles; and coordination of maintenance activities to ensure the readiness and sanitary condition of the premises. Such a philosophy rewards *facility managers* and holds that what happens in the recreation facility is what matters.

In contrast to this view, there is a role concept for professional recreation and leisure service personnel that perceives them as community figures. This concept identifies the development of people, human interaction, the improvement of the community, the preservation of the virtues of community and family life and a concern for the social problems that affect the lives of people as central to their concerns. The chain-link fence concept has little or no relevance to the contemporary needs of urban America.

The key to a successful conversion from a chain-link fence approach to providing services is for community leisure agencies to develop a holistic operational philosophy in which the primary goals are to (1) interpret service in terms of human experiences and needs; (2) provide a sufficiently extensive and diverse delivery continuum that recognizes professional role versatility; and (3) utilize an ecological organization, planning, and program design involving the complex of social, physical, and individual considerations contributing to the make-up of community life. These goals recognize that the individual participant and potential consumer are an integral part of the leisure service organization. Additionally, recreation and leisure agencies, through a holistic perspective, become aware that leisure may occur at any time, any place, and exhibit a variety of social behaviors.

Leisure is an attitude, a lifestyle, an experience, a block of time, a constraint, a need, and serves as an occupation. It poses problems for people but it also serves as a way of life, a form of consciousness, a worker benefit, a political strategy, and a central life interest. To the degree that agencies educate people to realize that leisure can permeate all of a person's life and provide an opportunity for the realization of personal needs and enhance human development, leisure services will be deemed viable as an integral element of community life.

There have been important changes in the fabric of American life over the past half century. Some of these social changes have increased accessibility of non-WASP persons within community life and other demographic shifts have created a new compositional make-up of traditional statistical demographic staples, including the American family and other primary social networks influencing leisure participation. Following the publication of the 1980 census it was revealed that there are more single-parent households, more women heading households, and more unmarried couples living together. It has been determined that fewer and fewer households will have children present in the future and more people living alone because of unwillingness to marry, and because of old age, separation, and divorce.

Increasingly, there will be various forms of nontraditional households in a society consisting of an older, more mobile population. There has also been a gradual crease in the number and proportion of black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans in th population, coupled paradoxically with a recognition that, according to federal ant discrimination laws, a majority of Americans are in the minority—females, blacks Hispanics, Asians, American Indians, Eskimos, Vietnam-era veterans, disabled, anc individuals over 65.

The linear life cycle (education → work → leisure → retirement) ascribed to industrial-oriented society is being broken. For over a century a work rhythm of life has served as the basis upon which leisure analysis has been anchored. It has been assumed in the past that leisure behavior stems from work conditions and is a depen dent variable. The combined effect of altered work cycles and changed social roles within an altered demographic structure in American society necessitates a new con ceptual framework for leisure and other social institutions, including work, family, anc education.

It is suggested by the changing social context of community life that leisure mus be viewed within a total human experience perspective. Clearly such a holistic per spective broadens the basis of leisure expression. Leisure has become for some peo ple an important basis of their social definition. This phenomenon may actually resul in diminishing the overall focus of a national culture for purposes of promoting indi vidual lifestyle interests.

Leisure apparently has emerged as an important element of life that has less to do with work or a variety of unobligated activities occurring on a weekend or during the summer months but more with experiences fulfilling novel personal needs at any time. As a form of personal expression, condition of lifestyle choice, and influence in person's life situation throughout the lifespan, leisure has evolved into a construc that is less reflective of an individual's demographic or socioeconomic status. To be leisure reflects an optimal state of freedom, a state of being and dynamic aspect o societal participation traditionally available only to a few select social classes through out the ages. The leisure element of community life can best be served when it linked to the development of the whole person throughout the lifespan.

NOTE

1. For example, transitional (waiting lounge in airport), integrational (playground), bonding (zoo), solitary (museum), custodial (Golden Age club), exchange (singles' bar), and fantasy (circus).

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VI

TRAINING ISSUES AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS

Part VI consists of two unrelated chapters; they are grouped together simply as a function of being ending material.

Doyle, Wilcox, and Reppucci (Chapter 27) provide a thoughtful and thorough discussion of four different models for training social and community change agents. The four models result from the positing of two orthogonal dimensions. The first dimension is concerned with the type of change the agent is trained to implement—replication or innovation. The second dimension depends on whether change is planned or spontaneous. These models include what Doyle and his colleagues refer to as the artisan, technician, scientist, and artist. Each model is exemplified by describing a particular training program.

In the final chapter of this volume, Kenneth E. Boulding presents his "reflections on the uncertain future of social and community life." This chapter is written from an evolutionary-ecological perspective. Not surprisingly, it is chock full of intriguing observations and thoughts on a wide array of topics relevant to social and community life. They are far too rich and detailed to do justice to in any way other than reading them in their entirety. But in closing, let me reiterate Professor Boulding's final words.

> *Both persons and institutions matter, and most persons realize their personhood mainly through institutions. We should not despair then of government, of law, or of political institutions, for these are in many ways the "dominant species" of the social ecosystem. But we should never forget either that these are changed by persons, and persons means us.*

27

Training for Social and Community Change

John B. Doyle
Brian L. Wilcox
N. Dickon Reppucci

Change is a universal phenomenon. From the Big Bang to the Quantum Leap, evidence of a nonstatic universe abounds. Like galaxies and atoms, social systems frequently are passive beneficiaries (and victims) of change. Nevertheless the distinctive features of human society make social change unique. Our ability to think allows us to plan change; our advanced powers of communication enable us to teach others how to plan change. From earliest history, planned social interventions have helped the human species adapt to a hostile environment. However, as societies reach ever higher levels of complexity, threats from nature are increasingly compounded by human artifacts (the population explosion, environmental pollution, the possibility of nuclear war), while tradition gives way to disparate visions of a better world. In response, a wide variety of formal and informal training programs for social innovators have emerged.

Not all changes are innovations, however. Watzlawick et al. (1974: 10) present a distinction between a "first-order change," "one that occurs within a given system which itself remains unchanged," and a "second-order change," "one whose occurrence changes the system itself." All systems are dynamic; constant alterations in a system's state result from ongoing and stable processes occurring within the system and between the system and its environment. Intrasystemic change mechanisms comprise part of the system definition. For example, the description of a particular species of organism includes those subsystems that induce normal growth in the organism. These metabolic processes are classified as first-order change.

Second-order change is "change of change." It requires that the systemic change functions themselves undergo alteration. Literary examples abound of human beings whose metabolic subsystems are transformed, by some inexplicable second-order change, into those of a frog or a cockroach or a rhinoceros. Such metamorphoses, whether in fictional accounts or in intellectual assessments of real-world events, are almost invariably viewed as paradoxical, anomalous, almost mystical. Those rare individuals who actually bring about a second-order change seem to possess some inexplicable gift, a "foreknowledge" (Polanyi, 1958) or an "intuition"

AUTHORS' NOTE: *The authors wish to thank Roger Kobak, Rob Roberts, and Michael Blank for their helpful comments on drafts of this chapter.*

(Bergson, 1912) about existing problems and new ways of solving them. Our understanding of second-order change, in science or in society, is at best rudimentary. Nonetheless, systemic changes, when they can be achieved, frequently represent great pragmatic advantages for the system undergoing change, as well as theoretical advances for those who study such systems.

Like biological systems, social and community systems are dynamic, undergoing constant first-order changes in interpersonal relations, social exchanges, and channels of communication and transportation. Although interested in stable systemic processes, the social change agent usually seeks to alter such processes, that is, to induce second-order change in the system. Two general strategies are possible for the accomplishment of this goal: (1) to identify a beneficial second-order change in one setting and to recreate it in another, and (2) to create second-order change directly, without the benefit of prior manifestations to be emulated.

The literature on the topic of training for social and community intervention is at first sight overwhelming. Many articles have appeared (see, for example, Hornstein, 1973; Hutchinson et al., 1980; Shippee, 1979) that describe the educational philosophies and training methods of particular academic and nonacademic programs. In a few cases, entire books have been devoted to this topic (Havelock and Havelock, 1973; Iscoe et al., 1977). Any attempt to summarize this vast literature would be necessarily incomplete and ultimately unsatisfying, as it seems that there are as many taxonomies of training strategies as articles written on the subject.

Moreover, these taxonomies do not directly address what we perceive as the central paradox underlying the notion of training for social and community change. True innovation connotes an injection of novelty into a system, the creation of something totally unprecedented. Training, on the other hand, requires the existence of established and replicable means leading to a predictable result. When established change strategies fail to resolve an intractable problem or to bring about a desired goal, the trained change agent is likely to be trapped in a "game without end" (Watzlawick et al., 1967): every solution is doomed to failure, unless one changes the rules of the game.

By learning a particular set of social change strategies, the change agent learns how to win by the rules. Breaking free of a game without end demands what Bateson (1972: 293) calls "Learning III": "a corrective change in the system of *sets* of alternatives from which choice is made." Moreover, the greater flexibility in problem solving afforded by Learning III is gained only by forfeiting the stability and security of playing by the old rules. The interplay of destructive and reconstructive forces in creative thought and behavior has been variously described as "unfreezing" and "refreezing" (Lewin and Grabbe, 1945), "breaking frame" and "reframing" (Goffman, 1974), "accommodation" and "assimilation" (Piaget, 1977). Training in its usual sense seems more intent on reifying than on challenging a particular framework for thinking about and acting within the social system.

We contend that there are two general strategies for training in second-order social change. First, a consciously implemented second-order change depends on a change in the thought systems by which the implementer conceives of the social system, both as it is and as it might be altered. The problem of training for second-order social change thus becomes transformed into the problem of training for second-order cognitive change. A second distinct and equally viable strategy exists if, as we believe, many second-order changes emerge spontaneously within the social system, independently of conscious efforts to induce them. Training in this case should focus on developing ways to interact with and to influence these spontaneous societal forces without controlling or fully understanding them. Clearly, the term "training" must

carry a number of caveats when applied to such strategies. Perhaps it is best to cla: sify as training programs only those that replicate second-order social change. Prc grams that seek to produce true innovations may more accurately be described "educational" (Rappaport, 1978; Reppucci, 1981). Rappaport (1978: 3) illuminat this distinction between training and education:

> *Training implies that I have a set of very specific skills, for very specific problems, and it implies that given proper instruction these are transferable and will lead to precise performance and predictable outcomes. . . . Education, on the other hand . . . implies that what is transferable, given proper instruction, are not specific skills so much as non-specific competencies. Education enables one to think about a variety of problems in a variety of ways. Training suggests professionals, specialized and licensed. Education suggests inquiry, adaptability, and flexibility.*

Four training/educational models comprise the organizing structure of this chap ter. Together the four models fit into a factorial grid across two dimensions (see Figur 27.1): (a) the type of second-order change (replication or innovation) that change agent is trained to implement, and (b) whether the social change s views second-order change as resulting from conscious planning or from spc ous emergence. The models are:

The Artisan. Training for social change artisanship involves replication of second-order changes that have emerged spontaneously within the social system.

The Technician. The technical training process aims at replicating consciously planned changes.

The Scientist. The goal of scientific education for social change is consciously planned innovation.

The Artist. The artistically educated change agent strives to induce social innovation by influencing spontaneous systemic processes.



FIGURE 27.1 A Two-Dimensional Representation of Social Change Training Models

The plan of this chapter is to discuss these four models, following each with a case study. As with most such models, these four represent pure types that are rarely found in nature. Two competing forces seem to be acting simultaneously within any given training/educational program. On the one hand, the impetus toward self-consistency in theory and practice pulls the program into a self-contained system of true believers. "Training for social and community change" becomes what Hofstadter (1979) calls a "strange loop," a statement that refers to itself. Training is a part of the social change process; process and content of training merge inseparably. For example, leaders of "T-groups" are usually trained through participation in T-groups, wherein the focal issue is the method of leading T-groups (Schein and Bennis, 1965). On the other hand, awareness of the inadequacies of the change agentry system invariably arises, either from within the system or through interaction with different ideas and practices in the social environment. The interplay of cohesive and dissipative forces produces a dynamic equilibrium in each program. In other words, we view social change training/educational programs as dynamic systems, constantly undergoing first-order change, but containing within them dissipative forces that could lead to second-order change.

MODELS OF TRAINING

The Artisan

An artisan shapes useful artifacts. Skilled in manipulating the tools of a particular trade and attuned to the demands of the paying public, the artisan engages more in replication than in innovation. Artisanship is an essentially conservative enterprise, built on a long tradition of what works, what looks good, and what sells. By observing society's responses to new forms of pottery, or furniture, or musical instruments, the artisan decides whether an innovation has achieved sufficient popular acceptance to warrant a change in his or her craftsmanship. The artisan does not create second-order change; he or she recreates it.

For the artisan, apprenticeship is the *sine qua non* of the training process. Rather than building on a formal framework of knowledge and theory, artisanship skills demand an intuitive "feel" for a craft. Through observation of and interaction with an accomplished artisan, the trainee acquires the lore of the craft and an initial grasp of the requisite skills. Supervised practice allows the apprentice to develop a journeyman's competence in applying the learned techniques to particular tasks. More formal didactic methods may be employed; however, the information presented is typically a compilation and categorization of those traditions and skills already known tacitly by the master craftsperson. The apprentice may begin to exhibit a personal style, but it is not explicitly promoted in the training process. Style is a luxury, something nice to have if not too outlandish, but certainly not essential.

Certain traditions in training for social change (see, for example, Alinsky, 1971) demonstrate close affinity with the artisanship model. Labor union organizers, community developers, political ward bosses, merchants, religious proselytizers—change agents with widely divergent orientations may be classified as craftspersons of a sort. Tradition more than innovation forms the content of an informal training program, in which social, promotional, and organizational skills are transmitted to the novice via apprenticeship and "hands-on" experience. Likewise, the process of train-

ing is itself a craft. The trainer teaches others as he or she was taught—informally experientially, pragmatically.

Social change artisans do not strive to invent new varieties of change. Their ideol ogies and methods may have been explicitly created by a past innovator (such as religious or political figure) who becomes revered as the founder of a movemen Alternatively, social change and training innovations may have evolved indepen dently of conscious planning or effort to produce them (for example, the "sit-dow strike" as a means of protest). In either event, artisans typically utilize training an change strategies that they did not invent.

Within the academic community, training of social change agents is a more sy tematic venture than the purely skills-oriented, traditional apprenticeship approac "Professional schools," from which vast numbers of business, legal, political, milita religious, and social work specialists are graduated each year, have radically rec fined traditional crafts into formalized and legitimized professions. Training in rates in varying proportions a substantial body of theory and an array of te skills deemed appropriate for the particular social change strategies acknowlec valid by the profession.

Nonetheless, such training models still rely largely on what Veblen (1919) large body of worldly wisdom" derived from precedent and prescriptive a "The higher reaches of generalization in these pragmatic inquiries are of the deductions from authentic tradition" (Veblen, 1919: 20). Information is judged wo thy of transmission to the trainee based on its proven utility in accomplishing prede termined goals, rather than its basis in theory or science.

In the law, for instance, many judicial decisions are rendered solely on the basis precedent. Further, precedent-setting cases are decided through the ad cess rather than by means of theoretical or scientific considerations. Ir precedent, the judge's reason for a decision is often of less significance t sion per se, a practice known as "the doctrine of the dictum." Consequently, the student is taught the traditions of the profession: case law for precedent perpetuat and adversarial persuasion for precedent setting.

Many academic programs in applied social science refer to their training strategy the "scientist-practitioner model." Similar to the medical school approach, the train program exposes the student to the basic theories, knowledge, and methodologies c science (such as psychology or sociology), then attempts to translate science into appl cation. The goal is synthesis: an attempt "to break down the distinctions among train ing, application or practice, and research" (Hutchinson et al., 1980: 241).

Despite protestations to the contrary, closer inspection of the actual component of the training format suggests that the hyphen in the "scientist-practitioner" moc stands for a sizable gap between two different sets of skills. Scientific training c tutes part of the educational package. However, practitioner skills generally de an artisanship approach to training. At minimum, learning to be a practitior quires the student to participate in supervised practicum-internship experiences. Un der the guidance of an accomplished professional, the trainee learns the "tricks of th trade" by direct tutelage, by trial-and-error experience in the real world, and by th role-modeling and feedback provided by the supervisor. Parallels with the appren ticeship model are obvious.

The skills imparted to the practitioner are pragmatic ones, proven effective in ap plication. Some programs, such as the Social Psychology of Change seminar at Co-lumbia Teachers College (Hornstein, 1973), develop their curricula by explicitly eval-uating persuasion and organization techniques employed by community organizers,

television producers, and the like. Utilitarian concerns are paramount; students attempt to identify and to learn those strategies that make change agents successful. "In this seminar it is assumed that guiding these successes is an artisan's intuitive, implicit understanding of the social and psychological principles underlying their approach to social innovation" (Hornstein, 1973: 92).

Case Study: ACORN

ACORN is an acronym for the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now. An offshoot of the antipoverty activist movement of the 1960s, ACORN was founded in Little Rock, Arkansas, by a welfare rights organizer from Massachusetts. Since its beginning in 1970, it has grown into a national network of neighborhood organizations, with over 40,000 dues-paying members in twenty-three states (Craig and Diebolt, 1981). Activities have expanded from welfare concerns to organizing blue-collar and middle-income neighborhoods around issues such as utility rates, housing, and tax reform.

While each of ACORN's affiliated organizations is locally based and financed, the community organizers in ACORN are professionals, transferred into a neighborhood on assignment by the "home office." The "outside agitator" label is thus an appropriate one when applied to ACORN organizers. The trained change agent moves into a new neighborhood with the express purpose of identifying and magnifying local concerns, around which a grassroots movement can be built.

ACORN recruits its staff members at its local organizations or through community organizers' information sources such as the monthly *Community Jobs* newspaper, published in Washington, D.C. Pay is minimal—usually under $5,000 per year to start—and a one-year minimum commitment is required in such places as inner-city Detroit. The new trainee is typically young, well educated, middle class, and idealistic. Turnover, as might be expected, is high.

Training occurs primarily via apprenticeship to an experienced organizer. The new recruit is immediately immersed in an ongoing neighborhood organization project, learning by guided experience the skills of the trade: planning, developing grassroots leadership, "door knocking," communicating, organizing. Most of these skills have been handed down as ACORN tradition, which in turn developed from methods acquired by the founders in other activist groups. After training is completed, the ACORN staff member is assigned to another neighborhood as a professional organizer.

Initial and ongoing training is supplemented by more formal teaching tools and methods. The Institute for Social Justice, a subsidiary of ACORN, has developed a set of seminars and publications useful in teaching particular organizer skills. Though based partly in radical political theory, the Institute's materials are primarily compilations of tried-and-true methods learned in practice by ACORN organizers. By means of these "how-to" materials, the Institute offers (for a fee) training in organizing skills to church workers, lawyers, and other activist groups such as the National Organization for Women. The Institute for Social Justice thus represents, in more explicit form and in a more formalized context, the implicit artisanship skills built up by tradition among ACORN organizers.

Although ACORN's methods are traditional, the tradition is by no means a static one. Rapid expansion and high turnover of the staff ensure a continual influx of new ideas. Many issues addressed by ACORN neighborhood groups have impact beyond neighborhood boundaries. Loose coalitions of different organizations often develop around a zoning law or a need for better crime control, facilitating the exchange of

information among activists with varying backgrounds and skills. Finally, ACORN provides structure to informal information networks within the association through its monthly newsletter and its annual national convention. The high point of the convention is a collective lobbying or protest action, emphasizing both the internal solidarity and the pragmatic focus of ACORN. Through these various means, the growth of an adaptive and successful body of strategies and tactics is assured.

The training program of ACORN shows definite signs of a tradition in transition. In particular, the creation of the Institute of Social Justice as a training arm points toward the development of a formal technology of community organizing skills. By making explicit the various components of the organizing process, the groundwork has been laid for more controlled experimentation to find out what works and what does not. An empirically tested set of skills may ultimately supplant implicit tradition as the basis for social intervention and, perhaps, as the basis for training. Thus the growth of ACORN as an organization has generated the seed, as it were, of a possible paradigm shift from artisanship to technicianship.

The Technician

John Kenneth Galbraith (1967: 2) defines technology as "the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks." In the technicianship model, the trainer of social change agents employs technological means to impart the skills deemed necessary for inducing social change. A pure, self-contained form of the technicianship model of training occurs when the skills acquired by the trainee are themselves technical in nature. Rather than applying scientifically derived strategies solely to the training of individual change agents, the pure technician applies them to entire social systems. Bower (1969: 927) optimistically presents this approach to social change in his paper, "Systems Analysis for Social Decisions":

> *What my title implies is a fundamental and very modern belief that the tools of quantitative analysis applied to societal problems in their full technological, economic, psychological, and political complexity can resolve what were traditionally viewed first as religious and then as political issues. In effect, the problem of order in society, which was originally conceived as the task of God, and later the task of kings and prime ministers, has now been conceived, at least partly, as the field of endeavor for a new kind of engineer.*

Nightmarish, Orwellian images are conjured from such proclamations. Many are wary of Skinner's (1971) proposals in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* without ever having read a page of it (Saunders and Reppucci, 1978). Despite our fears of society-wide technocracy, we need not look far for examples of social change technicians actively planning and shaping various components of the social system. The behavior modification expert (à la Skinner) is but one sort of technician; applied sociologists and social psychologists, operations researchers, systems analysts, marketing specialists, applied economists, and environmental planners employ quite different sorts of technology in their professional activities. Each of these change agents is trained in the utilization of a particular scientific tradition for the accomplishment of planned change in the real world. The goal of technical training involves "creating a cadre of professionals with a new set of skills. These persons, once they have the skills, will be able to effect changes in the larger sphere" (Havelock and Havelock, 1973: 39).

The technician and the artisan are both pragmatic, working to achieve recognized goals or to resolve recognized problems by means of recognized useful tools. Neither particularly concerned with inventing new tools. Likewise, a specialist's mastery of either artisanship or technicianship is achievable only after years of supervised experience in real-world tasks.

The technician differs from the artisan primarily in the types of tools employed. Mathematical and scientific concepts shape the more formal-analytical techniques of the technician. Consequently, training in science typically comprises a major component of the education process, with students being exposed to the historical development, the major theories, and the methodologies of whatever science they are learning to apply. However, the emphasis clearly falls on *application*, so the more esoteric theories and controversies being waged at the cutting edge of the field are given short shrift. Science, as taught to the technician, is presented as an established body of knowledge, rather than as a dynamic process of discovery, creativity, and conflict. Consequently, the technician's scientific knowledge may be substantially dated. Like artisanship, technicianship is conservative in its acceptance and adaptation of innovation.

The essence of the technicianship training program resides in the notion of "applied" science. It is presumed that physical and social systems function according to general laws or principles. Once science discovers and formalizes these laws, a technician who understands and manipulates their operations will be able thereby to engineer desired, planned, and predictable changes in a system. Training in science is oriented toward understanding and prediction: training in technical skills, toward manipulation. Hence, a technicianship approach to the training of social change agents utilizes applied social science in the design of the training program, the goal of which is to "engineer" predictable changes in the trainees.

Different technologies are derived from different sciences. Likewise, technicianship strategies for training social change agents have emerged from different approaches to science. Two different general approaches to the scientific study of social phenomena, reductionism and nonreductionism, have generated correspondingly different social change training technologies: reductionistic technicianship and artificial technicianship.

Reductionistic Technicianship

As has frequently been observed (see Boring, 1950), the social sciences developed from and modeled themselves after the natural sciences. Perhaps the most relevant feature of the "mature" sciences with respect to social change technology has been their "reductionistic" interpretation of reality (Grene, 1971). The goal of reductionistic science is to identify and to describe the simple mechanisms underlying the complexities of observable phenomena. Reductionistic technologies rely on the stability of underlying mechanisms, as stated mathematically by scientists, in the implementation of predictable change.

Reductionistic technicianship in social change implementation directly parallels reductionism in the physical sciences: Ultimately all social phenomena are presumed to be reducible to one basic mechanism (Pepper, 1942). As in technologies derived from the physical sciences, reductionistic technicianships derived from the social sciences differ from one another depending on the nature of the underlying mechanism.

One form of reductionism locates the basic social mechanisms within the individual. For example, by understanding the laws of individual learning, the trainer can presumably shape the social change trainee's behavior in predetermined ways. Skin-

ner (1968), in *The Technology of Teaching*, claims that all learning is caused by environmental impact on the individual's stimulus-response mechanism. The goal of teaching, therefore, is to construct a technology that enforces the learning of desired behaviors and prevents the emergence of undesired behaviors.

Ford (1980) has proposed a training program in which techniques derived from the science of behavioral analysis are applied to the training of environmental design professionals. After identifying a set of skills to be imparted to the trainees, Ford dissected these skills into discrete behavioral components in order to design a "microtraining" curriculum. Used also in training therapists, microtraining employs proven social learning techniques derived from psychological research (Bandura, 1969) to inculcate the trainee with the requisite skills. Thus, Ford's program teaches social change skills by constructing an environment that capitalizes on the individual's inherent learning mechanisms.

Other reductionistic technologies maintain the integrity of social units to a greater extent than do applied behaviorists. Sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and economists often attempt to reduce social phenomena to underlying mechanisms of collective rather than individual behavior. In economics, for example, laissez-faire capitalists, liberals, and Marxists all reduce the social economy to some sort of "invisible hand" that shapes social systems and constrains individual behavior. A reductionisic training strategy of the collective variety would treat social change trainees as a social system. However, to our knowledge training programs grounded in collectivistic reductionism do not exist.

A presumably inevitable consequence of reductionism is that eventually an equivalence would be established between the technology used for training change agents and the technology employed in inducing social change. If everything is reducible to the same underlying mechanism, then both training and social change must ultimately depend on the manipulation of the same mechanism. Therefore, the pure, self-contained form of reductionistic technicianship should occur fairly frequently in practice.

"Artificial" Technicianship

The technologies described thus far begin with a common belief that complex social processes are theoretically reducible to underlying mechanisms, statable in mathematical terms. However, considerable ignorance remains as to the precise nature of most social mechanisms. The vast complexity of social phenomena has eluded the reductionistic goals of science and technology, such that considerable unexplained variance remains in even the best predictive equations (Anderson, 1980; Miles, 1975).

The advent of computers has led to a new direction in social change technology. Both the individual and the social system began to be thought of in terms analogous to an information-processing machine. A deceptively simple but highly influential book by Polya (1975), *How to Solve It*, foreshadowed the shift to an information-processing technology of training. Writing for high school and college mathematics teachers, Polya observed that learning to solve even the most mechanistic mathematical problems requires active, purposive, nonmechanistic cognitive strategies. Such strategies, which include diagnosing problems, searching for possible solution strategies, and matching the appropriate formula to the problem, Polya called "modern heuristics." Heuristics are to be contrasted with "algorithms," systematic strategies of problem solving that invariably lead to a unique solution, that is, mechanistic technicianship strategies. Computers are able to solve problems algorithmically, but

only after they have been programmed to do so. The programmer thus takes a heuristic approach, systematically searching for ways to make the computer accomplish the desired task, then "teaching" the machine to perform the algorithm appropriate to the task. "Information-processing" theories of cognition (for example, Newell and Simon, 1972) conceive of mental activity as the generation and application of heuristics by which the individual learns to negotiate and to manipulate the environment. Cognition is seen as purposive, transforming data into information useful for the accomplishment of tasks.

Organizations and other social systems likewise have been analyzed in terms of coordinated information-processing systems (Galbraith, 1973). Change strategies focus both on the individuals in the system and on the system as a whole, attempting to facilitate the creation of effective structures and processes for information gathering, processing, and dissemination and for the selection and coordination of task performance strategies by means of heuristic analysis.

If this systems view is maintained, then the social change agent must be taught the heuristics of "programming" change processes into the social system. Simon (1981: ix) has proposed a specific curriculum for the training of social change agents based on such a premise. He approaches the social system as an "artificial" phenomenon, a creation of human design "molded, by goals and purposes, to the environment." While contingent on the reductionistic laws operating in the system and in its environment, purposive environmental adaptation strategies are not fully constrained by such laws. Mechanistic social science may set parameters on choice, but freedom exists in the selection among alternatives within the parameters. Planned social change depends on pragmatic choice among alternatives, not on deterministic causal mechanisms; on design, not on manipulation.

A "science of design" would consist of "a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process" (Simon, 1981: 132). In addition to algorithmic methods of choosing optimal change strategies (such as tools used by reductionistic social engineers and operations researchers), artificial change technicians would learn methods of "satisficing" in situations in which limitations on information-processing and knowledge capacities preclude optimization. Satisficing strategies are based on the heuristics of "bounded rationality," where environmental complexity is greater than the computational powers of the adaptive system. Simon proposes heuristic methods of the sort described by Polya in terms familiar to information-processing technicians: representation of design problems in both quantitative and qualitative terms; selective search methods for finding and choosing among alternative solutions; prioritization of tasks and allocation of resources; and establishment of feedback mechanisms, both within the system and at the system-environment interface.

A training program based on artificial technology considers the mind of the individual trainee, as well as the group of trainees, as an artificial system. The task of the trainer is to design a training process that promotes the purposeful adaptation of the system to the environment. For both the individual and the group, the general purpose is to become successful change agents; yet, each may have unique sets of goals within that purpose. The trainer must identify these goals and incorporate them into a specifically designed program.

The artificial systems strategy allows for a wide range of means to accomplish a given end. Information about a problem sets parameters on possible solutions, but freedom exists to design and to choose all solutions within those parameters. The "case study method," widely utilized in business schools, is particularly appropriate

to the development of data analysis, design, and decision making. The case, typically derived from an actual situation, presents information about the social system (usually a corporate entity), the environment (marketplace conditions), and the broad purposes and goals to be facilitated by change. Since the case presents only a limited amount of information about present circumstances and since future conditions are largely unpredictable, no one "right" change strategy exists. Students employ heuristics in evaluating the situation and in proposing changes that will improve the task-performance capabilities of the organization. The teacher and the students serve as feedback system to individual trainees by offering suggestions, criticisms, and refinements to a proposed problem solution.

Through this participative process, the entire group of trainees functions as an artificial system, generating alternative solutions and designing one or more "action plans" deemed particularly appropriate by the system. Trainees develop analytic, collaborative, and planning capabilities in a setting modeled on the social environment in which they will be using these skills.

Case Study: The Center for Interactive Management. The Center for Interactive Management (CIM) is an organization providing consultative services to management in the public and private sectors. Administered and staffed by the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences of the University of Virginia, CIM operates primarily according to the technicianship model of social change.

The stated goal of CIM is to link the traditional university functions of research, teaching, and public service with management problem-solving activities. The Center's change strategies, developed by the management and systems sciences, clearly reflect the information-processing methodology of artificial technicianship. The manager's primary tasks are classified as intelligence (problem specification), design (generation of options for problem solution), and choice (evaluation of options and selection of a preferred solution). A major assumption is that the consultees possess adequate knowledge about the specific problem-solving task. Therefore, rather than providing content-based input to management, CIM's staff consultants serve as "expert generalists" on the process of problem-solving.

The activities of CIM's process facilitators revolve around a set of prepackaged information-processing technologies. Each consulting method (nominal group technique, interpretive structural modeling, options field/options profile, and so on) is a highly formalized, invariant, heuristically based tool. With the aid of computer programs developed by CIM's administrators, the consulting staff ensures that input generated by the consultees is structured according to the format specified by the information-processing tool. A group of consultees, by following a preordained series of technological tasks, works through the intelligence-design-choice sequence as applied to a specific set of management problems.

CIM's process facilitators are graduate students in systems engineering. As such, their first exposure to the CIM technologies typically occurs in a graduate engineering course entitled Management of Research and Development. The course is itself planned and designed jointly by professor and students according to the design technologies of CIM. Further training is partly didactic, but primarily experiential. Through on-the-job apprenticeship to experienced facilitators, trainees develop their skills in group process facilitation and computer programming.

Occasionally CIM consults with organizations interested in learning the CIM technology for internal management purposes. In such cases the consultation takes the form of a training session. Facilitators use the standard CIM problem-solving tools in

these sessions, applying them to the task of designing an interactive management program modeled after CIM (Warfield, 1981). A self-contained system emerges, in which identical methods are used for both training and social change.

While CIM primarily represents the artificial technicianship approach, it clearly overlaps with other models. Facilitators receive much of their training via apprenticeship. While efforts to formalize the training process are under way, facilitator skills remain to a great extent those of the artisan. Evidence of conflict between technicianship and science also exists. The facilitators are doctoral students, oriented toward creative science and experimentation in systems engineering. Nonetheless, the directors of CIM actively discourage experimentation with the packaged technologies utilized by the Center. The constraints thereby imposed on the consultative process verge into the mechanism of reductionistic technology. The flexibility of heuristic artificial technicianship thus seem threatened from two directions: the scientific push toward methodological instability and the reductionistic pull toward algorithmic rigidity.

The Scientist

"Pure" science is an activity oriented toward description, explanation, prediction, and control; technology attempts to use scientific findings to bring about planned change. However, the difficulty of transition from pure science to technology is not solely due to the limitations in scientific knowledge. A value judgment must be inserted between the description by the scientist and the prescription of the change agent. Often, there is no basis within the scientific enterprise to justify the leap from "is" to "ought."

Nonetheless, scientists do affect the social system, whether consciously or not; the set of scientific breakthroughs that led to the atomic bomb is the obvious example. Within the scientific community, increasing attention has been paid to the impossibility of value-free science (see, for example, Rappaport, 1977) and to the inevitability with which science produces social change. The three basic components of scientific endeavor—hypothesis generation, hypothesis testing, and dissemination—may be combined in a training/educational program that aims to influence social systems directly.

Hypothesis Generation

Until relatively recent times, scientists had paid little attention to the importance of hypothesis generation. The reductionistic bias of "positivistic empiricism" assumed a direct, mechanical link between data observation and hypothesis construction. The theorist need not be creative; he or she must only record the findings and the universal laws would emerge of their own accord. Poincaré (1913), an eminent mathematician and physicist, accentuated the fallacy of a purely empirical definition of scientific discovery and stressed the importance of the hypothesis in science. A hypothesis emerges not simply as a discovery obtained through observation alone, but as a product of the scientist's creativity.

Kuhn (1970) developed the central notion of "paradigm shifts" in science and distinguished between "normal" and "revolutionary" science, a distinction which parallels that between first- and second-order change. The practitioner of normal science accepts the cognitive frameworks of the scientific status quo. By framing new problems in existing problem-solving formats, a "normal" scientist arrives at solutions by a mechanical, technical process. The "revolutionary" scientist reframes

problems in new terms and categories, resulting in novel ways of solving problems. If a revoluntary theory achieves acceptance within the scientific establishment, a paradigm shift occurs, leading to a restructuring of the ways in which scientists conceptualize the world. Problem definition yields problem solution (Caplan and Nelson, 1973). Wholly new types of social change strategies often follow in the wake of a paradigm shift, replacing what were previously considered essential tools of the trade. Hence the achievement of second-order cognitive change within the scientific community may bring about second-order change in the social system at large.

While hypothesis generation is an essential task of the scientist and a precursor of second-order social change, it is rarely an explicit component of the scientific training program. The generation of creative scientific thinking has typically been viewed as an intuitive gift, a capacity that most likely is unteachable (Polanyi, 1958). It is the paradox of second-order change: training attempts to structure the mind in a known way, while creative thought brings about the demise of old structures as part of the innovation process. It would seem that training in existing theories and methodologies cannot directly lead a budding scientific change agent to dismantle and replace those very theories and methodologies.

Taken to its logical end, this line of reasoning leads to agnosticism, even solipsism, with respect to training in creative science. The physicist David Bohm (cited in Buckley and Peat, 1979: 134) asserts:

> *I would say that theory has no foundation. Any creative act or process has no foundation. If it has a foundation, it is not creative. If it comes from something that is already there, then it is merely the working out of what is already there, so it is not really the creation of something new.*

Nonetheless, it may be possible to build into a training program certain components which, on a probabilistic basis, seem to function as preconditions to creative scientific endeavor. Such a training strategy assumes that hypothesis generation can never be reduced to a mechanistic process; that, consequently, the outcome of training will inevitably manifest a high degree of uncertainty. Further, while training of this sort may be based in a theory of creativity, it will not be derived from a specific theory of social change.

One precondition of scientific theory-building is an awareness of a problem that cannot be solved adequately with existing theories (Festinger, 1957; Piaget, 1977). Training in science usually does expose the student to the inchoate state of the field—the theories that conflict with data and with each other. It is presumed that perceiving the gaps and conflicts in social scientific thought will lead scientific change agents to reformulate problems in ways that may have more satisfactory solutions than currently exist.

Another important precondition of creativity seems to be a capacity for "divergent" thinking. One must be able to conceptualize events by means of new structures, to perceive the relationships between apparently unrelated phenomena. Interdisciplinary seminars are one mechanism by which students may explore ways of thinking that are very different from the accepted theories of their own scientific traditions.

Finally, it seems that a disproportionate number of influential scientists studied under mentors who were themselves influential scientists. It may be, of course, that the top scholars accept as students only the top prospects. It may also be that certain academic environments are particularly stimulating to the scholar's scientific inquiry. Whatever the case, some sort of osmosis does seem to occur; a way of thinking is

transmitted implicitly from mentor to student in much the same way as the artisan transmits skills to the apprentice. Perhaps there exists among great scientists a "tradition of creativity," a tradition that assures the demise of other scientific traditions. To explicate the process through which creative scientific thinking is transmitted would perhaps dramatically change the training process. At this point, however, we can only recognize that it happens and call attention to the importance of apprenticeship.

It may readily be observed that most of the strategies for training in hypothesis generation are heuristic in nature. Research findings on the effectiveness of this sort of training are equivocal. In summarizing the literature, Perkins (1981) concluded that students trained in the heuristics of creativity experience the greatest success when they use such strategies flexibly, adapting heuristics to their own problem-solving styles and to the problem at hand. Methods that require students to proceed mechanistically through a preordained sequence of heuristics—that is, to convert heuristics into algorithms (Scandura, 1977)—do not seem to be effective in scientific creativity. Finally, it should be noted that skill in heuristic manipulation cannot substitute for fluency in the subject matter of a scientific discipline.

Hypothesis Testing

In recent decades scientific social innovators have attempted to merge experimental and field research techniques to test hypotheses about planned social change. Various terms are employed to describe the systematic study of social intervention—"action research" (Lewin, 1946), "piecemeal social engineering" (Popper, 1957), "experimental social innovation" (Fairweather, 1967), "systematic experimentation" (Rivlin, 1971), "social experimentation" (Riecken and Boruch, 1974). In contrast to technicianship which replicates innovation by means of existing technologies, social experimentation entails the invention of new technologies. The scientist manipulates the social system in part to change it (presumably for the better), but an additional focus is to test theories about changes in "real-world" situations (Campbell, 1969).

Training the action researcher must include the basic components of a "pure" scientific curriculum: knowledge of the existing theories, content, and methodologies, and supervised research experience. In addition, the student must be familiarized with "quasi-experimental" research methodologies (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Linney and Reppucci, 1982), since "real-world" social systems seldom grant the experimenter sufficient control to use laboratory research designs.

To test hypotheses in field settings, the scientific change agent must develop particular social-organizational skills in addition to formal research competence (Cowen, 1978; Reppucci and Saunders, 1974). The action researcher must also learn to negotiate entree to social systems and to function as a nonautonomous participant in a team; these social-political skills usually are acquired, artisanwise, through informal contacts with experienced scientists and through trial and error in the field (Sarason et al., 1966). While presumably amenable to scientific analysis, these skills have typically been relegated to the domain of "common sense."

Dissemination

Another major trend has been the input of scientific findings to the legal (Loftus and Monahan, 1980) and political decision-making process (Reppucci and Kirk, forthcoming; Segall, 1976). The broad range of subjects addressed by social scientists overlaps at many points with major legislative and public policy issues. Social scien-

tists advocate various educational, employment, and social programs through the presentation of research purportedly justifying such programs on scientific grounds. Often each side of the political debate can marshal "expert" testimony from scientists in support of its position, thereby highlighting the adversarial process inherent in the scientific endeavor (Levine, 1974). Government agencies often commission individuals or interdisciplinary teams to study the potential impacts of contemplated legislative or policy decisions, in which case scientists may directly influence social change.

Social scientists less trusting of governmentally induced social action may also advocate direct action within the social system. Marxist ideology views science as a tool of the revolution. Others may advocate scientific activity as a means of "empowering" the disadvantaged (Rappaport, 1981). Even the conservative economist Hayek (1979) does not rule out the possibility of scientifically initiated social change via interaction with spontaneous forces inherent in the social order. "But," Hayek (1979: 149) qualifies, "there is all the difference between thus utilizing and influencing spontaneous processes and an attempt to replace them by an organization which relies on conscious control." Whether oriented toward governmental, community, or collective individual change, researchers aiming to induce social change need to learn political and relationship skills in order to negotiate the interface between the scientific community and the arena of change (Bevan, 1976, 1980; Kelly, 1971). While social scientists have amassed a considerable body of research on the dissemination process (see, for example, Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971), most frequently there is no provision for "interfacing skills" in the training program; students learn them in the "school of hard knocks."

Case Study: Research in Community Psychology, University of Virginia. Research in Community Psychology (RCP) is a doctoral program within the Department of Psychology at the University of Virginia and is fairly representative of programs that may be classified into the scientist model of social change. Its major goal is to prepare Ph.D.-level research community psychologists who will be qualified for placement in a variety of academic, research, and systems change positions. Students are expected to become knowledgeable concerning intervention and evaluation approaches to a variety of social problems, particularly those related to the well-being of children and families and community institutions and contexts that affect children and families. The guiding theoretical framework is ecological in nature, focusing on understanding the individual in social context and pursuing preventive interventions from a multidisciplinary perspective. Special emphasis is placed on obtaining research skills for hypothesis testing. Students begin their doctoral education with a two-semester sequence in quantitative methods and most pursue other courses in advanced statistical techniques. Two additional required courses, Research Methods in Community Psychology and Ecological Assessment, provide research skills that are particularly relevant to persons interested in conducting intervention research. Students acquire many of their research skills more informally, however, by collaborating with faculty members and other graduate students on joint research projects and by conducting independent research while completing a master's thesis and a doctoral dissertation.

Knowledge of basic theoretical issues and conceptual foundations as well as intervention modalities is acquired during a year-long course in community psychology. Most students then take several advanced seminars focusing on specialized topics, such as Change in Human Service Organizations and Intervention Strategies with Children. These small seminars are intended to allow students to grapple intensively

with relevant theoretical issues in a context that encourages creative and synthetic thinking and the generation of new hypotheses. It is assume that, by participating in such activities in the context of a seminar, students will acquire the heuristic skills necessary for creative scientific thought. Students also design individualized reading lists and examinations in major and minor specialty areas. Again, the intent is to encourage independent and creative synthesis of disparate theoretical and conceptual literatures.

The focus on knowledge dissemination, likewise, is handled in seminars and in the field. Courses such as Law and Psychology and Public Policy and the Family provide students with a rudimentary understanding of legal and political systems; and participation in relevant courses in other departments of the University is encouraged. Individualized field experience in dissemination activities and experimental social innovation are also an expected part of the educational program.

While the RCP program has as its central focus the training of social scientists, the training strategies used in achieving this and clearly overlap the artisanship and technicianship models. The program uses, to a certain extent, an apprenticeship system that is similar to, but not as highly structured as, those used in most artisanship programs. The training content is partly technical, particularly those aspects dealing with hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, much of the content of the RCP program remains focused on producing creative scientists who will concentrate their efforts on understanding social problems and developing innovative community and social interventions. Hence, the RCP program differs most fundamentally from artisanship and technicianship programs with respect to its central concern with innovation rather than replication.

The Artist

The creation of a work of art has more direct association with the creation of social and community innovation than does the formulation of a scientific theory (Benne et al., 1969). Science is an abstraction from reality; art shapes reality. Unlike the "objectivity" of a formal mathematical statement, the work of art is inseparable from the medium in which the artist works. So too the social innovation does not exist apart from its implementation within the social system. If such a creature as a "social change artist" existed, he or she would differ from the social change scientist by perceiving social reality as an artistic medium rather as a testing ground for theory.

Until a hundred years ago painting and sculpture were generally representational activities. The artist selected a person or thing as a subject, then reproduced the subject in such a way as to highlight its inherent beauty. Artisanship and technicianship were necessary but not sufficient conditions for "good" art; personal vision alerted the artist to nuances of beauty hidden from the amateur, while personal style enabled the artist to incorporate vision into representation.

Contemplation of the beautiful society has for centuries been the domain of philosophy. Plato's *Republic* and Augustine's *City of God* may be thought of as translations of the ideal state into a proposed real one (Krasner, 1980). Steeped in philosophical contemplation and striving to represent the beautiful ideal within a societal medium, the elite of earlier societies actively shaped their civilizations according to a shared artistic vision. Nor has the artistic visionary disappeared from the scene:

> *The Marxian vision is without question one of the three or four most powerful and encompassing world-visions to be found in the twentieth century; only Christianity*

> *and Islam give it serious rivalry. But with all allowance made for Marx's erudition and his historic impact upon the social sciences, especially sociology, it is as art united with prophecy, virtually religious prophecy, that Marxism survived. . . . no one reading* Capital *can doubt that, for all the intimidating apparatus of concept and principle, the artistic spirit lives [Nisbet, 1976: 108].*

In comparison, social change agents in the modern Western world are faced with the obstacle of creating innovation in a largely unplanned society. Moreover, skepticism regarding the determinism of positivistic science has rendered suspect the very notion of planned and predictable change. Indeterminacy permeates the findings of modern science—from the random fluctuation of subatomic particles (Heisenberg, 1952), to the appearance under "far from equilibrium" thermodynamic conditions of "self-organizing systems" (Prigogine, 1980), to the spontaneous emergence of genetic mutations (Auerbach, 1976), to emergent novelty in complex social systems (Hayek, 1967).

Further, the change agent's position as objective expert or aloof visionary has been eroded. Both the scientist and the artist function within the *Zeitgeist;* consequently innovation is invariably affected by sociocultural forces outside of the change agent's awareness. The value of an innovation thus may be judged only by standards relative to the particular sociohistorical moment (Buss, 1975).

The development of nonrepresentational art as an established mode of expression directly parallels the questioning of objectivity and ultimate reducibility in science (Waddington, 1970). Contrary to more traditional ways of painting and sculpting, much of modern artistry has no tangible "subject" as its pattern for beauty. Rather, the painter creates something that has no direct parallel in the "real" world. Personal vision and style interact not with the subject, but with the medium. The artist may have a general idea of what the finished product might look like, but that idea evolves as the brush strokes are applied to the canvas. Each next move is governed largely by contemplation of the preceding ones. Jackson Pollock (1978: 212) described the nonrepresentational method: "The painting has a life of its own. I try to let it come through. It is only when I lose contact with the painting that the result is a mess." Thus, we see both the interactive process and the relativity of standards, problematic in modern science, forming the basis of one strand of modern art.

The representational artist's freedom of expression is constrained by the necessity to depict an external object. For the nonrepresentational artist, this constraint is removed. Instead, the artist allows his or her personal vision and style to interact with the colors, textures, and shapes of the medium (Kruskopf, 1976). The medium shapes the artist, and vice versa; the artwork emerges from this mutual influencing process. By incorporating randomness into the artistic process (consider Pollock's dripping paint cans) or by introducing "found objects" into the artwork (as Picasso did with wallpaper fragments), the artist further highlights the notion of creativity through influence rather than through control.

Nonrepresentational artistic activity presents a number of implications for training in social change. Two areas, which have been relatively neglected by the other training models, warrant examination: interactive process and chance.

Interactive Process

Typically, the change process is described by incrementalizing it. The modern artist enters the process, becomes part of it, and affects it from within. By continually alternating between total immersion and distanced contemplation, the artist be-

comes attuned to crucial turning points in the creation of a work of art, junctures at which some conscious planning of the next move is necessary. The artist, simultaneously shaping and being shaped by the medium, helps bring about something totally new, a person-environment interaction with characteristics unpredictable from the sum of the components.

By implication, the social change artist should not be isolated from the social system (Levine, 1970). He or she must be immersed in the ongoing processes of the environment, become one with the environment, and then affect it from within. At the same time, the change agent must be sensitive to new directions of change in the social system that may call for some distanced reflection and conscious planning of new interventions.

A process-oriented training program would teach the trainee to attend to and to contemplate the immediate environment from an artistic perspective, not merely to think about things at a distance. In Bergson's (1912) terms, the trainee must learn to "penetrate" the system rather than to "encircle" it. At the same time, the trainee must learn when to step back, evaluate, and plan. Gibson's (1979) ecological theory of perception suggests that the environment presents the perceiver with a structured array of information regarding "variance" and "invariance," stability and change. Any disturbance in the invariant structure of the array triggers an awareness that a new event has begun. By moving within the environment, by "learning to perceive," and by being "motivated to perceive" (Gibson, 1979: 57), the artist-trainee would quickly recognize changes emerging within the social order. This perceptual acuity would enable the change agent to identify and to evaluate turning points in the social change process and to plan new interventions in response to these turning points.

The social change artist must learn to take the ecological perspective seriously. Training as an "outside consultant" leads to self-deception, since the artist cannot help but be a part of the system undergoing change. The change artist must be taught to allow his or her vision of change and of desired outcome to be shaped by the social medium. In this sense, Kelly's (1981) ecological approach to social experimentation verges into modern artistry. He implies that the interactive process of devising hypotheses to be tested is perhaps more important than the hypothesis itself.

A corollary position in the ecological perspective is that the change artist cannot help but induce change in the system. Just as the "outside consultant" is a myth, so is the "outside observer." Even as seemingly innocuous an activity as program evaluation inevitably results in subtle and not-so-subtle changes in the program itself (Sjoberg, 1975). The nonrepresentational metaphor would suggest that

> *in social-psychological sciences, the observer is not only* not *isolated from the phenomena, but he is very much a part of the phenomena. He is being influenced and he influences at the same time. He changes that which he measures, and he in turn is also changed, influenced in the very act of measuring. . . . Each action of the social-psychological scientist makes an impress on the social world; he changes it in the very act of studying it* [*Levine, 1974: 665*].

The change agent needs to realize that there is a tradeoff between understanding and change, and he or she will never be able to distance himself or herself from the interaction sufficiently to be able to cognize everything that is happening. Being comfortable with this lack of control and developing a tolerance for ambiguity are prerequisite to becoming an interactive change artist (Kelly, 1971).

Chance

Stochastic processes represent limitations on scientific understanding and prediction. For the modern social change artist, "chance is to a greater or less [sic] extent creative element, not a mere source of uncertainty and confusion" (Waddington 1970: 161). The change agent is free to incorporate the unexpected into the intervention, using "postcreative selection" to judge the results.

To this end, the trainee must learn to see chance events as mutations, with potential of adding a constructive new element to the change effort. The change a may also learn ways of increasing the activities of various randomness-gener processes within the system. Rivlin (1971) described such an attempted increa "random innovation" by the federal government in such 1960s programs as the c munity action program and model cities. Jacobs (1961), Alexander (1974), Hayek (1979) all suggest that spontaneously generated diversity of unplanned tems results in a better social order than a centrally planned system.

In sum, the nonrepresentational mode of artistic creativity has attempted to t form interactive process and chance from problems into virtues. Nevertheles artistic community has not been fully satisfied with the set of values espoused b movement. If it makes sense to think of social change agentry as an artistic pr then the recent history of art may have implications for future directions in traini social and community change.

Despite its advantages, nonrepresentational social artistry has muddied considerably with respect to the goals of social and community change. The expected to clarify his or her values while at the same time refusing to imp values on others. Success criteria are difficult to transmit to the trainee; since the va that predominate in a given social system undergo constant flux, that which see be a positive change today may be viewed negatively tomorrow. A theory that gl the interactive process of change without a predetermined end state—the p nant motif of empowerment and neo-Marxism (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977; port, 1981)—can never specify whether the change agent is becoming mo no one can define a successful neo-Marxist revolution, can one ever define revolutionary or a successful training program for revolutionaries?

For representationalists, on the other hand, the goal of a social inter explicit: to shape the social system according to a vision of the beautifu such an intervention demands the imposition of the change artist's values so be it. Objective social standards exist, irrespective of their acceptance masses. Furthermore, since the desired end state is clearly in mind from the ning, the representational change artist may judge the success of any interventi Marxist revolution may either succeed, fail, or be incomplete.

It seems that two equally problematic options remain open. On the one ha nonrepresentational social change artist may return to the value clarity of re tionalism. On the other hand, the change agent may move toward the "artisti evident in the last twenty years of modern art (Burnham, 1978). By fully acc inherent value of the social system, the change artist adopts a "minimalist" toward social intervention. A minimalist training program would strive to the trainee neither a set of values nor a set of skills, but an attitude of self-r nonjudgmentalism reminiscent of the Zen master (see Sarason, 1976).

Case Study: Highlander Folk School The Highlander Folk School serve

good example of a "training" program that represents social change artistry. Located in rural Tennessee, the goals of the Highlander Folk School are avowedly political: "educating for a revolution that would basically alter economic and political power relationships to the advantage of the poor and the powerless" (Adams, 1975: 205). In terms of goals, then, Highlander is similar to ACORN and its educational wing, the Institute for Social Justice. The two organizations differ markedly, however, in terms of the means used to educate persons who wish to move society toward those goals.

The educational programs conducted at Highlander all begin with one basic premise: learn from the students; their education must begin where they are, not where the teachers are. The "students" are the poor and disenfranchised who live in rural areas of the Appalachian region. They come to Highlander to learn from others who face similar problems.

The central component of the Highlander educational program is the residential workshop. Typically, the board and staff at Highlander make long-term commitments, five to ten years, to specific problem areas such as land exploitation, poverty and welfare rights, toxic waste dumping, occupational health and safety, and labor organizing. Residential workshops are then conducted around somewhat more specific aspects of these broad problem areas.

The term "workshop" is not used in the manner it is typically used by academicians. The guiding philosophy is self-education; thus the workshops bear little resemblance to traditional models of knowledge transfer. According to Mike Clark, a former director of Highlander, "the Highlander method is an effort to pose some alternatives to the top-down approach. Our main efforts go into developing small, democratically run groups of poor people" (Highlander Reports, 1982: 2). During workshops the poor take turns describing their problems and what attempts they have made at solving them. This process, fulfilling the idea of democracy by acting in unison, is the core of the workshop. Solutions to problems emerge from the participants and from the process, not from the staff or other experts. Staff members function primarily to facilitate the democratic group process (Adams, 1975) and serve as resource persons only when requested.

Workshops at Highlander tend to take one of two forms, depending on the developmental state of the social movement representing the workshop problem. If the social movement is relatively young and diffuse, the workshop tends to focus primarily on process, to the relative exclusion of content. The goal of such workshops is problem recognition and crystalization. "Second phase" workshops are conducted when social movements take a more concrete form. Participants in these workshops are already actively involved in the movement but typically desire additional information. While these workshops will make greater use of experts, the focus remains centered on process and self-education.

The workshops at Highlander are often characterized as anti-intellectual. This is not necessarily the case, although it is true that they are self-consciously nonacademic. Solutions to problems are not to be found in texts or the technical expertise of experts. Rather, solutions emerge from a process, and it is the process and not a given knowledge base that is fundamental. Change agents, thus, are not "trained" in any usual sense of the term. All persons are change agents; the missing ingredient needed to facilitate the process of social innovation is simply the context and process provided by Highlander. The Highlander Folk School does not offer a coherent training strategy, like the other three case studies. Instead, the general philosophy of education is the central focus. Change, then, emerges from this process much as the artist's work emerges from an equally "incoherent" process.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have refused to pass judgment on which of the four training models is "best." For that matter, we have expressed no opinions on whether it is a good idea to train change agents. It must be recognized that throughout human history the longing for social stability has exerted a force at least as powerful as the desire for social change. Even when social innovations are met with unanimous initial acceptance, likely as not the social system reverts inexorably toward *status quo ante* (Rappaport et al., 1979; Reppucci and Saunders, 1977).

Underlying each training model is an implicit value statement: Positive social change can be brought about through the activities of a trained expert.

> *If not always enlisted as a guide to salvation or the millennium, the expert has at least been the confidant of dark secrets or the pathfinder toward some ancillary truth. This role seems little abridged even in a "scientific age" when an expert may be implored not to "take sides" but to remain the neutral judge of contingencies. The experimenter proposes, he does not dispose; but we must assume that his neutrality is a discretionary one* (*Kelly, 1969: 14*).

We have considered standards of craftsmanship, technical proficiency, scientific truth, and aesthetics as criteria by which the various models judge the success of an innovation or a training program. However, the relevance of each of these criteria is limited primarily to a single training model. The lack of consensus on what defines a "good" social change therefore is not surprising, since the participants in the debate cannot even agree on the issues to be addressed.

It seems that the safest route would be to advocate a position of "absolute relativity": Since a plurality of values exists, "good" training programs "should" allow individual change agent trainees to define and to act in accordance with their own values. However, even if absolute relativity were not self-contradictory, it would be unjustifiable. Certain models, particularly representational art and artisanship, clearly maintain absolutist standards. Further, relativity within and relativity between models are vastly different concepts. Two technicians may disagree regarding the most efficient method of producing change, but they may agree that technical efficiency is the relevant dimension for making value decisions. In a sense, then, the issues that define a value conflict may be absolute within each model, even while internal debate rages surrounding these issues (Kohlberg, 1969). Thus, although we do make value judgments regarding social change and training programs, such judgments may reflect more on the models we buy into than on objective standards applicable to all models.

Speculation regarding the future of training for social and community change is as important and problematic a topic as that of value judgments. The multiplicity and variety of training programs and the heterogeneity of models operating simultaneously within each program seemingly ensure the dynamic unpredictability of future directions in training. Given the possibility of emergent second-order change, it is likely that unknown training "mutations" are surfacing even now. It is possible that the pull toward social stability may gain ascendancy, with "change agent nihilism" the result. Nevertheless, with modern society's heightened awareness of and interest in change, we have little doubt that training/educational programs for social and community change will proliferate in a congeries of common and exotic strains for some time to come.

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28

Reflections on the Uncertain Future of Social and Community Life

Kenneth E. Boulding

Decision as Choice Among Uncertain Images of the Future

The principal property of the future, especially of social systems, is uncertainty, mainly because an essential component of such a system is information, and information, even in the simplest Bell Telephone sense of bits, has to be surprising or it is not information. As we go beyond the simple concept of the information of information theory into the more elaborate constructs of know-how that the genetic structure has, and even more into know-what that human beings have, uncertainties become even greater. The essential, irreducible quality of this uncertainty can be seen if we ask ourselves, what would happen if we had a copy of tomorrow's newspaper? The answer is, of course, that tomorrow would not happen that way. The people who saw their names in the papers as having automobile accidents would not venture outdoors. There would be an enormous rush to buy things whose prices were going to rise and sell things whose prices were going to fall, which would make them rise and fall far more than the paper said, and so on.

Nevertheless, all decisions involve images of the future. We make no decisions about the past, although we may make decisions about the image of it that we are going to have in the future. All decisions are choices among alternative images of the future that we believe can be realized. We must construct images of the future, therefore, in terms of alternate possibile futures, rather than in terms of mechanical prediction. If we want to make decisions that will make things go to the better rather than to the worse, we must have some fairly realistic images of the futures that these decisions imply. The only things from which we can derive images of the future, however, are our images of the past, which in turn are derived from the records of it in memory, in documents, or in various kinds of remains. It is only in the perception of patterns of our image of the past that we can hope to project these to our images of the future.

Where we have a system of stable and discoverable parameters, like the celestial mechanics of the solar system, we can make very accurate predictions, as we can of eclipses. The solar system, however, is almost the only example that we know of a system of this kind. It is dangerous to apply the principles of celestial mechanics to biological, and especially to social, systems in which the parameters are constantly changing. It is very dangerous to project trends in social systems, for these are apt to change or even reverse themselves. All population projections, for instance, have

been wrong, almost without exception, due to unforeseen shifts in mortality or fertility, like the tremendous decline in infant mortality in the tropics around 1950, or the upsurge of fertility in the United States and some other countries between 1947 and 1961, or the remarkable decline in fertility in the sixties and seventies. Some parameters of social systems may be rather stable for awhile. It is then quite legitimate to identify them, but it is very dangerous to assume their continuance. There is nothing necessarily wrong in going to parameters of the second or third order and asking, are certain changes speeding up or slowing down, or even, is the rate of speedup or slowdown changing. These parameters, however, may be no more stable than are the others.

The Meaning of Social and Community Life

"Social and community life" is a real, but ill-defined, segment of the total system of human beings and their society. It is certainly an area in which the parameters, whatever they are, are often subject to quite rapid change. In a very broad sense, every relationship that one human being has with another is part of social life. It may be that any relationship that three or more human beings have with one another is community life. Nevertheless, we do distinguish roughly between economic, political, and social relationships, even though all relationships are likely to contain all three aspects in different degrees. Economic relationships concentrate on exchange, in which A does something for B, such as give B a commodity or service that B wants, and B similarly does something for A that A wants. These relationships always go somewhat beyond the things exchanged. We exchange courtesies as well as commodities, trust as well as securities, but the commodity exchange is still pretty central to what we think of as the economic relationship.

Political relationships are more likely to involve threat, as when I pay my taxes, mainly because I think I will get into more trouble than it is worth if I do not, or when one nation arms against another, or when a person is conscripted, or obeys any law out of fear of the consequences. The threats, however, usually have to be legitimated, which is more a social action than a political one. There is a good deal of exchange in log rolling and political tradeoffs, and voting is usually a social relationship involving some trading. If voting falls into threat, it is usually the end of democracy, which involves the convention that the loser in an election accepts the loss.

Social and community relationships, particularly those that involve identity, perceptions of what I am and what you are, concentrate especially in what I call the "integrative system." Some institutions are particularly concerned with developing and expressing identity: the church, the lodge, the athletic club, the reading group, amateur activities of many kinds, service clubs, and so on. Many institutions that have economic or political functions, like trade unions and professional associations, can also have very strong social functions. Also, the great informal network of friendship, visiting in people's homes, dinner engagements, holidays together, and so on. Then there is the family, the kinship group, which is, perhaps, the closest identity-creating structure, and the household, which can, of course, include people not in the kinship group. The workplace and the occupation are also very important in identity relationships: patient-doctor relationships, student-teacher relationships, clergy-parishioner relationships, all involve building an expression of identity. The negative of identity, indeed, is alienation. People who feel themselves to be "nobodies" make trouble for themselves and make trouble for society.

Social and community relationships are so complex, so multidimensional, that

they are hard even to describe (in fact, the main business of the novelist indeed describe them), and they are even harder to measure. So it is not always easy what has been going on, especially as relations of this complexity do not usually into the category of aggregate statistics. We do, of course, have statistics for thing marriage and divorce, church membership, and trade union membership, but a little weak on membership statistics in many other organizations, like service Boy Scouts, and things of that sort. We have very little time-series data on visit how children are raised, on how old people are treated in families, on how people know their neighbors, on how wide is the geographical extent of close tionships, and so on.

Grants and Reciprocity as Indicators

What I have called the "grants economy" (Boulding, 1981)—that is, the one-way transfers of economic goods—is a useful indicator, though less once thought because it is clear that there are two sources of grants: One is which is closely related to social and community life; the other is "fear," which closely related to political life. Grants within the family (and these are very something like 30 percent of national income in the United States is red within the family (Baerwaldt and Morgan, 1973)—are made on the whole desire for identification of parents with the welfare of children, children with the fare of parents, and so on, which is very much a matter of the concept of the id of the individual. What I pay to the bandit or the tax collector is largely paid out of of the consequences. Most grants are mixtures of the two: The part of my taxes out of love is what I would subscribe to the government if it were financed by a Fund. Part of the support I give to my children may be the result of fear of wh neighbors would say, although in some cases it is also the result of fear of wh police and the courts would say if I neglected this particular duty. The mixture o and fear, however, is very rarely fifty-fifty. It is usually heavily weighted towar side or the other, which means that it is certainly not impossible to separate out, in a rough way, the grants that are part of the integrative system and those tha part of the threat system.

Another complicating factor is the phenomenon of reciprocity, which lies where between a pure grant and exchange and is extremely important in soc community life. Exchange is contractual—A gives B something, and B gives A thing that is contracted for in advance. Reciprocity is informal and noncon We give each other Christmas presents, we entertain each other in our hom ents support their children in the expectation that in their old age they will b ported by them, and so on. A contract in itself is rather neutral in regard to an in tive relationship, though it does usually involve something in the way of tru respect, and usually there are sanctions on trading with an enemy. Reciprocity alr implies and indeed creates an integrative relationship. The exchange of gifts is more than trade. It involves saying, in effect, "I think you are a fine person, a think I am a fine person." It is reassurance of identity. On the other hand, the te reciprocity are important. If A feels that she is giving a lot to B and is not much in return from him, the relationship is endangered. We see this particularly family life, which is based on reciprocity rather than on exchange. The terms of procity are often invisible and misunderstood, and it is usually the business of riage counsellors to renegotiate them, if possible, if one or the other party feels

they have become too adverse. The difficulty with reciprocity is that because of its informal and noncontractual nature, it is often misunderstood. A may feel that she is giving a lot to B and not getting much in return, and B may feel just the same. What A gives up is not necessarily what B gets, and what B gives up is not necessarily what A gets, as it tends to be in simple exchange. A man gets home late and brings his wife flowers, and she thinks he has been up to something. For the same reason it is usually unwise to give the boss an expensive present.

Evidence of Change in Integrative Systems: Divorce and Crime

The complexity of these relationships is so great that it is quite hard to answer even the question of what has been happening to them. What we have to look for here is some evidence of change. We have to be pretty careful even about this. A beautiful example is divorce. We are all aware that the divorce rates have been increasing for a considerable period. On the other hand, for well over 75 years now the rate of dissolution of marriages has not changed much, and while divorce has increased, death has diminished (see Figure 28.1). It could well be that divorce is much more a reflection of longevity than it is of any change in the basic character of marriage.

The increase in crime rates, which is certainly worrying, may also have to be interpreted with care (Figure 28.2). It may be, as the crime economists suggest, that crime pays but only at the average wage. As the average wage has risen, the crime industry (if we think of it in those terms) has expanded likewise. On the other hand, the expansion of law enforcement and the overcrowding and worsening conditions of jails does not seem to have acted as much of a deterrent to crime, and just what it is that creates the identity of criminals is something that nobody has investigated very much. Crime is highly specialized in particular areas. Burglary certainly is a reflection of how much there is to steal and that amount has been increasing. Crimes of violence certainly have something to do with the culture of a society, which has always been rather violent in the United States, and the power of the gun lobby would certainly suggest that we are willing to buy guns with death just as we are willing to buy automobiles with death. Crime statistics may easily be misleading, and they certainly do not seem to present much of a model of crime. I do not know anybody who has the nerve to make projections in this area.



SOURCE: The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future Research Reports, *Demographic and Social Aspects of Population Growth* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972).

FIGURE 28.1 Marriage Dissolutions in the United States



SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Social Indicators III* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980: Table 5/6, p. 241).

FIGURE 28.2 Violent Crimes Reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, by Type (1960-1978)

Futures According to Plan—or to Plot?

Other approaches to imaging of the future besides projection again find social and community life rather intractable. One such approach is the plan. In its simplest form this is simple cybernetics or homeostasis, some kind of apparatus for sustaining a given state. It is much easier to predict the temperature a year from now in a room with a thermostat, as long as the system survives, than it is to surmise the temperature outside it. There are a few social thermostats that can be identified. If unemployment edges toward 10 percent, things tend to be done about it. And when a society has even double-digit inflation, it produces some kind of counteraction, often not too successful. More complicated are plans for growth and development. As an acorn is a plan for an oak tree, an investment plan of a corporation or a five-year plan of a Communist state is a plan for a pattern of the future that may or may not be realized. Then there is a law that sets up an agency with a plan for some kind of intervention in society. As Robert Burns said, however, "The best laid plans of mice and men gang aft a-gley." Then the unplanned very often happens, like Three Mile Island or stagflation, an abortive revolution or a lost war.

Intervention by plan or legislation into social and community life is very difficult and often quite disastrous. The Cultural Revolution in China, perhaps, is an example of one that turned out disastrously. I have suggested, indeed, that there is a kind of law of political irony that states that everything you do to hurt people helps them, and everything you do to help people hurts them. And while there are, fortunately, considerable exceptions to this law, there are also enough examples of it to be worrysome. Thus protection often injures the protected industry. Agricultural subsidies designed to help the poor farmer in fact tend to go to the rich ones. Medicaid and Medicare enrich the doctors and have not perceptibly expanded the expectation of life. Progressive taxes may easily be evaded by the unproductive and may hamper the activities of the productive. The tobacco quota enriches those descendants of landowners who happen to have had tobacco grown on their land in 1934 and also may increase the cancer rate. Quotas and licenses of almost any kind redistribute income quite arbitrarily to those who happen to get them. The wages of unorganized workers have often risen faster than those of organized workers. This happened dramatically in World War II. Beautiful climates and rich natural resources often produce stagnant societies. The list can be extended very discouragingly.

Another approach to the future is to look at episodes in the past that seem to be repeating themselves. Wars, depressions, revolutions, and hyperinflations have a certain pattern that can be detected. If we find ourselves at the beginning of such an episode, it is a bit like being in the first act of a play. I have been wondering lately whether it feels more like 1929, more like 1914, or, more hopefully, like neither. Social and community life, however, usually changes glacially if we except things like the "Cultural Revolution," and it is hard to find episodes in it beyond, perhaps, episodes of corruption and decay, and episodes of rebuilding and renewal. But the patterns are so diverse it is very hard to tell where we are in them.

The Evolutionary-Ecological Approach to Futures

Perhaps the best approach to this very difficult problem of futures is an evolutionary-ecological one, in spite of the deep indeterminancy in such systems and a corresponding inability to make very secure predictions. We can see social and community life, however, as part of the great ecosystem of the world, of innumerable species all interacting with each other in ways that create niches—that is, equilibrium populations of particular species. It sometimes pays to look for the possibility of empty niches, the probability of filling them, and the impact of filling them on all the other niches. In this, as in many other areas, hindsight is much easier than foresight. It is easy to see, for instance, that the overkilling of whales in the mid-nineteenth century led to a decline in whale oil, which created a niche for kerosene, which was filled by the discovery of oil and gas in 1858. The production of kerosene produced gasoline as an unwanted byproduct, which created a niche for the internal combustion engine of the automobile, which again was filled, which created niches for gas stations and supermarkets, trailer camps and emergency wards in hospitals, which also were filled. These particular niches may decline as gasoline becomes scarcer and more expensive with the exhaustion of the underground stocks. The rising prices of energy have created empty niches for conservation devices, for alternative energy systems, for photoelectric cells and cheap, high-capacity batteries for use in electric automobiles, and so on. Some of these niches get filled, and some do not. It certainly would

have been extremely difficult in, say, 1840 to predict the consequences of the decline in whale oil!

Impact of Television, the Pill, and Electricity

We can apply some of this mode of thought to social and community life and institutions. The invention of television, which occupied a very large niche rather rapidly, has diminished the niche for family conversation and perhaps for informal learning from people visiting in the home. It has diminished the niche for movies, although not to extinction. Television, indeed, has perhaps been the most significant change agent in social and community life in the twentieth century. It has probably destroyed a lot of informal learning, but it also is a window on the world that has widened the images of very large numbers of people and has had a considerable political impact. The rapid waning of McCarthy and McCarthyism in the early 1950s was attributed by some to the rise of television, which made McCarthy with his dark jowls look like a bad guy in a western movie, whereas over radio he came through rather effectively. It has been argued, indeed, that if we had had television in the 1920s we might never have had Hitler. It is one thing to be charismatic in a large public meeting, and even on the radio; it is quite another thing to be charismatic on the TV screen in the living room. In this sense, television may have been something of a safeguard against political excess. It certainly produced its own pathologies. One wonders whether it might not even produce something worse than Hitler.

Another very important impact has been cheap and easy birth control devices, especially the Pill, which certainly seems to have expanded premarital sexual activity and diminished the ethic of self-control.

The technical revolution in the household, which happened as a result largely of electricity and the labor-saving devices that followed it, has had a tremendous impact in releasing housewives for jobs outside. In some ways, this is comparable to the great revolution in agricultural production that has been going on for a long time, but which accelerated after about 1930 and has resulted in the release of some 30 million people from agriculture who have gone to the cities and have helped to create the urban problem. At least it helped to produce the color TV sets and other goodies that have doubled per capita income in the last generation. I find it hard to evaluate which has produced the greater consequences: the tremendous shift from rural to urban life, which has certainly profoundly affected social and community life and institutions, or the emancipation of women from housework, which has produced great pressures for equal economic and social treatment of women. As a result of this, perhaps, men have become slightly better fathers than they were a generation earlier. The custom of having the father participate in the birth, for instance, was almost unheard of thirty years ago, and it is commonplace today, at least in the middle class.

The Rise of Organized Religion and Education

One of the most extraordinary phenomena in the history of the United States has been the rise of organized religion. It is all the more extraordinary because it seems to be so unnoticed. We somehow remember the religious foundation of New England and Pennsylvania and we forget that the United States as a nation was founded in the

fine flush of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The Founding Fathers, if not all atheists, were at least deists and agnostics. I have seen one estimate (the source of which, unfortunately, I cannot recall) that only some 7 percent of the population at the time of the American Revolution were active members of any church. Today church membership is something over 60 percent, having peaked, perhaps, in the 1960s. This has been a fairly steady rise through the last two hundred years. Part of it, undoubtedly, is the immigrants' need for a distinctive identity, which they have found in the native churches, whether Greek Orthodox, Catholic, or Lutheran. The extraordinary vigor of both the Lutheran and Catholic churches in the United States compared with, say, the Lutheran Church in Scandinavia, or even the Catholic Church in Italy or Spain, suggests that there is something in Adam Smith's contention that free competition in religion both expands and purifies it. The extraordinary impact of Methodism and its innumerable offshoots into Protestant evangelism is also something that is strangely overlooked by American historians. The political power of organized religion was certainly reflected in the establishment of prohibition. Even though this failed, it certainly looks like the wrong answer to a very real problem of alcoholism that is still with us. The influence of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestantism is certainly reflected in the elections of both Carter and Reagan. To some extent this is a class phenomenon, though class in the United States is so complex and such a muddle that one hesitates almost to use the word.

"Liberals" tend to be college-educated professionals or quasi-professionals, whereas conservatives represent an alliance of the rich and the poor against the middle. Their political strength may well come from those who have not been to college, and who belong, paradoxically enough, to the closest thing that we have to a working class. Engels is reported to have said that change in quantity produces a change in quality, which indeed is a very profound remark. Alienation may well be a function of the size and structure of minorities. When only 5 percent of the population is college educated, as was the case even two generations ago, the other 95 percent may not feel very much deprived because as a majority they have their own culture and their own way of life. When 50 percent feel very much deprived, communication easily breaks down. The whole question of tolerance of elites by the nonelite is one of the most fascinating problems in social systems, and one that does not seem particularly responsive to current methods in the social sciences.

The Public Grants Economy

One of the ways in which the very strange and complex dynamics of the integrative system manifests itself is in the development of what might be called the "public grants economy"—that is, one-way transfers from government to nongovernmental organizations, including families, and even individuals. Money flows into government from taxes, which is essentially a grants economy. If the test of a grant is the transfer of net worth, there is no doubt that when a taxpayer pays taxes, his or her net worth goes down and the government's goes up. The government also receives money from the sale of securities and by simply printing money, and by the sale of securities to banks it obtains money in the form of bank deposits. The government spends money either in purchases, which is exchange, buying labor services and commodities, or in transfers or grants. Purchases of the federal government in the United States have actually been declining as a proportion of the national income for about 25 years. State and local government purchases have expanded sharply. Fed-



SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 123, "Money Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1978" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978: Table 12).

FIGURE 28.3 Percentage of Families and Unrelated Individuals by Total Money Income, United States (1947-1978), in constant $U.S.

eral grants, on the other hand, have also expanded sharply, both to state and local governments and to private organizations and persons.

The public grants economy is a reflection in part of the national integrative system. It reflects a dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of property and the results of the exchange system. This has two aspects: The first is the allocational aspect, which is essentially the redistribution of human activity and resource allocation. We allocate resources through public grants to such things as highways, parks, wilderness areas, urban renewal, pollution control, hospitals and medical care, nursing homes, homes for the aged, and so on, to which resources would not otherwise have been devoted. The other aspect, which is closely related to the first, is distribution of economic welfare, particularly in regard to personal riches or poverty. Distribution and allocation are very closely intertwined. Even if we give straight money grants to the aged, for instance, this will increase the allocation of resources to nursing homes. If we give aid to dependent children, it will increase the allocation to baby carriages. The overall stage of development of a society and its overall product mix will have a profound effect on the distribution of income and welfare. Again, in a society that can produce a stock of about half as many automobiles as there are people in the United States,

almost every family will have one. In a society that can only produce one automobile per 10,000 people, like China, the distribution of their enjoyment will be remarkably unequal.

One of the real puzzles of economics is the extraordinary stability of the proportional distribution of income. This is shown in Figure 28.3, where we see that in the last generation poverty in the United States has been halved by almost any standard we might take. This has been accomplished with virtually no redistribution of income among households. It has happened only because everybody has become twice as rich. The poor got twice as rich and so did the middle class and the wealthy.

The Revolt Against Government Intervention

The revolt against government intervention, and especially against the public grants economy, in social and community life is certainly expressed by the Reagan administration and is a fairly worldwide phenomenon. There are rumblings even in the Communist countries. It is a very complex phenomenon and in some ways very puzzling. It may be in part a displaced reaction, a feeling of helplessness about the arms race and the feeling that national governments are hurtling toward an unspeakable catastrophe in nuclear war that may destroy us all. We feel helpless in the face of national government, so we take out our resentment in school bond elections, Proposition 13, and the support of cutbacks in social services. Another possible element is an uneasiness, not wholly unjustified, about the efficiency of the public grants economy in the social service area. People are much more likely to make or to support grants if they feel they are efficient. If I give up a dollar and it only benefits you ten cents, I am not likely to do it. If I give up a dollar and it benefits you ten dollars, I am much more likely to do it. The uneasy feeling that there is a "law of political irony," even though there are many notable exceptions, may account in part for the current difficulties of the public grants economy.

The Household as a Crucial and Neglected Institution

At the bottom of all these difficulties is the fact that we are dealing with a system of literally inconceivable complexity, which is the human being. And furthermore, we are dealing with it in a setting that has been much neglected by social analysis—that is, the household. Perhaps the simplest definition of a household is a group of people who have a front door they can shut. The most common household is the family or the kinship group, but it is by no means confined to that. It is an institution with no equilibrium. Everybody ages constantly. Babies are born into it, people die out of it, children leave home, partners get divorced, and so on. It has no constant role structure, such as a university or a corporation tends to have. It represents a high concentration of both physical and human capital. In the household we are usually surrounded by far more capital goods than we are at our workplace. But it has no balance sheet, and very rarely an accountant, except perhaps at income tax time. It can take things in through that front door for a long time without giving much out, and vice versa. It is the only social institution that produces children and, if there is a population problem, that is where it lies. It is governed by reciprocity and not by exchange, and reciprocity is rarely the exchange of equal values. Parties in a household may feel they are giving a lot to it and not getting very much back or vice versa.

Each person in a household may have quite different images from the other persc about him- or herself and the others. Sometimes there is very little feedback. It has far and away the largest grants economy—30 percent of the national income is re tributed within households. It performs a great many social functions that neve into the statistics. Economists regard it as a black box into which they never Sociologists try to take the lid off, but are by no means sure that what they see i what the people inside see. The household is a strong source of personal i positive or negative. The households of the past generation created the proble are the principal source of income of psychiatrists in the present. In these da household usually has a window on the world in the shape of a television set. ever, if this is turned on all the time, it makes little more impact than the drips a plumbing and becomes commonplace and familiar. Everything that happens in family tends to be familiar and is taken for granted, but it may be very peculiar fc that. The house is a castle and the household inhabits a fortress, and the investiga who knocks at the door does so with some peril. It is not surprising that we know little about it when intervention in it is so difficult. And yet the household is a prin producer of persons.

The Problem: Individual Persons

Persons are the problem. For each person we could imagine a rough measure the capital value of the person to society at large. This would depend very much society's terms of trade with that person. How much does it get per unit of wha gives? There are people of very high capital value who have benefited perhap whole human race for many generations to come, and yet who have taken very from it in proportion to what they have given: Newton, Edison, Shakespeare. There are others with a highly negative social net worth, who have caused immense hu suffering and misery, and have taken away from the human race much more they added: Hitler, Stalin, Tamerlane. For the vast majority of the human race, haps the terms are fairly even. Most people must give to society a little more than they take, or there would be no capital accumulation. The rather grim test here is to ask ourselves: How much would the world gain or lose by a premature death? The idea time to die is when one's capital value is zero and the loss to the world just balances the gain. We do find, however, persons whose capital value in this sense is negative, who take from the rest of the world substantially more than they give to it over the course of their lives.

There is, of course, a life cycle here, and in immediate income terms, though not perhaps in terms of capital value, people generally give to the world more than they take in middle life, and take more than they give in childhood and old age. We are dealing here, however, with the total life span and the net cost to society of crime, parental incompetence, and the mistreatment of children, drug and alcohol addiction, habits like smoking that produce ill health and earlier death, and a lot of subtle elements that could be described as plain human nastiness. The object of public intervention, or of even private intervention at the personal household or even community level, would seem to have a major objective of increasing the positive social capital value of persons and diminishing the negative values. Here, however, we find ourselves in a maze of mirrors—persons are so complex. Each has a different history; each has different genetic potentials. Most of all, each has a different image of the personal identity.

The image of personal identity is at the core of a great many of these problems, yet we really understand very little about its formation. The fact that alienation, the lack of something to identify with, is the source of innumerable personal social evils is common, but its origins in the household, in the workplace, the community, the school, the church, are obscure indeed. My Methodist grandfather, a countryman and a blacksmith, with little formal education beyond the Bible, was poor by any modern standards. He could not even afford a bicycle. But I think he was about the most unalienated person I have ever known. He had a strong sense of his own identity, of his mission in the world, of his home in heaven, and if anybody had called him poor, he would have been insulted. The government, and certainly the public grants economy, was as remote to him as the stars, which, incidentally, he always denied were suns, and I have never forgotten the twinkle in his eye.

Hopes for Solutions: Human Learning and Competent Institutions

How do we develop an epidemiology of disalienation, of high-quality persons, with a high-level vision of their personal identity, with a high capital value of the rest of the world, and diminish the epidemiology that infects with alienation? I think we do not know the answer to this question, and this is perhaps why the future of social and community life looks very much like the present, perhaps a little worse. But the limits of human learning are very far from being reached, and it is not inconceivable that we can discover learning processes and institutions that will flood households with competence, give a strong sense of identity to individuals as they grow up, and gradually relieve society of the enormous burden of negative human capital that it now bears. What is important about the future is not that we should follow trends, for these are almost always illusory, but that we should have a vision of a possible change of parameters. As difficult and complex as the system is with which we are trying to deal, the human learning process also is tremendously complex; we have not reached its limits. In that there is hope, even though we may have to take a very long view before it is fully realized.

Malthus, in *Population: The First Essay*, after his terrible "miserific vision" of the enormous difficulty of removing human misery, wrestles as a Christian minister with the problem of evil and says, "Evil exists in the world not to create despair but activity" (1971: 138). The value of the evolutionary view of the world that I have been putting forward (as opposed to the mechanical view) is that it is not deterministic and opens up the large possibility that the human race, because of its extraordinary capacity for learning and knowledge, both in the realm of fact and in the realm of values, has enormous potential for moving the system of the world in the direction of human betterment. Progress in terms of human valuations is not a nineteenth-century fantasy, but a profound reality of the evolutionary process, although it is neither inevitable nor mechanical. It involves human activity in both learning and acting, in creating realistic visions of the future and in persuading people that they can act so as to make them come true.

The problems of social and community life certainly center in persons, but the solutions lie to a considerable extent in the ability of persons to inspire others to create institutions. The individual learning process is certainly all-important, but learning depends on the environment of the individual, both the immediate environment and the larger environment, of government, law, the media, the educational institutions, the churches, political parties, and so on. There are indeed cases of iso-

lated individuals—poets and prophets—who have profoundly changed the world through their impact on the symbolic system of the human race, but for most people, if they want to be effective, they have to work through institutions that amplify their own values and activities into the larger society. There is a feeling abroad perhaps that only persons matter and institutions do not. This is a gross misunderstanding of the realities of the world. Both persons and institutions matter, and most persons realize their personhood mainly through institutions. We should not despair then of government, of law, of political action, or of political institutions, for these are in many ways the "dominant species" of the social ecosystem. But we should never forget either that these are changed by persons, and persons means us.

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Author Index

Abramson, L. Y., 556, 557
Ackerman, F., 243, 264
Ackoff, R., 165, 167, 176, 177
Adams, C. A., 557
Adams, C. T., 470, 471
Adams, F., 634, 636
Adams, G. R., 472
Addams, J., 23, 32
Adelman, H. S., 357, 359
Agar, M. H., 104, 117
Ageton, S. S., 370, 382
Ahlbrandt, R., 532, 540
Aiello, J. R., 544, 557, 558
Aiken, L. H., 77, 93
Akpom, C., 96
Albritton, R. B., 442, 453
Alexander, C., 35, 47, 633, 636
Alexander, J. K., 286
Alexander, P., 210
Alexander, L., 93
Alfaro, J., 447, 453
Algina, J., 130, 141
Algozzine, B., 360
Alinsky, S., 243, 264, 618, 636
Allen, S., 96
Alperovitz, G., 244, 250, 264
Alterman, J., 588
Althoff, M. E., 93
Altman, F., 542, 543, 557, 559
Anderson, D. C., 623, 636
Anderson, T. E., 94
Anania, T., 161
Anschell, S., 589
Anthony, W. A., 87, 93, 418, 419, 435
Antonovsky, A., 547, 557
Apell, J., 248, 264
Ares, C., 394, 395, 405
Arkin, R. M., 551, 558
Armor, D., 194, 209
Aronowitz, S., 508, 518
Aronson, E., 155, 161
Arrow, K., 227, 234
Atkin, J., 324, 337
Attkinson, C. C., 76, 93
Auerbach, C., 631, 636
Austin, J., 386, 387, 391, 392, 393, 405
Averill, J., 550, 557
Axinn, J., 481, 498
Ayres, R., 201, 210

Bach, E., 538, 540
Baerwaldt, N., 641, 651
Barach, R., 589
Barnaby, D. J., 574, 588
Bailey, J., 440, 453
Baker, S. H., 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 405
Balbus, I., 264
Baldwin, J., 503, 245, 264
Baldwin, W., 469, 471
Ball, J., 505, 518
Ball, R. M., 442, 453
Ballenger, B., 260, 261, 264
Bandura, A., 277, 278, 286, 623, 636
Banet, D. P., 90, 97
Barber, L., 74, 95
Barber, R., 508, 509, 514, 518
Bard, M., 404, 405
Bardach, E., 227, 234, 517, 519
Barker, R., 103, 104, 117
Baron, R. M., 544, 557
Bateson, G., 616, 636
Bauer, R. A., 272, 286
Bauer, R., 119, 120, 138, 141
Baum, A., 544, 551, 552, 558
Bauzer, R., 368, 383
Beavin, J. H., 638
Beberman, M., 324, 325
Beck, P., 572, 573, 575, 577, 581, 583, 588
Becker, L. J., 590
Becker, M. H., 277, 286
Becker, N., 260, 264
Bedard, R., 258, 264
Bell, J. G., 97, 472
Bellas, C. J., 511, 519
Belton, E., 96
Benello, G., 250, 264
Benham, L., 429, 435
Benjamin, A. E., 61, 62, 313, 319, 320, 322, 443, 445, 446, 447, 453, 474
Benne, K., 242, 264, 630, 636
Bennett, E., 638
Bennis, W., 242, 255, 264, 618, 636, 638
Benus, J., 472
Berck, P., 118

Berelson, G., 287
Berger, D. E., 96
Berger, M., 558
Berger, P., 13, 14, 17, 54, 66, 413, 435, 633, 636
Berger, R., 208, 210
Bergson, H., 616, 632, 636
Berk, R. A., 76, 93, 94, 97
Berk, S. F., 93, 94
Berkowitz, L., 278, 286
Berman, K., 511, 519
Berman, P., 329, 337, 518, 519
Bernstein, C., 255, 267
Bernstein, P., 248, 264, 502, 511, 514, 519
Bernstein, R., 263, 264
Berry, J. L., 97
Berry, L. G., 589
Bevan, W., 629, 636
Bickman, L., 544, 558
Billingsley, D. L., 383
Billington, R. J., 74, 94
Binstock, R. H., 452, 453
Birch, J. W., 345, 346, 347, 348, 357, 358, 361
Bishop, J., 463, 464, 471
Bixby, A. K., 481, 498
Black, E., 188, 189, 193, 194, 195, 210
Black, G., 160
Black, J. S., 590
Blair, K. A., 360
Blake, U L., 96
Blanco, D., 95
Blanchard, F., 382
Blankenship, C., 347, 357, 359
Blankenship, L. V., 67
Blasi, J. R., 511, 521
Blatt, B., 316, 352, 353, 359
Blauner, R., 499, 501, 502, 519
Blechman, H. M., 456, 471
Blendon, R. J., 93
Bleu, K., 108, 118
Blomberg, R. D., 75, 94
Blomberg, T. G., 110, 117, 379, 382, 388, 405
Bloom, B. L., 120, 141, 636
Bluestone, B., 511, 514, 519
Bluestone, H., 142
Blumberg, A., 203, 210
Blumberg, P., 241, 242, 264, 502, 503, 519
Bogart, L., 275, 286
Boggs, G., 264
Boggs, J., 247, 264
Booth, H., 258, 264
Bootzin, R. R., 97
Borda, O. F., 244, 264
Boring, E. G., 622, 636
Boruch, R. F., 69, 70, 74, 76, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 628, 637
Boulding, K. E., 613, 641, 651
Boulet, J., 179, 180, 181, 476
Bouterline, S., 542, 558
Bower, C. P., 135, 141
Bower, J. L., 621, 636
Bower, R. T., 275, 286
Bowles, S., 250, 263, 264
Bowsher, P., 523, 540
Box, G. E. P., 102, 117, 121, 130, 141
Boyle, H. C., 243, 264, 538, 540
Bradbury, K., 464, 471, 494, 498
Brandt, L., 25, 32
Branston, M. B., 359
Brager, G., 239, 249, 264
Braverman, H., 249, 264, 500, 501, 519
Brecher, J., 246, 264
Breger, M., 92, 94
Brennan, T., 127, 141
Breitrose, H., 286
Bricker, D., 350, 359
Brody, E., 449, 453
Bromet, E., 156, 160
Bronfenbrenner, U, 14, 17
Bronfman, B. H., 590
Browkowski, A., 434, 435
Brown, B. W., Jr., 286
Brown, B. S., 96
Brown, C. E., 406
Brown, L., 346, 351, 359
Brown, M., 226, 234
Brown, P., 612
Brownell, E., 97
Bryan, W., 248, 259, 263, 264
Bryant, B. I., 265
Buck, J. A., 421, 429, 430, 434, 435
Buckley, P., 627, 636
Buckley, W., 37, 47, 57, 67
Bucuvales, M. J., 97
Buddenbaum, J. M., 275, 288
Budman, S. H., 435
Bueche, N., 472
Buell, G. J., 93
Bullock, C., 196, 210
Burch, W., 598, 606, 611
Burdge, R., 611
Burger, J. M., 551, 558
Burges, B., 256, 265
Burnhsm, J., 633, 636
Buss, A. R., 631, 636
Butler, G., 593, 611
Butler, L. H., 443, 453
Buttell, F., 263, 265
Bynum, T., 396, 405
Byrd, R. N., 91, 95

Cain, G., 495, 498
Cain, L. D., 62, 67
Cain, V. S., 469, 471
Calesnick, L. E., 558
Callaway, J. D., 382
Camara, H., 247, 265
Camara, S., 33, 34, 37, 47
Camilli, G., 141
Campbell, A., 120, 141
Campbell, D. T., 74, 83, 85, 88, 91, 94, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106, 108, 117, 121, 141, 142, 391, 406, 628, 636
Campbell, J., 559
Cannon, D., 96

Canon, B., 202, 210
Caplan, G., 546, 547, 558
Caplan, N., 54, 63, 67, 96, 108, 117, 374, 382, 385, 406, 627, 636
Carbone, N. R., 540
Cardarelli, A. P., 383
Cardenal, E., 247, 265
Carey, R. G., 96
Carlson, D., 162
Carlson, R., 611
Carney, F. J., 374, 382
Carney, J., 589
Carnoy, M., 249, 250, 265, 506, 508, 519
Carp, F. M., 545, 558
Carroll, T. O., 577, 588
Cartwright, L., 155, 160
Casey, J. O., 407
Casper, J., 203, 210
Casuso, V., 359
Cataldo, G. J., 524, 540
Cavel, P., 540
Cecere, L., 458, 471
Cecil, J. S., 74, 83, 93, 94
Cernkovich, S. A., 369, 382
Certo, N., 359
Chaffee, S., 286
Chambers, C., 25, 32
Chambers, C. A., 19
Champagne, A., 179, 180, 181, 182, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 208, 210
Cheek, N., 598, 605, 606, 611
Cherlin, D. L., 638
Cherniss, C., 155, 160
Chesler, M., 179, 180, 181, 255, 257, 263, 265, 476
Chesney, M., 156, 160
Chin, R., 264, 636
Chomsky, N., 323, 337
Choper, J., 210
Chown, B., 95
Churchman, C. W., 63, 67, 164, 165, 167, 169, 177
Citin, J., 590
Clark, D. L., 327, 337
Clark, R. J., 442, 453
Clarke, P., 275, 286
Clay, P. L., 532, 540
Clayton, J., 161
Clingempeel, W. G., 387, 407
Cloward, R. A., 474, 241, 244, 249, 253, 255, 263, 266, 376, 382
Cluett, C., 573, 576, 581, 584, 589, 590
Clute, M. C., 524, 540
Coates, R. B., 371, 373, 382, 383
Cochran, N., 83, 94
Cohen, D., 181, 184, 221, 222, 234, 235
Cohen, J., 82, 94
Cohen, S., 544, 551, 558, 560
Coldwell, D., 574, 588
Cole, H., 333, 337
Coleman, J., 194, 210, 220, 234
Coleman, P., 153, 160
Colligan, M., 156, 161
Collins, A., 23, 32
Compton, D., 611
Comstock, G., 179, 180, 269, 275, 278, 286, 287
Cone, J. D., 572, 573, 576, 589
Connelly, K. J., 400, 406
Conner, P., 96
Converse, P., 141, 269, 287
Cook, S. W., 573, 589
Cook, T. D., 76, 94, 96, 99, 106, 117, 121, 141, 628, 636
Cook, T. J., 96, 409, 411, 435
Cooley, M., 500, 501, 519
Cooley, W. W., 89, 94, 329, 337
Cooper, M., 356, 360
Coover, V. E., 248, 265
Cordray, D. S., 76, 94, 96
Corrado, R., 307, 313, 317, 318, 389
Cortner, R., 198, 210
Cowen, E. L., 545, 558, 628, 636
Cox, F., 249, 265
Cox, L. A., 370, 383
Craig, C. W., 620, 636
Craik, K. H., 542, 558
Crano, W. D., 112, 113, 115, 118
Cronbach, L. J., 91, 95, 101, 106, 117
Cronkite, R., 143, 161
Crowfoot, J., 179, 180, 181, 183, 255, 258, 263, 265, 476
Cruickshank, W. M., 341, 360
Cumming, E., 413, 435, 439, 453
Cumming, J., 413, 435
Cunningham, W. H., 573, 588
Curtin, R., 573, 588

Dade, J. T., 393, 398, 406
D'Augelli, A. R., 427, 435
Danelski, D., 208, 210
Danish, S. J., 418, 435
Danziger, S., 221, 234, 491, 492, 493, 498
Darley, J. M., 590
Darmstadter, J., 562, 563, 567, 588
David, H. P., 471
David, T., 153, 161
Davidoff, I., 78, 95
Davidson, S. M., 442, 453
Davidson, W. S., 69, 70, 101, 108, 109, 117, 118, 637
Davis, A., 25, 32
Davis, G. E., 551, 552, 558
Davis, H., 292, 312
Davis, K., 442, 448, 453
Davis, L. A., 91, 96
Day, D., 567, 573, 575, 577, 589
Deacon, C., 265
Dean, A., 547, 558
Dean, L., 158, 161
DeGrazia, A., 187, 210
Delaney, J. A., 426, 435
Dellario, D. J., 418, 419, 435
Denner, B., 413, 418, 435, 436
Deno, E., 347, 359

Deno, S. L., 346, 357, 359, 361
DePiano, L., 157, 161
Deppe, T., 611
DeRisi, D., 557
Derthick, M., 216, 234
Dervin, D., 275, 287
Dethman, L., 583, 590
Deutsch, A., 412, 413, 435
Dewey, J., 167, 168, 170, 177
Dickenson, J., 472
Dickenson, K., 472
Diebolt, J., 620, 636
Dieckman, D., 406
Dillman, D. A., 590
Dinkel, N. R., 79, 95
Dixon, M. C., 374, 383
Dmitriev, V., 350, 360
Dobson, O., 96
Doctors, S. I., 588
Dodd, N., 359
Doering, O. C., 575, 590
Dohrenwend, B. S., 547, 558
Donaldson, K., 413, 435
Donovan, D. L., 337
Doob, A. N., 280, 287
Douglas, J. D., 255, 265
Douvan, E., 436, 437
Dowd, J., 438, 453
Downs, A., 227, 234
Doyle, J. B., 613
Drachman, R. H., 286
Driscoll, J. M., 404, 406
Drucker, P., 508, 519
Druckman, J., 383
Dugdale, R. L., 341, 359
Dukes, F. O., 544, 559
Dumazedier, J., 598, 611
Duncan, G., 472
Duncan, R., 293, 312, 571, 590
Dunford, F. W., 376, 382
Dunkerley, J., 588
Durlack, J. A., 426, 429, 435
Dyer, R. F., 112, 115, 118
Dyk, W., 46, 47
Dytrych, Z., 469, 471

Easley, J., 326, 337
Eaton, W. W., 546, 558
Ebbesen, E., 397, 406
Eckstein, H., 456, 471
Edelson, E., 582, 588
Edgerton, J., 244, 265
Edginton, C., 602, 611
Edwards, D. S., 383
Edwards, R., 246, 249, 263, 265, 355, 360, 500, 519
Edwards, W., 381, 382
Egner, A., 346, 357, 359
Ehrilich, P. R., 576, 590
Eisenstein, F., 263, 265
Ellerman, D. P., 514, 515, 519
Elliott, D. S., 370, 371, 375, 379-380, 382
Ellis, F., 161
Ellis, P., 563, 571, 572, 588
Ellis, V., 207, 210
Ellison, C., 243, 265
Elmore, R., 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 220, 225, 234
Elmore, R. F., 315
Elworth, J. T., 590
Emerson, R. M., 409, 411, 435
Emery, F., 167, 177
Empey, L. T., 362, 370, 381, 383
Endicott, J., 78, 95
Ennis, R., 336, 337
Ensel, W. M., 559
Epstein, Y. M., 557
Erickson, M. L., 369, 370, 383
Erie, S., 226, 234
Erlich, J. L., 265, 266
Esser, C., 265
Estes, C., 313, 319, 320, 474
Estes, C. L., 51, 54, 61, 62, 67, 438, 440, 441, 443, 446, 448, 449, 452, 453, 454
Estroff, S. E., 418, 419, 420, 436
Evans, G. W., 544, 558

Fairweather, G. W., 57, 67, 99, 100, 101, 105, 118, 628, 636
Fallows, J., 218, 219, 234
Fanon, F., 245, 263, 265
Farquhar, J. W., 283, 285, 286
Farrow, F., 450, 453, 454
Faux, J., 250, 264
Feder, J., 448, 453
Feeley, M., 187, 188, 210, 393, 406
Feld, S., 436
Felder, C., 161
Fell, J. C., 94
Felton, B. J., 412, 437
Ferman, L. A., 501, 519
Festinger, L., 627, 636
Field, C. G., 90, 95
Field, O., 611
Figlio, R. M., 383
Finney, J., 101
Fiorelli, J. S., 353, 361
Fisch, R., 67, 407, 638
Fish, J. H., 243, 265
Fishbein, M., 280, 286
Fisher, J., 27, 32
Fisher, S. G., 426, 436
Fisher, T. H., 337
Fishman, R., 389, 406
Fiske, D. W., 108, 117
Fitch, J. S., 135, 142
Fitzritson, S., 161
Flacks, R., 262, 265
Flaherty, E. W., 76, 95
Flanagan, J., 258, 265
Flinn, W., 263, 265
Florio, D., 312
Fogel, D., 386, 406
Foley, H. A., 415, 436

Follman, J. F., 423, 435
Foner, A., 454
Ford, J. D., 623, 636
Forester, J., 263, 265
Foster, H. D., 577, 590
Fozard, J., 153, 161
Frank, R. E., 272, 286
Franks, D. J., 356, 359
Fraser, J. R., 400, 406
Fredin, E., 275, 286
Freedman, L., 535, 540
Freeman, H., 124, 141
Freeman, H. E., 93, 438, 453
Freeman, H. G., 99, 118
Freire, P., 244, 245, 246, 252, 255, 265
Fried, M., 547, 558
Frieden, K., 505, 519
Friedman, H., 471
Friedman, L., 204, 210, 221, 234
Friedman, M., 429, 435
Frisch, M., 243, 265
Friss, L. R., 443, 446, 453
Frith, G. H., 355, 360
Froelich, J. E., 400, 406
Froland, C., 23, 32
Fromm, E., 246, 265
Furstenberg, F., 506, 519

Gabriele, T., 558
Galbraith, J. K., 621, 623, 636
Galloway, C., 349, 353, 360
Gamson, W. A., 246, 247, 253, 265
Gans, H., 247, 265
Garafalo, J., 400, 406
Garet, M., 221, 234
Gardner, G. T., 570, 572, 590
Garfinkel, L, 320, 473, 474, 492, 498
Gartner, A., 432, 435
Gaudet, H., 287
Gaskell, G., 563, 571, 572, 573, 588
Gauvain, M., 161
Gearhart, B. R., 354, 360
Gendreau, P., 386, 407
Gentemann, K. M., 570, 588
Geoffrey, W., 332, 337
Gerould, D., 518
Gibson, J. J., 632, 636
Gil, P. G., 12, 17
Gilbert, J. P., 92,95
Gilbert, N., 443, 444, 446, 453
Gilkerson, L., 356, 360
Gilmartin, K., 121, 141
Gintis, H., 250, 263, 264, 265
Giordano, P. C., 369, 382
Gladhart, P. M., 573, 575, 588
Glass, D. C., 544, 551, 558
Glass, G. V, 69, 70, 97, 121, 130, 141, 142, 329, 337, 426, 429, 436, 437
Glazer, N., 263, 265
Gleicher, P., 547, 558
Glennan, T. K., 96
Glines, S. W., 91, 95
Goddard, H. H., 341, 360
Goertzel, V., 392, 406
Goffman, E., 413, 436, 545, 558, 616, 636
Goldberg, I. L, 341, 360
Goldberg, I. S., 437
Goldbourt, U, 546, 559
Goldenberg, I., 638
Goldhaber, M., 500, 501, 519
Goldkamp, J. S., 393, 398, 399, 406
Goldsmith, W. W., 517, 518, 519
Goldstine, D., 267
Gollub, J. O., 450, 451, 453
Gomez, H., 82, 94
Goodman, P., 577, 588
Goodnight, J., 563, 590
Goodwin, L., 14, 17, 56, 57, 67, 108, 118
Gordon, F., 515, 519
Gordon, G., 92, 95
Gordon, M., 377, 383
Gore, S., 546, 558
Gornick, V., 263, 265
Gorz, A., 259, 264, 265, 508, 519
Gottfredson, M. R., 393, 394, 398, 399, 406
Gottfredson, S. D., 84, 95
Gottlieb, D., 573
Gottman, J. M., 141
Gotts, E. E., 356, 360
Gouldner, A. W., 58, 67
Gowan, S., 244, 265
Grabbe, P., 616, 637
Graber, D. A., 275, 287
Grad, J., 465, 466, 471
Gradin, R., 561, 572, 576, 588
Graeff, J., 636
Gramlich, E., 471
Gramlich, E. K., 491, 498
Gray, D., 610, 611
Green, P., 58, 67
Greenbaum, J. M., 500, 519
Greenberg, B. S., 275, 287
Greenberg, D., 386, 406
Greenberg, E. S., 516, 519
Greenberg, G. D., 451, 453
Greenberg, M. G., 272, 286
Greenstone, D., 224, 225, 235
Greever, B., 256, 265
Gregory, D., 76, 95
Grene, M., 622, 636
Griffen, J. M., 574, 588
Griffen, L. M., 557
Griffith, J., 201, 210
Grizzle, G. A., 381, 383
Groenveld, L. P., 498
Gross, B. M., 537, 540
Gruenberg, E. M., 433, 435
Gruenewald, L., 359
Grusec, J., 286
Guba, E. G., 90, 95, 327, 337
Gunn, C., 514, 515, 519
Gurin, G., 424, 436
Gustavsen, J., 520
Gutirrez, G., 247, 265

Guttentag, M., 80, 95, 99, 118
Guttridge, P., 377, 383
Gyllenhammar, P. G., 502, 516, 519

Haber, S., 501, 519
Haener, D. P., 286
Hall, H., 23, 32
Hall, R., 462, 471
Hall, T. L., 577, 589
Halpern, S., 460, 472
Hamburg, B., 435
Hamburg, D., 435
Hamilton, M., 466, 472
Hamlin, D., 200, 210
Hammond, P. Y., 588
Hammer, T. H., 520
Hammermesh, D. S., 504, 519
Hammill, D. D., 357, 360
Hamre-Nietupski, S., 359
Handler, J., 187, 194, 196, 197, 200, 204, 206, 210
Haney, C., 203, 210
Hannan, M. T., 494, 498
Hannon, B., 575, 589
Hanson, C., 611
Hansen, D., 288
Hanusa, B. H., 556, 559
Hargreaves, W. A., 93
Hargrove, E. C., 74, 95
Harland, A. T., 401, 406
Harper, R. S., 354, 361
Harpin, R. E., 558, 636
Harrington, C., 440, 448, 449, 453
Harrison, B., 511, 514, 519
Hartman, R., 471
Harwood, C. C., 577, 589
Hasenfeld, E., 409, 410, 436
Haskell, W. L., 286
Havelock, R. G., 327, 337, 616, 621, 636
Haveman, R., 221, 234, 235, 320, 473, 474, 498
Havens, H. S., 76, 77, 78, 95
Havighurst, R. J., 439, 453
Hawley, P. K., 538, 540
Hay, R. A., 102, 110, 118, 121, 128, 142
Hayden, A. H., 350, 360
Hayden, T., 255, 265
Hayek, F. A., 629, 631, 633, 636
Hayes, D., 583, 589
Hayes, S. C., 572, 573, 576, 589
Heal, L. W., 346, 353, 360
Hearle, E. F., 121, 141
Heckscher, C., 515, 519
Heclo, H., 218, 223, 225, 235
Hedrick, T. E., 74, 95
Heffring, M., 312
Heirich, M., 247, 265
Heisenberg, W., 631, 636
Heller, K., 100, 118
Hendricks, M., 74, 76, 95
Hendrickson, L., 74, 95
Henry, D. A., 388, 398, 399, 406
Henry, J., 332, 337
Henry, W. E., 439, 453
Henton, D. C., 453
Herman, E. S., 508, 519
Herring, J., 118
Hess, K., 523, 540
Heumann, L. F., 473, 475, 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 540
Heuser, J. P., 369, 383
Heward, W. L., 346, 360
Hewett, F. M., 340, 342, 343, 360
Hicks, A., 317, 322
Hill, A. W., 333, 337
Hill, J. W., 351, 361
Hill, P. O., 77, 95
Hill, R., 455, 456, 457, 459, 460, 461, 472
Hines, F. K., 142
Hiroto, D. S., 551, 558
Hirschel, J., 202, 210
Hirschman, A., 228, 235
Hirschman, R., 429, 435
Hirst, E., 97, 561, 571, 581, 590
Hobbs, N., 546, 560
Hodges, W., 356, 360
Hoenig, J., 466, 472
Hofstadter, D. R., 618, 636
Holahan, C. J., 156, 161, 453, 473, 476, 543, 546, 549, 550, 552, 558, 559
Hollander, E. D., & Associates, 510, 519
Holmes, M., 447, 453
Hornstein, H. A., 616, 619, 620, 636
Hornung, R., 161
Horowitz, M. J., 93
Horton, B. D., 244, 266
Horton, J., 263, 266
Hoshino, G., 446, 454
House, E. R., 313, 314, 315, 677, 324, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 337
House, J. S., 508, 519
Hovland, C. I., 271, 287
Howard, D. R., 601, 602, 604, 607, 609, 612
Hudson, R. B., 441, 447, 452, 454
Huggins, N., 25, 32
Hughes, C. C., 35, 47
Hurvitz, N., 432, 436
Husen, T., 329, 337
Hutcheson, J. D., 523, 540
Hutchinson, W., 616, 619, 636
Hyde, A. A., 360
Hyman, H., 263, 267
Hyman, R., 508, 519

Igra, A., 153, 161
Insel, P. M., 99, 103, 118
Intagliata, J., 361
Iscoe, I., 616, 636

Jackall, R., 514, 519
Jackins, H., 248, 266
Jackson, D. D., 638
Jacobs, J., 633, 637
Janis, I. L., 274, 287
Jason, L. A., 79, 95

Jenkins, D., 506, 519
Jenkins, G. M., 102, 117, 121, 130, 141
Jensen, M., 605, 611
Joe, T., 453
Joerges, B., 473, 476, 565, 567, 572, 573, 574, 575, 589, 590
Johnson, A. G., 511, 519
Johnson, M., 454
Johnson, R. W., 60, 63, 67
Johnson, T. L., 507, 519
Jones, D. C., 502, 511, 515, 570
Jones, D. J., 539, 540
Jones, H., 204, 210
Jones, R. K., 95
Jones, R. L., 357, 360
Jordas, J. P., 501, 519
Joreskog, K., 89, 95
Jorgenson, D. D., 544, 559
Joy, V. D., 467, 472
Juarez and Associates, 82, 83, 91, 96

Kagan, R., 517, 519
Kahn, J., 161
Kahn, S., 239, 252, 256, 257, 266
Kane, R. A., 442, 448, 454
Kane, R. L., 442, 448, 454
Kaplan, A., 87, 96
Kaplan, F., 316, 322, 352, 353, 359
Karlin, R. A., 557
Karmisar, Y., 210
Kasius, C., 378, 383
Kasl, S. V., 501, 520
Katz, E., 271, 287
Katz, S., 96
Katzman, N., 286
Kaufman, M. J., 340, 341, 342, 357, 360
Kautsky, K., 264, 266
Kawazoe, N., 41, 47
Kearney, C. P., 330, 337
Keine, N., 567, 572, 589
Keith, P. M., 332, 337
Kelling, G. L., 403, 406
Kelly, G. A., 635, 637
Kelly, J. G., 545, 547, 559, 629, 632, 637
Kelly, R., 513, 520
Kelly, S., 100, 101, 106, 118, 210
Kelman, H. C., 466, 472, 571, 590
Kennedy, J. F., 415, 421, 436, 422
Kenniston, K., 241, 245, 249, 255, 266
Ketterer, R. F., 427, 436
Kiesler, C. A., 416, 417, 430, 436
Kilkeary, R., 575, 589
Kilmann, R. H., 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 174, 176, 177
Kinder, D., 590
King, J. R., 453
Kirchner, R. E., Jr., 407
Kirk, R. H., 628, 637
Kirscht, J. P., 286
Kish, L., 140, 141
Klapper, J. T., 271, 279, 287
Klein, H. J., 576, 589
Klein, M. W., 110, 118, 313, 316, 317, 362, 364, 365, 367, 368, 369, 371, 374, 375, 376, 377 378, 379, 380, 381, 383
Kliegl, R., 130, 142
Kluckhohn, C., 46, 47
Kluger, R., 193, 210
Kobrin, F., 465, 472
Kobrin, S., 369, 371, 373, 375, 378, 379, 383
Kochanowicz, N., 142
Koehler, F., 361
Kohlberg, L., 635, 637
Kohlenberg, R. J., 573, 576, 589
Koike, K., 41, 47
Kokopeli, B., 260, 266
Koller, D., 97
Konechni, V. J., 397, 406
Koocher, G. P., 429, 436
Koran, L., 158, 161
Kotler, M., 524, 541
Kotler, N. G., 513, 518, 520
Kotz, L., 251, 266
Kotz, N., 251, 266
Kraemer, K., 121, 142
Kramer, M., 433, 436
Krannich, R., 469, 472
Krashninsky, M., 228, 235
Krasner, L., 630, 636, 637
Kraus, J. F., 537, 540
Kraus, R., 607, 609, 611
Kraus, S., 274, 287
Kreisman, D., 467, 472
Kreps, J., 453
Krichbaum, D., 603, 611
Krisberg, B., 381, 383, 386, 387, 405
Krislov, S., 191, 192, 204, 208, 210
Kroes, W. H., 501, 520
Kroger, M. H., 96
Kroll, B., 545, 560
Krotki, K., 83, 96
Krusche, H., 573, 574, 589
Kruskopf, E., 631, 637
Ku, R., 108, 118
Kuhn, T. S., 164, 165, 177, 626, 637
Kulka, R. A., 424, 425, 436, 437
Kuo, W., 559
Kurth, T., 288
Kutza, E. A., 450, 454

Lakey, G., 253, 260, 265, 266
Lamb, H. R., 392, 406
Lampman, R., 484, 492, 493, 498
Land, K., 120, 142
Landry, P., 369, 383
Landsberg, H. H., 561, 589
Langer, E. J., 554, 555, 556, 557, 559
Langer, T., 142
Lapan, S., 338
Lapreato, S. C., 573, 588
Lariviere, P., 267
Larsen, S. C., 360
Larson, R. C., 403, 406
Lasson, K., 501, 520

Lasswell, H. D., 268, 287
Lates, B. J., 346, 357, 359
Laufer, W., 95
Lavrakas, P., 75, 93, 96
Lawton, M. P., 162, 545, 554, 559
Lazarsfeld, P. F., 120, 142, 268, 272, 287
LeBailly, 75, 96
Lee, P., 29, 32
Lee, P. R., 442, 448, 449, 453, 454
Leeds, R., 254, 266
Lefebvre, H., 247, 266
Lehne, R., 195, 208, 210
Leigh, J. E., 360
Leik, R., 472
Leinhardt, G., 329, 337
LeMasters, K., 312
Lemke, S., 69, 70, 71, 103, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 161
Lenihan, K. J., 97
Lenin, V., 246, 264, 266
Lentz, R. J., 78, 96
Leonard-Barton, D., 573, 574, 581, 589
Lerman, P., 371, 383
Leventhal, H., 274, 287
Levin, H., 481, 498
Levin, H. M., 225, 235, 336, 337, 473, 474, 505, 511, 512, 514, 515, 519, 520
Levine, A., 53, 67, 385, 406
Levine, J., 203, 210
Levine, M., 53, 67, 71, 385, 406, 413, 415, 416, 421, 423, 436, 629, 632, 637, 638
Leviton, L., 94
Levy, J., 599, 612
Levy, M. R., 275, 287
Lewin, K., 616, 628, 637
Lewis, A., 202, 210
Lewis, M., 263, 266
Lewis, O., 263, 266
Liberman, M., 432, 436
Lieberman, M., 146, 161
Lichtenberg, A. J., 563, 567, 590
Liebman, L., 220, 235
Light, R. J., 86
Lilly, M. S., 313, 315, 316, 341, 342, 343, 344
Lin, N., 546, 547, 558, 559
Lincoln, S. J., 524, 540
Lincoln, Y. S., 90, 95
Lindblom, C., 181, 184, 222, 235
Lindenthal, J. L., 142
Lindsey, D., 420, 436
Linney, J. A., 628, 637
Lipman, A., 555, 559
Lipsey, M. W., 78, 83, 85, 96
Lipsky, M., 14, 17, 56, 67, 316, 322
Lipton, D. R., 371, 378, 383, 386, 406
Liptzin, B., 79, 96
Little, M. A., 362, 377, 383
Litton, F. W., 354, 360
Liu, B. C., 120, 124, 142
Liu, J., 285, 287
Lloyd, K. E., 590
Lloyd, G., 25, 32
Lloyd, M. E., 590
Locatis, C. N., 80, 96
Lockhart, W., 199, 200, 210
Lodwick, D., 582, 589
Loftus, E., 628, 637
Logan, C., 511, 515, 520
Logue, J., 516, 520
Lortie, D., 332, 337
Loseke, D. R., 93
Lovins, A. B., 578, 589
Lowy, M., 203, 210
Lubeck, S. G., 370, 383
Luckmann, T., 13, 14, 17
Lustig, J., 266
Lutomski, L., 141
Lynn, C., 76, 91, 96
Lynn, L., 217, 235
Lynn, S. J., 412, 427, 436
Lyons, G. M., 58, 67

Maccoby, N., 286
MacDonald, G. E., 280, 286
MacDonald, M., 118, 494, 498
Mackintosh, E., 559
MacLean, J., 611
Madaus, G., 330, 337
Magidson, J., 89, 96
Maiman, L. A., 277, 286
Majchrzak, A., 76, 96
Majone, G., 229, 235
Malthus, T. R., 650, 651
Mandel, D. R., 557
Mandelker, D. R., 523, 540
Mann, L., 358, 360
Manor, R., 174, 177
Marcus, J., 267
Margolis, B. L., 501, 520
Marks, E., 435
Marmor, T. R., 442, 453
Marotz-Baden, R., 458, 472
Martin, C., 589
Martin, J. E., 353, 354, 360, 361
Martinson, R., 381, 383, 386, 406
Maruyama, M., 19, 20, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 52, 55, 59, 60, 63, 66, 67
Marvin, K. E., 79, 98
Mason, R., 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 174, 176, 177
Massey, C., 396, 405
Masters, S., 492, 498
Matejcek, Z., 471
Mathison, S., 313, 314, 315
Matre, M., 573, 588
Mattelart, A., 245, 247, 266
Mattick, H. W., 382
Mawby, R. I., 403, 406
Max, W., 161
Maxon, C., 366, 383
Mayer, W., 265
Mazur, A., 563, 589
McAleenan, M., 366, 383
McAlister, A. L., 280, 286

McCain, L. J., 130, 142
McCall, G., 101, 118
McCammon, S., 161
McCleary, R., 102, 110, 118, 121, 128, 130, 142
McClelland, L., 573, 589
McClure, G., 96
McClure, L., 76, 87, 96, 156, 161
McCombs, M., 286
McCord, J., 370, 383
McCoy, K., 95
McEachern, A. W., 368, 383
McGinness, G. D., 350, 360
McGregor, G. S., 574, 589
McGuire, T. G., 428, 429, 436
McGuire, W. J., 100, 118, 274, 287
McLaughlin, C., 558
McLaughlin, M., 183, 184, 220, 225, 234, 235, 315, 322, 329, 337, 518, 519
McLean, L. D., 337
McMillan, A. W., 481, 498
McNamara, E. F., 282, 287
McNess, M. P., 407
McNutt, G., 360
McSweeny, A. J., 94
Mead, M., 35, 46, 47
Mechanic, D., 413, 423, 430, 436
Medalie, J., 546, 559
Medalie, R., 201, 210
Mehren, B., 161
Melman, S., 242, 266
Meltsner, M., 208, 210
Meltzer, J., 453, 454
Memmi, A., 263, 266
Menchetti, B. M., 355, 361
Mendelsohn, H. A., 268, 282, 283, 284, 287
Menlove, F., 286
Mercer, C. D., 356, 360
Merry, S. E., 400, 406
Merton, R. K., 268, 287
Messe, L., 112, 113, 115, 118
Meyer, A. J., 286
Meyer, R. G., 406
Meyer-Abich, K. M., 561, 589
Michael, S., 142
Miles, I., 623, 637
Miles, M., 168, 171, 176, 177
Miller, A. D., 373, 382, 383
Miller, I. W., 556, 559
Miller, J. A., 453
Miller, R. D., 421, 436
Miller, T. I., 69, 70, 97, 135, 142
Miller, W. B., 374, 383
Miller, W. R., 551, 559
Mills, C. W., 264, 266
Milstein, J. S., 572, 573, 577, 589
Milsum, J., 37, 47
Mintzberg, H., 164, 277
Mirkin, P. K., 346, 359
Mitroff, I. I., 48, 49, 67, 69, 71, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 174, 176, 177
Moberg, D., 250, 251, 266, 515, 520
Mohr, L. B., 453
Mollenkopf, J., 537, 540
Mona, L. G., 340, 341, 342, 357, 360
Monahan, J., 76, 87, 96, 100, 118, 394, 402, 406, 420, 436, 628, 637
Monod, J., 33, 47
Montgomery, R., 523
Moore, C., 265
Moore, D. R., 348, 357, 360
Moore, J., 210, 338
Moore, J. W., 58, 67
Moore, W., 120, 142
Moos, B., 161
Moos, R. H., 69, 70, 71, 84, 85, 96, 97, 99, 103, 118, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 545, 546, 547, 550, 556, 557, 558, 559
Morgan, G., 463, 472
Morgan, J. N., 641, 651
Morris, D., 523, 540
Morris, N., 386, 388, 406
Morrison, B. M., 588
Morrison, D. E., 575, 582, 589
Morse, E. V., 92, 95
Mosteller, F., 95
Moynihan, D. P., 216, 235, 263, 265
Mulvey, E. P., 317, 322, 404, 406
Mumford, E., 434, 436
Munoz, R. F., 559
Munro, B., 472
Munro, G., 472
Murphy, J. F., 473, 594, 597, 601, 604, 607, 609, 612
Murphy, L., 156, 161
Murray, C. A., 370, 383
Murray, J. P., 287
Muslof, L. D., 456, 472
Myers, J. K., 120, 142

Nagel, S., 99, 118, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 187, 189, 194, 196, 197, 203, 210
Nahemow, L., 162
Nash, J. D., 285
Neale, M. S., 563, 572, 573, 576, 581, 590
Neef, M., 404, 423, 210
Nelson, G., 445, 447, 453, 454
Nelson, R., 219, 221, 227, 228, 229, 235
Nelson, S. D., 54, 67, 108, 117, 385, 406, 627, 636
Nenno, M. K., 524, 533, 541
Neugarten, B. L., 439, 454
Neuhaus, R. L., 633, 636
Neumeyer, E., 593, 612
Neumeyer, M., 593, 612
Newacheck, P. W., 443, 453
Newcomer, R. J., 453
Newhaus, R. J., 54, 66
Newman, D. K., 567, 575, 577, 589
Newman, O., 403, 406, 547, 548, 559
Newton, A., 401, 406
Newton, P. M., 422, 428, 437
Nie, N. H., 574, 590
Niepoth, W., 612
Nietupski, J., 359

Nietzel, M. T., 100, 118, 395, 398, 406, 426, 436
Nisbet, R., 631, 637
Niskanen, W. A., 227, 235, 430, 436
Norman, W., 556, 559
Novaco, R. W., 76, 87, 96, 544, 559
Novak, A. R., 360

Oakeshott, R., 511, 515, 520
Oaks, D., 202, 210
O'Brien, D. J., 574, 589
O'Connor, J., 263, 266, 503, 520
O'Day, R., 254, 266
Offutt, J., 95
O'Gorman, M., 413, 436
Ohlig, W., 560
Ohlin, L. E., 376, 382, 383
O'Keefe, G. J., 282, 283, 284, 287
Okun, A. M., 486, 498, 504, 520
Olsen, K., 76, 95
Olsen, M. E., 473, 476, 562, 563, 565, 571, 572, 573, 576, 577, 578, 581, 582, 583, 584, 588, 589
Opler, M., 142
Orlansky, M. D., 346, 360
Oros, C. J., 95
Osgood, D. W., 382
Osteen, L. B., 360
Ostendorf, D., 267
Owen, R. N., 588
Ozawa, M. N., 420, 436

Packard, V., 600, 612
Padia, W. L., 141
Paine, F., 264
Paine, L., 264
Paisley, W. J., 287
Palmedo, P. F., 588
Palmer, J. L., 505, 520
Palmer, M. H., 572, 573, 590
Palmer, T., 371, 383, 386, 406
Pancoast, D., 23, 32
Papsidero, J., 81, 82, 83, 91, 96
Parker, C. A., 357, 360
Parisian, J., 111, 118
Pascal, E., 530, 541
Pate, T., 406
Pateman, C., 502, 515, 520
Patman, W., 208, 210
Patterson, T. E., 275, 287
Paul, G. L., 78, 96
Paulson, R., 263, 266
Peat, F. D., 627, 636
Peat, Marwick and Mitchell, 371, 383
Peck, A. E., 575, 590
Peguillan, V., 453
Peltason, J., 193, 210
Pennebaker, J. W., 558
Pepper, B., 419, 436
Pepper, M. P., 142
Pepper, S. C., 622, 637
Perkins, D. N., 628, 637
Perlman, J. E., 523, 541
Perlman, R. 563, 567, 573, 574
Perloff, G. R., 312
Peterson, P., 224, 225, 235
Petty, C., 118
Phillips, S., 558
Piaget, J., 616, 627, 637
Pike, R., 588
Pillemer, D. B., 86
Pines, A., 155, 161
Pion, G., 94
Pipkorn, J., 507, 520
Pirages, D. C., 576, 590
Piven, F. F., 241, 244, 249, 253, 255, 263, 266
Platt, A., 382, 383
Plotnick, R., 234, 490, 498
Poincare, H., 626, 637
Polanyi, M., 615, 627, 637
Pollock, J., 631, 637
Polya, G., 623, 637
Polk, K., 373, 383
Popham, J., 330, 337
Popkin, S., 153, 161
Popper, K. R., 628, 637
Posavac, E. J., 96
Pratola, S., 161
Pratt, H. J., 451, 452, 454
Pratt, J., 96
Price, R. H., 158, 161, 313, 318, 319, 412, 413, 418, 427, 435, 436
Prigogine, I., 631, 637
Proshansky, H. M., 542, 543, 557, 559
Pryor, D. E., 388, 398, 399, 406
Pumpian, I., 359
Pynoos, J., 537

Quick, S., 326, 338

Rabkin, J. G., 386, 406, 546, 559
Radius, I. M., 286
Rainwater, L., 547, 559
Rankin, A., 405
Rapp, C., 109, 117
Rapp, N., 118
Rappaport, J., 53, 54, 67, 100, 101, 117, 118, 385, 406, 420, 436, 617, 626, 629, 633, 635, 637
Rauma, D., 93, 94
Ravich, R., 92, 96
Rector, J. M., 370, 383
Redner, R., 69, 70, 81, 97
Reed, D., 141
Rees, A., 96
Regier, D. A., 434, 437
Reif, L., 448, 449, 454
Reiff, R., 401, 406
Reim, B., 558
Rein, M., 220, 221, 233, 235, 443, 453, 454
Reinstein, R. C., 574, 588
Reis, R. E., 91, 96
Renner, K. E., 388, 407
Rennie, T., 142
Renzaglia, A., 346, 350, 351, 359, 361

Repetto, T. A., 403, 407
Reppucci, N. D., 387, 404, 406, 407, 418, 437, 613, 617, 621, 628, 635, 637, 638
Rescher, N., 174, 177
Resnick, S. M., 560
Revelle, R., 566, 567, 590
Reynolds, M. C., 345, 346, 347, 348, 357, 358, 360
Rezmovic, E. L., 74, 81, 97
Rhodes, W., 118
Ricco, L. J., 403, 407
Rice, R. E., 287
Rich, R., 291, 312
Rich, S., 461, 471
Richman, H., 453, 454
Riecken, H. W., 74, 78, 85, 92, 96, 628, 638
Riessman, F., 432, 436
Riley, M. W., 439, 454
Rindskopf, D., 83, 96
Risman, B. J., 79, 97, 403, 407
Rivers, W., 337, 338
Rivlin, A. M., 220, 235, 628, 633, 638
Roberts, D., 286
Roberts, D. F., 288
Roberts, H. E., 454
Roberts, M., 222, 235
Robin, G. D., 369, 383
Robins, P. K., 84, 86, 97, 462, 472
Robinson, J. P., 269, 287
Robinson, W., 327, 337
Rodgers, H., 196, 210
Rodgers, W., 141
Rodin, J., 154, 161, 555, 556, 559
Roesch, R., 313, 317, 318, 388, 389, 407
Rogers, D. E., 93
Rogers, E. M., 106, 118, 573, 574, 581, 589, 629, 638
Rogg, N. H., 531, 541
Rojek, D. G., 369, 383
Romig, D. A., 371, 378, 383
Rosa, E., 563, 589, 590
Rose, S., 241, 266
Rose, S. M., 445, 448, 454
Rosen, B. M., 426, 437
Rosenbloom, R. A., 523, 541
Rosenstock, I. M., 286
Rosenman, R., 160
Rosensteel, R., 161
Ross, B. H., 524, 541
Ross, H., 495, 498, 549, 560
Ross, H. L., 142
Ross, J. A., 80, 97
Ross, P. J., 120, 142
Ross, R., 141
Ross, R., 263, 266
Ross, R. R., 386, 407
Rossi, P. H., 84, 86, 89, 97, 99, 118
Rothman, D. J., 22, 32, 53, 67, 412, 437
Rothman, J., 242, 253, 255, 265, 266
Rumberger, E. D., 501, 520
Roussopolos, D., 250, 264
Rovner-Pieczenik, R., 387, 407
Rubinstein, E. A., 287
Ruddick, J., 333, 337
Rusch, F. R., 355, 360, 361
Rushton, J. P., 278, 287
Ryan, W., 54, 67, 183, 184
Ryglewicz, H., 419, 436

Sadd, S., 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 405
Saegert, S., 550, 553, 554, 556, 559
Sailor, W., 361
Sainsbury, P., 465, 466, 471
Salamon, L., 225, 228, 235
Salasin, S., 292, 312
Samuelson, R. J., 441, 452, 454
Sarason, S. B., 52, 58, 67, 165, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 332, 337, 546, 559, 628, 633, 638
Satin, M., 247, 266
Saul, J. A., 69, 70, 110, 111, 118
Saunders, J. T., 621, 628, 635, 637, 638
Sawhill, I. V., 494, 495, 498
Scandura, J. M., 628, 638
Scanlon, W., 453
Schaffarzick, J., 326, 338
Schaffer, A., 394, 407
Schalock, R. L., 353, 361
Schanie, C. F., 406
Schechtman, M., 267
Scheerenberger, R. S., 361
Schein, E. H., 618, 638
Schelling, T., 215, 235
Schipper, L., 563, 567, 590
Schleisinger, H. J., 436
Schliesinger, S., 201, 210
Schmalz, A., 120, 142
Schmutte, G. T., 95
Schnaiberg, A., 246, 266
Schnare, A. B., 536, 541
Schneider, K. E., 355, 361
Schneider, M., 124, 142
Schneider, S. A., 575, 590
Schnelle, J. F., 404, 407
Schoen, C., 442, 453
Schorr, A., 470, 472
Schramm, W., 271, 287
Schroeder, C., 159, 162
Schroeder, M., 244, 256, 266
Schroeder, S. A., 445, 454
Schubert, J. G., 378, 383
Schuller, V., 471
Schultz, C. L., 450, 454
Schultze, C., 226, 229, 235
Schulz, R., 555, 556, 559
Schur, E. M., 62, 65, 67
Schurr, S. H., 561, 590
Schuthberth, K. C., 286
Schutz, R. P., 361
Schwartz, B., 545, 560
Schweber, R., 267
Schweinhart, L., 467, 472
Sclar, E. D., 513, 520
Scull, A., 385, 386, 407, 413, 415, 417, 420, 437
Sears, D. T., 573, 574, 590

Sechrest, L., 81, 97
Seeburger, R., 201, 211
Seibert, J., 359
Seidman, E., 19, 20, 48, 61, 67, 118, 385, 405, 407, 435, 637
Segall, M., 628, 638
Seligman, C., 563, 573, 574, 590
Seligman, M. E. P., 551, 557, 558, 559, 560
Sellin, T., 383
Seltzer, 190, 211
Seltzer, M., 259, 267
Selznick, P., 241, 267
Seng, Y. P., 74, 76
Sessoms, H. D., 593, 595, 612
Sevelius, G., 160
Sewell, W. R., 577, 590
Shadish, W. R., 69, 70, 76, 77, 81, 87, 88, 94, 97
Sharp, G., 253, 267
Sharratt, S., 93
Shearer, D., 249, 250, 265, 538, 541
Sheldon, E., 120, 124, 141, 142
Shelton, R., 118
Sherman, S., 147, 162
Sherrod, D. R., 551, 560
Sheurer, D., 506, 508, 519
Shils, E., 440, 454
Shinn, M., 412, 437
Shippee, G., 563, 572, 590, 616, 638
Shoemaker, F. F., 629, 638
Showstack, J., 454
Sidel, R., 432, 437
Sidel, V., 432, 437
Sigelman, C. K., 360
Sikorski, L., 312
Silberman, C., 263, 267
Silverman, W. H., 79, 97
Silvertein, M., 539, 541
Simeone, R. S., 559
Simkhovitch, M., 25, 32
Simon, H. A., 623, 637, 638
Simonton, D. K., 130, 142
Sindelar, P. T., 346, 357, 361
Singer, J. E., 544, 551, 558
Sjoberg, G., 60, 62, 63, 67, 632, 638
Skibo, D., 338
Skinner, B. F., 1276, 621, 622-623, 638
Skolnick, J., 203, 211
Slater, R., 555, 559
Small, F., 237, 263, 267
Smeeding, T., 490, 498
Smelser, N., 460, 471, 472
Smith, A., 500, 520
Smith, D. A., 383
Smith, J., 244, 267
Smith, J. K., 96
Smith, L. M., 332, 337
Smith, M. B., 1164, 546, 560
Smith, M. L., 86, 88, 97, 329, 337, 426, 429, 437
Smith, P., 358
Smith, S. S., 313, 318, 319
Smollen, L. E., 513, 520
Smyer, M. A., 418, 435
Snapper, K., 80, 95
Snell, M. E., 346, 350, 351, 359, 361
Snow, D., 422, 428, 437
Snowden, L. R., 559
Soderstrom, J., 88, 94, 97, 583, 589
Sokol, R., 210, 393
Solnick, L., 518
Sommer, R., 545, 549, 560
Sontag, E., 350, 359, 361
Sorauf, F., 208, 211
Sorenson, B. A., 520
Sorenson, E., 93
Spacapan, S., 544, 558
Spangler, J., 453
Specht, H., 239, 249, 264, 443, 444, 446, 453
Spencer, B. D., 79, 97
Spiegelman, C., 85, 97
Spiegelman, R. G., 97, 956, 472
Spielberger, C. D., 636
Spillerman, S., 120, 142
Spiotto, J., 201, 211
Spitzer, R. L., 78, 95
Srole, L., 120, 142
Stack, C., 23, 32
Stake, R., 326, 337
Stanley, J. C., 74, 94, 101, 102, 117
Stebbins, L. B., 326, 337
Steiner, C., 248, 267
Stephens, O., 201, 211, 416
Stern, M. P., 286
Stern, P. C., 563, 565, 570, 572, 576, 578, 579, 581, 590
Stern, R. N., 509, 511, 514, 515, 520
Sternlieb, G., 529, 541
Stetson, D. M., 468, 472
Stigler, G., 227, 235
Stobaugh, R., 561, 590
Stockdill, J. W., 96
Stockman, D., 217, 235
Stoesz, D., 447, 454
Stokols, D., 544, 559, 560
Stokols, J., 559
Stone, A. A., 413, 437
Stone, P., 96
Straw, R. B., 82, 84, 91, 97
Struening, E. L., 546, 559
Struyk, R. J., 534, 541
Stuart, R., 109, 118
Stuening, E., 99, 118
Stufflebeam, D., 337
Sturz, H., 405
Suchman, E. A., 277, 288
Sudnow, D., 203, 211
Sullivan, B., 96
Sunaday, E., 558
Sundquist, J. L., 408, 421, 423, 437
Susman, G. I., 502, 503, 516, 520
Svejnar, J., 502, 506, 515, 519, 520
Swaczy, B., 250, 267
Swaminathan, H., 130, 141
Swan, G., 160
Sweeney, 190

Sweeney, T., 259, 267
Switzky, H. N., 360
Szalai, A., 269, 288
Szaz, T. S., 413, 437

Tamilia, P. R., 366, 383
Taube, C. A., 437
Taylor, R., 244, 265, 267
Taylor, S. J., 351, 352, 361
Teaff, J., 147, 162
Teasdale, J. D., 557
Teets, K. C., 286
Teger, A., 558
Teilmann, K. S., 362, 364, 367, 369, 377, 383
Teresa, J., 266
Terkel, S., 501, 520
Test, M., 466, 472
Thelen, G. C., 533, 541
Thissen, O., 120
Thomas, C. W., 368, 369, 383
Thomas, H., 511, 515, 520
Thomas, S., 84, 97
Thomas, W. H., 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 407
Thompson, E. P., 247, 276
Thorndike, E. L., 120, 142
Thorsrud, E., 516, 520
Thurman, S. K., 361
Thurow, L., 218, 235
Thurston, B., 520
Thurston, P., 330, 337
Timpane, M., 220, 235
Tissue, T., 464, 472
Tittle, C. R., 370, 383
Tomatzky, L., 99, 100, 118
Toulmin, S., 174, 177
Trapp, S., 267
Trickett, E. J., 94
Trifiletti, J., 360
Trochim, W., 85, 97
Trohanis, P., 360
Trolander, J., 25, 32
Tropman, J. E., 265
Trotsky, L., 246, 276
Tu, J., 108, 118
Tucker, H., 205, 206, 207, 211
Tucker, J. A., 346, 357, 358, 361
Tullock, G., 227, 235
Tuma, N. B., 498
Tumin, M. M., 238, 267
Turoff, M., 48, 49, 67
Tyler, R., 330, 338
Tyler, T., 75, 93, 96, 590

Urtes, M., 161
Uselton, P. H., Jr., 407

Vago, S., 571, 590
Valentine, J., 100, 118
Valins, S., 544, 551, 558
Valle, V., 312
Valles, J., 247, 267
Van Den Haag, E., 381, 383
Van Dusen, K. S., 365, 383
Van Raaij, W. F., 573, 581, 590
Vaunicelli, M., 466, 472
Veblen, T., 1269, 619, 638
Verba, S., 574, 590
Veroff, J., 424, 425, 436, 437
Villemez, W. J., 383
Vincent, B., 359
Vladeck, B. C., 442, 448, 449, 453, 454
Von Til, J., 562, 570, 577, 590
Vose, C., 208, 211

Waddington, C. H., 631, 633, 638
Wainer, H., 120, 142
Walberg, H. J., 85, 97
Waldhorn, S. A., 432, 453
Walker, D., 255, 267
Walker, D. F., 325, 326, 328, 337, 338
Walker, J. P., 375, 376, 378, 383
Walsh, L., 518, 521
Wamsley, G. L., 409, 437
Wandersman, A., 145, 162
Ward, M., 160
Warfield, J. N., 626, 638
Warkov, S., 563, 570, 590
Warlick, J., 465, 472
Warren, D. I., 538, 539, 541
Warren, R. B., 538, 539, 541
Warren, R. L., 263, 267, 563, 567, 573, 574, 590
Warwick, D. P., 571, 590
Wasby, S., 188, 189, 211
Washburn, S. L., 472
Washington, L. A., 94
Waters, J., 157, 158, 162
Waters, J. M., 636
Watson, F., 25, 32
Watzlawick, P., 48, 49, 50, 57, 59, 61, 63, 67, 385, 407, 615, 616, 638
Weakland, J. H., 51, 67, 407, 638
Weatherley, R., 14, 17, 56, 67, 316, 322
Weaver, D. H., 275, 288
Webber, G., 101, 118
Webber, M., 539, 541
Wehman, P., 351, 354, 355, 361
Weichselbaum, H. F., 382
Weikart, D. P., 90, 97, 467, 472
Weiner, S., 97, 472
Weiss, C. H., 79, 98, 220, 221, 235
Weiss, W., 271, 288
Weithers, J. A., 361
Weitzman, S. M., 360
Wellstone, P., 250, 267
West, R. W., 86, 97
West, S., 559
Wettick, R., 201, 211
Wetzel, J., 157, 162
White, P. E., 410, 437
White, S., 220, 221, 233, 235
Whittaker, G. F., 79, 97
Wholey, J. H., 80, 97
Whyte, W. F., 511, 519, 521
Wice, P. B., 395, 407

Wichelman, A., 393, 210
Wicks, N., 472
Wienk, R., 536, 541
Wilcox, B., 341, 350, 359, 361
Wilcox, B. L., 613, 552, 559
Wildavsky, A., 214, 221, 222, 223, 226, 235
Wilderson, F. B., 357, 360
Wilks, J., 383
Willemain, T., 228, 235
Willer, B., 353, 361, 467, 472
Williams, J., 612
Williams, W., 97, 216, 220, 235, 351, 361
Willis, G., 435
Willson, V. L., 141
Wilks, J., 406
Wilson, J. Q., 381, 383
Windle, C., 75, 95, 96
Winnett, R. A., 118, 563, 572, 573, 576, 581, 590
Winston, K., 470, 471
Wirt, F., 193, 211
Wirt, J., 326, 338
Wisseman, C., 161
Witte, A. D., 381, 383
Wohlwill, J. F., 557, 560
Wolcott, H. F., 332, 338
Wolf, C., 227, 235
Wolfe, T., 241, 249, 267
Wolfensberger, W., 340, 346, 361
Wolfgang, M. E., 369, 370, 383
Wolfhagen, C., 518
Wood, P. D., 286
Wood, K. H., 520
Woodward, B., 255, 267
World Bank, The, 510, 521
Wortman, P. M., 94
Wright, C. R., 268, 288
Wright, E. O., 243, 263, 267
Wright, G., 468, 472
Wright, J. R., 531, 532, 541
Wright, S. R., 99, 118
Wright, W. E., 374, 383
Wuebben, T. L., 99, 106, 118
Wyckoff, H., 248, 267
Wylie, J., 518, 521

Yancy, W. L., 547, 560
Yates, D., 235
Yergin, D., 561, 590
York, R., 351, 361
Young, D. K., 95

Zachiarias, 665, 325
Zald, M. N., 249, 267, 409, 437
Zaltman, G., 179, 180, 183, 291, 293, 303, 304, 312, 571, 591
Zasslow, M., 161
Zautra, A., 119, 120, 142
Zeigler, H., 205, 206, 207, 211
Zeisel, J., 553, 560
Zeitz, L., 210
Zigler, E., 100, 118
Zimmerman, S. L., 313, 320, 474, 455, 458, 472
Zimring, F. E., 389, 407
Zinober, J. W., 95
Zola, I. K., 440, 454
Zolik, E. S., 95
Zuiches, J. J., 588
Zwerdling, D., 250, 267, 515, 521
Zweig, F. M., 79, 98

Subject Index

Abortion policies, 462, 469-470
Action researcher, *see* Researcher
Adaptation, 543-544
Administrative orders, 321
Administrative system, *see* Systems
Advertising, *see* Tactics of social intervention
Advocacy organizations (see also Chapter 12)
  Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), 251, 252, 262, 524, 620-621, 634
  Children's Defense Fund, 316
  National Association for Retarded Citizens, 315, 316, 321, 322, 341, 350
  Gray Panthers, 248
  National Housing Partnership, 524
  National Low Income Housing Coalition, 524
  National Neighbors, 524, 539
  Neighborhood Housing Service, 524, 532
  Santa Monicans for Renters' Rights, 538
Agenda setters, 195
Aging, 49, 51-52, 55, 58, 61-62
  theories of, 439-441
    activity theory, 439
    developmental (life cycle) theory, 439
    disengagement theory, 439
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 28, 191, 218, 456, 459, 460, 462, 464, 474, 480, 481, 482, 483, 485, 494, 495
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (see also Advocacy organizations), 198, 199-200, 204, 205
American Institute for Research, 84, 93
Analysis
  cultural, 240, 244-248
  macrostructural, 240-244
Architectural/built environment, 476
Architectural Forum, 547, 557
Argumentation analysis, 174-176
Asylums, 22, 412

Backward mapping, *see* Strategies of social intervention
Bail reform, 314, 318, 385, 386, 393-399
Beneficient coercion, 180, 181, 182, 183
Berkeley Planning Associates, 156, 160
Bilingual-bicultural programs, 82, 83, 91
Blaming the victim, *see* individualism, premise of
Bonneville Power Administration, 564, 588
Bottom-up strategies/policies, *see* Strategies of social intervention
Boys' Club of America, 373, 382
Brown v. Board of Education, 187-189, 193, 343 (see also Desegregation, school)
Business Week, 533, 540

Canadian Commission for WHESCO, 35, 46, 47
Categorical vs. universal programs, 480, 486-487
Causality (see also Systems theory constructs, general, and Paradigm, types)
  interactive and multiply determined, 179
  linear, simple, 179, 313
Change processes/solutions
  first-order, 50, 51, 57, 60, 61, 63, 615-616, 626
  second-order, 50, 52, 57, 60, 61, 63, 615-618, 626, 627
Charity organization movement, 25
Children
  in need, 21
  institutions for, 22
  orphanages, 22
  protective legislation for, 26
  welfare, 26, 28
Citizen mobilization, *see* Tactics of social intervention
Citizen participation, 566, 567, 586, 599
Civil rights acts, 183, 184, 188, 193, 194, 528
COFO Memo, 459, 460, 461, 471
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, 561, 563, 588
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future Research Reports, 642, 651
Community-based care, 318, 386, 401, 408, 413, 415, 416, 418, 419, 423, 428, 448, 449, 465, 467
Community centers, 23
Community chests, 29
Community control, 513
Community corrections programs, 385, 386, 400
Community life, perspectives on, 599-600
Community Mental Health Centers, 76, 78, 79
Community psychology, 9, 76, 87
Compensatory education programs, 214
  Follow Through, 326, 356
  Head Start, 82, 83, 85, 91, 356, 467

Preschool, 462, 467-468
Right-to-Read, 329
Upward Bound, 87
Comptroller General, U.S., 513, 519
Conceptualization, error of (error of logical typing or of the third kind), 33, 34, 48-52, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64
determinants, 63
Congress, 193, 195, 204, 205, 209, 217, 429
Conscious planning or spontaneous emergence, 617
Consciousness raising, *see* Tactics of social intervention
Consultation and education services, 427
Consumers, mental health, 429, 434, 435
Control, personal (see also Environmental interventions), 545
Convergent reasoning/solution/conceptualization, 53, 63
Cost/benefit analysis, 79-81, 392, 449, 585-586, 587
Council on Environmental Quality, 564, 588
Countersystem analysis, 62-63
Criminal Justice Newsletter, 393, 406
Criminal justice, rights, 200-203
Miranda v. Arizona, 200
Crisis intervention, 426
Criticism, 60
Crowding, 197, 544-545, 546, 551, 552, 554
Cultures
Eskimo, 36, 45
Invit, 45
Jomon, 37, 39, 41
Mandenka, 33, 35, 36, 37-39, 45, 46-47
Manus, 35, 45, 46
Mononoke, 41
Navajo, 35, 45-46
Yamato, 37, 39, 41
Yayoi, 37, 39, 41
Curriculum reform, 324
federal involvement in, 324, 327
teachers' role in, 324, 327

Data Resources, Inc., 442, 453
Decision, as choice of images of the future, 639
Decriminalization, 317
Defensible space, 402-403, 547
Deinstitutionalization, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321
juvenile status offenders, 365, 372, 375, 379
mentally ill and/or retarded, 353, 418, 419, 420, 462, 465-467, 470
antecedents, 413-415
Delivery system, *see* Systems
Demonopolarization, 60
Density, *see* Crowding
Dependent individuals, 53
Desegregation
busing, 325, 326
public accommodations, 196
public housing, 197
school, 193-195, 204
Detention, preventive, 386, 393, 394
Developmentally disabled persons, *see* Handicapped persons
Dialectical tactics/reasoning, 62-63, 65, 168, 174
Diffusion, *see* Strategies of social intervention, dissemination of knowledge
Directorate-General for Research, Science, and Education, 561, 588
Discrimination
employment, 196-197, 204, 205
housing, 197-198, 528, 536-537
Disincentive effects, *see* Income transfer programs
Dispute resolution programs, 318, 399-401
Dissemination of knowledge, *see* Strategies of social intervention
Divergent reasoning/solution/conceptualization, 53, 63
Diversion programs
adult, 318, 385, 386, 387-393, 405
juvenile, 83, 99, 108-112, 317, 363, 371, 375-376, 379
Division of Labor
bureaucratic organization of large firms, 500-501
Divorce reform, 462, 468
no fault, 468
Donor system, *see* Systems
Due process, 364

East Side Housing Advisory Committee, Milwaukee, 529, 540
Ecological-transactional framework, 9, 14-16
Ecology, social, 99
assessment, 69-71, 629
measures, 84
Multiphasic Environmental Assessment Procedure, 143-157, 556
intervention methods, 157-159
organizational consultation, 159
Economic incentives/inducements, 183, 196, 204, 205, 209, 301, 315, 575-576
Economic penalties, 197, 204, 205, 209
Economic Report of the President, 499, 503, 505, 519
Editor and Publisher, 274, 286
Education, federal involvement in, 324-325, 328, 329, 330-331, 335-336
Educational interventions
control of, 328
effects on legislation, 328
local school control, 324, 330-331
as messy enterprises, 323
perspectives on, 331-335
cultural, 331-336
political, 331-336
technical, 331-336
political nature, 323, 324, 332
situational constraints, 328
social, 323
success of, 329, 330, 336

Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 188, 225, 323, 324, 328, 329, 336
Employment/unemployment, 390, 499, 502, 512
  discrimination, *see* Discrimination
  intervention programs, 49, 55, 62, 214
  private sector, 502-503, 506
  public sector, 503-504
Empowerment, 180, 253-255, 321, 434, 476
  of workers, 507
Energy conservation
  attitudes toward, 113-114, 562
  extent of participation, 113-114
  generalizations, 586-587
  goals and objectives, 566-567
  implementation instruments, 570-581, 587
  political/contextual considerations, 114
  program evaluation, 88, 581-586, 587
    cost-effectiveness, 585-586, 587
    conservation action, 582-583, 587
    contextual changes, 582
    energy savings, 583-585, 587
    measurement and design, 115-116
  program implementation, 578-581
  strategies, 567-578
  systems impact of, 114
Energy consumption, 561, 586
  contexts, 567, 569-570, 586
Energy Policy Project, 575, 588
Environmental-ecological research/assessment, 70-71, 101, 103, 104
Environmental interventions, 542, 556-557
  criminal justice, in, 402-405
  underlying values, 543-544
  types, 545-546
  to enhance social support, 546-550
  to foster personal control, 550-556
Environmental Protection Agency, 120, 124
Environmental psychology, 542, 543, 557
Environments
  high-rise housing, 547-548, 551-553
  consumer, 553-554
  tenement housing, 548-549, 553
  institutional, 549-550, 554-555
Ethnographic research assessment, 70, 84, 101, 104, 105
Evaluation research, 99, 304
  abortion reform, 169
  audience for, 76, 77, 78, 80
  compensatory education, 468
  criminal justice laws, 201, 202, 203
  divorce reform, 468
  educational, 76, 84, 86, 87
  income maintenance, 463, 465
  mentally retarded programs, 467
  summative, 296
Evolutional-ecological perspective, 613, 644-645
Executive branch influence on interest groups, 207
Experimental social innovation, *see* Research designs, experimental, randomized

Families
  crises, 23, 27
  responsibility for self-care, 21-22
  role of kin, 22-23
  single-parent, 27-28
  stability, 494-495
  structural deficit, 457, 458
  structural excess, 458
Financial incentives, *see* Economic incentives/inducements
Financing, federal, 416-417 (see also Housing)
  Community Mental Health Centers Act, 417, 423, 424
  income maintenance, 420
  Medicaid, 416-417, 430, 431
  Medicare, 416-417, 423, 430
  Supplemental Security Income Program, 416-417, 420
First Amendment, 198-200
First-order change, *see* Change processes/solutions
Follow Through project, *see* Compensatory education programs, Follow Through
Forward mapping, *see* Strategies of social intervention, forward mapping
Free speech, 198-199, 204
  clear and present danger, 198
  grave and probable test, 199
Frictionless solutions, 180, 181, 182, 183, 226-228, 229, 251
Friendly visiting, 25

Gallup Poll, 279, 281, 286, 575, 588
Gatekeepers, 317
General Accounting Office, 115, 118, 343, 344, 346, 357, 358, 360
Generalizability theory, 83
Goal moratorium syndrome, 42
Government
  authority, crisis of, 223-229
  regulation/interference, 270, 271
  revolt against, 648
Grants economy, 641
  public, 646-648
  and reciprocity, 641-642
Grassroots
  individuals, 184
  organization/movement, 30, 475, 476, 524
    actions and tactics, 525-527, 528-529, 530, 531, 532, 536-537, 538-540
    definition, 523
    national lobby groups representing, 523-524
    recent growth, 523-525

Habitability, 543
Handicapped Person Acts
  Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (PL94-142), 350
Handicapped persons (see also Special education)
  Homes for, 22

Mildly
curriculum-based assessment, 357
direct instruction, 357
early education, 356
labeling and classification, 357
racial bias in identification, 356-357
Moderately, severely, multiply, 340
community integration, 353
deinstitutionalization, 353
employment, 354-355
least restrictive environment, 350, 351
vocational preparation, 354-355
Head Start, *see* Compensatory education programs
Health belief model, 277, 279, 280, 283, 286
Health care, 442-443
home, 81, 83
Hegelian inquiry system, 63
Help-seeking patterns, 424-426
Hennepin County Economic Assistance Department, 461, 472
Heterogenistic, 34, 35, 38, 46, 47
Highlander Reports, 634, 636
Hospitalization, alternatives to, 82, 84, 91
Household, as neglected institution, 648-649
Housing, 442
integrated, 183, 184
interventions, 522-540
multiple effects of market errors and social inequities, 475, 527-538
private market errors and public interventions, 525-529
product complexity, incomplete and imperfect information, 527-529
financing complexity, 529-530
externalities, 531-532
misuse, 531
overregulation, 531-532
ineffectiveness, 532
income distribution, 532-536
federally subsidized low-income housing construction, 533
rental subsidies, 533-534
public housing, 29, 534-535
rehabilitation of substandard housing and removal of dilapidated housing, 535-536
social discrimination, 528, 534, 536-537
Human learning, limits on, 650
Hybrid research design model, 70, 105-116
application of, 108-116
assumptions of, 105
cost of, 116
experimental component of, 105-106, 109
exploratory component of, 106-107, 109-111
implications of, 116-117
for assessment, 107-108
for designing research, 106
of research, 99
Hypothesis
generation, 100, 105, 117, 626-628
testing, 100, 105, 117, 628
Ill-structured problems, 69, 71, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172
Implementation
context, 70
of programs, 83, 84, 316, 318, 578-581
Income maintenance experiments, *see* Income transfer programs, negative income tax experiments
Income support, 441-442, 448, 450
Income transfer policy, 52, 62 (see also Welfare)
current system, 479-481
evolution, 481-485
Social Security Act to War on Poverty, 482-483
start to 1935 Social Security Act, 481-482
underlying issues, 485-489
War on Poverty, the Great Society, and their aftermath, 483-485
1980 and beyond, 485
Income transfer programs, 473-474 (*see* also Welfare)
direct (cash or in kind), 180, 183, 481, 482, 487, 490, 491
disincentive effects, 52, 55, 62, 474, 492, 493
effects on, 490-495
negative income tax experiments, 62, 84-85, 86, 88, 320, 462, 471
Incremental progressive reforms, 19-20
Individualism, premise of, 13, 44, 46, 51-52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64-65, 66, 313-314, 320, 363, 378-379, 385, 473, 474
discriminating traits, assumption of, 387
individual deficiency, 440, 445
offender deficit, 387
Initiatives, federal and state
enterprise zones, 516-518
taxation, 516-518
Innovation vs. replication, *see* Replication vs. innovation
Institute for Social Justice, 257, 266
Institutional care, 22, 412, 413
Institutional deficiency, 320, 443-446
Institutions, as solutions to social problems, 651
Insurers, mental health care
federal, 430-431
private, 431-432
Interest groups, special, 195, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 325, 335-336, 409-411, 428, 430, 452, 461
Intervention, level of, 385, 405
commercial, 606, 608-609
community, 373, 376, 418, 476
federal, 194, 195, 196, 375, 408, 441, 442, 444, 449, 451, 462, 476, 482, 489, 522, 529, 532, 533, 536, 561, 562, 563-564, 607, 609
individual, 181, 238, 476
institutional, 476
local, 197, 320, 321, 373, 376, 450, 451, 462, 476, 489, 561, 565-566, 594, 606, 607
municipal, 522, 531, 536
organizational, 181, 238, 476
private, 343, 451, 522, 529-530, 606, 608-609
regional, 564-565

societal, 87, 181, 238
state, 194, 364-365, 367, 372-373, 377, 430-432, 444, 448, 449, 451, 462, 468, 476, 482, 503, 522, 536, 594, 607

Job rotation, 41
Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, 412, 415, 436
Joking relations, 39
Judiciary influence, 207-208
Juveniles (*see* also Troubled youth)
delinquent offenders, 49, 62, 64-65, 364, 369
gangs, 369
status offenders, 364, 369, 373, 377

Knowledge and policy, relationship, 220, 221, 223

Law, 187-209
and social change, interactive model (reciprocal effects), 189-205, 208-209
definition, 187
reform and legal services, 190-193
Learned helplessness, 551
"Least restrictive alternative," 350, 351, 421
Legislation, 187-209, 317, 319, 321, 350, 413, 418, 422-423, 424, 475, 482, 483, 484, 644
juvenile, 364, 373, 377
women, protective, 26
Leibnitzian inquiry system, 63
Leisure (*see* also Strategies and professional roles)
definition/meaning, 596-599
ecology of, 604-609
outdoor relief, 24
service agencies, 606-609
Litigation, 208, 319, 350
Long term care, 447-450

Mainstreaming, *see* Special education, normalization
Market
competition, 429
imperfect, 428, 431-432
labor, 493
perfect, 527
place, 429
Mass Media, *see* Tactics of social intervention
Medicaid, 218, 319, 320, 415, 417, 430, 439, 442, 444, 448, 449, 452, 461, 480, 481, 487, 644
Medicare, 319, 320, 416, 417, 430, 439, 440, 442, 444, 448, 449, 452, 461, 480, 644
Mental health problems, future, 432-435
Meta-analysis, 88
Mindscapes, 13, 20, 35-37, 52-53, 59, 63, 66, 316, 321
G-type (heterogenistic morphogenetic), 36-37, 39, 45, 46, 53, 59, 63
H-type (homogenistic hierarchical), 36-37, 39, 43, 53, 59, 61, 63
I-type (heterogenistic isolationistic), 36-37, 46
S-type (heterogenistic homeostatic), 36-37, 39, 46
Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 507, 520
Mobilization for Youth, 376, 383
Monopolarization, 60
Morphogenetics, 39, 41, 44, 47
Morphogenetic active incentives, 44, 47
Morphogenetic joint ventures, 44, 47
Morphogenetic management, 44, 47
Mutual adaptation, 184, 315, 317, 321

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 541
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 535, 541
National Citizen's Monitoring Project, 425, 535, 541
National Clearinghouse for Smoking and H 281, 288
National Council on Crime and Delinquency 378, 379, 383
National Federation of Settlements, 25, 32
National Institute of Education, 329, 337
National Institute of Mental Health, 80, 96
National Voter, 541
Nation's Housing, The, 533, 541
Natural networks, *see* Social support networks
Negation, 62
Negative income tax experiments, *see* Income transfer programs
Neglected individuals, 53
Net-widening, 379, 388-393, (*see* also unintended effects, negative)
Nonservice approaches, 320, 450-451
Normalization, *see* Special education
Northwest Public Power Association, 564, 589

Office of Energy Preparedness, 563, 589
Office of Management and Budget, 216, 219, 235
Officialdom, 55-57, 58, 66
Old age security, 29
Older Americans Act, 443, 445, 446, 447, 452, 463
Old Age Assistance, 482, 483, 491
Ordinary knowledge, 181, 184, 222
Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, 479, 498
Organizing, *see* Strategies of social intervention
Outpatient care, technologies of, 426-427, 428, 430, 431, 432
Outside-in principle, 40

Paradigm
constraints, 58, 59
funding agency, 58
university administration, 58
types (*see* also Causality)
mutual causal, 59, 63, 65
unidirectional, 59, 63, 65
shifts, 626, 627
Paraprofessional care, 426-427, 428
Parens patriae, 22
Paradox generation strategies and tactics, 60 66

Person-centered causal attribution bias, *see* Individualism, premise of
Persons, individual, the problem, 649-657
Philadelphia Macro-Analysis Collective, 244, 266
Police-level interventions, 403-405
Policy analysis, 99, 101, 102-103
  politics, 137
Political context-environment, 438, 451-453
  for policy, 441-451
Polyocular vision, 35, 37, 46
Poor people, 190, 193
  the "undeserving," 24
  the working, 23
  the "worthy," 24
Positive-sum game, 37, 38-39, 44
Poverty, 25, 490-491
Pragmatism, 54, 55, 61, 68
President's Commission on Housing, 534, 535, 541
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 100, 118
President's Commission on Mental Health, 546, 559
President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 350, 351, 352, 361
President's Research Committee, 120, 142
Pretrial diversion *see* Diversion programs
Prevention of
  crime, 273, 280, 282, 284-286
  heart disease, 280-281, 283-286
  juvenile delinquency, 317, 375, 379
  smoking, 280-283, 286
  violence, 402
Prevention, types
  primary, 402, 545
  secondary, 387, 400, 402
  tertiary, 402
Prison programs, 22, 81, 84, 91
Problem-solving groups constellation
  heterogeneous, 169
  homogeneous, 169
Productivity of workers, 502, 503, 506, 511, 512, 516
Professional
  loyalties, 101
  mental health, 428-429
  roles, 100, 116
    leisure service
      advocate, 602
      direct provider, 601
      enabler, 602
      information-referral/broker, 601-602
Psychotherapy, individual, 378, 426
  philosophy, 378
Public accommodations law, 196, 204
Public service policies, determinants, 365
  conventional wisdoms of professionals, 366
  social science data, 366
  values, needs, and special interests, 366

Qualitative research, 90-91
Quality of working life, 501, 502, 506, 507, 515, 516
Quantitative indicators, 69, 70
  child abuse indices, 131-134
  construct definition, 138
  experimental uses, 127-138
  future of, 140-141
  history, 119-121
  issues of aggregation, 139
  nonexperimental uses, 124-127
    monitoring, 124-125
    planning, 125-127
  normative issues and
    controlling for population differences among communities, 139
  reliability of indicator estimates, 140
  sources, 121-124
    in-house administrative, 121-122
    external administrative records, 122-123
    surveys, 123-124
  target the collection, 140
  technical and research problems, 138-140
  test scores, as indicators of success, 326-327

Race and equal protection, 193-198
Randomized experiments, *see* Research designs, experimental, randomized
Rationality, 54, 55, 61
Real estate brokers/agents, role in housing market, 527, 529, 532
Recipient system, *see* Systems
Recreation and park movement, 592-596
Redistributive effects, 214, 315
Reforms
  conservative, 315, 386
  liberal, 195, 315, 322, 385, 386, 387
Reframing, 60-65
Regression-discontinuity, *see* Research designs, quasi-experimental, regression-discontinuity
Release on Recognizance (ROR), *see* Bail reform
Religion, rise of organized, 646
Remedial-redistributive policies, 219
Replication versus innovation, 617
Research designs
  experimental, randomized, 69-70, 74, 76, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 99, 101-102, 105, 389, 391, 404, 462, 466, 467, 468, 492, 494-495, 628
  quasi-experimental, 69-70, 74, 85, 86, 101-104, 628
    regression-discontinuity, 92
    time series, 85, 127-138
      ARIMA, 127-132
Research Progress, 356, 360
Researcher, activist, 100, 105, 628
Research issues/problems
  ethical and legal constraints, 74, 92-93
  levels of design
    local/community, 74, 76, 79, 81
    national, 74, 81
    regional, 79, 81

state, 74, 79, 81
methods, 333, 335, 336
political-institutional difficulties, 74
power, 82, 88
questions, 75-78
random assignment, 391, 403
randomized response, 83
sample size, 74, 81, 83-84
in social contexts, 99, 101, 116
theory, 84, 87-89
Resource deficiency, 443-446
Resources, 321, 409-410
allocation problem, 216-220
Restitution, 318, 401
"Revolving door" policy, 319
Rights of patients, 420-421
in nursing homes, 448
"right to treatment," 413
Wyatt v. Stickney (1971), 413
Right-to-life doctrine, 191-192, 204
Role relationships (pattern of relationships), 57, 61, 180, 181, 314, 456, 459, 460
Rules of the game, 51

Scientist-practitioner, 619
Second-order change, *see* Change processes/solutions
Second-order consequences, *see* unintended effects, negative
Self-help, 319, 321, 432, 451
Alcoholics Anonymous, 459
Parents' Anonymous, 459
Service dilemmas, 432-435
Settlement houses
movement for reform, 25, 27
research on social issues, 26
under community chests, 30
"Sheltered work settings," 419
Single standard, 47, 54-55, 61, 66
Situation-centered perspective, 62, 64-65
Social and community life, meaning of, 640-641
Social change, 9, 11-12, 179, 183, 268, 270-271, 273, 275, 281, 283, 615, 618, 619, 623, 629
and law, interactive model (reciprocal effects), 189-205, 208-209
definitions, 179
principles
ability, 183, 292-293, 307, 309, 311
values, 183, 293-295, 307, 309, 310
information, 183, 295-297, 307, 309
circumstances, 183, 297, 307, 309
timing, 183, 298-300, 309, 310
obligation, 183, 300-302, 307, 310
resistance, 183, 302-304, 310, 311
yield, 183, 304-305, 309, 310
Social change agents/planners, 289-312, 613
training/education models, 613, 615-635
artisan, 617, 618-621
ACORN, 620-621
artist, 617, 630-634
and chance, 633
interaction process, 631-632
Highlander Folk School, 633-634
scientist, 617, 622, 630
Research Utilization Laboratory Program, 629-630
technician, 617, 621-622
Center for Interactive Management, 622-623
Social construction of reality, 13, 20, 54-55, 130, 438-441
Social ecology, *see* Ecology, social
Social experiments, *see* Research designs, experimental, randomized
Social indicators, *see* Quantitative indicators
Social justice, 238-240
Social learning theory, 277-279, 283, 286
Social problem solving, 19-20, 213, 220, 221, 222, 232
problem definition, 163, 385
problem formation and solution, 9
Social programs/policies, 9, 12, 16, 179, 180, 181, 182
formulation, 316, 318
Social projects, 12
Social scientists, 58, 59, 66, 187, 220, 246, 619, 628, 629
political responsibilities, 100
professional roles, 100
Social Security, 29, 61, 219, 319, 440, 441, 442, 444, 447, 448, 452, 456, 458, 465, 482, 483, 491, 493, 494
Social services strategy, 443-446
Social support networks, 21-24, 545, 546-547, 592, 599-600
Social work, 19
political role of, 27, 28, 29, 32
professionalization of, 29
Sociology of knowledge, 172
Solar Energy Research Institute, 578, 590
Special education, 339
continuum of services, 347-349
history, 340-345
normalization, 339, 341, 346, 347, 353, 358
Spirit of the times (sociopolitical *zeitgeist*), 52, 53-54, 63, 476
Spontaneous emergence or spontaneous planning, *see* Conscious planning or spontaneous emergence
Stakeholders, 13, 55-59, 66, 69, 71, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 182, 183, 313, 321
Standardization, *see* Single standard
State boards of control, 24
State of California Office of Planning and Research, 120, 121, 142
Strategies, curriculum development, 325-331
generic development, 325-328
mixed, 335
policymaking, 328-330
site specific development, 315, 330-331
Strategies, employment and business interventions
indirect, 504-506

economic growth, 504, 517
labor intensive methods, 504
training of workers, 505
wage subsidies, 505
persuasion, 506-507
macrostrategies, 475, 506-512
legislation, 506-508
worker pension funds, 506, 508-509
promoting small businesses, 506, 509-511
worker-owned and -managed firms, 506, 511-512
microstrategies, 475, 512-516
establishment of community enterprises, 512, 513-514, 516
establishment of worker-owned firms and worker cooperatives, 512, 514-515, 516
work reorganization, 512, 515-516
Strategies, energy conservation, *see* Energy conservation
Strategies, leisure service delivery, 600-601
Strategies of social intervention, characteristics
objective/goal, 179-181
nature, 179-181
target, 179
level/loci, 179, 181-182
Strategies of Social Intervention, types
advocacy, 26, 27, 208, 320, 321, 378, 409, 410, 451
backward-mapping, 181, 182, 183, 184, 231-234, 315
bottom-up, 112
dissemination of knowledge, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 289-290, 303-304, 311, 314, 321, 327-328, 335, 628
forward mapping, 181, 182
generalized, emergent, 16, 184-185, 321
law, 179, 180, 181, 182
organizing, 378, 476, 579
definition, 237
linkages between organizations, 256-258
new wave, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 237, 240, 262-263
programs, 252
research and education, 255-256
resources, 258-262
top-down, 12, 13, 16, 314, 315, 328, 336, 351
Street-level bureaucrats, 14, 56, 316, 321
Stress, environmental, 542, 544-545, 547-549
urban, 544, 547-549, 551-554
total institutions, 544-545, 554-556
Structural models, 86, 87, 88-89
Structures of social action
broad, 16, 181, 184, 185, 321, 322
fine, 16, 181, 184, 185, 321, 322
Summative evaluation, *see* Evaluation research
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 61, 218, 319, 416, 417, 420, 442, 444, 448, 462, 464, 465, 480, 484, 496
Supreme Court, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 208
Surveys, 75, 79, 84, 93, 293
Synergic Resources Corporation, 585, 590
Systems
Delivery, 14-16, 55-57, 61-62, 180, 181, 183, 184, 314, 315, 316, 321
Exo-, 14-16, 180
Administrative, 14-16, 55-57, 61-62, 180, 181, 182, 183, 315, 320, 321, 474
Donor, 14-16, 55-57, 61, 62, 180, 181, 182, 184, 315, 320
Macro-, 14-15, 57, 180
Micro-, 14-15
Recipient, 14-16, 48, 57, 61-62, 66, 180, 181, 184, 314, 315, 474, 476
Systems' theory constructs, general, 57
boundary maintenance, 455, 459-460
causal loops, 33, 37, 42, 43
deviation amplification mechanisms, *see* positive feedback, below
disequilibrium, 460, 465
equilibrium and adaptation, 455, 460-462, 465, 468, 470, 471
external environment, 460
homeostasis, 643
interdependence, 456-458
input-output processes, 331, 462, 471
morphogenetic processes, 461, 467, 468, 470, 471
negative feedback processes, 190, 460
positive feedback processes, 63, 460, 461
Systems, integrative, change of, 642

Tactics of social intervention
advertising, 271, 273, 274, 276, 280, 281, 282, 286
consciousness raising, 180, 316, 476
information campaigns, 271-280, 282-286
marches, mass, 206
media, mass, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 316, 321, 352, 353
broadcast, 268-271, 273-278, 280-283
characteristics, 268-277, 283
as entertainment, 271, 276, 280, 286
print/news, 268-271, 274-276, 282-283
public service announcements, 274, 276, 282, 286
as social innovation, 268-269
mobilization, citizen, 180, 206, 208, 476, 580-581
testimony, 206, 208
Task Panel on Costs and Financing, 416, 437
Technicianship
artificial, 623-625
reductionistic, 622-623
Textbooks
commercial publishing interests, 327, 328
impact on education, 324, 326
Time-series designs, *see* Research designs, quasi-experimental, time series
Theory of groups, 50
Theory of logical types, 50
Top-down strategies/policies, *see* Strategies of social intervention
Transpection, 66

Troubled youth
  etiology of, 367-368
  patterns of delinquency, 368-370, 381
  history, 363-365
  intervention, 370
    incarceration, 370
    early intervention, 370
    community treatment, 372
    counseling, 371
    diversion, 371
    deinstitutionalization, 371
    system processing, 371
    early sanctions, 317, 371
    rehabilitation, 381
    reintegration, 381
  treatment philosophy
    holistic, 381
    "just desserts," 381
Troubled youth, intervention programs
  successes
    Boys' Clubs of America, 373
    Massachusetts Experiment, 372-373
    Philadelphia Plan, 373-374
  failures
    OJJDP Prevention Institute, 375
    DSO, 375
    Diversion, 375-376
    Mobilization for Youth, 376
    The Group Guidance Project, 376
    Assembly Bill 3121—California, 377

Unemployment insurance, 29
Unexamined premises/assumptions/rules/values, 19, 20, 48, 50-52, 59, 61-66
Uniform solutions to particularistic problems and circumstances, 13, 54, 55, 61, 66, 184, 315
Unintended effects, negative, 183, 192, 209, 305, 310, 362, 373, 377
United States of ACORN, 252, 262, 267
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 120, 121, 122, 142, 457, 458, 472, 480, 498, 647, 651
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 194, 211
U.S. Committee on Economic Security, 483, 498
U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Aging, 442, 454
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 511, 514, 520
U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Aging, 449, 454
U.S. Department of Commerce, 643, 651
U.S. Department of Energy, 564, 578, 590
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 491, 498, 500, 501, 502, 503, 520
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 449, 454
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 442, 454, 523, 535, 541
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 501, 504, 520, 521
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 561, 590
U.S. General Accounting Office, 449, 454
U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 423, 439
U.S. Small Business Administration, 509, 513, 521
U.S. Surgeon General, 281, 288
Universal vs. selective services, 446-447, 450
Upward Bound, *see* Compensatory education programs
Urban Reinvestment Task Force, 532, 541

Values, 101, 164, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 270-271, 283, 331, 333-334, 339, 342, 456, 457, 471, 485-489, 635
  affecting community corrections, 386
  context, 438
  dominant societal values and traditions, 20, 52, 54-55, 57, 66
  shifting, 345-349, 355, 359
Victim-blaming, *see* Individualism, premise of
Vocations for Social Change, 248, 259, 267
Voting rights, 195-196, 204
Vouchers, 180

Welfare (see also Income transfer policy and programs)
  policy effects on families, 462-465
  programs, 56
Well-structured problems, 69, 70, 164, 165, 168, 172, 176
Worker-owned firms, 475
Worker participation in decision making, 503, 506, 507, 511, 514, 515, 516
Worker reorganization, 475

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